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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines social science evidence on the nature, prevalence and effects of child 
sexual abuse, as well as the Indian legislative framework and case law regarding child sexual 
abuse. This thesis conducts a synthesis of social science evidence, synthesis of Indian statutes 
and case law regarding child sexual abuse (with special emphasis on the law in the states of 
Goa and Kerala), analysis of the law, and theoretical analysis of principles from the United 
Nations Convention on Child Rights 1989. 
This thesis presents the law current to 30 January 2017. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is a study of the Indian legislative framework for the criminal prosecution of child 
sexual abuse. This thesis focuses on the impact of substantive provisions of criminal law 
which define and punish offences of child sexual abuse upon the legal framework. This thesis 
uses the national and regional1 laws prosecuting child sexual abuse before and after the 
enactment of the Protection of Children against Sexual Offences Act 2012 and examines the 
problems solved and created by these enactments. This thesis looks into trends in reported 
decisions on child sexual abuse in India from a synthesis of cases decided by the Supreme 
Court of India, along with case law from the High Courts of Goa and Kerala. 
The term ‘legislative models’ used in the title refers to statutes and reported case law 
decisions of the Union of India, which includes the decisions of the Supreme Court of India 
and relevant decisions from the High Courts of various states, as well as specific statutes 
and/or reported case law decisions within the jurisdictions of the states of Goa and Kerala. 
 
1.1. CONTEXT: NATIONAL AND STATE LAWS 
 
In India, child sexual abuse laws were largely archaic, even after two decades of acceptance 
of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child 1989 (referred to as UNCRC). 
Punishments for sexual abuse of children were under the general criminal law of the Indian 
Penal Code 1860 (referred to as IPC).The sensitivity of the issue of child sexual abuse and 
the hesitation of victims to report incidents were the reasons for a glaring deficiency of 
reported cases and legislation in India. The absence of national mandatory reporting 
procedures ensured there was no legal obligation to report incidents to the law enforcement 
agencies. 
 
The late 1990s heralded the computer revolution in India. In the early 2000s, police 
operations in the USA and the UK found evidence of uploading of child pornography from 
India. Also, the American media widely reported shameful incidents of various Indian 
professionals being party to sexual abuse of children through electronic means. There was a 
blatant absence of statistics in India regarding the problem of child sexual abuse. It is a social 
                                                        
1 In India, the word ‘state’ is used to denote provincial or regional legislation, as opposed to national or central 
or Union legislation. 
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reality that, unless public-spirited organisations and the media step in, the victim and his/her 
family do not receive support from the community and hence fail to press charges. Such 
absence of strong community support serves to hinder criminal proceedings to prosecute the 
offender at the initial stage itself, as the criminal justice machinery in India does not, by 
itself, play a pro-active role. 
 
It ought to have been the existence of these undocumented factors that propelled social 
activists and non-governmental organisations working in the field of children’s rights to exert 
pressure upon the national government to collect of statistics regarding the extent of abuse, as 
well as for the enactment of stronger laws. 
 
A National Commission for Protection of Child Rights came into existence in 2007, after the 
passing of the Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005. Thereafter, various 
states established their State Commissions for Protection of Child Rights. 
The first official prevalence study and the enactment of national special legislation in 2012 
The Ministry of Women and Child Development of the Government of India conducted an 
official study on abuse of children in 2007 encompassing 13 states in India. This study 
entitled “A Study on Child Abuse: India 2007” found the prevalence of child sexual abuse to 
be high: 53.22% of children have faced one or more forms of sexual abuse and 21.90% of 
child respondents have faced severe forms of sexual abuse. Three evidence groups 
comprising of children on the street, children at work and children in institutional care 
reported the highest incidence of sexual assault. Fifty per cent of abusers were persons known 
to the child or in a position of trust and responsibility. Most children did not report the matter 
to anyone. 
After the publication of this study, the government enacted an exclusive law dealing with 
various types of child sexual abuse. This law, entitled “The Protection of Children against 
Sexual Offences Act 2012” (referred to as POCSO), came into force on 14 November 
2012.This law is a landmark in the history of child rights in India because various sexual 
offences against children which previously did not exist in Indian criminal law were defined 
and criminalised for the first time. 
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The passing of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 
In December 2012, the brutal gang rape of a female student in the Indian capital of Delhi and 
her subsequent death led to mass protests against the Indian government for failing to provide 
adequate security for women. On 22 December 2012, a judicial committee headed by J. S. 
Verma, a former Chief Justice of India, suggested various amendments to the criminal law to 
deal with sexual assault cases. The committee’s report indicated that failures on the part of 
the government and police were the root cause behind crimes against women. Soon after, the 
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 came into force, amending the IPC, Indian Evidence 
Act 1872, the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 on laws related to sexual offences, as well as 
the POCSO. This amendment gave a new definition of the offence of “rape”, as well as 
inserted new sexual offences like harassment and voyeurism. It also inserted a provision into 
the POCSO clarifying which provisions were to prevail in the case of conflict between the 
IPC and POCSO. Currently, statutes prosecuting child sexual abuse in India are the IPC and 
the POCSO. 
Analysis of state legislative frameworks: Goa and Kerala 
This thesis examines legislation and reported judicial decisions in states of Kerala and Goa: 
the former being representative of all other states in the Indian Union, and the latter being 
unique in having a pre-existing regional legislation for offences against children. 
Goa is India's richest state and ranks on top for the best quality of life.2 Goa is situated on the 
western coast of India. The scenic beauty of its beaches has made it a world-famous tourist 
destination. Goa differs from most of the Indian states due to its historical and cultural 
significance as having existed as a former colony of the Portuguese Empire for 450 years 
amidst the British Colony in the peninsula, until India annexed it in 1961. In the early 2000s, 
controversies regarding child sexual abuse racked the state of Goa, which is unique due to its 
peculiar cultural and geographical significance. Goa’s heavy dependence on tourism to 
sustain its economy, coupled with the evidence that foreigners sexually abuse local children 
employed in tourism-based activities, caused the enactment of special legislation called the 
Goa Children’s Act 2003.3 This enactment provided a comprehensive definition of various 
offences against children, as well as laying down the procedure for the enforcement of 
                                                        
2 Finance Commission (2005). Reports of the Finance Commissions of India: First Finance Commission to the 
Twelfth Finance Commission: the complete report. New Delhi, Academic Foundation. 
3 Nair, P.M.,& Sen, S. (2005).Trafficking in Women and Children in India. New Delhi, Orient Longman, pp. 
153-154. 
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children’s rights. This legislation was not confined to protecting children from sexual abuse, 
but included punishment for offences of child labour, corporal punishment, and other 
offences against children. For the first time in India, the 2003 enactment put into operation a 
special Children’s Court for the trial of adult offenders of children. 
The state of Kerala has the highest literacy rate and best primary health services in India. It 
has the highest human development index in India as per the India Human Development 
Report (2011).4 There exists a high civic sense in the state, with the presence of a large 
number of women in various categories of work and government. However, patriarchal 
customs still exist and, despite its high female literacy rate, the rate of domestic violence is 
high. Incidents of child sexual abuse are rampant, but are still largely undocumented. This is 
my home state, and I have selected it based on my ease to access data and knowledge of the 
social situation. 
 
I commenced my research for this thesis in 2011. At this time, the Goa Children’s Act 2003 
was the only legislation in India which had specific provisions addressing sexual abuse 
against children. NGOs and governmental authorities in the state of Kerala were 
collaborating to bring out a separate regional statute to prosecute offences against children in 
Kerala. However, these efforts in Kerala were scrapped when the POCSO became binding 
upon all states, including Kerala and Goa. As at 2017, no distinction lies in the legal 
machinery existing in the regional and national models. However, as Goa has the earliest 
Children’s Court, and ought to have many reported cases on child sexual abuse before the 
High Court of Bombay (Goa Bench), the experience of the Goa model is highly relevant. 
This study examines reported case law on child sexual abuse from the High Courts of Goa 
and Kerala. 
 
Child marriage in India 
The IPC does not prohibit the cultural practice of child marriage. Specific exemption is given 
to rape by a husband of his wife, including a child wife, by section 375 IPC. In 1929, a 
specific enactment called the Child Marriages Restraint Act 1929 took measures to restrain 
child marriage by providing for mild punishments against the adult male marrying the child, 
the parent/guardian of the child whose marriage was performed, and the person who 
                                                        
4 Planning Commission (2011). India Human Development Report, 2011: Towards Social Inclusion. New Delhi: 
Institute of Applied Manpower Research ,Government of India, OUP. 
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performed or directed the ceremony. It was silent about the validity of a child marriage. It 
took another 77 years for the Indian government to prohibit child marriage through a national 
law entitled the Prohibition of Child Marriages Act 2006. Yet, a child marriage is not void 
under this enactment. Such a marriage is voidable, and can be nullified upon attainment of 
the age of majority. The practice of child marriage continues to prevail in certain regions and 
communities in India. Even the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 did not remove the 
exemption for rape of a child wife in section 375 IPC. 
 
1.2. PURPOSE, RESEARCH QUESTIONS, AND METHODOLOGY 
1.2.1.Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the nature and adequacy of Indian laws on child 
sexual abuse. The provisions of the IPC, which was the sole law prosecuting incidents of 
child sexual abuse until November 2012, was highly inadequate in addressing child sexual 
abuse. In 2013, soon after the POCSO came into force, nation-wide protests against the rape 
of a woman in Delhi in December 2012 forced the Government of India to bring about 
amendments to the IPC. The Parliament brought about many changes to the general criminal 
law on sexual offences. Amendment was made to the POCSO in order to clarify which law 
would prevail in cases of conflict between the IPC and the POCSO. Hence, it is necessary to 
study the current law on child sexual abuse in order to find out how adequate it is in defining 
offences and punishments. 
 
1.2.2. Research questions 
My research questions are: 
1. What is the social science evidence about the nature, prevalence and sequelae of child 
sexual abuse generally and in the Indian context? 
2.What are the legislative models for prosecuting child sexual abuse offences in India 
nationally and in the states of Kerala and Goa? 
3. What does a legal analysis of these frameworks reveal about advances and remaining 
problems in these models? 
4. What does a theoretical critique informed by the social science evidence and the UNCRC 
reveal about the adequacy of the law? 
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1.2.3. Methodologies 
 
a. Research Question 1 is social science research and synthesis. It reviews national and 
international literature on the subject, and comments on information gleaned from these 
reviews. 
b. Research Question 2 is doctrinal legal synthesis. It reviews substantive legal provisions 
and case law from reported Supreme Court and High Court decisions. It focuses on decisions 
from the High Courts of Goa and Kerala. Relevant case law on sexual abuse of children has 
been obtained by utilising the search engine of manupatra.com. Pertinent articles from the 
UNCRC have been used in order to lay down the framework for Research Question 4. 
c. Research Question 3 is conventional legal analysis. It analyses six key issues formed from 
the synthesis of provisions and case law on child sexual abuse in India. 
d. Research Question 4 is theoretical analysis informed by the evaluative 
perspective/analytical tools of the social science evidence and relevant articles of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
This thesis comprises of legal doctrinal synthesis and analysis, and social science synthesis 
and theoretical analysis. It does not conduct empirical research. The findings of this thesis are 
important in themselves and indicate the need for further research into other questions, 
including the use of multiple methodologies. 
Conventional citation styles have been used. In the social science and health evidence 
chapters (Chapters 2 and 5), APA style of in-text citations have been followed, while 
conventional legal citation styles have been adopted for legal synthesis and analysis in 
Chapters 3 and 4. 
1.2.4. Scope of this thesis 
 
This research is confined to non-commercial child sexual abuse by adult offenders. Hence 
child prostitution and child sex trafficking are outside the scope of this thesis.  
This thesis is about criminal law, not civil law or family law. It is about substantive criminal 
offences alone, not procedural matters.  Hence matters relating to the law of evidence 
including types of evidence and child witnesses are outside the scope of this thesis. Other 
procedural  matters like the detailed working of special courts dealing with offences 
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regarding children, the qualifications of counsels for prosecution and defence, sentencing 
procedure, the appropriateness of the quantum of punishment awarded in a judicial decision, 
rates of conviction, the treatment of sex offenders and sex offender registration procedure are 
also outside the scope of this thesis. 
This thesis discusses the substantive aspect of the offences of penetrative sexual abuse of 
children, such as rape and carnal intercourse; non-penetrative sexual abuse, such as sexual 
assault, sexual harassment, voyeurism; as well as case law by the Supreme Courts and High 
Courts, especially that of Goa and Kerala. The age for sexual consent is discussed in the 
context of the exemption given for rape of a child wife in section 375 IPC. Most studies on 
sexual offences in India are from a women’s rights perspective, and not from a child’s rights 
perspective. This thesis has been written based on a child’s rights perspective, similar to that 
of the UNCRC. 
This thesis does not conduct an in-depth study of the sentencing trends in reported case laws. 
It does not examine reported case law on women above the age of 18 years. It confines itself 
to case law regarding children below the age of 18.The words “woman” and “female” are 
used in this thesis to include a “girl” who is a female child, and the words “man” and “male” 
include a “boy” who is a male child.5 
In various sexual crimes against children, the IPC and the POCSO overlap. The Criminal 
Law (Amendment) Act 2013 clarified such overlap through amendment of sections 42 and 
insertion of section 42A of the POCSO. This thesis analyses conflicting situations in 
provisions of Indian laws on child sexual abuse, which arise as a result of this amendment. 
 
Despite staggering data about the incidence and prevalence of child sexual abuse in India, 
major studies on its effects have not been carried out. This thesis draws data from various 
studies around the world, as well as the few small studies that have been done in India. 
This study is the first of its type in India, and the findings from its comprehensive legal 
synthesis and analysis will make a substantial contribution to knowledge and understanding 
in this complex, sensitive and fast-developing topic. 
                                                        
5 Section 10, IPC. “Man”, “Woman”.—The word “man” denotes a male human being of any age; the word 
“woman” denotes a female human being of any age. 
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1.3. LITERATURE REVIEW, GAPS IN SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 
AND ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE 
1.3.1. Literature Review 
This review of literature sets the context for this study. It situates this thesis in several 
relevant bodies of literature: (a) social science evidence about the nature and prevalence of 
child sexual abuse and health evidence about the effects of child sexual abuse; (b) Indian 
criminal law for child sexual abuse; (c) the Kerala and Goa models of legislation and case 
law regarding prosecution of adult sexual offenders of children; and (d) relevant provisions of 
the UNCRC. 
(A) Social science evidence: The nature, prevalence and effects of child sexual abuse 
Nature of child sexual abuse 
This thesis refers to the World Health Organization and Council of Europe definitions of 
child sexual abuse, along with the definition put forth by India’s official report on child 
sexual abuse entitled “A Study on Child Abuse: India 2007”. Systemic reviews of literature 
and meta-analyses of statistics of child sexual abuse are referred to firstly based on gender. 
Studies by Cawson, Wattam, & Kelly (2000);Dinwiddie, Andrews, Gould,& Corry 
(2000);Andrews, Gould, & Corry(2002); Dunne, Purdie, Cook, Boyle, & Najman (2003); 
Putnam (2003); May-Chahall & Cawson (2005); Najman, Dunne, Purdie, Boyle, & Coxeter 
(2005); Davidson (2008); Pereda, Guilera, Forns, & Gomez-Benito (2009); Lalor & 
McElvaney (2010);Radford, Corral, Bradley, Fisher, Bassett, Howat, & Collishaw (2011); 
Stoltenborgh, van IJzendoorn, Euser, & Bakermans-Kranenburg (2011); Barth, Bermetz, 
Heim, Trelle, & Tonia (2013); Finkelhor (2014); and Mills, Kisely, Alati, Strathearn, & 
Najman (2016) have been cited. Secondly, these studies are referred to depending on the 
effect of economic development of a country; namely, high income, middle income and low 
income countries based upon prevalence statistics. Studies by Stoltenborgh, van IJzendoorn, 
Euser, & Bakermans-Kranenburg (2011); Barth, Bermetz, Heim, Trelle, & Tonia (2013); and 
Veenema, Thornton, & Corley (2015) have been cited. Thirdly, studies on India by RAHI 
(1998), Tulir (2006),Deb & Walsh (2012), the Ministry of Women and Child Development 
report titled “A Study on Child Abuse: India 2007”(2007), and published yearly records of 
the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) have been referred to. 
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Difficulties exist with definitions of what would constitute “sexually abusive activities” due 
to differences in the age gap of offender and victim. Social scientists like Finkelhor (2009), 
Haugaard (2000), and Lalor & McElvaney (2010) have classified these definitional 
difficulties as arising within the following domains: (1) lack of uniformity regarding age of 
the end of childhood; (2) lack of whether non-contact experiences can be included or 
excluded from the definition of child sexual abuse; (3) age differences regarding consensual 
sexual relationships between minors; and (4) contextual considerations to decide whether a 
certain behaviour is abusive. There is a vacuum in definitional discussions on the 
developmental perspective of children and their sexuality, with considerable confusion about 
what constitutes “normal” sexual behaviour in children and adolescents. This is partly 
because of rapidly changing societal norms about children and sex and partly because of the 
ethical constraints of undertaking empirical research into childhood sexuality (Vizard, 2006). 
This insight is important in dealing with a comprehensive definition of child sexual abuse in 
India. 
Vagueness exists regarding the line to be drawn between abuse and “experimentation” in 
sexual activity between children and young people (Cashmore & Shackel, 2014). The effect 
of such vagueness while formulating child sexual abuse legislation leads to difficulties in 
prosecution of offenders, as the active participation of victims is clear from the fact of the 
case. This is particularly relevant in India, as the vagueness of the POCSO  lies in the lack of 
contextual considerations in deciding whether a particular behaviour is sexually abusive or 
not. Presently the legislation criminalises consensual sexual relationships between minors and 
between minors and adults without a significant age difference, even in the absence of the 
element of coercion. 
Health effects 
Effects of abuse have been classified as short term and long term (Wyatt & Powell, 1988). 
Short-term effects include depression, suicide, sexual promiscuity, sexual perpetration, and 
academic underachievement (Paolucci, Genuis, & Violato, 2001). The long-term impact of 
child sexual abuse may involve depression, low self-esteem, anger, anxiety, obsessions and 
compulsions, sexual dysfunctions, self-mutilation, suicidality, dissociation, substance abuse 
problems, relationship problems, multiple psychiatric disorders, etc (Chen, Murad, Paras, 
Colbenson, Sattler, Goranson, Elamin, Deime, Shinozaki, Prokop, & Zirakzadeh, 2010). 
More serious consequences are caused by certain aspects of the abuse (sexual abuse within 
23 
 
the family, ongoing and multiple episodes, the use of force, methods used to gain child 
secrecy, and multiple perpetrators), legal system involvement (a case that results in acquittal), 
and lack of maternal support and maternal use of avoidant coping mechanisms (Corcoran & 
Pillai, 2008). Adverse physical and mental health effects often continue through adult life 
(Spataro, Mullen, Burgess, Wells, & Moss, 2004) and some victims become offenders (Salter 
McMillan, Richards, Talbot, Hodges, Bentovim, Hastings, Stevenson, Skuse, 2003). 
 
Views of children are largely excluded from the experiences of victims in developing 
countries. Lack of funding is partly to blame (Dunne, Purdie, Cook, Boyle, & Najman, 2006), 
and there exists an unwillingness on the part of governments to formally record and 
document the incidence and nature of child abuse (Davidson, 2008). Studies conducted by 
Pagare (2003), Deb & Sen ((2005), Chatterjee, Chakraborty, Srivastava,& Deb (2006), 
Priyabadini (2007), Deb & Walsh (2012), Sahay (2010), Krishnakumar, Satheesan, Geeta, & 
Sureshkumar (2014), Carson, Foster & Tripathi (2013),and Carson, Foster & Chowdhury 
(2014) in India indicate high levels of trauma and post-traumatic stress among sexually 
abused children. 
Lack of support or condemnation and/or alienation of the victim by community service 
providers is a result of negative, judgmental attitudes directed towards the victim. This 
secondary victimization or re-traumatization is usually experienced by victims of sexual 
assault, abuse, or rape. The types of secondary victimization include victim blaming and 
inappropriate behaviour or language by police, prosecutors, judges and doctors with access to 
the victim post-assault (Williams, 1984; Campbell & Raja, 1999).Exposure to the legal 
system also causes numerous mental health conflicts in child victims, as shown in studies by 
Connon, Crooks, Carr, Dooley, & Guerin (2011) and Mudaly & Goddard (2006). A common 
occurrence in an Indian courtroom is the scenario where lawyers repeatedly interrogate a 
child to narrate violent instances such as sexual assault, not realising the damaging effect 
such a legal methodology would have on a child (Sharma, 2005).Such factors aid non-
disclosure of sexual crimes. The literature on social science and health evidence are detailed 
in Chapter 2. 
(B) Indian substantive criminal law for child sexual abuse 
Generally, while there is a large body of criminal law about child sexual abuse, there is little 
discussion of it in research. Some authors have analysed several aspects of the law. 
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Adenwalla (2000) stated that the legal system and procedure in India allow child sexual 
abusers to escape on technical grounds, leaving the child victim to believe that he/she is at 
fault. Provisions in the IPC regarding rape, statutory rape, sexual abuse of a boy child, 
attempt to rape and other provisions of the IPC on child sexual abuse/exploitation were 
mentioned, along with judicial decisions, regarding the Indian law on child sexual abuse. 
Adenwalla (2000) comments that despite the Supreme Court’s of India’s recommendation to 
the Law Commission to make comprehensive recommendations regarding amending the law 
and procedure to cover child sexual abuse cases, the Law Commission has not risen to the 
task. Law ought to encourage transparency and accountability in order to bring to light child 
abuse within the family and institutions, and also act as a deterrent.6 
 
Jaising (2005) described the law on sexual violence in order to outline the legal responses to 
non-consensual sexual experiences of young persons in India. Jaising described the various 
types of violence, and states that the main limitation of existing laws on rape under section 
375 IPC and “unnatural offences” under section 377 IPC are that they are confined to 
penetrative abuse of penile-vaginal nature.7 The courts hesitate to adopt any interpretation of 
the word “penetration” which does not involve penile-vaginal intercourse. Other forms of 
sexual violence are outraging the modesty of women, incest, exploitation in custody homes 
etc. Male children are excluded from its purview. The IPC does not define and punish the 
crime of incest. Even though India has signed and ratified the Convention on the Elimination 
of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women 1979 which makes registration of marriages 
compulsory, the Indian government has declared its inability to comply with this requirement. 
The Child Marriage Restraint Act 1929 is unable to redress the problem of child marriage. 
Jaising (2005) identified the problem of conviction of a minor for rape even if he has 
consensual sex with a girl below the age of 16. This is stated to be a particular area of 
concern, especially when teenage consensual sex is increasing. 
Jaising (2005) commented on the rules of procedure for dealing with such cases. She stated 
that Indian law does not adequately recognise the issue of non-consensual sexual experiences 
of young persons or the special vulnerability that adolescents face by virtue of their age in 
situations of sexual coercion. It suggests that a simultaneous process of legislative and 
                                                        
6 Adenwalla, M. (2000). Child Sexual Abuse and the Law. India Centre for Human Rights and the Law, 
Mumbai. 
7 These provisions shall be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
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judicial reform is necessary in order to incorporate this recognition in the laws and judicial 
processes in India. Jaising (2005) suggested the adoption of a comprehensive definition and 
understanding of both “sexual violence” and “coercion” based on the particular experiences 
of adolescent communities and on developments in international and national law, while 
taking into consideration the different fiduciary and non-fiduciary relationships that 
adolescents experience which involve coercion. Jaising (2005) stated that any process of 
reform must emphasize sensitive and effective procedures that recognise the reality of 
adolescents’ vulnerability. It must be ensured that this vulnerability is not aggravated in 
courts of law.8 
Kannabiran (2009) analysed the law on sexual assault in the IPC from a woman’s context 
through case studies. It takes a closer look at the language that the courts have adopted in 
speaking about rape. She stated that throughout the 1870s there were sporadic reports about 
the battery and deaths of resistant child-wives by irate adult husbands who got handed light 
sentences, if they were incarcerated at all. She cited the historical case of Phulmoni, an 11-
year-old girl who had not yet come of age, who died in 1890 after her 35-year-old husband 
raped her.9 Kannabiran (2009) concluded that the language used by courts in India depicts the 
shocking proximity that these discursive frameworks have with the patriarchal informal 
justice systems that construct women as property to be possessed or commoditised.10 
Raha & Giliyal (2013) studied the implication of the POCSO upon the problem of child 
marriages, against the backdrop of the IPC (as amended by the Criminal Law (Amendment) 
Act 2016) and the Prohibition of Child Marriages Act 2005. They concluded that the only 
legal recourse for children below the age of 18, who enter into consensual sexual relations, in 
order to evade a minimum term of 10 years rigorous imprisonment under the 2012 
legislation, is to get married.11 
Bajpai (2006) examined constitutional provisions, statutory provisions and case law 
regarding child rights in India, as well as international and regional conventions and 
standards. Here, the right to protection against sexual abuse and exploitation was examined in 
                                                        
8 Jaising I. (2005). The vulnerability of adolescence: Legal responses to non-consensual sexual experiences of 
young persons in India. Jeejeebhoy S.J., Shah I., & Thapa S. (Eds.). Young People in Developing Countries. 
London: Zed Books Ltd, pp.215-226. 
9 Queen-Empress v. Hurree Mohun Mythee (1891) ILR 18 Cal 49 
10Kannabiran, K. (2009). Sexual assault and the Law. K. Kannabiran, & R. Singh, (Eds.), Challenging the 
Rule(s) of Law: Colonialism, Criminology and Human Rights in India., New Delhi: SAGE, pp. 78-118. 
11Raha, S., Giliyal, A. (2013). Child Marriage and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. 
CCL-NLSIU. https://www.nls.ac.in/ccl/justicetochildren/poscoact.pdf. 
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detail in the context of the National Crime Records Bureau statistics and other social science 
evidence studies. The Juvenile Justice Act, the IPC, the Child Marriage Restraint Act, the age 
of marriage under Hindu, Muslim, Christian and Parsi personal laws, as well as civil marriage 
statutes, the validity of child marriages under personal and civil laws, laws regarding child 
trafficking and pornography case law, reforms to the IPC, the Code of Criminal Procedure 
1973 and the Indian Evidence Act 1872 were commented on. Importantly, Bajpai (2006) 
stated that child marriage is void under the civil statutes and Parsi civil law, but valid under 
Hindu, Muslim and Christian personal laws. Even though the facilitators of the child 
marriage can be punished under the law, the marriage itself remains valid. If the law were to 
render child marriages as void, the sufferer would be the bride, as the stigma of already 
having been married would pursue her and she would not receive maintenance, due to the 
illegality of the marriage. Bajpai (2006) noted that women are not punished under the Child 
Marriage Restraint Act 1929, perhaps because society presumes that the woman has little say 
in finalising and performing marriages, and also because the main objective of the Act was 
preventive rather than punitive. Bajpai (2006) made the following statement: 
Under the current laws, if a child is sexually abused, a case can be filed for statutory rape or ‘outraging 
the modesty of the woman’ in the case of girls and for ‘unnatural sexual offence’ in the case of boys. 
The ordinary criminal laws are totally inadequate to protect the children who are victims of sexual 
abuse. These legislations do not include the common forms of child sexual abuse, nor their impact on 
the children.12 
Agnes (2013), in her article against raising the age of consent from 16 to 18 years,  
highlighted the sociological trend that the age of marriage for females increases only when 
the standard of living is raised, and when public spaces are safe for them to pursue their 
education.13 Agnes (2013) pointed out that though there has been a consistent demand from 
urban, middle-class legal scholars and social activists to declare child marriages void, there is 
a legislative reluctance to give in to this even after the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 
2006. This is because of the plurality of cultures and socio-economic backgrounds in the 
Indian population. The contemporary concern over child marriage needs to be located within 
socio-economic factors such as extreme poverty among the urban and rural poor, lack of 
access to education for girls, and fear of rape and sexual abuse. Much more than the elite and 
                                                        
12Bajpai, A. (2006). Right to Protection Against Sexual Abuse and Exploitation. Child Rights in India: Law, 
Policy, and Practice. Delhi: OUP, pp. 208-278 at p. 225. 
13 Agnes (2013) cited the instance of how a girl child being raped when returning from school in rural Karnataka 
in January 2013 led to around 400 girls being denied access to education because their parents were fearful of 
their security. She stated that such girls will soon be married off, despite a law in place that stipulates the 
minimum age for marriage is 18. 
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middle classes, it is the backward castes, the Dalits and Muslims who are burdened with 
these concerns. Agnes (2013) pointed to the inability of the law in facilitating interventions at 
the community level to curb child marriages arranged by natal families. There is a need for 
community-level sensitisation, greater security for girls in public spaces, and better resources 
for education of girls in poverty-stricken villages and urban slums. Agnes (2013) underlined 
that the campaign for stringent laws has only strengthened patriarchal power and weakened 
the negotiating power of young girls contracting marriages of choice.14 
Moirangthem, Kumar & Math (2015) identify challenges in the law regarding consented 
sexual activity between adolescents and an adult, child marriage, consent for medical 
examination, medical examination when a female doctor is absent, treatment cost, training of 
medical personnel, the role of a mental health professional, and mandatory reporting. They 
proposed that any consensual sexual act that may constitute penetrative sexual assault should 
not be an offence when it is between two consenting adolescents, otherwise both the 
adolescents will be charged under the POCSO. Also, child marriage is illegal under the 
POCSO . In India, even though secular law prohibits child marriage, certain personal laws 
continue to sanction it, thus complicating matters.15 
Bajpai (2015) examined child rights law from various perspectives: the definition of a child, 
children in the juvenile system, children in conflict with law, child victims of abuse and 
crime, physical abuse of children, sexual abuse of children, child pornography, economic 
exploitation of children, etc. The history of the law is traced: until 2012, there was no 
comprehensive law on child sexual abuse. The IPC does not recognize child abuse. Only rape 
and sodomy could lead to criminal conviction. Anything other than rape as defined by the law 
amounts to “outraging the modesty”. After several years of campaigning for a separate law 
on child sexual abuse, the POCSO Bill was passed in 2012. Bajpai (2015) stated five 
“important” aspects of the new law: (1) it defines child sexual abuse as a gender-neutral 
crime; (2) it defines acts that constitute child sexual abuse comprehensively by including 
penetrative, non-penetrative, and non-touch forms of abuse; (3) it grades the quantum of 
punishment on the basis of regular and aggravated offences that take into account custodial 
forms of child sexual abuse; (4) it sets up a detailed procedural mechanism, including the 
establishment of special courts with child-friendly methods of recording evidence and 
                                                        
14 Agnes, F. (2013). Controversy over Age of Consent. Economic and Political Weekly, 48(29), 10-13. 
http://www.epw.in/journal/2013/29/commentary/controversy-over-age-consent.html. 
15Moirangthem, S., Kumar, N.C., Math, S.B. (2015). Child sexual abuse: Issues & concerns. Indian J Med Res 
142(July) pp.1-3. 
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conducting trials; (5) it has provisions enabling reporting of cases by a child and squarely 
imposes burden of proof on the accused. Bajpai (2015) made two recommendations regarding 
reforms to POCSO. Firstly, the law must include support services to child victims, since 
many child sexual abuse cases are not reported to the police. Secondly, the fact that the age of 
sexual consent is raised to 18 years is a matter of concern, as this provision of criminalizing 
consensual sexual behaviour may be misused by the police or even parents in some cases. 
Bajpai (2015) quoted the statement of Kamini Lau, Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi in April 
2015, that when the age gap between youngsters in love who are on the verge of attaining 
majority is within acceptable limits and does not reflect an exploitative coercive situation, 
then the legal system cannot be used to punish them and courts cannot ruin their lives by 
taking a hyper-technical view.16 
A study by Raha (2016) examined 667 judgments passed by 20 judges from 1 January 2013 
to 30 September 2015 from the Delhi District Courts. It found that the number of cases 
involving boys is negligible, compared to girls. Most cases involved victims between the age 
of 12 to 18 years, and children below 5years of age constituted only 7% of the total victims. 
Interestingly, in none of the cases in which the prosecutrix admitted to a romantic 
relationship was the voluntary nature of the relationship or the age gap between them 
scrutinized by the court. 
Pathak (2016) critiqued the idea of gender-specificity in Indian rape law on the grounds that 
it reinforces a binary notion of gender, and results in gross under-inclusion. Hence he 
advocated a human-rights based approach in defining the offence of rape, and negates the 
role of gender in identifying the victims and perpetrators of an act of rape. He developed an 
argument regarding the state’s obligation of non-discrimination on the basis of sex, the 
recognition of transgender rights, and examines the argument against gender-neutrality.17 
Satish (2017) studied all rape cases decided by the High Courts and the Supreme Court of 
India between 1984 and 2009 in order to analyse the rape sentencing regime. Myths and 
stereotypes on rape that influence sentencing were identified as follows: 
(1) rape of a virgin is considered to be more serious than rape of a woman with previous 
sexual experience 
                                                        
16Bajpai, A. (2015). Achievements and Challenges in Legal Protection for Child Rights. In Shiva Kumar, A. K., 
Rustagi, P. & Subrahmanian, R. India's Children: Essays on Social Policy., Delhi: OUP, pp. 136-167. 
17Pathak, H. (2016).Beyond the Binary: rethinking Gender Neutrality in Indian Rape Law. Asian Journal of 
Comparative Law, 11:367-397. 
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(2) the young age of the accused is relevant in reduction of sentence 
(3) the absence of injuries on the body of the victim is a mitigating factor 
(4) the demeanour of the victim as a mitigating factor-reduced sentence for the defendant on 
the ground that the rape was not brutal 
(5) past sexual history influence sentencing 
(6) rape by an acquaintance is less traumatic than rape by a stranger, with lesser punishment 
given to the acquaintance rapist 
(7) prior sexual relationship between the defendant and victim lessened the average sentence. 
The study by Satish (2017) showed that despite law reform, myths and stereotypes about 
rapists and rape victims that used to be embedded in rape law have merely shifted from the 
charging and trial stages to the sentencing stage, leading to unwarranted disparity.18 This 
study is inclusive of rape of women of all ages, and is not confined to rape of female children. 
It is clear from this review of existing literature that while these authors have explored some 
aspects of the law, there are numerous and substantial gaps in research that this thesis will 
help to address. 
Coverage of Indian law 
Chapter 3 details the comprehensive literature review and analysis of the IPC, the POCSO, 
and the Goa Children’s Act 2003. The following provisions of these laws are explained in 
Chapter 3: 
1. The following sections of the IPC are detailed in this chapter: Sections 354 (assault or 
criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty), 354A (sexual harassment and 
punishment for sexual harassment), 354B (assault or use of criminal force to a woman with 
intent to disrobe), 354C (voyeurism), 354D (stalking), 375 (rape), 376 (punishment for rape), 
376A (punishment for causing death or resulting in persistent vegetative state of victim), 
376B (sexual intercourse by husband upon his wife during separation), 376C (punishment for 
sexual intercourse by person in authority), 376D (punishment for gang rape), 376E 
(punishment for repeat offenders), 377 (unnatural offences), 509 (word, gesture or act 
intended to insult the modesty of a woman) and 511 (punishment for attempting to commit 
offences punishable with imprisonment for life or other imprisonment). These offences, along 
                                                        
18Satish, M. (2017). Discretion, Discrimination and the Rule of Law- Reforming Rape Sentencing in India. 
Delhi: Cambridge University Press. 
30 
 
with corresponding judicial decisions both before and after the Criminal Law (Amendment) 
Act of 2013, are important to the law on child sexual abuse. Law Commission reports as well 
as committee reports recommending changes in these provisions are referred to here. 
2. The following sections of the POCSO  are cited: sections 3and 4 (penetrative sexual assault 
and punishment), sections 5 and 6 (aggravated penetrative sexual assault and punishment), 
sections 7 and 8 (sexual assault and punishment), sections 9 and 10 (aggravated sexual 
assault and punishment), sections 11 and 12 (sexual harassment and punishment), sections 13 
and 14 (using a child for pornographic purposes and punishment), section 5 (punishment for 
storage of pornographic material involving child), sections 16 and 17(abetment of an offence 
and punishment), section 18 (punishment for attempt to commit an offence), section 42 
(alternate punishment), section 42A (act not in derogation of any other law). 
3. The Goa Children’s Act 2003 are detailed in Chapter 3: section 2(x) (definition of  the term 
“sexual offence”), Section 2(y) (definition of the term “sexual offences” comprising of (i) 
grave sexual assault (ii) sexual assault (iii) incest),and section 8(2) (punishment for sexual 
offences). Case law decided by the High Courts of Goa and Kerala are compiled here. 
Comparisons are drawn in the form of a chart to examine the differences and similarities 
between the IPC, the POCSO, the Goa Children’s Act 2003 and the Kerala situation with 
regard to the IPC and POCSO . 
Six key issues are identified from this detailed review of the law: 
a) Has the nature and scope of the sexual offences in the POCSO  made positive advances in 
responding to child sexual abuse? 
b) Has the nature and scope of the amended offence of rape in the IPC made positive 
advances in responding to child sexual abuse? 
c)  Does the current interpretation of the offence of carnal intercourse in the IPC offer 
sufficient protection against child sexual abuse? 
d) Is the current criminalisation of abusive and non-abusive sexual activity of children below 
the age of 18 a positive advance in responding to child sexual abuse? 
e) Does the present law on sexual assault in the IPC make positive advances in responding to 
child sexual abuse? 
f) Does the statutory exclusion of child-wife rape from the scope of the amended offence of 
rape in the IPC construe a positive advance in responding to child sexual abuse? 
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These issues are analysed further from legal, social science and theoretical perspectives. In 
Chapter 4, the POCSO is compared with the IPC. 
 
4. Articles 1, 12, 19 and 34 of the UNCRC are discussed in Chapter 3. As stated earlier, six 
problematic areas are identified from the legal synthesis of case law and legislation on child 
sexual, which are analysed using legal analysis tools in Chapter 4. From these six issues, four 
issues are further distilled to be theoretically analysed in Chapter 5, using the social science 
and health evidence discussed in Chapter 2, as well as the five relevant provisions of the 
UNCRC in Chapter 3. 
 
The four key issues for theoretical analysis are: 
a) The nature and scope of the provisions on sexual offences in the POCSO from a child 
rights’ perspective 
b) The gap in the IPC regarding sexual offences against children created by the nature and 
scope of the amended offence of rape in sections 375 and 376 IPC and the present 
interpretation of the offence of carnal intercourse in section 377 IPC 
c) The current criminalisation of all sexual activity (both abusive and non-abusive) of 
children below the age of 18 
d) The statutory exclusion of child-wife rape from the scope of the amended offence of rape 
in the IPC. 
1.3.2. Gaps in scientific knowledge 
There have been very few socio-legal studies about the nature and sequelae of child sexual 
abuse in the Indian context. Prevalence studies on a national level have not been conducted 
since the first official study report on child abuse was published in 2007. While certain small 
sample studies exist, there is a glaring deficit regarding major studies on a scale which could 
clearly depict the connection between sexual abuse of a child and its ill effects on the 
physical and mental health of a child victim. 
Even more significantly for the purpose of this thesis, there is an absence of substantive 
analysis of the law before and after the recent major changes brought about by the POCSO. 
There is resultant absence of research analysing Indian laws on child sexual abuse using the 
context of social science evidence from India. The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, 
which amended sections 42 and 42A of the POCSO, has created confusion regarding which 
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law prevails for POCSO offences that overlap with the IPC. There has not been sufficient 
clarification from the courts regarding overlapping provisions. This is a major gap in the 
existing level of knowledge regarding the applicability of POCSO over the IPC, especially in 
the context of prosecution of the offence of sexual intercourse with a female below the age of 
18 with her husband in the context of the validity of child marriages under the Prohibition of 
Child Marriages Act 2006 and the corresponding absence of the offence of marital rape in the 
IPC. 
In addition to this, most existing literature in India analyses rape and other sexual offences 
from a women’s rights perspective. Analysis of such legal provisions from a child rights’ 
perspective has not been given due consideration. No meaningful studies have been published 
regarding cases of child sexual abuse in Goa or Kerala, despite the fact that Goa has the 
oldest Children’s Court in India. Bajpai (2006, 2015) examines child rights laws from various 
perspectives; however, the overlap between the IPC and POCSO has not been clearly 
specified. Pathak (2016) examines the issue of gender-neutrality within the definition of rape 
in section 375 IPC. This thesis examines six problematic issues within the laws on child 
sexual abuse, which is inclusive of the definition of rape in section 375 IPC. Critiques of 
problematic areas in the Indian law on child sexual offences using the theoretical framework 
of social science evidence and UNCRC provisions are also absent. 
Empirical analysis of the nature and effects of child sexual abuse from reported case law in 
India and empirical studies of sentencing trends in child sexual abuse cases are further gaps 
in scientific knowledge that can be examined, but are outside the scope of this thesis.  
1.3.3. Original contributions to knowledge 
Informed by the gaps in the research and guided by my four research questions, this thesis 
makes four major contributions to knowledge. 
 
1. It synthesises social science evidence about the nature, prevalence and sequelae of 
child sexual abuse generally and in the Indian context. 
This thesis examines the social science evidence about child sexual abuse, and its nature and 
effects upon the health of victims. Small-sample prevalence studies on child sexual abuse in 
India point to the fact that sexual abuse of children occurs irrespective of differences in 
sexual abuse on the basis of gender and race, religion, caste and class. Studies on the effects 
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of child sexual abuse on physical and mental health, as well as lack of support from the legal 
system have been cited in this thesis. This thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge 
by synthesising Indian and international literature on the topic, which is used as a contextual 
base for the entire thesis, and provides a thorough exposition of evidence of child sexual 
abuse in the Indian context. Such socio-legal synthesis aims to foster future outcomes of 
legislative policy changes by developing new methodologies for health and legal support in 
India. 
 
2. It synthesises the legislative models of statutory provisions and case law, both before 
and after the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, regarding prosecuting child sexual 
abuse offences in India nationally, and in the states of Kerala and Goa. 
This thesis has been written from a child rights’ perspective, as embodied in the UNCRC. 
Existing literature on sexual offences is largely based upon a women’s rights perspective. 
This is a novel contribution to existing literature on sexual offences in India. 
 
The legal synthesis in Chapter 3 is a novel and comprehensive coverage of the development 
of legislative models from pre-2012 to post-2012 POCSO and pre-2013 to post-2013 
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013. Chapter 3 compares the various legislations on child 
sexual abuse in India, and how these laws would impact the states of Kerala and Goa; the 
former state representing all other states in the Indian Union, and the latter state being unique 
in having a pre-existing special regional legislation for offences against children. Such 
comparison is an original contribution to knowledge, especially after the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act 2013. This thesis also examines case law on child sexual abuse decided by 
the High Courts of Kerala and Goa, which is also original contribution to knowledge. 
The present law on child sexual abuse comprises of the POCSO and the IPC, as amended by 
the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013. This thesis identifies six issues from an analytical 
perspective as a result of the synthesis of these laws in Chapter 3. 
 
3. It performs a legal analysis of legal frameworks, both before and after the Criminal 
Law (Amendment Act) 2013, in order to reveal advances and remaining problems in 
these models. 
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These six issues are analysed in Chapter 4, using statutory and case analysis for consistency, 
coherence and correctness with policy and fundamental legislative principles. Lord 
Bingham’s principles regarding the rule of law framework are used as a reference to 
determine how closely the statutes on child sexual abuse comply with the rule of law 
principles enshrined in the constitutions of modern governments. Lord Bingham (2007) stated 
that the core of the existing principle of rule of law is that all persons and authorities within 
the state, whether public or private, should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws 
publicly and prospectively promulgated and publicly administered in the courts.19 He broke 
down the scope of the existing principle by identifying eight sub-rules. Of these eight sub-
rules, six have been identified as relevant to the analysis of this thesis in Chapter 4. These six 
sub-rules are as follows: 
First, the law must be accessible and, so far as possible, intelligible, clear and predictable.20 
Secondly, questions of legal right and liability should ordinarily be resolved by application of 
the law and not the exercise of discretion.21 Thirdly, the laws of the land should apply equally 
to all, save to the extent that objective differences justify differentiation.22 Fourthly, the law 
must afford adequate protection of fundamental human rights.23Fifthly, adjudicative 
procedures provided by the state should be fair.24Sixthly, the existing principle of the rule of 
law requires compliance by the state with its obligations in international law.25 
These six issues are legally analysed using conventional doctrinal methods, which include: 
(i) a comparison of substantive provisions of the POCSO  against the amended 
sections 42 and 42A in order to find out whether the IPC would prevail 
(ii) examination of the consistency, coherence and correctness of statutory provisions 
and case law from a framework of governmental policy guidelines as well as 
fundamental legislative principles characteristic of a rule of law society, such as 
whether the provisions offer adequate protection of a class of persons, or whether 
undue judicial discretion is conferred by statute etc. 
These are original contributions to the knowledge of child sexual abuse law in India. 
 
                                                        
19 Bingham, Lord (2007). The Rule of Law. The Cambridge Law Journal, 66(1), 67–85 at 69 
20Ibid. 
21Id at 72. 
22Id at 73. 
23Id at 75. 
24Id at 80. 
25Id at 81. 
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4. It performs a theoretical critique informed by social science evidence and the UNCRC 
about the adequacy of the law. 
Of the six issues identified for conventional legal analysis, four issues are taken for further 
theoretical analysis, informed by 
(i) the evaluative perspective and analytical tools of the social science evidence 
(ii) provisions of the UNCRC which have been identified as relevant to this thesis. 
This theoretical analysis is a novel contribution to knowledge in this area. 
1.4. Sequencing of Chapters 
Chapter 1 introduces the thesis, outlining the research questions and original contributions to 
knowledge. Chapter 2 describes the social science evidence on the nature and effects of child 
sexual abuse from international studies as well as from studies in India. Chapter 3 synthesises 
national legislation and Supreme Court case law on child sexual abuse along with reported 
case law from the High Court of Kerala, as well as the Goa Children’s Act 2003 and reported 
case law from the High Court of Goa. This chapter concludes by identifying six key issues 
for conventional legal analysis in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 is a theoretical analysis of four key 
issues from the perspectives of social science evidence and child rights under the UNCRC. 
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis. 
  
36 
 
CHAPTER 2: SYNTHESIS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 
EVIDENCE OF THE NATURE, PREVALENCE AND 
EFFECTS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 
This chapter is divided into three major parts. The first part discusses the nature of child 
sexual abuse: its definitions, risk factors, and socio-cultural contexts, with emphasis on 
Indian studies on the same. The second part discusses prevalence issues: problems faced by 
researchers in accessing data, reasons for non-reporting, structural barriers to disclosure, and 
prevalence studies based on gender statistics and economic development statistics. Incidence 
and prevalence data on India have been compiled here. The third part discusses the effects of 
child sexual abuse and the Indian legal system on the health of the victim. 
The Report by the Ministry of Women and Child Development in 2007 on Child Abuse 
(referred to as the 2007 MWCD Report) will be examined in detail to provide the Indian 
context. The examination of the socio-psychological context that accompanies child sexual 
abuse provides scientific evidence of the reasons why it is important there be a strong legal 
framework to punish, respond to and prevent child sexual abuse. The dearth of scientific 
studies in this area in India calls for an examination of studies conducted in other countries. 
For this purpose, this chapter contains a review of international social science literature about 
the nature, prevalence and effects of child sexual abuse. This sets an overall context for the 
legal synthesis and analysis in Chapters 2 and 3, and provides the basis for the theoretical 
analysis conducted in Chapter 4. 
2.A. THE NATURE OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 
 
In India, child sexual abuse has been an age-old problem. Female child prostitution in the 
name of customary religious practices has existed from historical times (Ditmore, 2006). 
Child marriages still exist under the protection of ethnic customs (UNICEF, 2009). UNICEF 
has stated that child marriage "represents perhaps the most prevalent form of sexual abuse 
and exploitation of girls"(UNICEF, 2006). The subject of child sexual abuse is still taboo in 
India. Sex and sexuality are not regarded as matters for discussion with young people by the 
largely traditional conservative family and community structure in most parts of the country. 
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Hence, children do not even realise they are being abused. A deep-seated fear has always 
moved Indian families to keep their girls and their virginity safe and many kinds of social and 
cultural practices have been built ensuring this. It is said that there is a “conspiracy of 
silence” around child sexual abuse. However, this fear does not generally extend to boys 
(Kakkar, L., Varadan, S., & Kumar, P., 2007). The resultant effect is that the various forms of 
sexual abuse do not get reported. 
 
Reflecting the nascent state of public and official awareness of child sexual abuse, an official 
study on child abuse was first conducted on the national level by the Ministry of Women and 
Child Development (MWCD) in 2007, “A Study on Child Abuse: India 2007”. 26 This Report 
defined the term “sexual abuse” with reference to children and explained nine types of sexual 
abuse: four severe forms and five other forms of sexual abuse (MWCD, 2007). 
The first part of Chapter 2 discusses the nature of child sexual abuse – its definitions, risk 
factors, and socio-cultural contexts – with emphasis on Indian studies on the same. 
 
2.A.1. Definitions of child sexual abuse 
 
Child sexual abuse has been identified as a global phenomenon with grave life-long 
outcomes. These estimates vary widely depending on the country under study, the definitions 
used, the type of child sexual abuse studied, the extent of coverage, and quality of data 
(Singh, Parsekar, & Nair, 2014). This section outlines the popular definitions of child sexual 
abuse, set against the background of the definition of the term as used in India. 
 
Many international bodies have developed different definitions of child sexual abuse. While 
they are similar, there are also some light differences, and it is instructive to refer to several 
leading definitions. 
2.A.1.i. The WHO definition 
The World Health Organization Report on the Consultation on Child Abuse Prevention 
(1999) defines child sexual abuse as the involvement of a child in sexual activity that he or 
she does not fully comprehend, is unable to give informed consent to, or that violates the laws 
                                                        
26 Kakkar, L., Varadan, S., & Kumar, P. (2007). A Study on Child Abuse: India 2007. Ministry of Women and 
Child Development, Government of India. http://www.childlineindia.org.in/pdf/MWCD-Child-Abuse-
Report.pdf 
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or social taboos of society. Child sexual abuse is evidenced by this activity between a child 
and an adult or another child who by age or development is in a relationship of responsibility, 
trust or power, the activity being intended to gratify or satisfy the needs of the other person. 
This may include but is not limited to the inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any 
unlawful activity, the exploitative use of a child in prostitution or other unlawful sexual 
practices, and the exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and material.27 
 
2.A.1.ii. The Council of Europe definition 
Sexual abuse is: a) engaging in sexual activities with a child who, according to the relevant 
provisions of national law, has not reached the legal age for sexual activities (this does not 
apply to consensual sexual activities between minors); and b) engaging in sexual activities 
with a child where use is made of coercion, force or threats; or abuse is made of a recognised 
position of trust, authority or influence over the child, including within the family; or abuse is 
made of a particularly vulnerable situation of the child, notably because of a mental or 
physical disability or a situation of dependence.28 
 
2.A.1.iii. The definition in the Ministry of Women and Child Development Report 2007: 
The 2007 MWCD Report defined sexual abuse as inappropriate sexual behaviour with a 
child. It includes fondling a child's genitals, making the child fondle an adult's genitals, 
sexual assault (intercourse, incest, rape, sodomy), exhibitionism and pornography. To be 
considered child abuse, these acts have to be committed by a person responsible for the care 
of a child or related to the child (for example, a babysitter, parent, neighbour, relatives, 
extended family member, peer, older child, friend, stranger, or a day-care provider).29 
 
The 2007 MWCD Report classified sexual abuse into two types: severe forms and other 
forms. 
1. Severe forms of sexual abuse: 
a) assault, including rape and sodomy; 
b) touching or fondling a child; 
                                                        
27 World Health Organization. (1999). Report of the Consultation on Child Abuse Prevention. Geneva, 29–31 
March. Document WHO/HSC/PVI/99.1 at p. 62. 
28 Article 18, Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and 
Sexual Abuse, CETS No. 201. 
29 Supra n. 26 at p. 13. 
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c) exhibitionism: forcing a child to exhibit his/her private body parts; and 
d) photographing a child in nude. 
2. Other forms of sexual abuse: 
a) forcible kissing; 
b) sexual advances towards a child during travel; 
c) sexual advances towards a child during marriage situations; 
d) exhibitionism: exhibiting before a child; and 
e) exposing a child to pornographic materials30 
2.A.1.iv. Difficulties within definitions of “sexually abusive activities” with regard to age 
gap of offender and victim 
 
Various studies have documented different kinds of activities as being considered child 
sexual abuse. Within the use of broad definitions, difficulties exist in deciding whether a 
particular behaviour is sexually abusive or not. 
An important aspect of the relationship between the victim and perpetrator concerns the age 
gap. It is debatable whether exposure of children above a particular age to pornographic 
materials, by peer group members, can be classified as “other forms” of child sexual abuse as 
used in the 2007 MWCD Report. Social scientists have classified these definitional 
difficulties as arising within various domains: (1) lack of uniformity regarding age of the end 
of childhood (Finkelhor, 1994)’ (2) lack of whether non-contact experiences can be included 
or excluded from the definition of child sexual abuse; (3) age differences regarding 
consensual sexual relationships between minors (Lalor & McElvaney, 2010);(4) contextual 
considerations to decide whether a certain behaviour is abusive (Haugaard, 2000). There is a 
vacuum in definitional discussions on the developmental perspective of children and their 
sexuality, with considerable confusion about what constitutes “normal” sexual behaviour in 
children and adolescents. This is partly because of rapidly changing societal norms about 
children and sex and partly because of the ethical constraints of undertaking empirical 
research into childhood sexuality (Vizard, 2006). This insight is important in dealing with a 
comprehensive definition of child sexual abuse in India. 
A number of studies have reported that boys are more often sexually abused by their peers or 
others closer in age to them, including their siblings, cousins and other relatives. Prevalence 
                                                        
30 Id at p. 73. 
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figures that rely on a five-year age gap between the victim and perpetrator are likely to 
underestimate the abuse of boys by peers and age-mates. Vagueness exists regarding the line 
to be drawn between abuse and experimentation in sexual activity between children and 
young people (Cashmore & Shackel, 2014). The effect of such vagueness while formulating 
child sexual abuse legislation leads to difficulties in prosecution of such offenders/abusers, as 
the active participation of victims is clear from the fact of the case. This is dealt with in 
greater detail in Chapter 3.31 
The next sub-section outlines various factors that increase the risk of child sexual abuse, and 
draws conclusions based on scientific research as to whether these factors actually increase 
risk of child sexual abuse. This sub-section examines whether the low socio-economic 
development of a country poses a risk on its child sexual abuse rate. The next sub-section 
addresses how society and culture influence the incidence rate of child sexual abuse being 
reported in India. 
2.A.2. Risk factors for children becoming victims of child sexual abuse 
 
The extent of violence against children is difficult to measure because much occurs in the 
privacy of family homes and is never reported or investigated. In addition to this, in some 
nations, data collection mechanisms do not exist (UNICEF, 2009; Pinheiro, 2006; Deb & 
Walsh, 2012). Hence it is a challenge to determine factors that pose a risk for children being 
victims of sexual abuse. The following studies by Finkelhor (1994), Putnam (2003) and 
Ronan, Canoy & Burke (2009) identified certain risks: 
2.A.2.a. Finkelhor (1994): parental inadequacy, unavailability, conflict, harsh 
punishment, emotional deprivation 
Community studies showed several factors as being consistently associated with higher risk 
for abuse: parental inadequacy, unavailability, conflict, harsh punishment, emotional 
deprivation. Race and socio-economic factors are not relevant risk factors. 
                                                        
31 Even though the Protection of Children Against Sexual Offences Act 2012 has narrowed down the definitions 
of the six types of sexual abuse offences stated in the legislation, and has included non-contact crimes of sexual 
nature, its vagueness lies in the lack of contextual considerations in deciding whether a particular behaviour is 
sexually abusive or not. Presently the legislation criminalises consensual sexual relationships between minors 
and between minors and adults without a significant age difference, in the absence of the elements of coercion 
or dependence. 
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2.A.2.b. Putnam (2003): gender, age, physical disabilities, family constellation 
This study identifying a number of factors that increase risk for child sexual abuse: 
a) Gender: Girls are 2.5 to 3 times higher risk than boys, although approximately 22% to 29% 
of all child sexual abuse victims are male. Boys are underrepresented in psychiatric samples, 
especially older boys who may be reluctant to disclose or who may be shunted into the 
criminal justice or substance abuse treatment systems. 
b) Age: Risk for child sexual abuse rises with age. As a risk factor, age is believed to operate 
differentially for girls and boys, with high risk starting earlier and lasting longer for girls. 
c) Physical disabilities: These lead to increased risk, especially those that impair a child’s 
perceived credibility such as blindness, deafness and mental retardation. The three factors of 
dependency, institutional care and communication difficulties seem to contribute to this 
increased vulnerability. 
d) Low socioeconomic status: This has much less impact on child sexual abuse. Community 
survey studies find almost no socioeconomic effects, but a disproportionate number of child 
sexual abuse cases reported to Child Protective Services come from lower socioeconomic 
classes. 
e) Race and ethnicity: These do not seem to be risk factors for child sexual abuse, although 
they may influence the effects exhibited by the child. Studies found out that Latina girls have 
worse emotional problems than Afro-American or white girls. 
f) Family constellation: The absence of one or both parents is a significant risk factor. The 
presence of a stepfather in the home doubles the risk for girls, not only for being abused by 
the stepfather but also for being abused by other men prior to the arrival of the stepfather in 
the home. Parental impairments, particularly maternal illness, maternal alcoholism, extended 
maternal absences, serious marital conflicts, parental substance abuse, social isolation and 
punitive parenting have all been associated with increased risk in some studies. 
2.A.2.c. Ronan, Canoy and Burke (2009): gender, family issues 
Similarly, this study states that child sexual abuse has a different aetiology than other forms 
of child maltreatment, with the risk factors common to most child maltreatment (like 
substance abuse, domestic violence, mental illness, lower socioeconomic status, poor parental 
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skills etc) significantly less common in cases of child sexual abuse. Child sexual abuse is 
more likely to occur in situations where the child is female, and where there is marital 
conflict, low parental attachment, overprotective parenting, and parental alcohol abuse. 
Further, low socioeconomic status does not appear to be a risk factor. 
 
It can be seen that a common finding in these studies is that race and socioeconomic status 
are not considered as risk factors for child sexual abuse. 
2.A.3. India: The socio-cultural context of child sexual abuse: risk factors 
In India, child sexual abuse occurs both within and beyond the family system. The problem 
of child sexual abuse extends into India's early history and is considered a deep-rooted 
societal concern. Although child sexual abuse is a major concern in India, there is an 
inadequate amount of research that has specially examined child sexual abuse in Indian 
children and the relevant cultural factors. A significant number of India's children are at-risk 
for sexual trauma or already suffering the negative ramifications of abuse (Carson, Foster, & 
Chowdhury, 2014). 
A review of Indian publications by Carson et al. (2014) on the factors which help perpetrate 
child sexual abuse show eight results. First, sexual abuse does not always occur in isolation 
and may include other forms of child maltreatment. Second, although girls have higher 
prevalence rates of sexual abuse and may be unprotected by their family members, boys are 
also victims of sexual abuse and may experience significant difficulty disclosing their 
experiences due to feelings of shame. Third, some studies have noted the correlation between 
sexual abuse and poverty, yet child sexual abuse occurs in families of all socio-economic 
levels, and social isolation may be an even greater risk factor. Fourth, studies indicate that 
many victims of child sexual abuse are traumatized by their experiences and may suffer both 
short and long-term ramifications of their abuse. Fifth, counselling is usually effective in 
helping children reduce their trauma-related symptoms and improve their well-being. Sixth, 
adults must be mandated to properly report sexual abuse, as family secrecy about child sexual 
abuse is harmful to victims. Seventh, the rights of children should be made a priority by the 
government and individual citizens, so prevention initiatives that include education about 
child maltreatment must occur on multiple levels (family, community, state, and national). 
Seventh, laws need to be improved to protect children and hold offenders accountable. 
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Eighth, government organizations and non-governmental organisations must make both 
intervention and prevention services a priority. 
 
The 2007 MWCD Report states that harmful traditional practices like child marriage, the 
caste system, discrimination against the female child, child labour and the Devadasi 
tradition32 increase the vulnerability of Indian children to abuse and neglect. Beinart (2011) 
reviews publications that state different cultural practices have been developed to protect a 
girl’s virginity because female virginity before marriage is prized in India. These cultural 
practices include child marriage, segregating the sexes except in situations that can be 
observed by elders, and opposing marriage with a non-virgin female. Most Indians believe 
that families and communities – as opposed to the government – are responsible for the care 
and protection of children (Beinart, 2011). 
A review of 44 publications, including publications on India, regarding the incidence and 
characteristics of all forms of child sexual assault in 32 low and middle income countries 
since 1980 identified child sexual abuse at all levels of society in nearly every region and 
continent of the world. The difficulty in researching and discussing child sexual abuse were 
due to the sensitive and taboo nature of the topic, difficulty of accurate measurement, barriers 
to reporting, barriers to justice, and the false perception of child sexual abuse as a new 
phenomenon. Early marriage, human trafficking, sexual coercion, forced first sex, and males 
as victims were identified as characteristics and topics placing individuals at risk for child 
sexual abuse, with poverty and its resultant social or family strain as exacerbating factors 
(Veenema, Thornton & Corley, 2015). 
The existing studies indicate crimes against children in India, as in other parts of the world, 
are vastly underreported. Current estimates assert that between 18% and 50% of India’s 
children have experienced some form of child sexual abuse, with girls reporting higher 
incidence than boys. The statistics are conservative as many children do not disclose their 
abuse, and those who do may not be protected or believed. Thus, there is general agreement 
that child maltreatment, including sexual abuse, is much more widespread than what is 
commonly reported or recognized (Deb, 2002, 2009; Chawla, 2004; Deb & Mukherjee, 2009; 
Iravani, 2011; Carson, Foster & Chowdhury, 2014). 
                                                        
32 Devadasi system in India is a religious practice in the states of Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, 
Orissa and Tamil Nadu, whereby parents dedicate a daughter to worship and service of a Hindu deity for the rest 
of her life. The marriage usually occurs before the girl reaches puberty and requires the girl to become a 
prostitute for upper-caste community members. They are forbidden to enter into a real marriage. 
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2.A.4. The 2007 MWCD Report on Child Abuse in India: a socio-cultural context 
The first government effort to identify child abuse statistics nationally was the National Study 
on Child Abuse conducted in 2007 by the Ministry of Women and Child Development, with 
the support of UNICEF, Save the Children, and Prayas. This study covered 13 states in India 
and a sample size of 12,447 children, and is considered to be one of the largest empirical in-
country studies of its kind in the world. The study aimed at developing a dependable and 
comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon of child abuse, in order to facilitate 
forming appropriate policies and programmes for curbing and controlling of the problem. 
This report was able to garner strong public opinion which helped to propel the enactment of 
special legislation pertaining to sexual offences against children in India in 2012. The key 
findings of the 2007 MWCD Report are as follows: 
1. 53.22% children reported having faced one or more forms of sexual abuse that included 
both “severe” and “other forms”. 
2. Statistics on the gender percentage of children reporting sexual abuse show that 52.94% 
were boys and 47.06% girls. Nine out of 13 states reported higher percentage of sexual abuse 
among boys as compared to girls, with Delhi reporting 65.64% boys to 34.36% girls. Kerala 
had statistics of 55.04% boys to 44.96% girls, while Goa had statistics of 52.27% boys to 
47.73% girls. 
3. The age distribution of children reporting sexual abuse showed that although the abuse 
started at the age of 5 years, it gained momentum 10 years onward, peaking at 12 to 15 years 
and then starting to decline. 
4. 21.90% of children faced severe forms of sexual abuse and 50.76% faced other forms of 
sexual abuse. 
5. 5.69% of children reported being sexually assaulted. 
6. Children on the street, children at work and children in institutional care reported the 
highest incidence of sexual assault. 
7. 50% abuses are persons known to the child or in a position of trust and responsibility. 
8. Most children did not report the matter to anyone. 33 
The MWCD Report identified children between the ages of 5–18 on the basis of five 
categories of children: children in family environment, not attending school; children in 
                                                        
33 Supra n. 26 at pp.vi-vii and 73-74. 
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schools; children in institutional care; working children; and street children.34 Chapter IV of 
the MWCD Report deals with the profile of the respondents and their socio-demographic 
background. It extensively provides for gender and age distribution of data. But examination 
of the nature of child sexual abuse in the socio-cultural context of class and religion is 
difficult, as adequate data regarding these is unavailable in this Report or elsewhere. 
2.A.4.a. Gender and age 
 
The study sample of 12,447 children was almost equally divided between boys and girls: 
51.9% were boys and 48.1% were girls. The Report provides clear data regarding child abuse 
from a gender and age perspective with regard to the five categories identified: children in 
family environment, not attending school,35 children in schools,36 children in institutional 
care, 37 children at work38 and children on the streets.39 Interestingly, the MWCD Report 
                                                        
34Id at p. 15. 
35 Out of the total sample, 18.04% of children were in this evidence group. 52.38% of these children were boys 
and the remaining girls. 50.59% children in this evidence group were in the age group of 5–12 years; 2.54% in 
the age group of 13–14; and 26.77% in the age group of 15–18 years. In the age group of 5–12 years, 53.95% of 
these children were boys, while 54.15% of children in the age group of 13–14 years and 47.92% children in the 
age group of 15–18 years were boys. 
36 Out of the total child respondents, 25.41% were children in schools, of which 49.76% were boys and 50.24% 
were girls. Across the states, the sample size of boys and girls was approximately 50:50 with a 10% variance. 
41.54% of children in this evidence group were in the age group of 5–12 years, while 32.98% of children were 
in the age group of 13–14 years and 25.48% of children were in the age group of 15–18 years. In the age group 
of 5–12 years, 50.61% children were girls, while 55.80% of children in the age group of 13–14 years and 
42.43% of children in the age group of 15–18 years were girls.   
37 Out of the total sample, 18.04% of children were in this evidence group. Among the child respondents in 
institutions, 29.54% were from children's homes (46.33% boys, 53.67% girls) followed by 25.97% from shelter 
homes (57.04% boys, 42.96% girls), 24.89% from other homes (50.09% boys, 49.91% girls), 10.75% special 
homes (52.52% boys, 47.48% girls) and 8.85% (72.45% boys, 27.55% girls) were from observation homes. 
45.48% of children in this evidence group were in the age group of 5–12 years, while 29.84% of children were 
in the age group of 13–14 years and 24.68% of children were in the age group of 15–18 years. In the age group 
of 5–12 years, 54.16% of children were boys, while 50.45% of children in the age group of 13–14 years and 
53.61% of children in the age group of 15–18 years were boys. From the sample size, the gender and age-wise 
break-up of the number of children in need of care and protection in institutions (children's homes, shelter 
homes and other homes) showed that children as young as 5, 6, 7 and 8 years old were languishing in 
institutions. The number of girls in institution rose in the early teenage years. The Report attributes this fact to 
girls in this age group being more vulnerable and also trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation and child 
domestic work. Analysis shows that, barring the ages of 11 and 12 years, the number of boys in conflict with the 
law was much higher than that of girls.  
38 Out of the total sample, 19.90% of children were in this evidence group. 50.30% of these children were boys 
and the remaining girls. 34.68% of children in this evidence group were in the age group of 5–12 years, while 
2.85% of children were in the age group of 13–14 years and 42.47% of children were in the age group of 15–18 
years. In the age group of 5 to 12 years, 51.92% of children were girls, while 52.30% of children in the age 
group of 13–14 years and 46.48% of children in the age group of 15–18 years were girls. Among all the children 
in this evidence group, 23.16% were child domestic workers, 11.21% were working in tea kiosks and 
restaurants, 7.83% were engaged in bidi rolling and the remaining were working in 'other' occupations such as 
lock making, carpet weaving, construction, shops, artisans, etc. 
39 Out of the total sample size of child respondents, 18.6% were street children of which 55.33% boys and 
44.67% were girls. The study revealed that 65.9% of the street children lived with their families on the streets. 
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states that the gender and age distribution of children on the street indicated two significant 
findings: first, that girls of all age groups are also living on the streets rendering them 
vulnerable to abuse and exploitation; second, the number of boys living on the streets is 
larger than that of girls.40As discussed earlier, the Report shows that boys had a higher rate of 
sexual abuse than girls. 
2.A.4.b. Religion and caste 
 
Of these child respondents, 71.4% were Hindus, 14.2% Muslims, 12.7% Christians and 1.7% 
from other religious backgrounds. Among Hindus, 25.4% children were from Scheduled 
Castes (SCs), 15.1% from the Scheduled Tribes (STs) and 29.2% from the Other Backward 
Classes (OBCs).41 
 
The MWCD Report does not provide data regarding its respondents on the basis of caste and 
religion. Hence no analysis about the nature of child sexual abuse based on religion is 
possible. 
2.A.4.c. Class 
 
The MWCD Report does not make any reference to the economic background of the 
identified child respondents based on the five identified categories mentioned previously. The 
Report does not give any sociological data on non-school going children who live within a 
family environment. Hence it is impossible to determine their socio-economic background. 
With regard to children who go to schools, the total percentage of children going to 
government schools was 55.54%, private schools was 26.29%, NGO-run schools 14.91%, 
and 3.26% in other schools (namely, schools run by charitable organizations and religious 
bodies).It is clear from the data provided by this Report that demarcation of the respondents 
based on socio-economic class is not possible here, either. 42 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Out of these children, 51.84% slept on the footpaths, 17.48% slept in the night shelters and 30.67% slept in 
other places including under flyovers and bridges, railway platforms, bus stops, parks, market places, etc. 
40  60.94% of children in the evidence group were in the age group of 5–12 years, while 19.90% children were 
in the age group of 13–14 years and 19.16% children were in the age group of 15–18 years. In the age group of 
5–12 years, 53.97% of children were boys, while 55.31% of children were in the age group of 13–14 years and 
59.68% of children in the age group of 15–18 years were boys. 
41 Supra n.26 at p. 35. 
42 Id at p.15. 
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The same applies to data regarding children in institutional care. However, this researcher 
would categorise this group of child respondents to belonging to the lower economic strata of 
society. It is usually neglected children from poverty stricken backgrounds with no protective 
familial network who end up being in conflict with law. Children from middle class and 
upper middle class families in India are never allowed by the protective social network to 
face the criminal justice system. The institutions for children in conflict with law are the 
observation homes and special homes. The institutions for children in need of care and 
protection are called shelter homes and children’s homes, which house children who are 
rescued from child trafficking for prostitution or domestic work. These children are generally 
trafficked with the active consent of their family members, who belong to impoverished 
backgrounds, and sell their offspring for economic enrichment. The MWCD Report fleetingly 
refers to this aspect.43 Children at work44 as well as children who live in streets45 are the last 
two categories mentioned in the Report. Thus a perusal of data provided from the Report 
leads to the inference that these respondents belong to the lowest economic strata of society. 
 
2.A.5. Statistics on Kerala 
A recent study in Kerala by  Krishnakumar, Satheesan, Geeta, & Sureshkumar (2014) of 
1,614 respondents (688 boys and 926 girls) in the age group of 15–19 years of age spread 
across 12 of the 14 districts in Kerala found that 36 % of boys and 35% of girls had 
experienced sexual abuse at some point during their lifetime. The overall prevalence of 
sexual abuse varied from district to district with the lowest (13%) in Thiruvananthapuram 
district and the highest (50%) in Kannur district. Most instances were sexual advances while 
using public transport. Feelings of insecurity and isolation at home, of being disliked by 
parents, and of being depressed were significantly higher in adolescents who had experienced 
sexual abuse. Interestingly, a significantly larger percentage of adolescents with history of 
sexual abuse suffered physical punishment at home compared to those who had no history of 
sexual abuse. 
Krishnakumar et al. (2014) compared their findings on prevalence with prevalence data from 
the 2007 MWCD Report. It found out that the prevalence of sexual abuse among the sample 
of children from Kerala in the 15–18 year age group in the 2007 MWCD study is much 
                                                        
43Id at p. 36. 
44Id at p.36, 37. 
45Id at p.37. 
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higher than the prevalence rate observed in the present study. There are also significant 
differences between the prevalence rates of individual types of sexual abuse as observed in 
the 2007 study and in the Kerala study, which could be because of the difference in the 
method of data collection. In the 2007 MWCD Report, information was collected using focus 
group discussions and one-to-one interaction, with higher chances of revealing abuse; in 
contrast, the 2014 Kerala study was a self-report survey. Krishnakumar et al. (2014) reason 
that it is unlikely for all affected children to reveal complete details of a private and 
confidential issue like sexual abuse in a self-report survey. Also, the 2007 Report included 
only two districts from Kerala, while the 2014 Kerala study included all districts in Kerala. 
2.A.6. Conclusion 
The 2007 MWCD Report, which defined the nature of sexual abuse of children and explored 
its prevalence, is the first of its kind in India. This Report has integrated international 
perspectives on child sexual abuse, as well as perspectives on India, as seen in indices which 
include sexual abuse of children during travel and marriage. 
Global research establishes that difficulties exist in defining whether a particular behaviour is 
sexually abusive or not. One important aspect of this definition issue is the relationship 
between the victim and perpetrator and the age gap. Difficulties exist when the so-called 
child victim and the perpetrator belong to age groups within a five–year gap. It is debatable 
whether exposure of children above a particular age to pornographic materials by peer group 
members can be classified as “other forms” of child sexual abuse, as was done in the 2007 
MWCD Report.46This difficulty is manifested when protective legislation against child 
sexual abuse does not provide relief for cases of “experimentation” by children of the same 
age. This issue is further examined in Chapter 3 regarding the POCSO. 
Among the various risk factors, global research establishes that low socio-economic 
background is not a sufficient risk factor for child sexual abuse. The 2007 MWCD Report 
does not specifically focus on children from lower socio-economic backgrounds. Despite the 
lack of this specific index, the majority of the evidence groups consist of children from 
poorer economic backgrounds, because children from affluent families are generally found to 
be attending school and are not found in homes of institutional care, nor do they work nor 
live on the streets. Hence, this Report focuses on children from poorer economic 
                                                        
46 Adolescents who had no experience of sexual abuse other than exposure to ugly pictures were omitted in 
calculating the total prevalence of sexual abuse. 
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backgrounds. Statistics regarding prevalence of sexual abuse among children from middle 
class economic backgrounds, versus prevalence of children from lower economic 
backgrounds, cannot be obtained from this Report. 
This section examined the nature of child sexual abuse from international and Indian 
literature. Indian studies on social science evidence of child sexual abuse are limited. Studies 
into definitions of sexual abuse in India are almost non-existent. Socio-cultural contexts play 
a great role in disclosing child sexual abuse. When gender and age contexts are taken, studies 
show that boys and girls are equally vulnerable to abuse, especially during teenage ages. 
Social class does not show any significant impact upon child sexual abuse; however, children 
on the street, children at work and children in institutional care are especially vulnerable. 
 
Examination of literature in this section shows that the MWCD Report portrays higher 
prevalence of abuse of boys than girls. Also, most sexual abuse occurs between 10-15 years 
of age. Data showing religion and class statistics were not available from this Report. 
 
There is reason to believe that statistics regarding boys showing a higher rate of sexual abuse 
than girls may be because one of the “other forms” of sexual abuse investigated in this Report 
was “exposure to dirty pictures”, of which the percentage of boys reporting this exposure was 
higher compared to girls in all 13 sample states. The Report stated that an overwhelming 
majority of child respondents (66.1%) were shown dirty pictures by their friends or 
classmates, with uncles or neighbours the second highest in this category at 13.1%. It is 
important to understand that the process of discovering sexuality is different from being 
abused, so viewing pornographic images with peer group members may not classify as abuse. 
It may not be correct to classify the data of children being shown pornographic pictures on 
the same level as children in abusive situations. Hence the statistics on boys having a higher 
rate of abuse in the MWCD Report (2007) might be exaggerated. 
 
2.B. PREVALENCE OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 
 
 
This section discusses various prevalence studies in the area of child sexual abuse. Prevalence 
is defined as the proportion of the adult population that have been victims of sexual abuse at 
some time in their childhood. Sources of data regarding “prevalence” include surveys of adult 
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members of the public that ask about their childhood experiences (Finkelhor, 1994).47 In 
contrast to prevalence, “incidence” is defined as the number of cases of sexual abuse during a 
year that come to the attention of professionals. Sources of data regarding incidence include 
child protection agencies and law enforcement and medical or mental health professionals.48 
Incidence studies may underestimate the occurrence of child sexual abuse because only a 
small proportion of abuse cases may be reported to authorities. Moreover, incidence studies 
capture fewer child sexual abuse experiences than prevalence studies because the timeframe 
of incidence studies is more limited than the lifetime reports in prevalence studies 
(Stoltenborgh, van IJzendoorn, Euser, & Bakermans-Kranenburg, 2011). 
Prevalence rates vary according to when the research was conducted, how sexual abuse is 
defined, who is targeted, what type of survey method is used, and the way the questions are 
worded (Cashmore & Shackel, 2014). This section outlines the barriers in formulating 
statistics regarding prevalence rates, due to lack of adequate data caused by non-disclosure of 
child sexual abuse. This section also examines whether gender and the degree of socio-
economic development of a country influences reporting of child sexual abuse. 
Important global and Indian studies on prevalence rates have been cited in this section. 
Various meta-analyses of the international literature found that approximately 20% of women 
and 8% of men experience sexual abuse as children. However, studies point out that actual 
prevalence of male child sexual abuse is higher, but is under-reported. Prevalence studies of 
child sexual abuse show greater prevalence rates for females over males. 
Also, analysis of the effect of the level of economic development of a country on child sexual 
abuse statistics shows that child sexual abuse occurs irrespective of the economic status of a 
country across all socio-economic classes. Hence this problem requires carefully planned 
mechanisms by both national governments and civil society in order to combat these crimes. 
2. B.1. Problems faced by researchers 
 
Various problems are faced by researchers in the area of child sexual abuse, which act as 
barriers in formulating global trends. These are the lack of adequate data, which may be 
                                                        
47Prevalence statistics include events that meet the criteria for incidence reports, and events that were never 
disclosed to a professional, were never disclosed by professionals to child protective services and were outside 
the definitions used by child protective services, such as date rape.   
48Incidence statistics include statistics on events that are disclosed to child protective services and to other 
authorities like the police, and not disclosed to child protective services or the police.   
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aggravated due to perpetuation of myths that contribute in adding to already existing 
difficulties in disclosure and non- reporting of child sexual abuse. 
1. Lack of adequate data about child sexual abuse: There has been a preponderance of 
results from Caucasian, Western, and Christian countries and a relative lack of data from 
middle-Eastern, African or Far-Eastern countries (Finkelhor, 1994). The absence of research 
on child abuse in Africa is because it is “overshadowed by political and economic problems, 
lack of resources, the enormity of the phenomenon, and the lack of a research culture and 
research experience” (Lachman, 1996; Finkelhor, 1994; Lalor & McElvaney, 2010).49 
2. Prevalence of myths about child sexual abuse: Lack of adequate data allows for 
perpetuation of various myths on sexual abuse; namely, that most Indians believe that child 
sexual abuse is largely a Western problem and that it does not occur in India. This belief can 
be partially explained by India's conservative family and community structure that does not 
allow discussion of sex and/or sexuality. Another myth is that it is girls, rather than boys, 
who need to be kept safe. India has developed a culture that prizes virginity in female 
children. Many different cultural and social practices have developed in order to safeguard a 
female child's sexual purity prior to marriage. These practices include child marriage, 
segregating the sexes except in situations that can be observed by elders, and prohibiting 
marriage with a non-virgin female (Beinart, 2011). 
Such myths diminish awareness and prevent allocation of adequate resources to prevent 
abuse and assist victims, as well as dissuade victims from disclosing abuse due to the 
negative outcomes that occur when abuse is disclosed, but not believed. It is relevant to note 
that such myths also affect legal processes and decisions, as they impact professionals and 
care providers (who are mandated reporters), influence juror attitudes and trial outcomes, and 
impact on judicial decisions. For these reasons, identifying these myths is an important step 
in disseminating accurate information, providing appropriate support to victims following 
disclosure, and informing prevention and intervention efforts (Cromer & Goldsmith, 2010). 
3. Non- reporting of child sexual abuse: Disclosure of experiences of child sexual abuse by 
the victims is rare, and usually happens after a considerable amount of time has passed (Paine 
                                                        
49 Recently, effort has been made to review literature on child sexual abuse in Middle Eastern countries and 
North Africa by Polonko, Adam, Naeem and Adinolfi (2011).  The authors note that there was resistance in 
these societies to acknowledge CSA and the subject is taboo. The authors point out that child sexual abuse in the 
Middle East for boys is not only higher than that of boys in western countries, the rates are higher for girls than 
for boys in the Middle East and North African countries. 
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& Hansen, 2002). Such non-disclosure happens when the child is either (or both) preverbal or 
too young to understand the nature of the acts (Berliner & Conte, 1990). The child usually 
develops coping mechanisms. An Australian study found that 48% of the women who had 
suffered sexual abuse as children never disclosed it. Among those who did, almost half 
disclosed at least 10 years after the first event (Fleming, 1997). A national study in the USA 
found that of 416 women and 169 men who suffered child sexual abuse, 33% and 42% 
respectively had never disclosed it before the study, and a further 24% and 14% only 
disclosed at least one year after the event (Finkelhor, Hotaling, Lewis, & Smith, 1990). The 
available statistics are likely to be underestimated because of frequent underreporting of 
sexual abuse (Kogan, 2004; Priebe & Svedin, 2008; Chen et al., 2010). Difference in 
prevalence rates between males and females can be due to differences in definitions of child 
sexual abuse, the methods by which abuse has been assessed, and the characteristics of 
research samples (Spataro, Moss, & Wells, 2001). 
Reasons for non-reporting 
1. Safety concerns: The reason for such non-reporting of child sexual abuse is the loss of 
control in sexually abusive relationships with adults and the fear of being harmed by the 
perpetrator. The fear for personal safety and the fear of upsetting adults frequently prevent 
children from responding to the abuse and reporting it. This is reinforced by victim 
statements where victims appear to be submissive during the perpetration of the acts. This 
finding is increasingly supported by victim surveys (Cawson, Wattam, & Kelly, 2000; 
Davidson, 2008). In some cultures, victims of sexual assault may be murdered if the event 
becomes known or even suspected (“honor killings”), which indicate that victim blame and 
assumptions are likely to influence beliefs and actions related to child sexual abuse (Cromer 
& Goldsmith, 2010). 
2. Gender variations: Reasons for delaying disclosure also varies across the genders, as seen 
in the different prevalence rates between males and females. Males reported difficulty 
disclosing because they feared being viewed as homosexual and as victims. Women's 
difficulties centred on feeling conflicted about responsibility, and they more strongly 
anticipated being blamed or not believed (Alaggia, 2005). In a study involving 145 men and 
151 women who were asked about disclosure at the time of the abuse and the length of time it 
took for them to discuss the experience, it was found that men were significantly less likely 
than women to disclose the abuse at the time it occurred and also took significantly longer to 
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discuss their childhood experiences later in life (O’Leary & Barber, 2008). Factors that 
perpetuate non-disclosure by males are the socialisation of males within a culture where 
independence, sexual prowess and self-reliance are valued, whilst vulnerability, fear, 
dependency and homosexuality are considered as weaknesses and likely to lead to rejection 
and denigration (Spataro, Moss, & Wells, 2001). 
3. Cultural concerns: Collectivist cultures, such as many found in Asia, consider the needs of 
a group above those of an individual, which might result in ignoring the abuse experiences of 
an individual family member in order to protect the family from the shame associated with a 
reported case of abuse. Also, cultural differences with regard to sexuality and to sexual 
restraint, as well as cultural myths, might influence the prevalence of sexual abuse and/or the 
willingness of sexual abuse victims to disclose their experiences. The taboo around girls 
losing their virginity before marriage and the taboo on boys’ homosexual experiences are 
examples found within Hispanic cultures (Stoltenborgh, van IJzendoorn, Euser, & 
Bakermans-Kranenburg, 2011). These reasons are also valid in the Indian context. 
“Structural barriers” to disclosure 
Structural barriers include linguistic competence during investigations and interventions, lack 
of documents in families’ native languages, unfair immigration laws, racism and other forms 
of discrimination, economic barriers that interfere with investigations and interventions, lack 
of adequate health insurance, and overcrowded schools where teachers do not know their 
students well enough to detect abuse. Structural changes are essential to help children from 
all cultures disclose when they are abused and to persist with disclosure in the face of 
pressures to recant. 
 
Thus, these barriers not only constrain victims, but also inhibit others; hence, the importance 
of using a broad framework to understand the factors that inhibit disclosure. Three broad 
categories of barriers to disclosure of child sexual abuse were identified by Collin-Vézina, De 
La Sablonniere-Griffin, Palmer, & Milne (2015), each containing several sub-themes: 
1. Barriers from within: internalized victim-blaming, mechanisms to protect oneself, and 
immature development at time of abuse. 
2 Barriers in relation to others: violence and dysfunction in the family, power dynamics, 
awareness of the impact of telling, and fragile social network. 
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3. Barriers in relation to the social world: labelling, taboo of sexuality, lack of services 
available, and culture or time period. 
 
These studies showcase the need to devise new methods to ensure disclosure of incidence of 
abuse. The following sections deal with certain meta-analyses on the global prevalence of 
child sexual abuse, developing and middle income countries, as well as systemic reviews on 
prevalence. 
 
2.B.2. Prevalence studies: Systemic reviews and meta-analyses 
This section discusses systemic reviews of literature and meta-analyses of statistics of child 
sexual abuse, firstly based on gender, then on the effect of economic development of a 
country – namely, high income, middle income and low income countries – upon prevalence 
statistics. It then proceeds to examine studies on the Indian situation. 
2.B.2.a. Gender-based statistics: 
Here are the important systemic reviews of prevalence statistics on the basis of gender in the 
USA, UK and Australia, followed by prevalence statistics of meta-analyses from a global 
perspective. 
2.B.2.a.i. Systemic reviews on country basis 
2.B.2.a.i.(i) USA 
 
A study by Gorey & Leslie (1997) in the USA calculated the prevalence for women as 16.8% 
and 7.9 % for men. Another meta-analysis by Bolen & Scannapieco (1999) calculated 
prevalence at 20% for girls and 7% for boys. 
 
Putnam (2003) outlines the epidemiology of child sexual abuse. In the USA, before the late 
1970s, child sexual abuse was regarded as rare. In the following decades, the incidence based 
on official statistics increased dramatically by 67% in all forms of child abuse from 1986 to 
1993. Officially reported cases of child sexual abuse, however, declined during this same 
period. In 2000, child sexual abuse constituted approximately 10% of all officially reported 
child abuse cases and numbered approximately 88,000 substantiated or indicated cases, a 
41% decrease from the peak estimate of 149,800 cases in 1992. Statistics on the prevalence 
of child sexual abuse are derived primarily from retrospect accounts by adults and can be 
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divided into studies using clinical versus non-clinical samples. Prevalence figures vary 
widely as a function of the selection and response rate, the definition used, and the method 
(namely, self-reported versus structured interview) by which an abuse history is obtained. 
Community samples typically range from 12 % to 35 % of women and 4 % to 9 % of men 
reporting an unwanted sexual experience prior to the age of 18 years. 
A review of six studies in the USA by Townsend & Rheingold (2013) regarding contact 
sexual abuse of children estimated the prevalence rate for girls at 10.7% to 17.4% and the rate 
for boys at 3.8% to 4.6%. 
Finkelhor, Shattuck, Turner, & Hamby (2014) took a sample of three similarly designed 
national telephone surveys of youths in 2003, 2008, and 2011. This study found that the 
lifetime experience of 17-year-olds with sexual abuse and sexual assault was 26.6% for girls 
and 5.1% for boys. The lifetime experience with sexual abuse and sexual assault at the hands 
of adult perpetrators exclusively was 11.2% for females and 1.9% for males. For females, 
considerable risk for sexual abuse and assault was concentrated in late adolescents, as the rate 
rose from 16.8% for 15-year-old females to 26.6% for 17-year-old females. For males, it rose 
from 4.3% at 15 years to 5.1% at 17 years. This study found that self-report surveys in late 
adolescents reveal high rates of lifetime experience with sexual abuse and sexual assault at 
the hands of both adults and peers. Because of high continuing victimization during the late 
teen years, this study pointed out that assessments are most complete when conducted among 
the oldest youths. 
2.B.2.a.i.(ii) UK 
Research studies in the UK by Cawson, Wattam, & Kelly (2000) suggested that the problem 
is more prevalent than official statistics indicate. It was suggested that 16% of children and 
young people under 16 years experienced sexual abuse as a child. 
A national study by May-Chahal & Cawson (2005) found that 10% of respondents reported 
sexually abuse as a child involving sexual contact, with a further 6% reporting experience of 
non-contact abuse. 
Davidson (2008), while commenting on the British situation, says that it is difficult to know 
whether the incidence of sexual offences against children under the age of 16 years has 
increased, as such children are excluded from the random sample conducted by the Annual 
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British Crime Survey undertaken by the British Home Office. Official criminal statistics in 
the UK clearly show that the rate of reporting has increased substantially since the early 
1980s. 
A report by Radford, Corral, Bradley, Fisher, Bassett, Howat, & Collishaw (2011) on child 
maltreatment and victimisation in the UK found that16.5% of young people aged 11 to 17 
years reported experiences of contact and non-contact sexual abuse in their lifetime, and 
9.4% in the past year. Almost 5% (4.8%) of young people aged 11 to 17 years had 
experienced sexual abuse involving physical contact during childhood. 
2.B.2.a.i.(iii) Australia 
Dinwiddie, Heath, Dunne, Bucholz, Madden, Slutske, Bierut, Statham, & Martin (2000) 
conducted a study using structured telephone interviews with 5,995 Australian twins. It was 
found that 5.9% of women and 2.5% of men had been sexually abused before 18 years of age. 
 
Andrews, Gould, & Corry (2002) studied the overall findings of seven studies done on child 
sexual abuse in Australia. They found that the adjusted prevalence estimates were 5.1% for 
males and 27.5% for females. The onset of abuse occurred at a mean age of 10 years, with 
most cases starting before the age of 12 years. In the vast majority of cases the offender was 
known to the child (75%), with 40% of cases involving an offender who was a family 
member. 
 
In a study conducted by Dunne, Purdie, Cook, Boyle, & Najman (2003) through a telephone-
based survey of randomly selected males and females, the researchers found that for non-
penetrative child sexual abuse, 15.9% were males and 33.6%females. With regard to 
penetrative child sexual abuse, 4% of males were abused, compared to 12% of females. 
 
In a sample of 1,793 persons aged 18–59 years, randomly selected from the electoral roll for 
Australian states and territories in April 2000, it was found that more than one-third of 
women and approximately one-sixth of men reported a history of child sexual abuse before 
the age of 16 years. Women were more likely than men to report both non-penetrative and 
penetrative experiences of child sexual abuse. An exception was attempted anal intercourse, 
with men more likely to report this experience (Najman, Dunne, Purdie, Boyle, & Coxeter, 
2005). 
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Mills, Kisely, Alati, Strathearn, & Najman (2016) stated that since most Australian studies 
relied on retrospective self-reporting, their study investigated the incidence of child sexual 
abuse in the same birth cohort using both retrospective self-reporting and prospective 
government agency notification, and examined the psychological outcomes in young 
adulthood. Twenty-one retrospective child sexual abuse questions were completed by 3,739 
participants. Child sexual abuse was self-reported by 19.3% of males and 30.6% of females. 
Irrespective of method of reporting, adverse psychiatric outcomes were seen when child 
sexual abuse is defined using either method. 
2.B.2.a.ii. Meta-analyses studies 
 
A number of meta-analyses have been able to discern rates of child sexual abuse stratified by 
gender. While there are several of these studies, using slightly different methodologies (for 
example, definitions of child sexual abuse), all have produced similar overall findings, with 
some making even more nuanced findings applying to geographical locations. 
 
The meta-analysis of the international literature by Pereda, Guilera, Forns, & Gomez-Benito 
(2009) found that approximately 20% of women and 8% of men experienced sexual abuse as 
children. Similarly, a global metal-analytic review of population-based studies of childhood 
sexual abuse has estimated cumulative prevalence rates for sexual abuse prior to age 18 as 
18.0% for girls and 7.6 % for boys (Stoltenborgh et al. 2011). This comprehensive meta-
analysis combined prevalence figures of childhood sexual abuse reported in 217 publications 
published between 1980 and 2008, through self-reported as well as informant studies. Self-
reported childhood sexual abuse was more common among female (180/1000) than among 
male participants (76/1000). The lowest rates of self-reported child sexual abuse for both girls 
(113/1000) and boys (41/1000) were found in Asia, and highest rates were found for girls in 
Australia (215/1000) and for boys in Africa (193/1000). 
 
Lalor & McElvaney (2010) listed studies in 11countries, and concluded that the rates for 
penetrative child sexual abuse are higher for girls than for boys. For female children, rates for 
penetrative abuse range from 0.3% to a high of 18%. Data on perpetrators are not always 
reported, but the studies above show that for all types of child sexual abuse “strangers” make 
up only a minority of perpetrators and a high proportions of perpetrators were well known to 
the child (such as family members, boyfriends, neighbours, relatives or teachers). 
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Barth, Bermetz, Heim, Trelle, & Tonia (2013) conducted a meta-analysis of systematic 
reviews of prevalence studies published between 2002 and 2009 that reported child sexual 
abuse worldwide in children below 18years. Fifty-five studies from 24 countries were 
included. Prevalence estimates ranged from 8% to 31 % for girls and 3% to 17 % for boys. 
This study found that 9 girls and 3 boys out of 100 are victims of forced intercourse. 
 
Najman, Dunne, Purdie, Boyle, & Coxeter (2005) commented that despite indications that 
25% to 33% of those experiencing child sexual abuse are men, the literature has only recently 
begun to reflect this. The sexual abuse of boys appears to be common and clinically 
underreported, under-recognised and undertreated (Spataro, Moss, & Wells, 2001). 
2.B.2.b. Statistics based on economic development 
Studies on the influence of economic development of a country upon child sexual abuse 
incidence and prevalence rates have shown that development does influence prevalence 
statistics. This part discusses certain meta-analyses that have dealt with the effect of 
economic prosperity on prevalence statistics, and compares it with analyses about how low 
socio-economic class increases the risk of abuse. 
Analysis of the effect of economic development on child sexual abuse prevalence by 
Stoltenborgh et al (2011) found that, for boys, prevalence was higher in low-resource 
countries than in high-resource countries, whereas no significant effects of economic 
development level emerged for girls. 
Barth et al. (2013) conducted a meta-analysis of systematic reviews of prevalence studies 
published between 2002 and 2009 that reported child sexual abuse worldwide in children 
below 18 years. It found that where 55 studies from 24 countries were included, inconsistent 
ﬁndings emerged regarding the effect of Human Development Index50 in female child sexual 
abuse. Countries with a moderate Human Development Index showed lower prevalence of 
child sexual abuse. Countries with high and low Human Development Indexes showed the 
highest prevalence for child sexual abuse. The Human Development Index did not affect 
prevalence rates in males. 
                                                        
50 This is a composite statistic of life expectancy, education, and per capita income indicators, which are used to 
rank countries into four tiers of human development. 
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Veenema, Thornton, & Corley (2015) reviewed 44 publications regarding the incidence and 
characteristics of all forms of child sexual assault in 32 low and middle income countries 
since 1980. This review indicated that sexual abuse of children is an endemic problem that 
exists in low and middle income countries and affects female and male children from all 
social classes. This review found that child sexual abuse of males has received little attention 
in the literature. Children usually do not tell anyone that they have been sexually abused 
without being prompted to do so. Even when children are questioned about acts of sexual 
abuse, the phenomenon is grossly under-reported. Many cultures believe that problems 
concerning child abuse are to be traditionally handled within families, thus nullifying 
community support for legal interventions. The falsely-perceived low incidence of child 
sexual abuse in some countries seems to be related to an inability to recognize and report 
cases of abuse. 
Earlier, it was pointed out by Putnam (2003) and Ronan, Canoy, & Burke (2009), that that 
low socio-economic status of the victim has little impact on child sexual abuse. While lower 
socio-economic status is a significant risk factor for child maltreatment, in contrast, low 
socio-economic status does not appear to be a risk factor for child sexual abuse. Hence, a 
conclusion can be reached that the economic status of a victim and economic development 
index of a country do not play significant roles in incidence of child sexual abuse, as this 
problem is widespread and affects all economic classes. 
2.B.3. Prevalence studies in India 
There are few studies conducted in India in the area of child sexual abuse. Only one official 
study has been conducted in 2007. The following sections discuss each study in detail: 
2.B.3.a. Samvada (1996) 
The NGO called Samvada’s 1996 study on students in Bangalore states that 47% of the 
respondents had been sexually abused and 15% of them were less than 10 years old. Of these, 
62% had been raped once and 38% had suffered repeated violations. 83% of the respondents 
had experienced physical eve teasing, 13% when they were less than 10 years old. 
Disclosures had been made by 86% of those eve teased, 67% of those molested and 61% of 
those seriously abused.15% of respondents were used for masturbation mostly by male 
relatives when they were less than 10 years old. 75% of the abusers were adult family 
members. 
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2.B.3.b. Sakshi (1997) 
In a survey with 350 school girls in New Delhi by the NGO called Sakshi in 1997, 63% had 
experienced child sexual abuse at the hands of family members and 25% of the girls had 
either been raped, made to masturbate the perpetrator, or engage in oral sex. 
2.B.3.c. RAHI (1998) 
 
The NGO called Recovery and Healing from Incest(RAHI) is attributed to having conducted 
India’s first study of child sexual abuse in 1998 called “Recovery and Healing from Incest, 
Voices from the Silent Zone” (New Delhi, 1998). The study interviewed 600 English-
speaking middle and upper class women, out of whom 76% said they had been abused in 
their childhood or adolescence. 40% of the respondents said they had been abused by a 
family member, mostly an uncle or a cousin. 
2.B.3.d. Tulir (2006) 
A study on child sexual abuse carried out by NGOs Save the Children and Tulir in 2006 
looked at the prevalence and dynamics of child sexual abuse among school-going children in 
Chennai, India. 2,211 respondents were examined. This study found that 42% of children had 
faced at least one form of sexual abuse, of which 48% were boys and 39% were girls. The 
prevalence of sexual abuse in upper and middle class was found to be proportionately higher 
than in lower or lower middle class.51The majority of the abusers were people known to the 
child.52 
 
Both the TULIR study and the RAHI study showed higher prevalence rates of child sexual 
abuse in higher income families, which helps to combat the myth that child sexual abuse is 
more rampant among the lower socio-economic classes. Also, many abusers were people 
known to the child. 
                                                        
51 The results contradict various other myths and popularly perceptions about child sexual abuse in India: that it 
happens only in poor and illiterate families. The study included children from various socio-economic strata of 
society. The prevalence of sexual abuse in upper and middle class was found to be proportionately higher than 
in lower and lower middle class (the criteria used for stratification: family income less than Rs.6,000 per month 
= lower and lower-middle class; between Rs.6,000 and Rs.12,000 per month = middle class; higher than 
Rs.12,000 per month = upper class). See Tulir (2006). Research on Prevalence & Dynamics of Child Sexual 
Abuse Among School Going Children in Chennai. TULIR – CPHCSA and Save the Children Sweden at p. 10. 
52Those close to the child use tactics like trickery and making the children feel special in order to abuse them 
and intimidate them to keep that abuse a secret. These tactics indicate the carefully thought-out path that an 
abuser often takes in order to first prepare a child for abuse and later to maintain the abuse. This context usually 
makes it difficult for the child to say "no" to acts of abuse, and the abuser is also often successful in giving the 
child the impression that s/he is a participant in those activities, and/or that these activities must be kept a secret. 
See Id at pp. 19-20. 
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2.B.3.e. Ministry of Women and Child Development, Government of India (2007) 
Report 
 
The report of this Ministry in 2007 is briefly explained in order to lay down the socio-
economic context that facilitates child sexual abuse in India. 
2.B.3.e.i. Background: 
There is a substantial child population in India which is largely vulnerable to abuse, 
exploitation and neglect. The only information available annually regarding crimes against 
children has been the consolidated crime data maintained by National Crime Records Bureau, 
which was woefully inadequate. Only a few sporadic studies, with limited scope, existed. The 
increasing incidence of child abuse showed that the problem was bigger than what was either 
understood or acknowledged. This prompted the government under the Ministry of Women 
and Child Development to initiate the National Study on Child Abuse, as it was evident that 
India needs both legislation as well as large scale interventions to deal with the increasing 
incidence of child abuse. 
In this context, the Ministry of Women and Child Development of the Government of India 
conducted the first official national survey of child abuse, published through its report titled  
‘A Study on Child Abuse: India 2007’. It was one of the largest studies of its kind undertaken 
in India, and provided information about the nature and extent of child abuse in different 
settings and recommend immediate and appropriate responsive actions to be undertaken by 
families, community, government and civil society organisations for the care and protection 
of children. It strengthened grounds for separate legislation on child abuse, facilitating 
formulation of appropriate polices, strategies and schemes, and contributed to evolving 
guidelines for the prevention and control of child abuse.53 
2.B.3.e.ii. Categorisation of sexual abuse of children 
As stated in 2.A.1.iii., the MWCD Report categorised sexual abuse into four severe forms 
and five other forms of sexual abuse. 
(i)Severe forms of sexual abuse include: 
1. sexual assault: defined as penetration of the anus, vagina or oral sex 
2. making the child touch or fondle private parts 
3. making the child exhibit private body parts 
                                                        
53Supra n. 26 at pp. 8-9. 
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4. being photographed in the nude 
(ii)Other forms of sexual abuse include: 
1. forcible kissing 
2. sexual advances made during travel: a stranger takes advantage of a crowded situation and 
the instinctive fear of the child to carry on this abuse in a fairly anonymous fashion 
3. sexual advances during marriage functions: kissing, touching and fondling of private body 
parts of children by someone in marriage functions and other ceremonies.54 
4. exhibition: children forced to view private body parts 
5. exposure to pornographic materials: limited only to “dirty pictures” and excluded 
“exposure to other pornographic materials”.55 
2.B.3.e.iii. Findings: 
This Report brings out the following facts: 
1. Out of the total child respondents, 53.22 % reported having faced one or more forms of 
sexual abuse that included severe and other forms. 
2. The states of Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar and Delhi reported the highest percentage of 
sexual abuse among both boys and girls. 
3. 21.90 % of child respondents reported facing severe forms of sexual abuse and 50.76 % 
other forms of sexual abuse. 
4. Out of the child respondents, 5.69 % reported being sexually assaulted. 
5. Children on the street, children at work and children in institutional care reported the 
highest incidence of sexual assault. 
6. 50% of the abusers were persons known to the child or in a position of trust and 
responsibility. 
7. Most children did not report the matter to anyone. 
2.B.3.e.iv. Contexts of sexual abuse 
The 2007 MWCD Report used three contexts to explain the nature of the phenomena: gender, 
age, and the five evidence groups. Data on rates of occurrence of sexual abuse in each state 
was also provided. The prevalence data with regard to Kerala and Goa, which are of special 
importance to this thesis, are cited accordingly. 
                                                        
54The hustle and bustle, the crowd and the busy nature of Indian marriages make it easy for abusers to target 
young children. The festive and teasing environment helps the perpetrator to take advantage of an innocent child 
and the whole situation is not taken seriously by anyone. Id at p. 91.  
55 Id at p. 73. 
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The first part deals with consolidated data on sexual abuse. Table A depicts the main findings 
as laid down in the MWCD Report. The second part deals with the consolidated data on the 
severe forms of sexual abuse. The data distribution on the prevalence of severe forms of 
sexual abuse is given as a sub-section. Table B assimilates these findings. The third part deals 
with the consolidated data on the other forms of sexual abuse. The data breakup on 
prevalence of other forms of sexual abuse is given. Table C assimilates these findings. 
1. Consolidated data on sexual abuse 
This is the consolidated prevalence data regarding severe forms of sexual abuse and other 
forms of sexual abuse. Findings on the basis of age, gender and class have been synthesised 
from the findings laid down in the MWCD Report (2007). 
Table A Consolidated data on sexual abuse 
 
TYPE OF 
ABUSE 
Sexual Abuse 
Age data The age distribution of children reporting sexual abuse in one or more forms showed that 
though the abuse started at the age of 5years, it gained momentum at 10 years onward, peaking 
at 12–15 years and then starting to decline. The Report analysed that children in the pre-
adolescent to adolescent years are the most vulnerable. 
Age data (per 
state) 
No data given 
Gender  data The Report looked at gender breakup of children who were subjected to one or more forms of 
sexual abuse in the sample states. It found out that the overall percentage of boys was much 
higher than that of girls: 52.94 % were boys and 47.06% girls. In fact, 9 out of 13 states 
reported higher percentage of sexual abuse among boys as compared to girls, with states like 
Delhi reporting a figure of 65.64%. 
 
Gender data 
(per state) 
No data given 
Class or 
evidence 
group data 
Among the five different evidence groups, the highest percentage of children who faced sexual 
abuse were those at work (61.61%), followed by children on the streets  at 54.51% and children 
in family environment not going to school at 53.18%. Children in schools reported 49.92% 
sexual abuse and children in institutional care reported 47.08%. 
State data No data given 
  
2. Consolidated data on the severe forms of sexual abuse 
Out of the total respondents, 20.90 % were subjected to severe forms of sexual abuse. 
2.1. Data breakup on prevalence of severe forms of sexual abuse 
a. Sexual assault: 
Out of the child respondents 5.69% reported being sexually assaulted. 72.1% of children did 
not report the matter to anyone. 50% of the abusers were cousins, uncles, friends and 
classmates. 
b. Forced to touch private body parts of the body: 
14.5% reported prevalence of this form of sexual abuse. 77 % of children did not report the 
matter to anyone. 
c. Exhibition: Children forced to exhibit private body parts: 
12.6 % of child respondents reported that someone forced them to show or exhibit their 
private body parts. 80% chose to keep quiet. The highest percentage of children stated that 
the offenders were friends and classmates followed by uncles and neighbours. An 
overwhelming majority of children (82.2%) chose to keep quiet. As in other categories, the 
majority of those children reported to their parents (8.4%), 5.1% of children preferred to 
report to their siblings and only 0.7% children reported the matter to the police. 
d. Being photographed in the nude: 
4.46% reported being photographed in the nude. 71.4% of the respondents did not report the 
matter to anyone. The friend or classmates and the uncle or neighbour emerged as the main 
abusers. The Report observes that brothers and cousins as abusers together amount to 21%. 
  
Table B Consolidated data on the severe forms of sexual abuse 
 
TYPE OF 
ABUSE 
Severe forms of sexual 
abuse- consolidated data 
 
Sexual assault Forced to touch private 
body parts of the body 
Exhibition: Children 
forced to exhibit private 
body parts 
Being photographed in the 
nude 
Age data Over one-fifth of these 
children faced more than 
three forms of sexual 
abuse. Among these, 
39.58% were in the age 
group of 5–12years, 35.59 
% in the age group of 15–
18 years and 24.83% in the 
age group of 13–15 years. 
From the data available, 
analysis revealed that 
severe forms of sexual 
abuse crossed the 5% mark 
from the age of 10years, 
peaked at 15years and by 
the time the child reached 
18years, went below the 
5% mark. 73% of the total 
prevalence of child sexual 
abuse was reported among 
children between 11–18 
years of age. Therefore the 
pre-adolescent to the 
adolescent child seems to 
be the most at risk. The 
Report noted the 
disturbing data that 
children between 6–10 
years also face severe 
forms of sexual abuse. 
Children in Assam, 
Andhra Pradesh, Bihar 
and Delhi reported the 
highest prevalence of 
sexual assault in the 
categories of children of 
ages 15–18, 13–14 and 
5–12. Regarding Kerala, 
children within category 
of ages 13–14 reported 
the second highest 
prevalence in India, 
63.33% (topped by the 
Mizoram at 69.23%,), 
within the category of 
ages 15–18 at 13.33% 
and within the category 
of ages 5–12 at 23.33%. 
Regarding Goa, children 
within the category of 
ages 15–18 reported a 
prevalence of 50% and 
children within the 
category of ages 5–12 
reported a prevalence of 
50%. 
38.50% of these children 
were in the age group of 15–
18 years while 36.87 % were 
in the age group of 5–12 
years and remaining 24.62% 
in the age group of 13–14 
years. If compared with the 
prevalence of sexual assault, 
the percentage of children 
forced to fondle or touch 
private body parts continued 
to be high amongst children 
in the age groups of 5–12 
years and 15–18 years. 
Further in-depth analysis of 
data on children forced to 
touch or fondle private body 
parts revealed that one-
quarter of child respondents 
(25.41%) were in the age 
group of 5-10 years, which 
meant that every fourth child 
facing this form of abuse 
was in the age group of 5–10 
years. 
No data given The majority of cases 
(48.17%) were among 
children in the category of 
ages 5–12 years. This was 
followed by 28.02% among 
adolescents in the age group 
15–18 years and remaining 
23.81% in the age group of 
13–14 years. 
Age-wise data 
on State basis 
No data given No data given No data given No data given No data given 
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Gender-wise 
data 
20.90% of children who 
were subjected to severe 
forms of sexual abuse, 
57.30% were boys and 
42.70 % were girls. 
54.4% were boys and 
45.6% were girls. 
No data given 60.25% were boys and 
39.75% were girls. 
 
52.01% were boys and 
47.99% were girls. 
 
Gender-wise 
data on State 
basis 
No data given No data given No data given No data given No data given 
Class-wise or 
Evidence 
group-wise 
data 
No data given Children on the streets, 
children at work and 
children in institutional 
care reported the highest 
prevalence. 
Children on the streets, 
children at work and 
children in institutional care 
reported the highest 
prevalence. 
Working children reported 
the highest percentage 
(16.35%) of those being 
forced to exhibit private 
parts of the body followed 
by 15.10% by street 
children and 12.14% by 
children in institutional 
care. Interestingly, when 
examined within the total 
cases of children being 
forced to exhibit private 
body parts, about 25.86% 
were working children. 
The other evidence groups 
reporting high percentage 
of sexual assault were 
street children (22.32%) 
followed by children in 
school (18.89%). Among 
children in institutional 
care the percentage was 
17.40% and children in 
family environment not 
going to schoolwas 
reported at 15.52%. 
Children on the streets 
reported the highest 
prevalence rate at 5.39 %, 
followed by children in family 
environment not going to 
school at 5.27%, children at 
work (shop, factory or other 
places) at 4.75%, andchildren 
in institutional care at 4.68%. 
Children in school reported a 
low percentage of 2.80%. 
State-Wise 
data 
Assam reported the highest 
prevalence of sexual abuse 
of boys (62.55%) and girls 
(51.19%), followed by the 
Delhi with 54.66% boys 
No data given The highest prevalence was 
reported from Assam at 
43%, and the lowest 
prevalence from Goa 
(1.61%). The statistics of 
The highest percentage of 
prevalence was reported 
from Assam at 46%.The 
lowest percentage was 
from Goa (0.80%). Kerala 
The Report states that children 
in Andhra Pradesh, Assam, 
Bihar and Delhi reported the 
highest prevalence. However, 
the consolidated prevalence 
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and 22.54 % girls, and 
Bihar with 35.89% boys 
and 30.40% girls. Goa 
reported the lowest 
prevalence of sexual abuse 
in both boys (2.55%) and 
girls (2.17%), which is not 
in line with the general 
perception. Kerala reported 
severe forms of sexual 
abuse as 21.22% for boys 
and 13.84% for girls. 
Kerala were not shown in 
the Report. 
 
reported a prevalence of 
16.28% in the category of 
ages 5–12, 18.60 % in the 
category of ages 13–14 
and 65.12 % in the 
category of 15–18. 
figures were not given. Kerala 
reported a prevalence of 
25.81% for children in the 
category of ages 5–12, 
22.58% for children in the 
category of 13–14 and 51.61 
% regarding children in the 
category of 15–18. 
 
  
3. Consolidated data on the other forms of sexual abuse: 
50.76% of the respondents were subjected to other forms of sexual abuse. Over 50% of 
children faced more than two other forms of sexual abuse. 
3.1. Data breakup on the prevalence of other forms of sexual abuse 
The other forms of sexual abuse included forcible kissing, sexual advances made during 
travel and marriages and exposure to pornographic materials: 
a. Forcible kissing: 
21.06% of the respondents reported being forcibly kissed. Friends, classmates, uncles or 
neighbours were the main abusers. The majority of children (73.0%) did not report the 
matter. Out of those who reported the matter, the highest percentage (14.8%) told their 
parents about the incident, while 6.7% of them felt comfortable in sharing the incident with 
their brother or sisters. 
b. Sexual advances during travel: 
The Report cited the example of a crowded situation on a bus which creates an excuse for the 
abuser to get away. The Report stated that it is not surprising that children from all evidence 
groups had faced this situation: 27.9% of the respondents reported prevalence. Reporting 
continued to be low, as 64% children kept quiet or ignored the incident. Out of those 
reporting the matter, 13.1% reported to the bus conductor, 9.6% told their parents, 6.1% 
shared the incident with their brothers or sister. 
c. Sexual advances during marriage situations: 
11.32% of the respondents reported sexual advances during a marriage situation. When asked 
whether the child reported the incident, the majority of children responded that they either 
kept quiet or ignored or avoided the person. The Report reiterates here that in a marriage 
situation where there is general bonhomie, teasing and jokes all around, the chances of 
someone taking the child's reporting seriously are low. In many situations it is also difficult 
for the child to distinguish whether the abusive situation was meant to be a joke or was 
intended to take advantage of the child. 
d. Exhibition: children forced to view private body parts: 
16.97 % of the respondents admitted to being forced to view private body parts of abusers. 
Almost 79% of children chose to keep quiet when forced to do so. The abusers were friends, 
classmates, uncles and neighbours. 
e. Exposing children to pornographic materials: 
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30.22% of the respondents reported prevalence.80% responded that they did not report the 
matter. 
 
 
  
Table C Consolidated data on the other forms of sexual abuse 
 
TYPE OF 
ABUSE 
Consolidated data on other forms 
of sexual abuse 
Forcible kissing Sexual advances during 
travel situation 
Exhibition: children 
forced to view private 
body parts 
Exposing children to 
pornographic materials 
Age-wise data 38.24% were in the age group of 5–
12 years, 34.82 % in the age group 
of 15–18 years and 26.94% in the 
age group of 13–14 years. The 
study found that 63.64% of 
respondents in the age group of 15–
18 years, 52.43% in the age group 
of 13–14 years and 42.06% in the 
age group of 5–12 years were 
subjected to other forms of sexual 
abuse. The age chart depicts that 
while the other forms of sexual 
abuse began at the age of 5 years, it 
rose sharply from 10 years, peaked 
at 14 years and by the time the child 
reached 18 years, it went below the 
5% mark. 81.53% of the total 
prevalence of child sexual abuse 
was reported amongst children 
between 11–18 years of age. The 
Report noted that the pre-adolescent 
to the adolescent child seemed to be 
the most at risk. 
41.17% were in the 
age group of 5–12 
years, 25.73% in the 
age group of 13–14 
years and 33.10% in 
the age group of 15–
18 years. One in four 
girls reported being 
forcibly kissed. 
 
InKerala and Goa, children 
in age group of 5–12 years 
reported prevalence of 
20.89% and 40.87% 
respectively, prevalence of 
24.89% and 34.78% 
respectively in the category 
of ages 13–14, and 
prevalence of 54.22% and 
24.35% respectively in the 
category of ages 15–18. 
 
38.67% were in the age 
group of 15–18 years, 
followed by 36.13% in 
the age group of 5–12 
years and the 
remaining 25.20 % in 
the age group of 13–14 
years. Assam (62.24%) 
reported the highest 
percentage of 
prevalence. The highest 
percentage of such 
cases in children in the 
age group of 15–18 
years were reported 
from Mizoram 
(60.85%) followed by 
Kerala (52.23%) and 
the lowest in Uttar 
Pradesh (23.91%). The 
percentage of children 
in the age group of 13–
14 years was highest in 
Goa (35.71%) and 
lowest in Andhra 
Pradesh (21.69%). 
34.86% were in the age 
group of 5–12 years, 26.12% 
in the age group of 13–14 
years and 39.02% in the age 
group of 15–18 years. The 
highest prevalence rate was 
reported from Assam 
(64.72%).The highest 
percentage of boys (86.70%) 
was from Kerala followed 
by Goa (80.70%). 66.1 % 
were shown dirty pictures by 
their friends and classmates, 
followed by uncles and 
neighbours (13.1%). 
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TYPE OF 
ABUSE 
Consolidated data on other forms 
of Sexual Abuse 
Forcible kissing Sexual advances during 
travel situation 
Exhibition- children 
forced to view private 
body parts 
Exposing children to 
pornographic materials 
Age-wise data 
on State basis 
  The Report found that the 
highest percentage of cases 
of children in the age group 
of 5–12 was reported from 
Goa at 56%, and the highest 
percentage of cases of 
children in the age group of 
15–18 years was reported 
from Kerala (52.22%), 
Assam (48.37%) and 
Mizoram (45%).Regarding 
Kerala and Goa, prevalence 
in the category of children in 
the age group of 5–12 was 
15.56% and 56% 
respectively, prevalence in 
the age group of 13–15 was 
32.22% and 12% 
respectively and prevalence 
in the age group of 15–18 is 
52.22% and 32% 
respectively. 
Regarding the 
prevalence in the 
various categories for 
the Kerala and Goa, 
children in the 5–12 
age category had a 
prevalence of 14.65% 
and 21.43% 
respectively, 33.12% 
and 35.71% 
respectively for the 
category of 13–14 and 
52.23% and 42.86% 
respectively for the 
category of 15–18 age 
group. 
 
Gender-wise 
data 
53.07% were boys and 46.93 % 
were girls. 
44.98 % were boys 
and 55.02% were 
girls. 
39.11% were boys and 
60.89% were girls. Of these, 
37.25% were in the age 
group of 5–12 years, 27.61% 
in the age group of 13–14 
years and 35.14 % in the age 
group of 15–18 years. The 
Report found that more girls 
faced sexual abuse of the 
form of rubbing private body 
parts against the shoulder of 
the child during travel as 
compared to boys. 
55.58 % were boys and 
44.42 % were girls. 
67.03% were boys and 
32.97% were girls. 
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TYPE OF 
ABUSE 
Consolidated data on other forms 
of Sexual Abuse 
Forcible kissing Sexual advances during 
travel situation 
Exhibition- children 
forced to view private 
body parts 
Exposing children to 
pornographic materials 
Gender-wise 
data on State 
basis 
No data given No data given The highest percentage of 
89.36% of girls was from 
Madhya Pradesh. The 
Report cites Kerala to be on 
the higher mark with 
57.18% of girls reporting 
prevalence. The highest 
percentage of prevalence 
sexual advances in marriage 
functions upon boys was 
from Delhi at 75.14%. 
No data given No data given 
Class-wise or 
Evidence 
group-wise 
data 
No data given Children at work and 
street continued to 
report higher 
percentage, 25.68% 
and 21.99%, 
respectively. The 
Report observed that 
the high percentage 
(21.04%) of children 
in family 
environment 
reporting forcible 
kissing is a cause of 
concern. Children in 
institutional care 
reported 18.64%, 
followed by children 
in schools at 18.50%. 
 
No data given 
 
The highest prevalence 
pertained to children at 
work (shop, factory or 
other places) at 
21.24%,children on the 
streets at 
20.32%,children in 
family environment not 
going to school at 
16.21%, children in 
institutional care at 
14.12% and children in 
schools at 13.74 %. 
While the percentages of 
working children (37.84%) 
and children on the streets 
(31.06%) reported higher 
prevalence rates of being 
shown dirty pictures as 
compared with the other 
three evidence groups, it is 
clear all children faced such 
abuse, with children in 
family environment not 
going to school at 28.62%, 
children in schools at 
27.51% and children in 
institutional care at 26.34%. 
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TYPE OF 
ABUSE 
Consolidated data on other forms 
of Sexual Abuse 
Forcible kissing Sexual advances during 
travel situation 
Exhibition- children 
forced to view private 
body parts 
Exposing children to 
pornographic materials 
State-Wise 
data 
Assam reported the highest 
percentage of sexual abuse 
(86.26%) of those children who 
faced one or more other forms of 
sexual abuse, followed by Andhra 
Pradesh (72.83%), Delhi (72.26%) 
and Bihar (67.64%). Kerala 
reported a percentage of 44.80% 
while Goa reported 34.06%. The 
lowest percentage was found in 
Rajasthan at 29.36%. 
 
Among children in 
the category of 13–14 
years, Mizoram 
(57.89%) and Kerala 
(54.13 %) had the 
highest incidence. 
The percentage of 
children in the 15–18 
age group was 
constantly high in 
Kerala in all severe 
forms of sexual abuse 
and the same trend 
continues even in the 
other forms of sexual 
abuse. Regarding 
Kerala and Goa, the 
prevalence of forcible 
kissing among 
children in the 
category of ages 5–12 
is 15% and 44% 
respectively, that of 
children in the 
category of ages 13–
14 is 30.71% and 
28.00 % respectively, 
and that of children in 
the category of ages 
15–18 is 54.29% and 
28% respectively. 
 
No data given No data given No data given 
 
  
2.B.3.f. Deb & Walsh (2012) 
In a study by Deb & Walsh in 2012 regarding the pervasiveness and impact of physical, 
psychological, and sexual violence on the social adjustment of Grades 8 and 9 school 
children in the state of Tripura, findings revealed that 18.1% of students experienced sexual 
violence at home, of which girls were more often victims. 
2.B.3.g. Krishnakumar, Satheesan, Geeta, & Sureshkumar (2014) 
This study included 1,614 adolescents in Grades 11 and 12 of 17 randomly selected schools 
in 12 of the 14 districts of Kerala. Among the adolescents, 1,610 were in the 15–18 age group 
and 4 of them were 19 years of age. They included 688 (43%) boys and 926 (57%) girls. 
Overall, 570 (35.3%) reported experiencing one or more forms of sexual abuse. Among the 
girls, 324 (35%) and among the boys 246 (36 %) reported lifetime experience of sexual 
abuse. Most instances were sexual advances which occurred during travel in a bus or train. 
Forcible kissing, forcing to touch private parts, taking nude photographs and exhibiting 
pornographic pictures were the most common experiences mentioned. Adolescents who had 
no experience of sexual abuse other than exposure to pornographic pictures were not included 
in calculating the total prevalence of sexual abuse. 
2.B.4. Incidence of reported child sexual abuse to the police: The NCRB reports 
 
The National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) is the governmental agency which is 
responsible for maintaining the statistics of incidence of crime. In the absence of any other 
governmental agency recording child sexual abuse statistics, as well as the absence of any 
reporting agency other than police stations – which continues to be the official crime-
reporting machinery in India under the POCSO – it is the NCRB reports that have 
traditionally been used to find out the incidence of reported crimes. 
From 2001 to 2013, excluding rape of girl children, all other crimes affecting children under 
sections 354, 377 and 509 of the IPC were clubbed along with other crimes. Hence it is not 
possible to get specific data on the incidence of child sexual abuse against boy children in 
India in the NCRB Reports until 2013. The 2014 NCRB Report has provided clear statistics 
regarding the status of crime in India, including the disposal of cases as well as persons 
arrested for various crimes by the police and the courts, which is discussed in the next sub-
section. 
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The data presented in the next sub-section demonstrates that true prevalence data contrasts 
significantly with the recorded crime data. The 2007 MWCD Report, as well as other smaller 
studies, has clearly demonstrated greater prevalence of various kinds of sexual abuse of 
children. 
2.B.4.a. The 2014 and 2015 NCRB statistics 
This discusses the data regarding incidence of crimes against children during 2014 and 2015 
as registered in police stations in India. From 2014, data demonstrates a patent departure from 
earlier precedents, which shows that the government is finally taking crimes against children 
seriously. 
(1) Sections 375 and 376 IPC: 
In 2014, the rate of rape of girl children was at 3.1 % per lakh of population. Kerala had a 
rate of 8.1%, Goa at 11%. The highest rate of incidence was in Mizoram at 24.5%.56 In 2015, 
the rate of rape of girl children was at 2.4%. Kerala and Goa had rates at 7.7% and 9.6% 
respectively. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands had the highest rate at 19.1%, followed by 
Delhi at 16.6%.57 
(2) Section 354 IPC: 
Section 354 IPC comprises of offences pertaining to assault on women (girl children) with 
intent to outrage their modesty (sexual harassment, assault or use of criminal force to gir l 
children with intent to disrobe, voyeurism, stalking, others).The incidence rate in 2014 was 
2.5% per lakh of population. Kerala had a rate of 2.1% while Goa was at 7.7%. The highest 
incidence was found in Delhi at 19.1%, followed by Mizoram at 8.6%, Madhya Pradesh at 
8.1% and Tripura at 7.4%. In 2015, the rate was 1.9%, with Kerala at 2.6% and Goa at 5.4%. 
The highest incidence is seen in Delhi at 15.6%, followed by the Andaman and Nicobar 
Islands at 8.8%. 
(3) Section 377 IPC: 
The total incidence of unnatural offences against children for 2014 was at a rate of 0.2%. 
Kerala registered a rate of 1.1%, Goa had 0% incidence. Mizoram registered a rate of 1.1 %. 
Haryana had the highest rate at 1.2 %.For 2015, the rate of incidence was at 0.1%, with 
                                                        
56 Chapter 6, Crime in India, 2014 
57 Chapter 6, Crime in India, 2015 
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Kerala at 0.4% and Goa at 0.1%. Haryana also registered an incidence rate of 0.4%, with 
Punjab at 3%. 
(4) Section 509 IPC: 
For 2014, the offence of insulting the modesty of women (girl children) attracted a rate of 
0.1% per lakh of population in India, with Kerala at 0%. Goa had the highest rate of 1.2 %, 
followed by Delhi at 1%. For 2015, the rate was 0.8 %, with Kerala at 0.1% and Goa at 0.2%. 
The highest rate was recorded in Delhi at 0.9%, followed by Telangana at 0.5%. 
(5) Offences under the POCSO : 
For 2014, specific data was available regarding the offences under five heads: section 6 
(punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault), section 8 (punishment for sexual 
assault), section 10 (punishment for aggravated sexual assault), section 14 (punishment for 
using a child for pornographic purposes), section 15 (punishment for storage of pornographic 
material involving child), as well as ‘Others’. The rate of crime was 2.0% per lakh of 
population. In Kerala the rate was 4.7%. In Goa the rate was 0.8%. Mizoram and Sikkim had 
the highest rates of 11.3% and 11.4 % respectively. In 2015, the rate was 3.3%, with Kerala 
at 5.5 % and Goa at 0%. The highest incidence rate was recorded at Mizoram with 30.7%, 
followed by Sikkim at 26.6%. 
The NCRB Reports in 2014 and 2015 demonstrate that clear statistics regarding crimes of 
sexual abuse against children are being gathered, which will help collate authentic data on the 
incidence rates of child sexual abuse. However, there is no clear data collection mechanisms 
for monitoring prevalence trends. This confirms the connection to disclosure/ non-disclosure, 
social taboos, family inhibitions and the other impediments – but it also links with problems 
in the justice system. 
The following is a comparative table of statistics for 2014 and 2015 based on the NCRB 
reports regarding sexual offences against children: 
Table D -Comparison of NCRB statistics for 2014 and 2015. 
 2014 2015 
Sections 375,376 
IPC 
3.1 % 2.4% 
Section 354IPC 2.5% 1.9% 
Section 377IPC 0.2 % 0.1% 
Section 509IPC 0.1% 0.8 % 
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Offences under 
POCSO 
2.0% 3.3% 
Is there a higher prevalence of child sexual abuse of boys in India? 
Prevalence rates of child sexual abuse from a gender perspective differs from global 
prevalence which records higher rates for girl children. According to the MWCD Report of 
2007, the prevalence rate of all types of sexual abuse of boys in India is higher than that of 
girls. The overall percentage of boys being abused was 52.94%, which is higher than that of 
girls at 47.06%, even though the statistics may have differed if boys viewing “dirty pictures” 
is not taken as an index belonging to the “other forms of sexual abuse”. Among the 20.90% 
of children who were subjected to severe forms of sexual abuse, 57.30% were boys and 
42.70% were girls. The TULIR report (2006) also recorded higher prevalence of sexual abuse 
of boys in a sample in Chennai. The Krishnakumar, Satheesan, Geeta and Sureshkumar 
(2014) study found that boys and girls are at equal risk in Kerala. These findings are contrary 
to meta-analyses of the international literature which estimate a higher incidence of sexual 
abuse among girls than boys – almost double the rate. However, the study by Deb & Walsh 
(2012) recorded higher prevalence rates for girl children in a small sample in the state of 
Tripura, which is in accordance with global prevalence trends. This study produced statistics 
consistent with international studies regarding gender (25% girls against 11.3% boys). It may 
be pertinent to note that this state was not included among the sample of states examined in 
the 2007 MWCD Report. 
 
One reason for a higher incidence of sexual abuse being recorded for boys in the 2007 
MWCD Report could be the taking of the indicia “Exposing children to pornographic 
materials”. The Report states:: “It would be important to note that the question was only 
limited to dirty pictures and it did not cover exposure to other pornographic materials.”58 
What exactly was meant by the term “dirty pictures” has not been defined. The Report goes 
on to state that 30.22% of the respondents reported incidence, of which 67.03% were boys 
and 32.97% were girls. 34.86% were in the age group of 5–12 years, 26.12 % in the age 
group of 13–14 years and 39.02% in the age group of 15–18 years. 66.1% were shown “dirty 
pictures” by their friends and classmates, followed by uncles and neighbours (13.1%). The 
highest group reporting incidence of this kind of abuse was among boys in the 15–18 age 
group. Whether consensual exposure of children in this age group to pornographic material 
by children of their own age group can be classified as sexual abuse reflects the difficulty in 
                                                        
58Supra n. 26 at 93. 
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formulation of the definition of child sexual abuse when the abuser and victim belong to the 
same peer group. Interestingly, the study by Krishnakumar et al. (2014), which omitted 
adolescents in Kerala who had no experience of sexual abuse other than exposure to “ugly 
pictures” in calculating the total prevalence of sexual abuse, puts equal prevalence of sexual 
abuse among both boys and girls. 
2.B.5. Conclusion 
The 2007 MWCD Report shows that children in the pre-adolescent to adolescent ages are the 
most vulnerable. There seems to be a higher prevalence of sexual abuse of boys. However, 
effective policy changes have not been made to create awareness, nor have structural changes 
in the criminal justice machinery been made to address the issue and punish offenders. The 
issue of female sex offenders has not been sufficiently studied so as to bring about scientific 
analysis of data and subsequent law reform. 
While analysis of global data shows that low socio-economic status does not play a relevant 
role in causing risk of child sexual abuse, the MWCD Report shows larger prevalence of 
child sexual abuse among children at work, children on the streets and children in 
institutional care. As the majority of respondents in the five evidence groups were comprised 
of children from the lower economic strata, a broad presumption cannot be made that 
children from economically disadvantaged groups run greater risk of sexual abuse. The RAHI 
(1998) and TULIR (2006) studies, which were conducted with respondents belonging to 
middle and upper classes, have also shown high prevalence rates. A comparison of these 
three studies may lead to the conclusion that socio-economic status does not play a relevant 
role in child sexual abuse. 
 
2.C. EFFECTS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 
 
Child sexual abuse results in various adverse effects on the victim. Studies on the 
psychopathological effects of child sexual abuse have been conducted, some of which are 
discussed in this section. Some studies have been conducted regarding the effects of the legal 
system upon a victim of child sexual abuse. The aim of this research is to formulate 
mechanisms for better protection of the victim from the distressing consequences emanating 
from submitting to the criminal justice system, leading to protection from subsequent re-
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victimisation. The following sections explain various studies into the psychopathological 
effects of child sexual abuse. 
2.C.1. Studies on the psychopathological effects of child sexual abuse 
Children who experience sexual abuse often suffer numerous adverse consequences, although 
the nature, severity and extent vary for each individual. Effects of abuse have been classified 
as short term and long term (Wyatt & Powell, 1988). Short-term effects include depression, 
suicide, sexual promiscuity, victim-perpetrator cycle, and academic underachievement 
(Paolucci, Genuis, & Violato, 2001). The long-term impact of child sexual abuse in 
adulthood may involve depression, low self-esteem, anger, anxiety, obsessions and 
compulsions, sexual dysfunctions, self-mutilation, suicidal tendencies, dissociation, substance 
abuse problems, relationship problems and multiple psychiatric disorders (Chen et al., 2010). 
Externalizing problems like sexual behaviour problems, hyperactivity, aggression, Attention 
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, higher levels of hyperactivity and aggression and high 
prevalence of conduct disorder in sexually abused children are commonly reported among 
children with a history of child sexual abuse. Internalising disorders are depression and 
anxiety, like phobias, separation anxiety disorder and obsessive –compulsive disorder (Trask, 
Walsh, & Delillo, 2011). More serious consequences are caused by certain aspects of the 
abuse (sexual abuse within the family, ongoing and multiple episodes, the use of force, 
methods used to gain child secrecy, and multiple perpetrators), legal system involvement (a 
case that results in acquittal), and lack of maternal support and maternal use of avoidant 
coping mechanisms (Corcoran & Pillai, 2008). Debilities like deafness, blindness, and mental 
retardation have found to be associated with increased risk of being sexually abused. Adverse 
physical and mental health effects often continue through adult life (Spataro, Moss, & Wells, 
2004) and some victims become offenders (Salter et al., 2003). 
Use of rigorous definitions to explore health sequelae, isolating the exact acts experienced, 
the identity of the abuser, the duration and frequency of the acts, use of force or threats, and 
age of onset to inform conclusions about the association between specific manifestations of 
child sexual abuse and health sequelae have contributed to better understanding of the effects 
of child sexual abuse. 
This section discusses systemic reviews of literature and meta-analyses of statistics of the 
effects of child sexual abuse. The results of such reviews highlight the urgency of the need to 
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prevent such abuse from happening, as well as the need for policy to enable multiple health 
services to combat the various psychopathological effects of sexual abuse upon children. 
2.C.1.a. Systemic reviews on the psychopathological effects of child sexual abuse 
Many studies have been conducted on the effects of sexual abuse. 
Tricket, Noll, & Putnam (2011) conducted a 23-year longitudinal study of the impact of intra-
familial sexual abuse on female development. The conceptual framework integrated concepts 
of psychological adjustment with theory regarding how psychobiological factors might 
impact development. Results indicated that sexually abused females showed earlier onsets of 
puberty, cognitive deficits, depression, dissociative symptoms, maladaptive sexual 
development, hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal attenuation, asymmetrical stress responses, high 
rates of obesity, more major illnesses and healthcare utilization, persistent PTSD, self-
mutilation, physical and sexual re-victimization, being involved with an abusive partner, 
becoming a teen mother, having a premature baby, risky sexual activity, abuse of drugs and 
alcohol, experiencing more lifetime traumas, and failing to complete high school. As parents, 
they place their children at increased risk for abuse and neglect and overall mal-development 
as they repeat generational patterns of abuse, neglect, and family dysfunction. 
Mills, Kisely, Alati, Strathearn, & Najman (2016) recently found that both self-reported and 
agency-notified child sexual abuse were associated with increased odds of lifetime major 
depressive disorder (MDD), anxiety disorders, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 
Adverse psychiatric outcomes are seen when child sexual abuse is defined using either self-
report or agency-notified method. 
Negriff, Schneiderman, Smith, Schreyer, & Trickett (2014) cautioned against combining all 
of the sexually abused youth into one group, as this would discount the nuances of their 
experiences and the impact these different characteristics may have on the development of 
subsequent problems. Without first examining and describing the characteristics of the sexual 
abuse that these youth experienced, certain sub-groups of youth who may exhibit resilience to 
these adverse early life experiences may be excluded. Information gleaned from these 
analyses should be used to examine the mental health, physical heath, and behavioural 
functioning of the sexually abused youth in this sample. 
Trickett, Noll, & Putnam (2001) in a homogenous group of maltreated children (all females, 
all intrafamilial sexual abuse involving genital contact or penetration) found that differences 
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in the abuse experience are important to understanding both acute and long-term behaviour 
problems and adjustments. 
Trickett & Putnam (1993) stated that the experience of sexual abuse can be expected to result 
in low self-esteem, an impaired sense of control and competence, and increased negative 
effect. Two reasons were given: first, the fact that the traumatic events are brought about by 
outside forces, which causes feelings of loss of control, which grow into feelings of 
incompetence. Second, the trauma of sexual abuse disrupts several of the intra-psychic 
conditions that promote cognitive development, like a loss in achievement levels due to 
decreased motivation to please others, and attention problems and memory lapse caused by 
increased dissociation. The stress produced by the trauma of child sexual abuse will have 
physiological effects on the developing child, which include patterns of hormonal levels that 
are associated with high levels of sexual and aggressive behaviour. These same physiological 
mechanisms may affect the timing of puberty in sexually abused girls, like early onset of 
puberty. 
2.C.1.b. Meta-analyses 
The following are meta-analyses which have studied the psychopathological effects of child 
sexual abuse. 
2.C.1.b.i. Paolucci, Genuis, &Violato (2001) 
 
Paolucci, Genuis, & Violato (2001) conducted a meta-analysis of 37 published research 
studies from 1981 to 1995 on the effects of child sexual abuse for six outcomes: PTSD, 
depression, suicide, sexual promiscuity, victim-perpetrator cycle and poor academic 
performance. Many of these studies were published in 1994 and most were done in the 
United States. The analyses provided clear evidence confirming the link between child sexual 
abuse and subsequent negative short- and long-term effects on development. There were no 
statistically significant differences when various potentially mediating variables such as 
gender, socio-economic status, type of abuse, age when abused, relationship to perpetrator, 
and number of abuse incidents were assessed. It was stated by Paolucci, Genuis, & Violato 
(2001) that the results of their meta-analysis supported the multifaceted model of 
traumatization rather than a specific sexual abuse syndrome of child sexual abuse. 
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Paolucci, Genuis, & Violato (2001) detailed the effects of child sexual abuse. They referred 
to material where, despite a lack of theoretical and empirical support, proponents of child and 
adult sexual relationships have argued that sexual interests and behaviors of adults with 
children should be considered acceptable, normal and healthy expressions that affirm a 
child’s sense of personal worth, independence and sexual power. There is also opinion that 
these “diverse” experiences are believed to enable children to construct their own sexuality 
from greater possibilities and thereby foster healthy child development. However, Paolucci, 
Genuis, & Violato (2001) pointed to numerous empirical studies investigating the 
developmental impact of sexual abuse on children and adolescents which indicate that many 
symptoms of maladjustment and maladaptation are associated with the experience of sexual 
abuse. Most frequently reported are problems of depression, anxiety and other internalising 
disorders,as well as externalising problems such as dissociation, conduct disorders, 
aggressiveness and inapproporiate or early sexual behaviour and activity. Some of the 
difficulties reported by child sexual abuse victims are sexual maladjustment, interpersonal 
problems, educational difficulties, acute anxiety neuroses, self-destructive acts, somatic 
symptoms, and loss of self-esteem. PTSD symptoms and sexualised behaviours are among 
the most frequently reported effects. 
The meta-analysis by Paolucci, Genuis, & Violato (2001) provides compelling eidence of the 
negtive impact of child sexual abuse on human development, as it is associated with the 
development of sexual prosmiscuity, victim perpetrator cycle and poor academic 
performance regardless of victim age, gender or socio-economic status. This study classifies 
child sexual abuse as an important social, politial and mental health problem which requires 
urgent action. 
2.C.1.b.ii. Nelson, Heath, Madden, Cooper, Dinwiddie, Bucholz, Glowinski, 
McLaughlin, Dunne, Statham, & Martin (2002) 
 
Nelson, Heath, Madden, Cooper, Dinwiddie, Bucholz, Glowinski, McLaughlin, Dunne, 
Statham, & Martin (2002) conducted a twin study involving a large sample of young adult 
Australian same-sex twins (1,159 female and 832 male) and found that 16.7 % of the women 
and 5.4% of the men reported parental alcohol-related problems. Significantly increased risk 
was observed in women reporting a history of child sexual abuse for eight adverse outcomes, 
namely major depression, suicide attempt, conduct disorder, alcohol dependence, nicotine 
dependence, social anxiety, rape after the age of 18 years and divorce; most similar risks 
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reached statistical significance in men. The greatest risks were associated with child sexual 
abuse involving intercourse. Childhood sexual abuse-negative twins from childhood sexual 
abuse-discordant pairs compared with other child sexual abuse–negative individuals had 
increased risk for many adverse outcomes suggesting correlated family background risk 
factors. Childhood sexual abuse-positive members of child sex abuse-discordant pairs had 
significantly greater risk for all eight examined adverse outcomes than their co-twins. Nelson 
et al. (2002) concluded that self-reported childhood sexual abuse was associated with 
increased risk for adverse outcomes, controlling for family background. Family background 
risk factors were associated with adverse outcome risk. 
2.C.1.c.iii. Tyler (2002): 
Tyler (2002) reviewed 41 articles examining the social and emotional outcomes of childhood 
sexual abuse. The outcomes examined included suicide and substance use, gang involvment, 
pregnancy, running away, PTSD, risky sexual behaviour and behavioural problems. The 
results for each of these outcomes tended to vary by developmental period. However, 
problems of internalizing and externalizing behaviour appeared to be specific to sexually 
abused children of all age groups. Tyler stated that some studies found differences in 
outcome according to gender, race and age. Although findings related to abuse 
characterisitics varied from study to study, the severity of the abuse, use of force and victim’s 
relationship to the perpetrator were found to be especially important. Other factors, such as 
family support and parental monitoring, were found to mitigate a negative outcome. Tyler 
summarised the effects by developmental period through the following chart: 
Table E: Effects of child sexual abuse based on Developmental Period of children: Tyler 
(2002) 
Developmental 
period 
Domain Findings 
Early childhood Social and 
emotional 
development 
Inappropriate sexual behaviour, internalizing, 
externalizing 
Middle childhood Social and 
emotional 
development 
 
Depression, suicidal ideation, PTSD, sexual anxiety, 
inappropriate sexual behaviour, internalizing, externalizing 
Adolescence Social and 
emotional 
development 
 
Risky sexual behaviour, depression, suicidal thoughts, suicide, 
internalizing(e.g., low self-esteem), PTSD 
externalizing (e.g., anti-social behaviour), substance use, gang 
involvement, pregnancy, running away 
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2.C.1.d.iv. Chen, Murad, Paras, Colbenson, Sattler, Goranson, Elamin, Seime, 
Shinozaki, Prokop, & Zirakzadeh (2010): 
A comprehensive search (from January 1980–December 2008, all age groups, any language, 
any population) of 9 databases: MEDLNE, EMBASE, CINAHL, Current Contents, 
PsycINFO, ACP Journal Club, CCTR, CDSR, and DARE was conducted in this study. This 
search yielded 37 eligible studies, 17 case-control and 20 cohort, with 3,162,318 participants. 
There was a statistically significant association between sexual abuse and a lifetime diagnosis 
of anxiety disorder, depression, eating disorders, post-traumatic stress disorder, sleep 
disorders, and suicide attempts. Associations persisted regardless of the victim's sex or the 
age at which abuse occurred. Associations between sexual abuse and depression, eating 
disorders, and PTSD were strengthened by a history of rape. A history of sexual abuse is 
associated with an increased risk of a lifetime diagnosis of multiple psychiatric disorders. 
2.C.2. The Indian situation: Studies about the psychopathological effects of child sexual 
abuse in victims 
The number of studies on prevalence and effects of child sexual abuse are few. The MWCD 
Report in 2007 did not study the effects of abuse upon children. Large-scale data on the 
subject is therefore absent. The limited studies in India have found adverse effects on child 
victims of sexual abuse. This section deals with the effects which have been documented by 
researchers. Some researchers offer suggestions regarding how these effects can be 
minimised. 
With regard to the effects of sexual abuse in India, a study conducted by Pagare (2003) 
investigated the maltreatment histories of 72 boys in an observation home in Delhi. In the 
study, 38.1% disclosed a history of sexual abuse, with most perpetrators unknown to the 
victims. Signs of physical abuse were observed in 23.8% of the sample, and behavioural and 
emotional challenges were evident in 16.3%. The relatively few symptoms noted might be 
explained by the boys' efforts to conceal their symptoms to avoid the stigma and social 
ostracism that can be experienced by male victims. 
A study conducted by Deb & Sen ((2005) in India points to high levels of trauma and post-
traumatic stress among trafficked children. This study documented that due to the lack of 
adequate medical and mental-health care, many children do not receive treatment and thus 
experience the long-term ramifications of severe psychological trauma. 
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A study in Kolkata, West Bengal conducted by Chatterjee, Chakraborty, Srivastava, & Deb 
(2006) examined characteristics of sexually trafficked children. Many mental, physical, and 
social challenges were noted, specifically depression, loss of interest in daily living, and 
loneliness. Furthermore, 14.6% of the children in the study had HIV/AIDS. Many children 
faced rejection by their family members and communities. 
 
A study conducted in Kolkata, West Bengal by Deb & Mukherjee (2011) examined the 
psychological, social and emotional adjustment of 120 sexually abused girls (ages 13-18) 
who were living in either observation or rehabilitation homes. The majority of the girls, who 
lived in rural environments, left their homes believing they were going to be married or 
provided with a job, only to be sold as child sex workers, prostitutes, bar girls, dancers. The 
experience of abuse correlated with violence in the home, substance abuse, and maternal 
unemployment status. Over half of the girls no longer had communication with their families. 
Many of the girls’ families wanted them to return home upon finding them, yet the majority 
of girls stated that they did not want to return home. Mental health inventories indicated high 
levels of depression and anxiety as well as low self-esteem in the sample. Many of the girls 
believed that counselling was helpful. 
 
Another study was conducted by Deb & Walsh (2012) among school children in Tripura 
regarding the impact of physical, psychological and sexual violence on social adjustment. 
The social adjustment scores of school children who experienced violence, regardless of the 
nature of the violence, was significantly lower when compared with scores of those who had 
not experienced violence. Social adjustment was poorer for girls than boys. 
 
A study in Western Madhya Pradesh by Sahay (2010) investigated the experiences of 
sexually abused girls and their families. The reactions of the girls' families to the discovery of 
child sexual abuse often caused re-traumatisation and hindered their healing process. Many 
families, wanting to avoid the stigma of sexual abuse, forced the girls to remain silent about 
their experiences. Furthermore, girls were expected to deny their need for medical or mental 
health services. Even if legal action was taken against the perpetrators, families still expected 
their daughters to forgive the offender and “forget” the abuse. Yet, according to Sahay, the 
girls in the study felt it was impossible to “forgive and forget”. This study highlighted the 
complex familial and social factors that influence the well-being and healing process of 
female victims of child sexual abuse. 
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The Krishnakumar et al. (2014) study which was conducted on sexual abuse of adolescents 
between the ages of 15–19 in Kerala found that feelings of insecurity and isolation at home, 
of being disliked by parents, and of being depressed were significantly more in adolescents 
who had experienced sexual abuse, compared to those who had not. 
Priyabadini (2007), Carson, Foster, & Tripathi (2013) and Carson, Foster, & Chowdhury 
(2014) point out that failure of parents or caregivers to believe and act to protect children 
exacerbates their level of distress (namely, betrayal trauma) and prevents children from 
receiving the mental health treatment they may desperately need. 
Children in India share the effects of physical and mental trauma with similarly situated 
children in other parts of the world where larger studies have been conducted. Yet, it can be 
seen that in sexually abused Indian children the physical and mental torture is multiplied, as 
such children are prevented from disclosing abuse due to heavy social ostracism, which 
compounds the problem. 
2.C.3. Effects of the legal system upon children 
With regard to studies on rape victims, Campbell (1998) found that even for survivors who 
had the assistance of a rape victim advocate, 67% had their legal cases dismissed, and 80% of 
the time this decision was made by legal personnel and contradicted the victim’s wishes to 
prosecute the assault. Most rape victims whose cases were prosecuted were more distressed 
than those whose cases were not prosecuted (Cluss, Boughton, Frank, Stewart, &West, 1983). 
Survivors held positive attitudes toward investigating officers, but were frustrated by the 
overall response of the criminal justice system (Frazier & Haney, 1996).Studies on rape 
victims show that such victims may turn to the legal, medical, and mental health systems for 
assistance, but there is a growing body of literature indicating that many survivors are denied 
help by these agencies. What help victims do receive often leaves them feeling re-victimized. 
These negative experiences have been termed "the second rape" or "secondary victimization" 
(Campbell & Raja, 1999).The same findings seem applicable to children too. 
A common occurrence in an Indian courtroom is the scenario where lawyers repeatedly 
interrogate a child to narrate violent instances such as sexual assault, not realising the 
damaging effect such a legal methodology would have on a child (Sharma, 2005).Children 
have reported that the experience of being “protected” by services was, at times, more 
traumatic than the alleged abuse (Mudaly & Goddard, 2006). 
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Studies on children reveal those aspects of the criminal justice system that children found 
most distressing, which include their contact with the defense counsel, the experience of 
attending court and testifying, the perceived fairness of court procedures and outcomes, and 
the impact of court delays on their emotional state and personal safety. Methods to contain 
such distress include the need to address systemic delays for court procedures and the 
environment to be child-friendly, for systems to be established which will protect children 
from contact with the abuser, psychological support for children and their families, and 
specialist training in child sexual abuse for police and lawyers (Connon et al., 2011). 
2.C.3.1. Access to mental health support systems 
 
The introduction of adequate mental health support systems is necessary in the Indian context 
in order to prevent re-victimisation of the child by the criminal justice system. Studies have 
pointed out the dire need for removal of “structural barriers” with regard to the lack of access 
to adequate physical and mental health support systems. Access to mental health support for 
both the child and the non-offending family members makes the passage through disclosure, 
evaluation and examination and often involvement with social workers and the police less 
onerous and has been shown to positively impact long-term emotional outcomes (Heger, 
2014). 
Moirangthem, Kumar, & Math (2015) point out that the role of mental health professional is 
crucial in interviewing the child when in court. As the definitive signs of genital trauma are 
seldom seen in cases of child sexual abuse, the evaluation of child sexual abuse victim 
requires special skills and techniques in history taking, forensic interviewing and medical 
examination. Since child sexual abuse can result in both short-term and long-term harmful 
mental health consequences, mental health professionals need to be involved in follow-up 
care of the victim with regard to emergence of psychiatric disorders by providing individual 
counselling, family therapy and rehabilitation. 
In India, adverse effects of child abuse can be combated by making available counsellors 
with specialized training in childhood trauma, including sexual abuse. Vocational and social 
skills training skills training is also essential (Deb & Mukherjee, 2011). In India, a policy of 
employment of trained psychologists in schools is still in its infancy. It is not mandatory to 
have a trained counsellor in school. A statement by the Indian School Psychology 
Association in 2010 aspires to appoint at least one trained school psychologist in each school. 
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Deb & Walsh (2012) comment that meeting this goal will require enormous professional 
effort and political will.59 
In cases of legislations concerning children and their rights, mental health considerations 
must become an inextricable component of law, and therapists must be included in the legal 
framework for the future benefit of the child as a long-term remedy. Such an inclusion and 
institutionalisation would distant the risks attached to the common blunders committed by 
lawyers dealing with child victims in trauma (Sharma, 2005). Bajpai (2015) comments on the 
importance of therapeutic jurisprudence in Indian legislation on children and their rights. The 
psychological conditions of rescued and victimized children are not considered in Indian laws 
and in judgments. Mental health considerations must be an important component of law, and 
therapists must be included in the legal framework. The lawmakers, medical doctors, and 
judges must take the mental health concerns of the child into consideration. 
2.C.4. Conclusion 
 
The 2007 MWCD Report found that 53.22% of children have faced one of more forms of 
sexual abuse that included both “severe” and “other forms”. Prevalence of boys at 52.94% 
was much higher than that of girls at 47.06%. Multiple negative outcomes occur, with 
differences in outcome according to gender, race and age, along with the severity of the 
abuse, use of force and victim’s relationship to the perpetrator. Important mitigating factors 
included family support and parental monitoring. 
There have been no official studies from a national perspective regarding the effects of child 
sexual abuse. The 2007MWCD Report recorded data regarding the incidence and prevalence 
of various forms of child abuse, but did not record the effects of these. The print media in 
Kerala, after sensationalising cases of child sexual abuse, makes little attempt to explore 
further information regarding the sociological and psychological aspects of the offenders and 
the impact of such cases on society (Raj & Manikandan, 2013).60 This is true for the rest of 
                                                        
59Counselling services were available in only 9% of schools in India (Bhatnagar, 1997). The number of school 
psychologists in India was unknown. The world’s most child-populous countries (China, India, and Indonesia) 
have 379 million children with no access to school psychology services (Jimerson et al., 2009; Ying, Wu, & 
Lin, 2012). 
60 Raj & Manikandan (2013) attempted to analyze the prevalence of girl-child abuse in Kerala, a state which is 
often considered to be unique in India, having achieved a quality of life which is much higher than the rest of 
India and perhaps some industrialized countries. The frequent reporting of crimes against children made it 
significant to the prevalence of girl-child. Data was collected from the reports of two regional language daily 
newspapers – Mathrubhumi, Malayala Manorama– as well as from an English language newspaper- The Hindu. 
89 
 
India. Mere sensationalising by the media is not enough. Pressure must be put upon the 
government to undertake further research on the prevalence and effects of child sexual abuse 
as a policy matter, so as to facilitate the development of better preventive and curative 
mechanisms. 
Better physical and mental health outcomes through active involvement of multiple health 
care providers with the involvement of social workers and the police would make the passage 
of the child through the Indian legal system less traumatic. A synthesis of these studies show 
evidence of a dire need for access to mental health support for both the child and the non-
offending family members in order to make disclosure, evaluation and examination by the 
criminal justice system easier.   
                                                                                                                                                                            
Further information regarding the crime statistics was collected from National Crime Records Bureau and 
Kerala State Crime Records Bureau. The study showed that the incidence of girl-child abuse is greater than that 
being reported by media. In the majority of cases, the abuser/offender was an immediate family member (nearly 
36% of the time was the father). The ages of victims generally vary from 4 to 16 years. Out of 14 cases reported 
during the time period of six months (August 2012–January 2013), 5 victims were abused by their father. From 
the available information about the socio-economic status of the victims, the majority were from lower class 
families. The age of the abusers varies from 22 to 49 years. Based on the available information the majority of 
the abusers were from middle class families and upper class families. Some of them were reported to have 
severe alcohol consumption and one with mental disturbance. No other details regarding the abusers are given in 
any of the newspapers. 
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CHAPTER 3. SYNTHESIS OF LAWS OF THE INDIAN 
UNION AND GOA AND KERALA ON SEXUAL 
OFFENCES AGAINST CHILDREN 
3. I. Aims and objectives of this chapter 
Chapter 1 has dealt with the social science background regarding child sexual abuse. Chapter 
3 conducts a detailed synthesis of the Indian legislative and case law framework at a national 
level, and in Goa and Kerala, and compares these frameworks. It is this synthesis that helps 
draw out key issues for analysis in Chapter 4. 
 
This chapter discusses the existing legislation, case law and the Law Commission reports on 
child sexual abuse. It refers to constitutional law, substantive criminal law, procedural 
criminal law and the special law on sexual offences against children. The chapter traces the 
legal frameworks as they have developed. A key focus is on the nature of the 2013 
amendments to the Indian Penal Code 1860 (IPC), the Indian Evidence Act 1872, and Code 
of Criminal Procedure 1973 and their impact on laws related to sexual offences against 
children. 
 
Case law on the subject, both with regard to substantive as well as procedural aspects, is 
examined. Despite the slow evolution of a legal framework for protection of children’s rights 
against sexual abuse through case law, it is the positive contribution of new legislative 
models and case law to the child rights discourse that has helped in evolving mechanisms for 
protection against sexual abuse. Authoritative case law will be synthesised, especially where 
relevant to key legislative offences, to show problems in how the law does or does not enable 
prosecution of a range of sexual offences in national jurisdiction as well as in the jurisdiction 
of Goa, which possesses a separate legislation for prosecution of offences against children. 
There are a range of criminal offences that will be focussed on in this chapter: namely, 
sections 354, 375-377, and 509 IPC, as well as the six offences in sections 3-15 POCSO. The 
synthesis of the law will clarify that the POCSO created offences against children which are 
absent from the IPC. In fact, the offence of rape in the newly amended IPC is modelled on 
the provision punishing penetrative sexual assault in the POCSO. The POCSO also creates 
offences whereby sexual abuse of male children can be punished, unlike the IPC which 
continues to be absent provisions protecting boys from sexual abuse. Thus, the presence of 
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the POCSO extends the criminal law in many ways. Six key issues are identified as a result of 
this legal synthesis, which will be analysed at length in Chapter 4. 
3.II. The applicability of national laws, state laws, Supreme Court decisions and High 
Court decisions 
India is a federal state. It is divided into 28 states61 and 7 union territories62. Under the 
Government of India Act 1935 – a pre-Independence document enacted during the British 
rule – the word “Provinces” was used instead of States. However, the Constitution of India, 
which came into force in 1950, uses the word “States” to denote the provincial demarcation 
of territories within the Union of India. Having adopted the parliamentary form of 
government, the constitutional structure at the centre and in the states is the same.63 In India, 
the terms “federal law” and “provincial law” are not used. Instead, the terms 
“national/central/union law” are used to denote “federal law” and the terms “state law” or 
“regional law” is used to denote “provincial law”. 
 
The Union Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India (Art. 
245 of the Constitution of India). Though India is understood to be a federal state, the balance 
between the legislative powers of the Union Parliament and state legislatures tilts in favour of 
the Parliament.64 A law passed by Parliament applies to all states and union territories unless 
expressly stated in the jurisdiction clause. A law passed by a state legislature applies only to 
that state. In case of conflict between national law and state law, it is the national law which 
prevails, unless specific amendments are made to such national law by the state legislature, 
and such specific amendment would apply only to that state. 
India follows the common law system of adherence to precedents. The Indian Constitution is 
the supreme legal document, from which all statutory laws draw their authority. In all 
                                                        
61 All States have the same status under the Constitution of India. 
62 The Union Territories are areas which are centrally administered areas to be governed by the President acting 
through an Administrator.  
63Just like the Centre, each State has an executive, legislature and judiciary. The Executive Head of the Centre is 
the President assisted by the Prime Minister and his Council of Ministers. The legislative power is vested with 
Parliament. At the state level, the executive head is the Governor aided and assisted by the Chief Minister and 
the Council of Minister. Each state has a Legislature, of which some are bi-cameral and others unicameral. 
However, India has only one stream of judiciary headed by the Supreme Court of India. There are High Courts 
in each state, under which come the subordinate judiciary of the respective states. The Chief Justice of India is 
the head of the Indian judiciary, while each High Court is headed by a Chief Justice. 
64 The legislative powers of the Parliament and state legislatures are subject to the provisions of the Constitution 
of India viz: (1) the scheme of the distribution of powers; (2) the Fundamental Rights under Part III of the 
Constitution of India; (3) other provisions of the Constitution of India. 
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relevant situations, the statute will prevail, unless struck down by the Supreme Court or High 
Courts as violating the Constitution, through the constitutional power of judicial review of 
legislative and executive action. The Court can declare a central or state statute as 
unconstitutional on the ground of violation of fundamental rights or if it is against the scheme 
of distribution of powers under the Constitution or the ground of violation of other 
constitutional provisions. While the decision of the High Court would have state-wide 
operation, that of the Supreme Court would be operative nationally. 
All decisions of the Supreme Court of India are considered to be binding upon all lower 
courts in India. A judicial decision of a High Court of a state has only persuasive effect upon 
the high courts and lower courts of other states in India over which it has no jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, the lower courts of all the states usually take as binding the decisions given by 
any High Court in the absence of a contrary decision of the respective High Court which has 
jurisdiction over it. However, the judicial decision of a High Court of a particular state is an 
authoritative precedent upon all lower courts over which it has jurisdiction. It is in the context 
of their authoritative or persuasive power on all other High Courts within the Union of India 
that case law has been explained in this thesis. 
3.III. The Law Commission of India and other committees appointed by the executive 
The work done by the Law Commission of India in the area of rape and other sexual offences 
against women and children is relevant, as the Law Commission is an executive body 
established by an order of the Government of India. Its major function is to work for legal 
reform. Its membership primarily comprises legal experts, who are entrusted a mandate by 
the government. The Chairman of the Law Commission is generally a retired judge of the 
Supreme Court. The Commission is established for a fixed tenure and works as an advisory 
body to the Ministry of Law and Justice. State Law Commissions can also be appointed by 
the Indian states individually. There is no binding value of the recommendations of the 
Commission. The Law Commission of India, though an ad hoc body, has been a key 
instrumentality in the process of law reform. Its role has not only been advisory but also 
critical of the government policies and has been recognized by the Supreme Court and 
academia as pioneering and prospective. In a number of decisions, the Supreme Court has 
referred to the work done by the Law Commission and followed its recommendations. It is of 
relevance to this thesis that the 42nd Law Commission Report (1971), the 84th Law 
Commission Report (1980), the 156th Law Commission Report (1997) as well as the 172nd 
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Law Commission Report (2000) have recommended, time and time again, that the law on 
sexual offences against women and children needs to be revisited. 
The Commissions of Inquiry Act 1952 provides for appointment of Commissions of Inquiry 
either by Central Government or State Government for making an inquiry into any definite 
matter of public importance in order for the government to decide the course of action to be 
followed. The initiative in the appointment of such a commission rests entirely with the 
executive, and the executive defines the terms of reference of this commission. The 
commission shall have the powers of a civil court, while trying a suit under the Code of Civil 
Procedure 1908, with regard to summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person from 
any part of India and examining him on oath; requiring the discovery and production of any 
document; receiving evidence on affidavits; requisitioning any public record or copy thereof 
from any court of office; and issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or 
documents. It is a fact-finding body and is not required to adjudicate upon the rights of the 
parties and has no adjudicatory power. The mere fact that the procedure adopted by it is akin 
to a procedure at a civil trial and that it has the power to administer oath does not impart the 
commission with the status of a court. The government is not bound to accept its 
recommendations or act upon its findings. The executive's response may vary from outright 
rejection of an inquiry report to slack corrective action, taking advantage of the shortness of 
public memory.65 
Additionally, the Ministry of Home Affairs handles legislative aspects of the IPC, Code of 
Criminal Procedure 1973 and also the Commission of Inquiry Act 1952. Various committees 
were appointed by this Ministry via Gazette Notification to study the need for reforms in 
problematic areas.66 
3.A. Synthesis of union legislation and case law 
3.A.1. The national context and background 
In India, at the time this research commenced in 2011, there was no union or national 
legislation on offences specifically related to non-commercial child sexual abuse. There were 
                                                        
65Ram Jethmalani v. Subramaniam Swamy AIR 2006 Delhi 300; Monteiro, J.B. (1964). Commissions of Inquiry 
Their Limitations. The Economic Weekly, pp. 1137-1142. 
http://www.epw.in/system/files/pdf/1964_16/28/commissions_of_inquirytheir_limitations.pdf. 
66Commissions and Committees, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India http://mha.nic.in/cc. 
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various national statutes which had general application to children, but no law existed which 
was designed to accommodate the particular context of child sexual offences. The substantive 
general criminal law of India, the IPC, defined various sexual offences. The IPC applied to 
cases of sexual abuse of children; however, only sexual offences which came under the 
category of insulting the modesty of a woman, outraging the modesty of a woman, rape of a 
woman and unnatural sexual offences were criminalised. Even then, the adequacy of 
punishment under these provisions in cases of sexual abuse of children was questionable. 
Hence these laws were found insufficient in the context of punishment of sexual crimes 
against children. 
The UNICEF appointed a commission under the chairmanship of the eminent jurist Justice 
V.R. Krishna Iyer, which submitted a report to the Government of India in 2000. This report 
put forth a new idea of having a Children’s Code for guaranteeing various rights to children. 
This Code outlined the functions of a National Commission and State Commissions for 
Children, as well as a system of Special Courts for children. 
In 2003, Goa was the only state which boasted a provincial or regional statute covering both 
commercial and non-commercial offences against children. In 2009, Kerala contemplated a 
regional statute titled Kerala Sexual Offences Against Children Act 2009, but the need for this 
was obliterated after national legislation on the subject was mooted. Initially, from 2005, 
national legislation on all offences of any type against children were deliberated, but these 
deliberations stalled when the more pressing need for national legislation on sexual offences 
against children came to the forefront. 
In 2012, various sexual offences against children were defined for the first time in the 
Protection of Children Against Sexual Offences Act 2012 (POCSO). Penalties for these 
offences were prescribed. This legislation was entered into force on 14 November 2012. 
Concurrently, in 2012, a general legislation was drafted, amending various provisions of the 
IPC, the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (also referred to as CrPC) and the Indian 
Evidence Act 1872, and redefining various sexual offences. Thereafter, the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Bill 2012 was introduced in the Rajya Sabha (Upper House of Parliament) on 
4 December 2012. 
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Within a month, the notorious “Delhi Rape Case” occurred in December 2012. A gang rape 
of a 21-year old female physiotherapy student in Delhi led to her eventual death.67 The 
ensuing uproar and nation-wide protest, engineered by social media, put the government in a 
political crisis. 
3.A.1.a. The J.S. Verma Committee 
The mass upheaval led to the speedy appointment of the three member committee on 22 
December 2012, headed by a former Chief Justice of India, with two Members – Justice Leila 
Seth, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, and Gopal Subramanium, 
former Solicitor General of India –to recommend amendments to the Criminal Law to 
provide for quicker trial and enhanced punishment for criminals accused of committing 
sexual assault against women.68 
The report of the J.S. Verma Committee was submitted within a month, recommending 
various amendments to the IPC regarding various provisions on women’s safety. To meet the 
needs of the Delhi Rape Case, the punishment of the death penalty was added for the offence 
of rape when it caused the victim to die or to be placed in a permanent vegetative state. 
Importantly, there were recommendations regarding witness protection for complainants of 
sexual violence, that the previous sexual experience of the victim should not be decisive for 
determination of consent or quality of consent given by the victim, and that the two-finger 
medical test, which is conducted to determine the laxity of the vaginal muscles, must be 
discontinued. 
The Report devoted a chapter to the issue of child sexual abuse. The failure of the state to 
prevent and prosecute cases of child abuse in institutions of care and custody patronized by 
the state, was pointed out by the Committee. It stated that sexual assault upon women and 
children in situations of communal violence, regional conflicts and armed conflicts on 
                                                        
67A woman named Jyoti Singh Pandey and her male friend were returning home at 9:30 p.m. They got into an 
off-duty charter bus which contained six people, including the driver. After the bus started the men on board 
taunted the couple, asking them what they were doing alone at such a late hour. She was brutally raped, and 
suffered serious injuries to her abdomen, intestines and genitals. Both Pandey and her friend were pushed out of 
the bus onto the road naked, where passers-by refused to help. At the hospital, there was lapse in emergency 
treatment. She was placed in mechanical ventilation. A series of surgeries were performed on Pandey, but by 25 
December she had a fever of around 103 °F and internal bleeding due to sepsis. On 26 December, the Indian 
Government, flew her to a multi-organ transplant hospital in Singapore. She had a cardiac arrest during the six 
hour flight to Singapore. The hospital authorities at Singapore stated that she had suffered brain damage, 
pneumonia and abdominal injury. She died in Singapore on 29 December 2013. Her body was cremated on 30 
December 2013 under high police security. 
68Government of India Ministry of Home Affairs Notification No. S.O.(3003)E, dated 23 December 2012. 
http://mha.nic.in/sites/upload_files/mha/files/JS-VermaCommittee-2013.pdf . 
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account of their identity deserve to be treated as aggravated sexual offence at law. In a 
chapter on education and perception reform, the Report dealt with the psycho-social effects of 
child sexual abuse. The detailed comments of this Committee regarding sexual assault and 
rape have been dealt within this chapter. 
 
The J.S. Verma Committee Report also recommended the promulgation of a presidential 
ordinance to incorporate amendments to the Criminal Law Amendment Bill 2012.69A 
Presidential Ordinance was promulgated on 3 February 2013. The Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Bill 2013 was placed before the Lok Sabha (Lower House of Parliament). A 
Parliamentary Standing Committee Report on the Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill 2012 was 
laid before the Rajya Sabha on 1 March 2013 and before the Lok Sabha on 4 March 2013. 
The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 was finally passed by the Lok Sabha on 19 March 
2013 and by the Rajya Sabha on 21 March 2013. This Act produced changes to the IPC, the 
Indian Evidence Act 1872, and the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 on laws related to 
sexual offences. 
3.A.1.b. The Constitution of India 1950: fundamental rights protecting children 
The Constitution of India 1950 is the document which gives validity to the constitution of the 
Union of India. The Preamble of the Constitution of India 1950 declares the fact that the 
Indian Constitution has derived its authority from the people of India. It proclaims the 
keystone principles of Justice, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity as the basis upon which the 
governance of the country lies. 
When India becomes signatory to any international convention, the Indian Union considers it 
a binding duty for the Indian state to enact laws for enforcing the convention in municipal 
law.  In case such enactment of new laws do not take place, there are many examples in 
Indian judicial history where citizens have been granted relief when approaching the High 
Court or the Supreme Court under writ jurisdiction conferred by Article 32 and 226 of the 
Constitution of India 1950 in asking for judicial directives to the Indian executive and 
legislature in order to enforce international conventions by enactment of law. This is 
discussed in greater detail in Section 3.D.2 of this chapter. 
 
                                                        
69 Chapter 3, Para 71. Verma, J.S., Justice, Seth, L., Justice, & Subramaniam, G. (2013). Report of the 
Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law. New Delhi: Government of India at p. 113. 
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The welfare and well-being of children in India has been guaranteed through certain 
provisions in the Constitution of India 1950. These are: 
(i)  Article 15(3): The State can make special provision for children. This is part of the 
fundamental rights and is a justiciable right under the Constitution. It is a derivative right, 
flowing from the right to equality under Article 14. Article 14 states that the State shall not 
deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the 
territory of India 
(ii) Article 21: No person shall be deprived of his right to life and personal liberty 
except according to procedure established by law. This is a justiciable right. The concept of 
procedural due process of law has been incorporated into the Indian Constitution by case law, 
so that the words “procedure established by law” in Article 21 should mean “fair, just and 
reasonable procedure” in accordance with the principles of natural justice; namely, the right 
to fair hearing and the rule against bias.70 
 (iii) Article 21A: The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children 
of the age of six to fourteen years in a manner determined by law. This is a justiciable right, 
inserted by a constitutional amendment in 2005. Thereafter the Right of Children to Free and 
Compulsory Education Act 2009 was enacted. 
 (iv) Article 39(e): The State shall direct its policy towards securing that the health and 
strength of workers, men and women, and the tender age of children are not abused and that 
citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter avocations unsuited to their age or 
strength. This is a Directive Principle of State Policy and is categorised as a non-justiciable 
right. 
3.A.1.c. National laws and state laws 
3.A.1.c.i. National general substantive criminal law 
The general substantive criminal law comprises of the Indian Penal Code 1860(IPC). This 
has been amended many times, with the latest amendment in 2013, as per the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act 2013. 
3.A.1.c.ii. National general procedural criminal law 
The general procedural criminal law comprises of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, and 
the Indian Evidence Act 1872. 
                                                        
70Maneka Gandhi v Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597. 
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The CrPC lays down the general procedure for the prosecution of offenders with a specific 
hierarchy which applies uniformly across every state.71 The pattern of trying cases involving 
sexual offences against children was as per the 1st Schedule of the CrPC.72 The Indian 
Evidence Act 1872 lays down the general evidentiary principles to be adopted in a court of 
law including cases of child sexual abuse.73 
                                                        
71 At the lowest level is the First Class Magistrate’s Court which is competent to try offences punishable for a 
period not exceeding three years or with fine not exceeding Rs. 10,000. Next is the Chief Judicial Magistrate 
Court which is competent to impose any fine and award any punishment up to a period of seven years. Above 
that is the Assistant Sessions Court with power to award punishment up to ten years and any fine. Of the lower 
judicial courts, the Sessions Court can award any punishment prescribed by law. However, the death sentence 
needs the confirmation of the High Court. The High Court is the highest appellate court within the state. It has 
supervisory powers over all lower judicial courts within its territorial jurisdiction. The Supreme Court is the 
highest appellate court in the Union of India for both civil and criminal matters. The Supreme Court and the 
High Courts also have original jurisdiction in select matters like union and state disputes or interstate disputes, 
and for writ petitions in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari and prohibition 
regarding matters violating the fundamental rights of persons guaranteed under the Constitution of India. 
72This states which courts had the jurisdiction to try the following offences: 
Section 354-Assault or use of criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty- Triable by any 
Magistrate 
Section 375 –Rape- Triable by the Court of Session 
Intercourse by a man with his wife not being under twelve years of age- Triable by the Court of Session 
Section 376-A- Intercourse by a man with his wife during separation- Triable by the Court of Session 
Section 376-B- Intercourse by public servant with woman in his custody-Triable by the Court of Session 
Section 376-C-Intercourse by superintendent of jail, remand home etc- Triable by the Court of Session 
Section 376-D-Intercourse by manager etc of a hospital with any woman in that hospital- Triable by the Court of 
Session 
Section 377- Unnatural offences- Triable by the Magistrate of the first class 
Section 509- Uttering any word or making an gesture intended to insult the modesty of a woman etc- Any 
Magistrate. 
73Section 118 lays down who may testify before the Court. All competent persons shall testify, unless the Court 
considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them, or from giving rational answers 
to those questions, by tender years, extreme old age, disease, whether of body or mind, or any other cause of the 
same kind. In cases of absence of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence can be taken. It is an established rule 
of evidence that circumstantial evidence can be depended up where there are no pieces of direct evidence. 
Illustration (j) of Section 157 states: ‘The question is whether A was ravished. The facts that shortly after the 
alleged rape, she made a complaint relating to the crime, the circumstances under which, and the terms in 
which, the complaint was made are relevant’. The legal admissibility and relevancy of such evidence as to 
conduct is also admissible for the purpose of corroboration. This can be found in section 157. The Act also 
provides for delayed complaints and the factors to be taken into consideration. This has implications with regard 
to filing of cases relating to child sexual abuse. Section 53 states that in criminal cases, the previous good 
character of an accused is relevant. After the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, various new sections haves 
been inserted which redefine the jurisprudence regarding consent of a woman to sexual activity. Section 53A 
lays down that evidence of character or previous sexual experience is not relevant in certain cases involving a 
prosecution for an offence under sections 354, 354A, 354B, 354C, 354D, 376, 376A, 376B, 376C, 376D or 
376E of the IPC or for attempt to commit any such offence. Here, where the question of consent is in issue, 
evidence of the character of the victim or of such person's previous sexual experience with any person shall not 
be relevant on the issue of such consent or the quality of consent. Section 114A lays down a presumption as to 
absence of consent in certain prosecutions for rape. In a prosecution for rape under clauses (a) to (n) of sub-
section (2) of section 376 of the IPC, where sexual intercourse by the accused is proved and the question is 
whether it was without the consent of the woman alleged to have been raped and such woman states in her 
evidence before the court that she did not consent, the court shall presume that she did not consent. An 
explanation of "sexual intercourse" is given to mean any of the acts mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) of section 
375 of the IPC. A new proviso has been inserted to section 146 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 which bars the 
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3.A.1.c.iii. National Special Legislation 
A few special enactments of relevance to the topic of child sexual abuse have been enacted 
by the Parliament, such as the Information Technology Act 200074, the Juvenile Justice (Care 
and Protection of Children) Act 2000,75 the Commissions of Protection of Child Rights Act 
2005,76the Protection of Women Against Domestic Violence Act 2005,77the Prohibition of 
Child Marriage Act 2006,78and the POCSO. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
adducing of evidence or putting questions in the cross-examination of the victim as to the general immoral 
character, or previous sexual experience, of such victim with any person for proving consent or the quality of 
consent. However, consent of a girl-child below the age of 18is now not considered to be valid consent after the 
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013.  
74The Information Technology Act 2000 is an enactment aimed to regulate e-governance and facilitate e-
commerce by providing infrastructural facilities for creation, promotion and use of digital signatures and to 
provide for reliable electronic records. It lays down offences committed in electronic form and their 
punishments. Of importance to child rights, section 67B gives a substantial punishment for child sexual abuse in 
electronic form, viz, imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years and with a 
fine which may extend to 10 lakh rupees and in the event of second or subsequent conviction with imprisonment 
of either description for a term which may extend to seven years and also with fine which may extend to 10 lakh 
rupees. The Protection of Children against Sexual Offences Act 2012, in section 28(3) specifically refers to 
section 67B of the ITA, and transfers the prosecution and punishment of sexual abuse offences against children 
in electronic form from the ambit of ordinary courts to the ambit of the Special Courts contemplated under the 
Act. 
75 The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2000 defines a child as a person below the age of 
18. However, in 2016, the JJA was amended to provide for trial in the Children’s Court along with adult 
offenders, in case it is assessed that the child needs to be tried as an adult for the commission of a heinous crime. 
The JJA consolidates two issues: namely, the law relating to children in conflict with law, and children in need 
of care and protection. It stresses a child-friendly approach with a focus on the best interests of children. The 
JJA lays down the legal procedure for protecting a child delinquents as well as child victims of crimes. The 
Juvenile Justice Board consisting of a magistrate and two social workers shall decide cases involving children 
accused of crimes. The maximum punishment that can be awarded is three years confinement in a rehabilitative 
home. There shall be a Special Juvenile Police Unit in each police station to assist such children involved with 
the law. The JJA provides for the formation of a Child Welfare Committee in each district for rendering 
assistance to child victims of crimes. Such Child Welfare Committees consist of five members, none of whom 
are part of the Indian judiciary, unlike the Juvenile Justice Board which consists of one judicial member. The 
members of the Child Welfare Committee are selected from people who have interest in social work. Such 
Committee has certain magisterial powers, hence its orders have legal sanctity. It can pass certain orders for the 
welfare and protection of the child. Each District shall have a District Child Protection Unit consisting of the 
District Child Protection Officer and various people of eminence who are committed to the cause of children. It 
has supervisory powers over the working of the Juvenile Justice Board and Child Welfare Committee in the 
district. The State Child Protection Unit coordinates the District Child Protection Units.  
76This enactment is the only statute that refers to the International Convention on Child Rights and India’s 
obligation under the Convention in its preamble. The definition of “Child Rights” is to include the rights defined 
under the UNCRC.76 The CPRCA provides for the constitution of a National Commission and State Commission 
for Protection of Child Rights, as well as Children’s Courts for providing speedy trial of offences against 
children or of violation of child rights. The National Commission of Child Rights comprises of a chairperson 
who has done outstanding work for promoting the welfare of children and six members drawn from the field of 
education, child health care or child development, or who have worked in juvenile justice or the care of 
neglected or marginalised children or children with disabilities, elimination towards labour, expert in child 
psychology or sociology or laws relating to children. The functions of the National Commission include 
examining and reviewing the safeguards provided in law for the protection of child rights and recommending 
measures for their effective implementation, inquiring into violations, inspecting homes and institutions meant 
for children etc. The State Commissions have similar functions to be carried out in their respective states.Here 
the State Government may, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court by notification, under 
section 25, specify at least a court in the state or for each district, a Court of Session to be a Children’s Court to 
try the said offences. For every Children’s Court, the State Government shall specify a public prosecutor. 
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3.A.1.c.iv. State laws 
States are permitted to enact their own laws with regard to subjects mentioned in the State 
List, or in the Concurrent List of the Constitution. Such laws apply only within the territorial 
jurisdiction of that state. Goa is the only state which enacted a law dealing with offences 
against children, including sexual abuse of children, through the Goa Children’s Act 2003. 
3.A.1.c.v.  In case of conflict between national and state law, which prevails? 
In any Indian state, the national law prevails, followed by state law. Only in the absence of 
national law will a state law prevail. In cases where there is a gap in the national law it will 
be the state law which prevails. For example, with regard to rape of a girl child in Kerala, a 
                                                                                                                                                                            
77The law criminalizes and punishes all kinds of abuse against women and children within the precincts of a 
domestic relationship which can be treated as domestic violence. Domestic violence is defined in section 3(a) to 
include conduct causing sexual abuse to the aggrieved person, who is a woman in a domestic relationship with 
the abuser. "Sexual abuse" is also explained to include any conduct of a sexual nature that abuses, humiliates, 
degrades or otherwise violates the dignity of woman (Explanation I (ii) of Section 3). The Rules refer to child 
sexual abuse in Form IV of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules 2006, which provides 
Information on Rights of Aggrieved. 2.2.(iv) states that a person can receive protection and assistance under this 
statute if the persons with whom such person is/was residing in the same house, commits any acts of violence 
against her or a child in her care and custody including physical  violence, sexual violence, verbal and emotional 
violence and economic violence. Sexual violence includes acts of child sexual abuse. This would mean that 
sexual abuse of a person below the age of 18 years within the precincts of a domestic relationship would classify 
as domestic violence, and such a person can resort to the legal machinery envisaged under this statute for 
redressal. The Act introduces the machinery of “protection officers” to assist aggrieved persons, judicial officers 
and police in justice delivery, as well as registered “service providers” to provide legal aid, medical, financial or 
other assistance to aggrieved persons. According to section 5, any police officer, protection officer, service 
provider or magistrate who has received a complaint of domestic violence or is otherwise present at the place of 
an incident of domestic violence or when the incident of domestic violence is reported to him, shall inform the 
aggrieved person (a) of her right to make an application for obtaining a relief by way of a protection order, an 
order for monetary relief, a custody order, a residence order, a compensation order or more than one such order 
under this Act; (b) of the availability of services of service providers; (c) of the availability of services of the 
Protection Officers; (d) of her right to free legal services under the Legal Services Authorities Act 1987; (e) of 
her right to file a complaint under section 498A IPC. Protection orders, residence orders, monetary relief, 
custody orders, compensation orders, interim and ex parte orders may be made by the Magistrate (sections 18-
22). 
78This law replaces the previous Child Marriage Restraint Act 1929, reflecting the stronger intention of the state 
not simply to restrain but prohibit child marriage. As in the previous Act, the definition of child remains the 
same in the new law” a child is a male under 21 years of age and a female under 18 years of age (section 2(a)). 
Under the new Act, child marriages are voidable at the option of the contracting party who was a child at the 
time of the marriage (section 3(1)). The petition to declare the marriage void has to be filed within two years of 
the child attaining majority (section 3(3)). The Act provides for punishment for any male over 18 years of age 
who marries a minor: rigorous imprisonment of up to 2 years or with a fine upto 1 lakh rupees or both (section 
(9)). Similar punishment is prescribed for anyone who performs, conducts, directs or abets or negligently fails to 
prevent any child marriage. However, no woman can be punished with imprisonment (section 11 proviso, 
section 13(10) proviso). All offences are cognizable and non-bailable (section 15). The Act declares that in 
certain circumstances the marriage of a minor will be declared null and void. These situations include a minor a) 
enticed out of the keeping of the lawful guardian; or (b) by force compelled, or by any deceitful means induced 
to go from any place; or (c) is sold for the purpose of marriage; and made to go through a form of marriage or if 
the minor is married after which the minor is sold or trafficked or used for immoral purposes (section 12). Also, 
any child marriage solemnised in contravention of an injunction order issued by a magistrate, whether interim or 
final, shall be void ab initio (section 14). 
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charge would be framed under the POCSO, read along with sections 375 and 376 IPC. If a 
boy child were molested, a charge would be framed under the POCSO, read along with 
section 377 IPC. If the same offences were committed in Goa, which has a special state 
legislation, a charge would be framed under the POCSO, read along with the relevant section 
of the IPC and the corresponding section of the Goa Children’s Act 2003. Before the POCSO 
came into force on November 14, 2012, sexual offences against children committed in any 
state other than Goa could be registered only under the relevant section of the IPC which 
contained grossly inadequate punishments. From 2003 onwards, Goa was the only Indian 
state where various offences against children, including sexual offences, were registered 
under the Goa Children’s Act 2003. Now, the POCSO prevails over the Goa Children’s Act. 
3.A.2. Indian Penal Code 1860 
The national substantive criminal law on sexual abuse of children consists of the IPC. This is 
a general criminal law statute defining various kinds of offences against the body, property, 
and the state. This section discusses eight sexual offences of relevance to children under the 
general criminal law, ranging from those of least gravity to those of greatest gravity. Prior to 
the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, sexual offences against children were not defined 
in the IPC. Certain sexual offences protective of women existed, but even these offences 
were not sufficient to protect women and girl children. After the Criminal Law (Amendment) 
Act 2013 of 2013, positive changes were brought about into general criminal law. This 
amendment is important in the history of criminal law because it has revised and reformed 
the law in relation to women’s rights to a great extent. Sexual offences against women like 
rape were more broadly defined in the IPC. New offences like sexual harassment, voyeurism 
and stalking were introduced for the first time. As the definition of the term “woman” in the 
IPC includes girl children, this amendment is significant as it brought about reform in the law 
with regard to sexual offences against girl children. However, this amending statute did not 
address the issue of punishment for sexual violations of male children in the IPC. This 
section discusses the original provisions before the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, the 
J.S. Verma Committee recommendations and new provisions after the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act 2013. 
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Table 1 depicts the eight sexual offences before and after the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 
2013 and a comparison of both in each of these eight key legislative provisions in order to 
provide a summary: 
  
  
Table 1: Major developments regarding offences against children in the Indian Penal Code 1860 
Offence 
in the 
IPC 
Previous provision (before the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act 2013) 
Current provision (after the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act 2013) 
How is the current provision 
different from the previous 
provision? 
Word, 
gesture 
or act 
intended 
to insult 
the 
modesty 
of a 
woman 
s.509 
1. The offender is gender-neutral. 
2. The offence comprises of utterance of any 
word, or making a gesture or doing an act 
intended to insult the modesty of a woman. 
3. Punishmentwith simple imprisonment up to 
one year duration, or with fine, or with both. 
1. The offender remains gender-neutral. 
2. The offence comprises of utterance of any 
word, making any sound or gesture, or 
exhibiting any object, intending to insult the 
modesty of any woman. 
3. Punishment with simple imprisonment up to 
three years duration, along with fine. 
1. It increases the term of 
imprisonment from a maximum of 
one year to three years. 
2. Imprisonment was formerly 
optional but is now compulsory 
with an additional fine. 
Assault 
or 
criminal 
force to 
woman 
with 
intent to 
outrage 
her 
modesty 
s.354 
1. The offender is gender-neutral. 
2. The offence comprises of assault or use of 
criminal force to any woman, intending to 
outrage or knowing it to be likely that the 
offender will thereby outrage her modesty. 
3. Punishment with imprisonment of either 
description up to two years duration, or with 
fine, or with both. 
1.  The offender remains gender-neutral. 
2. The offence comprises of assault or use of 
criminal force to any woman, intending to 
outrage or knowing it to be likely that the 
offender will thereby outrage her modesty. 
3. Punishment with imprisonment of either 
description for a minimum of one year duration 
up to five years, along with fine. 
1. It sets a new minimum term of 
one year imprisonment, where 
formerly there was none. 
2. It increases the maximum term of 
imprisonment from two years to 
five years. 
3. Imprisonment was formerly 
optional at the discretion of judge 
but is now compulsory with an 
additional fine. 
Sexual 
harassm
ent and 
punishm
ent for 
sexual 
harassm
ent 
s.354A 
No specific offence existed previously. Sections 
354 and 509 applied regarding this type of 
offence. 
1. Offender is male (use of the term “a man”). 
2. These acts comprise this offence: (i) physical 
contact and advances involving unwelcome and 
explicit sexual overtures; or (ii)a demand or 
request for sexual favours; or (iii)showing 
pornography against the will of  a woman; or 
(iv)making sexually coloured remarks. 
3. Punishment for the first three types of sexual 
harassment is rigorous imprisonment up to three 
years duration, or fine, or both. The fourth type 
of sexual harassment carries punishment of 
imprisonment of either description up to one 
1. The type of sexual harassment 
listed in clause (i) of s. 354A(1): 
physical contact and advances 
involving unwelcome and explicit 
sexual overtures. This would 
previously have come under the 
offence in s.354 with punishment of 
imprisonment of either description 
for a term which may extend to two 
years, or with fine, or with both. 
The current punishment is rigorous 
imprisonment for a term which may 
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year duration, or fine, or both. extend to three years, or with fine, 
or with both. 
2. The type of sexual harassment 
listed in Clause (ii) of s.354A(1): 
demand or request for sexual 
favours. This would previously 
have come under the ambit of s 509 
with simple imprisonment of up to 
one year, or fine, or both. The 
current punishment is rigorous 
imprisonment for a term which may 
extend to three years, or with fine, 
or both. 
3. The type of sexual harassment 
listed in clause (iii) of s. 354A(1): 
showing pornography against the 
will of a woman; or making 
sexually coloured remarks. This 
would previously have come under 
the offence in s.509 with 
punishment of simple imprisonment 
upto one year, or fine, or both. The 
current punishment is rigorous 
imprisonment for a term which may 
extend to three years, or with fine, 
or both. 
4. The type of sexual harassment 
listed in clause (iv) of s.354A(1): 
making sexually coloured remarks. 
This would previously have come 
under the offence in s. 509 with 
punishment of simple imprisonment 
up to one year, or fine, or both. The 
current punishment is imprisonment 
of either description for a term 
which may extend to one year, or 
fine, or both. 
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Offence 
in the 
IPC 
Previous provision (before the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act 2013) 
Current provision (after the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act 2013) 
How is the current provision 
different from the previous 
provision? 
Assault 
or use of 
criminal 
force to 
a woman 
with 
intent to 
disrobe 
s.354B 
No such offence existed previously. Section 
354 applied for this type of offence. 
1. Offender is male (use of the term “a man”). 
2. The offence comprises of assault or use of 
criminal force to any woman or abetment of 
such an act with the intention of disrobing or 
compelling her to be naked. 
3. Punishment with imprisonment of either 
description for term not less than three years up 
to seven years, along with fine. 
This offence would previously have 
come under the offence in s.354 
with punishment of imprisonment 
of either description for a term 
which may extend to two years, or 
with fine, or both. The current 
punishment is imprisonment of 
either description for a minimum 
term of three years and a maximum 
of seven years, along with fine. 
Voyeuris
m 
s.354C 
No such offence existed previously. Section 
509 applied for this type of offence. 
1. Offender is male (use of the term “a man”). 
2. The offence comprises of watching, or 
capturing the image of a woman engaging in a 
private act in circumstances of privacy or 
disseminating such image to any third person 
without her permission. 
3. Punishment on first conviction with 
imprisonment of either description for a term 
extending from one year to three years along 
with fine and on subsequent conviction, with 
imprisonment of either description for a term 
extending from three years to seven years, along 
with fine. 
This offence would previously have 
come under the offence in s.509. 
The current punishment on first 
conviction is with imprisonment of 
either description for a term which 
shall not be less than one year, but 
which may extend to three years, 
along with fine, and on subsequent 
conviction, with imprisonment of 
either description for a minimum 
term of three years and a maximum 
of seven years, along with fine. 
Whereas previously, under s.509, 
the punishment would have been 
simple imprisonment upto one year, 
or fine, or both. 
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Offence 
in the 
IPC 
Previous provision (before the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act 2013) 
Current provision (after the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act 2013) 
How is the current provision 
different from the previous 
provision? 
Stalking 
s.354D 
No such offence existed previously. Section 
509 applied for this type of offence. 
1. Offender is male (use of the term “a man”). 
2. These acts constitute this offence: (i) 
following a woman and contacting her to foster 
personal interaction repeatedly despite a clear 
indication of her disinterest; or (ii) monitoring 
the woman’s use of any form of electronic 
communication. 
3. Punishment is imprisonment of either 
description for a term up to three years and fine, 
and on a subsequent conviction, with 
imprisonment of either description for a term up 
to five years, and fine. 
This offence would previously have 
come under the offence in s.509, 
where the punishment would have 
been simple imprisonment up to 
one year, or fine, or both. The 
current punishment has a higher 
duration on first conviction as well 
as on second conviction, and the 
type of imprisonment is not 
restricted to simple alone, but may 
be either simple or rigorous 
imprisonment. 
Rape 
s.375 
1. Offender is male (use of the term “a man”). 
2. This offence occurs if he has sexual 
intercourse with a woman under six 
circumstances. 
3. These six circumstances are the following: 
against her will; without her consent; with her 
consent, when her consent has been obtained by 
putting her or any person in whom she is 
interested in fear of death or of hurt; with her 
consent, when the man knows that he is not her 
husband, and that her consent is given because 
she believes that he is another man to whom she 
is or believes herself to be lawfully married; 
with her consent, when she is unable to 
understand the nature and consequences of  her 
act of consent due to unsoundness of mind or 
intoxication or the administration of any 
stupefying or unwholesome substance; with or 
without her consent, when she is under sixteen 
years of age. 
3. Penetration is sufficient to constitute the 
sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of 
rape. 
4. Sexual intercourse by a man with his wife, 
1. Offender is male (use of the term “a man”). 
2. This offence incurs if he: (a)penetrates his 
penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, 
urethra or anus of a woman or makes her do so 
with him or any other person; or (b) inserts, to 
any extent, any object or a part of the body, not 
being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or 
anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him 
or any other person; or (c) manipulates any part 
of the body of a woman so as to cause 
penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any 
part of body of such woman or makes her to do 
so with him or any other person; or (d) applies 
his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a 
woman or makes her to do so with him or any 
other person, under seven circumstances. 
3. These seven circumstances are the following: 
against her will; without her consent; with her 
consent, when her consent has been obtained by 
putting her or any person in whom she is 
interested, in fear of death or of hurt; with her 
consent, when the man knows that he is not her 
husband and that her consent is given because 
she believes that he is another man to whom she 
1. Previously the offence only 
covered penile penetration of the 
vagina. It now covers penile and the 
other forms of penetration of a 
woman’s body (mouth, any object 
or a part of the body, not being the 
penis, any part of the body of a 
woman). 
2. Previously the offence treated the 
consent of a woman above sixteen 
years of age as valid. It now deems 
valid consent can only be given by 
a woman above eighteen. 
3. Now, rape is also deemed to 
occur when she is unable to 
communicate consent (e.g., in an 
intoxicated or drugged state). Lack 
of physical resistance shall not be 
regarded as consent. 
4. In the new provision, the term 
“vagina” is defined to include labia 
majora, to clarify that penetration of 
the labia majora would also 
constitute rape. Formerly, this was 
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who is above fifteen years of age, is not rape. is or believes herself to be lawfully married; 
with her consent, when she is unable to 
understand the nature and consequences of  her 
act of consent due to unsoundness of mind or 
intoxication or the administration of any 
stupefying or unwholesome substance; with or 
without her consent, when she is under eighteen 
years of age; when she is unable to communicate 
consent. 
4. Consent is defined to mean an unequivocal 
voluntary agreement when the woman by words, 
gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal 
communication, communicates willingness to 
participate in the specific sexual act, provided 
that consent shall not be deemed only due to 
lack of physical resistance to the act of 
penetration by the woman. 
5. In this section, “vagina” shall also include 
labia majora. 
6. Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man 
with his wife, who is above fifteen years of age, 
is not rape. 
not the case. 
5. In the new provision, consent, 
which was not defined previously, 
is defined and includes recognition 
that lack of physical resistance does 
not demonstrate consent. 
Punishm
ent for 
rape 
s..376 
(1) 
1. Punishment for rape under s.375 is 
imprisonment of either description for a term 
extending from seven years to life or for a term 
which may extend to ten years along with fine. 
2. The court has the discretion to impose a 
sentence of imprisonment for a term less than 
seven years for adequate and special reasons to 
be mentioned in the judgment. 
3. Exemption to punishment is given for a case 
of rape of a wife by her husband, when the wife 
is above twelve years of age. A husband who 
rapes his wife, who is between the ages of 
twelve and fifteen, shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either description for a term 
which may extend to two years or with fine or 
with both. 
1. Punishment for rape under s.375 is rigorous 
imprisonment of either description for a 
minimum term of seven years, which may 
extend to imprisonment for life, along with fine. 
1. Formerly, judges had discretion 
to impose either simple 
imprisonment (no hard labour) or 
rigorous imprisonment (includes 
hard labour as per s.53 IPC). Now, 
discretion has been removed so that 
imprisonment can only be rigorous. 
2. The new law has removed the 
previous lower punishment for 
sexual intercourse with a child wife 
aged between twelve and fifteen. 
3. The new law removes the 
previous judicial discretion to 
award punishment of less than 
seven years imprisonment. 
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Offence 
in the 
IPC 
Previous provision (before the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act 2013) 
Current provision (after the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act 2013) 
How is the current provision 
different from the previous 
provision? 
Punishm
ent for 
rape 
s.376(2) 
1. The offender is male. 
2. Such offender is a police officer who 
commits rape under certain circumstances 
specified in the provision or is a public servant 
who commits rape under certain circumstances 
specified in the provision or is on the 
management or on the staff of a place of 
custody established by law or of a woman's or 
children's institution, who commits rape on any 
inmate of such institution; or is on the 
management or on the staff of a hospital, who 
commits rape on a woman in that hospital; or 
such offender commits rape on a woman 
knowing her to be pregnant or such offender 
commits rape when she is under twelve years of 
age or such offender commits gang rape. 
3. Punishment is rigorous imprisonment for a 
minimum term of ten years which may extend 
for life, and fine. 
4. The court is given the discretion to impose a 
sentence of imprisonment of either description 
for a term of less than ten years, for adequate 
and special reasons to be mentioned in the 
judgment. 
1. The offender is male. 
2. Such offender is a police officer who commits 
rape under certain circumstances specified in the 
provision or is a public servant, who commits 
rape under certain circumstances specified in the 
provision or is a member of the armed forces 
deployed in an area by the Central of a State 
Government who commits rape in such area; or 
is on the staff of a place of custody established 
by law or of a woman's or children's institution, 
who commits rape on any inmate of such 
institution; or is on the management or on the 
staff of a hospital, who commits rape on a 
woman in that hospital or is a relative, guardian 
or teacher of, or a person in a position of trust or 
authority towards the woman, who commits rape 
on such woman or the offender commits rape 
during communal or sectarian violence or the 
offender commits rape on a woman knowing her 
to be pregnant or the offender commits rape on a 
woman when she is under sixteen years of age 
or the offender commits rape, on a woman 
incapable of giving consent; or the offender is in 
a position of dominance or control over a 
woman, and commits rape on such woman or 
the offender commits rape on a woman suffering 
from physical or mental disability or the 
offender, while committing rape, causes 
grievous bodily harm or maims or disfigures or 
endangers the life of a woman or the offender 
commits rape repeatedly on the same woman. 
3. Punishment is rigorous imprisonment for a 
term extending from ten years to life, which 
shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of 
that person’s natural life, and fine. 
1. The new law clarifies that life 
imprisonment shall mean 
imprisonment until the end of the 
convict’s natural life. 
2. The new law provides for 
aggravated punishment for rapists 
of girls aged under sixteen, whereas 
formerly, such punishment was 
limited to rapists of girls under 
twelve. 
3. Aggravated punishment for 
rapists who are relatives, guardians 
or teachers of the victim, or who are 
in positions of trust or 
responsibility towards the victim. 
4. Removal of judicial discretion to 
impose sentence of either 
description of less than ten years for 
adequate and special reasons 
mentioned in the judgment. 
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Offence 
in the 
IPC 
Previous provision (before the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act 2013) 
Current provision (after the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act 2013) 
How is the current provision 
different from the previous 
provision? 
Unnatur
al 
Offences 
s.377 
1. The offender is gender-neutral (use of the 
word “whoever”). 
2. The offence comprises of voluntarily having 
carnal intercourse against the order of nature 
with any man, woman or animal. 
3. Punishment is imprisonment for life, or 
imprisonment of either description for term 
which may extend to ten years, and fine. 
4. Penetration is sufficient to constitute the 
carnal intercourse necessary to this offense. 
No legislative change No change. 
  
The following is a description of legal developments regarding the eight key legislative 
provisions, which includes executive reports as well as important explanatory case law. 
3.A.2.a. Section 509 IPC: Word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a 
woman 
 
This punishes a word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman. This 
provision is used to cover a wide range of sexual offences such as eve-teasing, exhibitionism, 
sending or showing of pornographic material, making obscene or sexually-toned remarks, 
telephone calls or sending obscene messages, voyeurism, and so on.79 
Pre-Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013: 
Section 509 IPC stated thus: 
Whoever, intending to insult the modesty of any woman, utters any word, makes any sound or gesture, 
or exhibits any object, intending that such word or sound shall be heard, or that such gesture or object 
shall be seen, by such woman, or intrudes upon the privacy of such woman, shall be punished with 
simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both. 
 
This is a non-cognizable, bailable offence, triable by any magistrate. It is compoundable by 
the woman whom it was intended to insult or whose privacy was intruded upon with the 
permission of the court (section 320, CrPC).80 
The term “insulting the modesty of a woman” has not been defined. Also, the punishment, of 
up to one year imprisonment and /or fine, has largely been considered as grossly inadequate, 
and women’s rights groups have been clamouring to get section 509 IPC amended with 
increased punishment. 
Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill 2012 
This proposed legislation did not alter the term “insulting the modesty of a woman” in section 
509. It increased the maximum punishment to three years imprisonment with fine of “not less 
than one thousand rupees.” 
                                                        
79Seshadri, S.P., Haritas, K.I. (2009).Preserving Wellness and Personhood: A Psychosocial Approach to the 
Child. In Kannabiran, K. & Singh, R. (Eds.), Challenging the Rule(s) of Law: Colonialism, Criminology and 
Human Rights in India.(p. 184), New Delhi: SAGE. 
80 Section 320, Code of Criminal Procedure lays down the categories of compoundable offences. All offences 
which are excluded from the table of compoundable offences are considered to be non-compoundable, which 
means that a compromise and settlement of the dispute cannot be attained by the parties independent of the 
court. 
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Justice Verma Committee Report 
The J.S. Verma Committee Report specifically recommended the repeal of this provision.81It 
may be inferred that the use of words, acts or gestures that create an unwelcome threat of a 
sexual nature would come under the definition of the offence of sexual assault (under section 
354 IPC) with one year imprisonment or fine or both as punishment.82 
Post-Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 
No repeal was made of the provision. The term “insulting the modesty of a woman” was 
retained by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013. Punishment is simple imprisonment for 
an enhanced term which may extend to three years, and with fine. However, no minimum 
fine was imposed. The provision reads as follows: 
Whoever, intending to insult the modesty of any woman, utters any word, makes any sound or gesture, 
or exhibits any object, intending that such word or sound shall be heard, of that such gesture or object 
shall be seen, by such woman, or intrudes upon the privacy of such woman, shall be punished with 
simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and also with fine. 
 
The amendments made in 2003 to section 354 IPC have specifically criminalised sexual 
harassment, assault with intent to disrobe, voyeurism and stalking as separate offences within 
the section 354 IPC cluster of offences. 
Table 1 demonstrates the differences between definitions of the offence both before and after 
the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013. 
A defect of the provision which points towards ambiguity is that it is not clear from the 
present amendment as to what acts would constitute offences under section 509 IPC which 
merit imprisonment up to three years, and which do not come under the sections 354A, B, C 
and D IPC categories of offences. While the section 509 IPC offence is non-cognizable, 
sections 354A, B, C and D IPC offences are cognizable. 
3.A.2.b. Section 354 IPC: Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her 
modesty 
This punishes use of criminal force to outrage the modesty of a woman. Section354is 
attracted in cases where is criminal force used by the accused with intent to outrage the 
modesty of a woman. It can range from mere catching hold of a woman's hand to any heinous 
                                                        
81 Chapter 3, Para 67, Verma, J.S., Justice, Seth, L., Justice, & Subramaniam, G. (2013). Report of the 
Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law. New Delhi: Government of India, p. 111 
82Ibid 
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nature of sexual assault which may fall short of penile penetration or an attempt to do so or 
unnatural offences.83 
Pre-Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 
The following portion outlines the law before the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013. 
Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any woman, intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely 
that he will thereby outrage her modesty, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for 
a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. 
This was a non-cognizable, bailable offence, triable by any magistrate.84 It was classified as 
an offence compoundable only with the permission of the court before which prosecution for 
such offence was pending. The woman upon whom criminal force was used was the person in 
whom power was vested to compound the offence with the permission of the court. 
The meaning of the term “outraging the modesty” has not been explained in the statute. The 
following case is important because it deliberated on the meaning of the term “modesty” in 
the context of a sexual violation of a baby girl. 
State of Punjab v. Major Singh (1967)85 
This is the landmark case which deliberated on the question of the capacity of a female child 
of a few months of age to possess “modesty” which could be outraged as stipulated in section 
354 IPC. Here the respondent inserted his finger and tore the vagina of a female child of just 
7.5 months of age. He was stripped to the waist at the time the child’s mother entered the 
room and put on the light, after which he fled from the room. The trial court convicted the 
respondent under section 323 of the IPC for voluntarily causing hurt to rigorous 
imprisonment for one year and Rs. 1000/- fine and a further period of three months for non-
payment of fine. In appeal before the Punjab High Court, the judges differed in the view of 
whether the person could be said to have outraged the modesty of a child under section 354 
of the IPC. The majority took the view that the offence could be committed only when a 
woman felt that her modesty was outraged. The child upon whom the criminal force was used 
was of too tender an age to be capable of having any sense of modesty. One of the judges 
who differed and answered the question in the affirmative, held that the word “modesty” 
meant accepted notions of womanly modesty and not the notions of the woman against whom 
                                                        
83Santhosh Madhavan @ Amrutha Chaithanya v. C.I. of Police & Anr. MANU/KE/0162/2008. 
84 As per the First Schedule of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 
85AIR 1967 SC 63.Also cited in Santhosh Madhavan @ Amrutha Chaithanya v. C.I. of Police & Anr. 
MANU/KE/0162/2008. 
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the offence was committed and that the section was intended as much in the interest of the 
woman concerned as in the interest of public morality and decent behaviour. Further, that the 
object of the provision could be achieved only if the word “modesty” was considered to be an 
attribute of a female irrespective of whether she had developed enough understanding to 
realise that an act was offensive to decent female behaviour or not. The High Court did not 
alter the sentence. 
The matter went to the Supreme Court. The three-judge bench felt the need to deliberate on 
whether a girl who was 7.5 months of age could be said to possess the requisite modesty that 
was capable of being outraged. Divided opinion also prevailed there. Chief Justice Sarkar, in 
his dissenting judgment, stated that under the section the accused would be guilty of an 
offence if he assaults or uses criminal force "intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely 
that he will thereby outrage" the modesty of a woman. This intention or knowledge is the 
ingredient of the offence and not the woman's feelings or reaction. The test therefore would 
be whether a reasonable man would think that the act of the offender was intended to or was 
known to be likely to outrage the modesty of the woman. In the present case, there could be 
no question  of the accused having intended to outrage the modesty of the child or having 
known that his act was likely to have that result, because, although the victim is a "woman" 
under the IPC, no reasonable man would say that a female child of that age was possessed of 
womanly modesty. 
However, on equally strong reasons, two judges differed with this view and interpreted the 
word “modesty” in such a manner so as to bring the offence committed by the accused 
under section 354 IPC. As per Mudholkar J, under section 354 IPC, while the individual 
reaction of the victim to the act of the accused would be irrelevant, when any act done to or in 
the presence of a woman is clearly suggestive of sex according to the common notions of 
mankind, that act must fall within the mischief of the section and would constitute an offence 
under the section. Since the action of the accused in interfering with and thereby causing 
injury to the vagina of the child, who was 7.5 months old, was deliberate, he must be deemed 
to have intended to outrage her modesty. Bachawat, J went on to make the famous statement: 
“The essence of a woman's modesty is her sex. Even a female of tender age from her very 
birth possesses the modesty which is the attribute of her sex. Under the section the culpable 
intention of the accused is the crux of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant, 
but its absence is not always decisive. The respondent is punishable for the offence under the 
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section because, by his act, he outraged and intended to outrage whatever modesty the little 
victim was possessed of.” 
The Supreme Court altered the conviction of the respondent under section 323 IPC to one 
under section 354 IPC, and awarded the respondent rigorous imprisonment for a term of two 
years and a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, and in default, rigorous imprisonment for a period of six 
months. Out of the fine, Rs. 500/- was to be paid as compensation to the child. 
The Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill 2011 
This recommended the substitution of the words “shall be punished with imprisonment of 
either description for a term of one year which may extend to five years and shall also be 
liable to fine which may not be less than one thousand rupees” for the words “shall be 
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, 
or with fine, or with both” in Section 354 IPC. 
The J.S. Verma Committee Report 
This suggested a complete overhaul of the offence in section 354 IPC. It recommended that 
all non-penetrative non-consensual forms of sexual contact should be defined as sexual 
assault under section 354.86 The Committee recommended the drafting of section 354 IPC as 
in the form of actual touch as well as use of threatening words, acts or gestures.87 Thus the 
sexual nature of an act would be determined on the basis of the circumstances. Sexual 
gratification as a motive for the act would not be a prerequisite for proving the offence.88 
                                                        
86 Chapter 3, Para 67 and Para 69, Verma, J.S., Justice, Seth, L., Justice, & Subramaniam, G. (2013). Report of 
the Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law. New Delhi: Government of India, pp. 111-112. 
87 Section 354: Sexual assault and punishment for sexual assault: 
(1) The following acts shall constitute the offence of sexual assault: 
(a) Intentional touching of another person when such act of touching is of a sexual nature and is without the 
recipient’s consent; 
(b) Using words, acts or gestures towards or in the presence of another person which create an unwelcome threat 
of a sexual nature or result in an unwelcome advance. 
Explanation: For the purposes of this section, ‘acts’ shall include the display and dissemination of pornographic 
material. 
(2) Any person who commits the offence described in sub-clause (a) of sub-section (1) above shall be 
punishable with rigorous imprisonment that may extend to five years, or with fine, or both. 
(3) Any person who commits the offence described in sub-clause (b) of sub-section (1) above shall be 
punishable with imprisonment of either description that may extend to one year, or with fine, or both.  
Section 354, Sub-heading 4, Appendix 4, Verma, J.S., Justice, Seth, L., Justice, & Subramaniam, G. (2013). 
Report of the Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law. New Delhi: Government of India.p.436. 
88 Chapter 3, Para 69,Verma, J.S., Justice, Seth, L., Justice, & Subramaniam, G. (2013). Report of the Committee 
on Amendments to Criminal Law.New Delhi: Government of India, p.112. 
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Post-Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 
After amendment by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, section 354 states: 
Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any woman, intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely 
that he will thereby outrage her modesty, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a 
term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to 
fine. 
Table 1 demonstrates the differences between definitions of the offence both before and after 
the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013. The minimum mandatory punishment has been 
stipulated as one year where none existed, and the maximum punishment as five years, in 
place of the previous two years. 
This offence has been made a cognizable, non-bailable one, triable by any magistrate as well 
as compoundable by the woman assaulted to whom the criminal force was used,89 with the 
permission of the court before which its prosecution is pending. By making this provision 
cognizable and non-bailable, the legislature has finally understood the gravity of the crime 
and has brought much-needed relief to victims of such assault. 
Unfortunately, the use of an archaic term like “outraging the modesty” of a woman continues 
to exist in the post-2013 provision. Even after the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, it is 
not clear as to what acts would constitute offences which “outrage the modesty of a woman” 
under section 354, which would not come under the ambit of section 509. This defect has 
been identified as one of the issues for analysis in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
 
Certain additional offences have been created by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 in 
continuation to section 354. These are the offences of sexual harassment, assault to disrobe, 
voyeurism and stalking. 
3.A.2.c. Section 354A IPC: Sexual harassment and punishment for sexual harassment 
This is a new offence inserted by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013. It was not 
recommended by the J.S. Verma Committee. This provision states: 
(1) A man committing any of the following acts 
(i) physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures; or 
(ii) a demand or request for sexual favours; or 
(iii) showing pornography against the will of a woman; or 
(iv) making sexually coloured remarks, 
shall be guilty of the offence of sexual harassment. 
                                                        
89As per the First Schedule read with section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. 
116 
 
(2) A man who commits the offence specified in clause (i) or clause (ii) or clause (iii) of sub-section (1) 
shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with 
fine, or with both. 
(3) Any man who commits the offence specified in clause (iv) of sub-section (1) shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with 
both. 
 
Formerly this offence would have come under the ambit of section 509 IPC. However, the 
punishment awarded under section 509 IPC for sexual harassment was only up to one year 
and/or with fine. 
When a man commits an act involving physical contact and advances involving unwelcome 
and explicit sexual overtures, or commits an act involving a demand or request for sexual 
favours, or commits an act of showing pornography against the will of a woman, he shall be 
punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term up to three years and/or with fine. This is the 
first category of offences and punishment stipulated under the provision. 
When a man commits an act of making sexually-coloured remarks, he shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, and/or with fine. 
This is in tune with the pre-2013 punishment awarded for insulting the modesty of a woman 
under section 509 IPC. The differences between section 509 IPC and the present definition of 
the offence can be seen in Table 1. 
The two different punishments for acts comprising sexual harassment are both cognizable, 
bailable offences, triable by any magistrate.90 As per section 320 CrPC, it is not included 
under “Compoundable offences”. Hence it may be understood to be non-compoundable, 
unlike section 354 IPC. 
3.A.2.d. Section 354B IPC: Assault or use of criminal force to a woman with intent to 
disrobe. 
This is a new offence inserted by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013. Previously, this 
offence would have come under the ambit of section 354. 
The J.S. Verma Committee Report 
The Report suggested the inclusion of a new offence punishing assault of a woman intending 
to disrobe her.91This recommendation found a place in the 2013 amending statute.92 
                                                        
90 As per the First Schedule of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. 
91 Appendix 4, Verma, J.S., Justice, Seth, L., Justice, & Subramaniam, G. (2013). Report of the Committee on 
Amendments to Criminal Law.New Delhi: Government of India, p.437. 
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Post-Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 
Section 354B IPC states thus: 
Assault or use of criminal force to a woman with intent to disrobe. Any man who assaults or uses 
criminal force to any woman or abets such an act with the intention of disrobing or compelling her to be 
naked shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than 
three years but which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
Here both the actual doer of the act of disrobing and the abettor of the act of disrobing are to 
be given a minimum mandatory punishment of three years simple or rigorous imprisonment 
and fine, and a maximum punishment of seven years simple or rigorous imprisonment and 
fine. The differences between section 354 IPC and the present provision punishing the 
offence can be seen in Table 1. 
This is a cognizable, non-bailable offence, triable by any magistrate.93 It is not included under 
“Compoundable offences” as laid down in section 320 CrPC. Hence it may be understood to 
be non-compoundable, unlike section 354 of IPC. 
3.A.2.e. Section 354C IPC: Voyeurism 
This is a new offence inserted by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013. This offence 
would have previously come under section 509 IPC. 
The J.S. Verma Committee Report 
The Report suggested the inclusion of a new provision defining and punishing the offence of 
voyeurism94 in the IPC. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
92 Section 354A: Assault or use of criminal force to woman with intent to disrobe her: Whoever assaults or uses 
criminal force to any woman or abets such act with the intention of disrobing or compelling her to be naked in 
any public place, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less 
than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. 
93As per the First Schedule of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. 
94Section 354B: Voyeurism: Whoever watches a woman engaging in a private act in circumstances where she 
would usually have the expectation of not being observed either by the perpetrator, or by any other person at the 
behest of the perpetrator shall, be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term 
which shall not be less than one year, but may extend to three years, and with fine, and be punished on a second 
or subsequent conviction, with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than three 
years, but may extend to seven years, and also with fine. 
Explanation 1:“Private act”, in the context of this provision, is an act carried out in a place which, in the 
circumstances, would reasonably be expected to provide privacy, and where the victim's genitals, buttocks or 
breasts are exposed or covered only in underwear; or the victim is using a lavatory; or the person is doing a 
sexual act that is not of a kind ordinarily done in public. 
Explanation 2: If the victim consented to capture of the images or other material, but not to their dissemination 
to third persons, such dissemination shall be considered an offence within this section. 
Appendix 4, Verma, J.S., Justice, Seth, L., Justice, & Subramaniam, G. (2013). Report of the Committee on 
Amendments to Criminal Law. New Delhi: Government of India, p.437 
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Post-Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 
 
Section 354C IPC states thus: 
Voyeurism. Any man who watches, or captures the image of a woman engaging in a private act in 
circumstances where she would usually have the expectation of not being observed either by the 
perpetrator or by any other person at the behest of the perpetrator or disseminates such image shall be 
punished on first conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less 
than one year, but which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine, and shall be 
punished on a second or subsequent conviction, with imprisonment of either description for a term 
which shall not be less than three years, but which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable 
to fine. 
Explanation 1: For the purpose of this section, “private act” includes an act of watching carried out in a 
place which, in the circumstances, would reasonably be expected to provide privacy and where the 
victim’s genitals, posterior or breasts are exposed or covered only in underwear, or the victim is using a 
lavatory; or the victim is doing a sexual act that is not of a kind ordinarily done in public. 
Explanation 2: Where the victim consents to the capture of the images or any act but not to their 
dissemination to third persons and where such image or act is disseminated, such dissemination shall 
be considered an offence under this section. 
 
It is a notable fact that various school-aged girls in India have committed suicide due to 
blackmail when images of them carrying on acts pertaining to bodily functions are captured 
by cameras placed in bathrooms and disseminated through the internet. “Private acts” has 
been defined in Explanation 1 as acts carried out in a place which would reasonably be 
expected to provide privacy and where the victim’s genitals, posterior or breasts are exposed 
or covered only in underwear, or the victim is using a lavatory; or the victim is doing a sexual 
act that is not of a kind ordinarily done in public. Watching, capturing images of such private 
acts and dissemination of such images, all come under the same category of “voyeurism”.  
Privacy laws are generally deficient in India, leading to difficult situations where even the 
public media does not hesitate to publish photographs and films which affect the privacy of 
the people involved in such photograph or film. Hence, Explanation 2 of this section would 
come as a relief to many women. Where the victim consents to the capture of the images or 
any act but not to their dissemination to third persons and where such image or act is 
disseminated without her permission, such dissemination is also considered an offence under 
this section as per Explanation 2. The differences between section 509 IPC and the present 
provision punishing the offence can be seen in Table 1. 
 
When the offender is committing a first time offence, the CrPC classifies this offence as 
cognizable, bailable, triable by any magistrate.95 In the case of a second or subsequent 
                                                        
95As per the First Schedule of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. 
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conviction, the offence is cognizable, non-bailable, triable by any magistrate.96It is not 
included under “Compoundable offences” as laid down in section 320 CrPC. Hence it may 
be understood to be non-compoundable, unlike Section 354 IPC. 
3.A.2.f. Section 354D IPC: Stalking 
This is a new offence inserted by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013. It previously 
would have come under the ambit of section 509 IPC. 
The J.S. Verma Committee Report 
The Report suggested the inclusion of a new provision defining and punishing the offence of 
stalking97 in the IPC.98 This recommendation was couched in gender-neutral terms for both 
offender and victim. However, it was incorporated into the 2013 amending statute in gender-
specific terms of man as offender and woman as victim. While this recommendation put a 
minimum term of one year imprisonment as punishment and a maximum term of punishment 
as three years imprisonment, the amending statute made the term of punishment for first 
conviction as upto three years imprisonment and for subsequent conviction, the term of 
punishment as upto five years imprisonment. 
Post-Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 
Section 354 D IPC states thus: 
(1) Any man who- 
(i) follows a woman and contacts, or attempts to contact such woman to foster personal 
interaction repeatedly despite a clear indication of disinterest by such woman; or 
(ii) monitors the use by a woman of the internet, e-mail or any other form of electronic 
communication, 
commits the offence of stalking: 
                                                        
96Ibid. 
97 Appendix 4, Verma, J.S., Justice, Seth, L., Justice, & Subramaniam, G. (2013). Report of the Committee on 
Amendments to Criminal Law. New Delhi: Government of India, p.437. 
98 Section 354C(1): Stalking: Whoever follows a person and contacts, or attempts to contact such person to 
foster personal interaction repeatedly, despite a clear indication of disinterest by such person, or whoever 
monitors the use by a person of the internet, email or any other form of electronic communication, or watches or 
spies on a person in a manner that results in a fear of violence or serious alarm or distress in the mind of such 
person, or interferes with the mental peace of such person, commits the offence of stalking.  
Provided that the course of conduct will not amount to stalking if the person who pursued it shows:  
i. that it was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime and the person accused of stalking had 
been entrusted with the responsibility of prevention and detection of crime by the state; or,  
ii. that it was pursued under any enactment or rule of law, or to comply with any condition or requirement 
imposed by any person under any enactment; or, 
iii. that in the particular circumstances the pursuit of the course of conduct was reasonable 
(2) Whoever commits the offence described in Section 354C(1) shall be punished with imprisonment of either 
description for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to three years, and shall also 
be liable to fine. 
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PROVIDED that such conduct shall not amount to stalking if the man who pursued it proves that – 
(i) it was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime and the man accused of stalking 
has been entrusted with the responsibility of preventing and detection of crime by the State; or 
(ii) it was pursued under any law or to comply with any condition or requirement imposed by any 
person under any law; or 
(iii) in the particular circumstances such conduct was reasonable and justified. 
(2) Whoever commits the offence of stalking shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of 
either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine; and be 
punished on a second or subsequent conviction, with imprisonment of either description for a term 
which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
 
The offence of stalking is committed when a man follows a woman and contacts, or attempts 
to contact such woman in order to foster personal interaction repeatedly without her consent, 
or monitors the woman’s use of any form of electronic communication. However, if such 
man can prove that such following and contacting of the woman was done legally, or under 
reasonable circumstances, then he would not have committed the offence under this section. 
The differences between Section 509, IPC and the present provision is depicted in Table 1. 
When the offender is committing a first time offence, the CrPC classifies this offence as 
cognizable, bailable, triable by any magistrate.99 In case of a second or subsequent conviction, 
the offence is cognizable, non-bailable and triable by any magistrate.100 It is not included 
under “Compoundable offences” as laid down in section 320 CrPC. Hence it may be 
understood to be non-compoundable, unlike section 354 IPC. 
Rape: Problematic areas 
Table 1 depicts the differences between the definitions of the previous and the present 
versions of the offence before and after the passing of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 
2013. The nature and scope of the amended offence of rape in the IPC is analysed in Chapter 
4 in the following contexts: 
1. What is the rationale behind the continuance of the term “rape” instead of “sexual assault”? 
2. Does gender-specificity in the case of the offence of rape render the law discriminatory in 
that it excludes male children from its ambit? 
3. Is a lack of consistency evident in the act of the legislature, which crafted the offence of 
“Rape” in gender-specific terms for both perpetrator and victim in the IPC, while excluding 
the same from the POCSO? 
                                                        
99As per the First Schedule of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. 
100Ibid. 
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Other issues within the offence of rape that shall be analysed in Chapter 4 are with regard to 
the age of consent to sexual activity for girl children and, in the context of child marriage, the 
statutory exclusion of child-wife rape from the scope of the amended offence of rape in the 
IPC. 
These contexts must be considered while examining the following provisions on rape: 
3.A.2.g. Section 375: Rape 
 
This provision defines rape. The law on this matter underwent a substantial change on 3 
February 2013 after the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013. The pre-February 2013 law on 
rape is understood to cover only penile penetration of the vagina of a female101 without her 
consent – the age of consent being sixteen years. 
 
The following part traces the developments on the law of rape in a chronological manner, 
referring to relevant Law Commission Reports recommending changes, as well as important 
case law which helped to guide law reforms. 
Pre-Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 
Section 375 IPC 102 stated thus: 
Rape.—A man is said to commit “rape” who, except in the case hereinafter excepted, has sexual 
intercourse with a woman under circumstances falling under any of the six following descriptions:— 
First— Against her will. 
Secondly—Without her consent. 
Thirdly— With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom 
she is interested in fear of death or of hurt. 
Fourthly—With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband, and that her consent is 
given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully 
married. 
Fifthly— With her consent, when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind 
or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or 
unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she 
gives consent. 
Sixthly— With or without her consent, when she is under sixteen years of age. 
Explanation: Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of rape. 
Exception: Sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, 
is not rape. 
 
A man is guilty of rape when he has sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or 
without her consent. The sixth description states that when a man has sexual intercourse with 
a woman below the age of sixteen, then the issue of consent is immaterial, and that such 
                                                        
101Sakshi v Union of India MANU/SC/0523/2004. 
102 This was amended by Act No. 43 of 1983, section 3. 
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sexual intercourse is considered to be rape irrespective of consent. However, the courts in 
many cases have not relied on the sixth description for convicting the accused. Instead, the 
issue of the underage girl child’s consent has been given greater importance. 
The significance of penetration: Madan Gopal Kakkad (1992) 
The Explanation to Section 375 stated that penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual 
intercourse necessary to the offence of rape. 
Madan Gopal Kakkad v. Naval Dubey and Another (1992)103 
In this case, the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of the term “penetration” for rape under 
section 375 IPC. 
The facts of this case involved a minor girl aged eight who was raped by her friend’s uncle in 
1982. The respondent was aged 28 and had completed his medical studies. Both respondent 
and victim belonged to highly educated and affluent families. The respondent committed the 
offence in such a way that her hymen was not injured. Medical evidence pointed to injuries 
on the labia majora and minora alone. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused was 
in the habit of raping young girls in the locality who were friends of his niece, and that his 
niece herself had confessed to the victim that she had been raped by him many times. The 
Trial Court discharged the respondent of offences under sections 354, 375 and 376 IPC. The 
State appealed to the High Court. The High Court found the respondent guilty of the offence 
only under section 354 IPC and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 3,000, in default to suffer 
simple imprisonment for 6 months and also directed a sum of Rs. 2,000 out of the fine 
amount if collected to be paid over as compensation to the father of the victim girl. The State 
did not prefer any appeal before the Supreme Court. However, the father of the victim girl, 
feeling aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, filed this criminal appeal on two 
grounds:(1) that the High Court erred in finding the respondent guilty of a minor offence 
under section 354 of the IPC when all the necessary ingredients to constitute an offence 
punishable under section 376 of the IPC have been satisfactorily established; (2) that the 
sentence of fine alone imposed by the High Court under section 354 IPC for this serious 
offence was grossly inadequate and not commensurate with the gravity of the offence 
committed by the respondent. 
 
Supreme Court 
                                                        
103MANU/SC/0509/1992. 
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In appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court. Upon examination of 
the evidence preferred before the Trial Court and High Court, Justices S.R. Pandian and M. 
Fathima Beevi came to a finding that there is acceptable and reliable evidence that there was 
slight penetration, not a complete penetration. The judgment stated that it is well understood 
from various legal treatises as well as High Court case law on the subject that even the 
slightest penetration is sufficient to make out an offence of rape and the depth of penetration 
is immaterial.104The Supreme Court held that, having regard to seriousness of crime, the 
respondent was to be convicted under section 376 and was sentenced to undergo rigorous 
imprisonment for period of seven years with fine of Rs. 25000. A delay of ten years had 
already occurred. The High Court’s reason for imposing a fine only and not sentencing 
imprisonment to the accused was that the respondent "is now gainfully employed and there is 
nothing to show that he is indulging in his nefarious activities". The Supreme Court judges 
stated that the reasons given by the High Court for imposing only a fine are not in conformity 
with existing sentencing policy for a case of such grave nature. The Supreme Court judges 
took into account the fact that the victim was presently 19 years old and continued to undergo 
untold agony of the traumatic experience and the deathless shame suffered by her, and that 
she was harbouring the impression that her future chances for getting married in a respectable 
family had been completely marred. 
Various judicial decisions reiterate the point. It is quite possible to commit legally the offence 
of rape even without causing any injury to the genitals or leaving any seminal stains.105 The 
sine qua non of the offence of rape is penetration, and not ejaculation. Ejaculation without 
penetration constitutes an attempt to commit rape and not actual rape.106 
                                                        
104Reference was made to Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice (Vol. 4) at page 1356; Gour's“The Penal Law of 
India" 6th Edn. 1955 (Vol. II) p.1678; Halsbury's Statutes of England and Wales (Forth Edition) Volume 12 
vide R v Hughes [1841] 9 C & P 752; R v Lines [1844] 1 C &K 393 and R v Nicholls [1847] 9 LTOS 179; Natha 
v Emperor 26 Cri.L.J. [1925] 1185; Abdul Majid v Emperor AIR 1927 Lah 735(2); Mussammat Jantan v The 
Crown (1934) PLR 36; Ghanashyam Mishra v State MANU/OR/0023/1957, AIR1957 Ori 78; D. Bernard v 
State (1947) Cri.L.J. 1098; In Re Anthony AIR 1960 Mad. 308. 
105 A similar case, State of U.P. v Babul Nath MANU/SC/0837/1994 where a five year old girl was raped by the 
accused, it was laid down by the Supreme Court that in order to constitute the offence of rape neither Section 
375 of IPC not the Explanation attached thereto require that there should necessarily be complete penetration of 
the penis into the private part of the victim/prosecutrix. To constitute the offence of rape it is not at all necessary 
that there should be complete penetration of the male organ with emission of semen and rupture of hymen. Even 
partial or slightest penetration of the male organ within the labia majora or the vulva or pudenda with or without 
any emission of semen of even an attempt at penetration into the private part of the victim would be quite 
enough for the purpose of Sections 375 and 376 of IPC.  
106 Koppula Venkatrao v State of AP (2004)3 SCC 602 stated that the definition of “rape” as contained in section 
375 of the IPC refers to “sexual intercourse” and the Explanation appended to the section provides that 
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The penetration referred to, before the Criminal Law Amendment 2013, was exclusively 
penile penetration of the vagina of the woman. Section 375 of the IPC extends only to 
heterosexual intercourse involving penetration of the vagina by the penis, which is explained 
by a statement that penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary for 
the offence of rape.107 
Marital rape under section 375, pre-2013 
The original exception to section 375 in 1860 read: 
Sexual intercourse of a man with his own wife, the wife not being under ten years of age, is not rape. 
Kannabiran (2009) outlines the case Queen Empress v Hurree Mohun Mythee108, where an 
11-year old girl named Phulmoni died in 1890 after her 35-year-old husband raped her. The 
women of Phulmoni's family testified in court that since caste codes did not permit 
premenstrual cohabitation, the couple had been kept apart until, her husband had stolen into 
Phulmoni's room and forced himself on her. Yet the English judge, Wilson J., accepted the 
husband's version that they had cohabited several times earlier, and hence intercourse was not 
the cause of death. The charge of rape did not arise because she was clearly over 10 years of 
age. The jury consisted of six Hindus, two Europeans and one Mohamedan. The husband was 
found guilty of causing death inadvertently, by a rash and negligent act under section 338 of 
the IPC, and was sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment. After Phulmoni's death, 44 
women doctors, as part of the reformist movement to raise the age of consent, brought out 
lists of child-wives who had died or suffered grievous hurt, raging debate on marital rape in 
India.109 
The colonial government then proposed to increase the age of consent for sexual intercourse 
for a girl from 10 to 12 years by the Age of Consent Act passed in 1891, after much 
opposition from some Indian leaders.110Such increase in age was believed to be an 
interference by the British rulers into the Hindu religion. This age was further increased to 13 
years in 1925 and to 15 years in 1940. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of rape. Intercourse means 
sexual connection. 
107Sakshi v Union of India AIR 2004 SC 3566. 
108 (1891) ILR 18 Cal 49. 
109Kannabiran, K. (2009). Sexual assault and the Law. Kannabiran,K. & Singh,R. (Eds.), Challenging the 
Rule(s) of Law: Colonialism, Criminology and Human Rights in India. (pp. 78-118 at 82-83), New Delhi: 
SAGE. 
110Sharma, K & Gupta, A. (2015). When even rape is legal. The Hinduhttp://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-
ed/when-even-rape-is-legal/article7298898.ece. 
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Law Commission of India: 42nd and 84th Reports 
The 42nd Law Commission Report on the Indian Penal Code 1860 in 1971 suggested a 
separate section 376A punishing sexual intercourse with a child-wife below twelve years of 
age with heavier punishment of seven years imprisonment and fine and if the child-wife is 
between the ages of 12and 15, with a milder punishment of two years and fine.111 However, 
the 84th Law Commission of India Report in 1980, titled “Rape and allied offences some 
questions of Substantive Law, Procedure and Evidence”, recommended punishment of all 
instances of rape of girls below the age of 18. As marriage of girls below the age of 18 is now 
prohibited by law, section 375 should reflect this changed mentality.112 
A chart was given in the 84th Law Commission Report (1980) showing the historical growth 
of the law regarding age of consent, as on 31 March 1980: 
Table 2 : Chart of the 84th Law Commission Report (1980) showing the historical 
growth of the law regarding age of consent 
 
Year  Age of consent 
under section 
375, 5th Clause, 
IPC 
Age 
mentioned in 
the Exception 
to Section 
375, IPC 
Minimum age of 
marriage under the 
Child Marriage 
Restraint Act 1929 
1860 ....................................................... 10 years 10 years - 
1891 (Act 10 of 1891)(after the 
amendment of IPC) 
12 years 12 years - 
1925 (after the amendment of IPC) 14 years 13 years - 
1929 (after the passing of the Child 
Marriage Act) 
14 years 13 years 14 years 
1940 (after the amendment of the Penal 
Code and the Child Marriage Act) 
16 years 15 years 15 years 
1978 ....................................................... 16  years 15 years 15 years 
The post-1940 Exception to Section 375 increased the age of consent of a married woman to 
sexual intercourse to 15. Post-1940, this Exception states that sexual intercourse by a man 
with his own wife, the wife not being under 15years of age, is not rape. From this, it is 
generally understood that a man cannot be guilty of raping of his own wife, if she is over the 
                                                        
111Law Commission of India (1971). 42nd Report Indian Penal Code 1860. (Para 16.119 at 278);  Law 
Commission of India (1971). 42nd Report Indian Penal Code 1860. (Para 16.119 at p.278) 
http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/1-50/Report42.pdf. 
112Law Commission of India (1980). 84th Report on Rape and Allied Offences Some Questions Of Substantive 
Law, Procedure and Evidence.( Para 2.20 at p.9). http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/51-100/Report84.pdf. 
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age of 15years, on account of the matrimonial consent she has given, which she cannot 
retract.113 
The Code of Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 2008 
 
Section 198 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 deals with prosecution for offences 
against marriage. According to sub-section 6, the courts cannot take cognizance of an offence 
of rape under section 376 IPC one year after the lapse of an offence regarding sexual 
intercourse by a man with his own wife who is below 15 years of age. Through an 
amendment in 2008, the words “fifteen years of age” in section 198 of the CrPC was 
substituted with “eighteen years of age” in sub-section 6.  Hence sub-section 6 of section 198 
CrPC now reads: 
 
No court shall take cognizance of an offence under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 (45 of 
1860), where such offence consists of sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife being 
under eighteen years of age, if more than one year has elapsed from the date of commission of the 
offence. 
Court on its own motion ( Lajja Devi) v State (2012)114 
Regarding the pre-2013 section 375IPC position of the offence of rape, the Delhi High Court 
observed that it is “distressing” that the IPC “acquiesces child marriage” by stating that 
sexual intercourse by a man with his wife above the age of 15 and below the age of 16 years 
is not rape. The Court lamented the distressing fact that various legislations – like the Indian 
Majority Act 1875, Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956 and the Dowry Prohibition 
Act 1961– also recognize child marriages and thereby destroy the very purpose and object of 
the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act 2006 (referred to by the court as the PCM Act) which 
has been enacted to restrain and prevent the solemnization of child marriages. 
The Court then distinguished the position of girls below and above 16 years of age. With 
respect to girls above the age of 16 years, it held that if the girl is more than 16 years, and the 
girl makes a statement that she went with her consent and the statement and consent is 
without any force, coercion or undue influence, the statement could be accepted and Court 
will be within its power to quash the proceedings under section 363 or 376 IPC. Attending 
circumstances, including the maturity and understanding, social background, and the age of 
                                                        
113 However, he has no right to invite others to rape her. If he does so, he would be said to abet the offence. 
114 2012 VIAD (Delhi) 465. 
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the girl and male, have to be taken into consideration. The girl above the age of 16has right to 
get the marriage nullified under section 3 of the Prohibition against Child Marriage Act 
2006. In cases of marriage of a girl below the age of 16 years, her consent would be 
immaterial. Most importantly, the Court also held that consummation with a wife below the 
age of 15 years is an offence and it is irrelevant whether she is married or applicable personal 
law provides otherwise.115 
Meena & Another v State & Another (2012)116 
The Court observed that for a girl who is not the wife of the man but is below 16 years of age 
even consensual intercourse between the two amounts to rape. But if the girl is above 16 
years and is wife of the man, then even forced intercourse is not rape. This provision in the 
IPC is a specific illustration that the legislature has legitimized the concept of child marriage 
by keeping a lower age of consent for marital intercourse.117 
Sexual consent obtained by putting the woman or any person in whom she is interested in 
fear of death or of hurt.: Tukaram (1979) 
The 42nd Law Commission Report of 1971 regarding amendments to the IPC characterised 
rape into three categories: rape proper, rape with child-wife, and illicit intercourse with the 
girl between 12 to 16 years of age with her consent. It recommended that the words “either to 
herself or to anyone else present at that place” be added after the words “(c) with her consent 
when it has been obtained by putting her in fear of death or of hurt” in description (3) of 
section 375 IPC. However, this recommendation was not acted upon because of the 
dissolution of the Lower House of Parliament (Lok Sabha) in 1979. 
Tukaram & Another v. The State of Maharashtra118 (The Mathura case)(1979) 
The Mathura case is a classic example of how the supposed “consent” of a child below the 
age of 16 is taken into consideration by the Indian criminal justice system in order to 
establish that there was no rape. This case involved the instance of custodial rape on 26 
March 1972, wherein Mathura, a young tribal girl, was raped by two policemen in the police 
station compound. The Supreme Court’s acquittal of the accused led to public outcry and 
                                                        
115Raha, S. & Giliyal, A. (2013). Child Marriage and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 
2012.( p. 3), Bangalore: CCL-NLSIU https://www.nls.ac.in/ccl/justicetochildren/poscoact.pdf . 
116 W.P. (Crl.) 1231/2012. 
117 Yadav, A. (2016). A rape covered under the veil of marriage. Lawfarm https://lawfarm.in/blogs/a-rape-
covered-under-the-veil-of-marriage. 
118AIR 1979 SC 185. 
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protests. This resulted in the amendments in Indian rape law through the Criminal Law 
(Second Amendment) Act 1983. 
As per the facts of the case, a Dalit119 girl of 14 to 16 years of age named Mathura lived with 
her brother. A young man named Ashok wanted to marry her, but his match was initially 
rejected. Later on, they decided to marry. After Mathura left her home with Ashok, her 
brother lodged a complaint at a police station stating that Mathura had been kidnapped by 
Ashok and his family members. Later on, all of them went to the police station. After the 
recording of statements, they were permitted to leave. However, a constable directed Mathura 
to stay back and her family to proceed out. She was raped by the two police constables 
present there. When her family came searching for her, she informed them immediately about 
the rape. The sessions court failed to believe in this story and said that because Mathura was 
“habituated to sexual intercourse”, her consent was voluntary; under the circumstances rape 
could not be proved. On appeal, the High Court reversed the decision of the lower court and 
convicted the accused, observing that her subsequent conduct in making a statement 
immediately, not only to her relatives, but also to the members of the Crown, leaves no 
manner of doubt that she was subjected to forcible sexual intercourse. It said that mere 
passive or helpless surrender of the body and its resignation to the others’ lust, induced by 
threats or fear, cannot be equated with desire or will, nor can it furnish an answer by the mere 
fact that the sexual act was not in opposition to such desire. The Court stated that the fact that 
the only reason Mathura was in the police station was because of the complaint filed by her 
brother makes it more probable that any effort to have sexual intercourse was made by the 
accused and was without the consent of the prosecutrix. 
 
Supreme Court appeal 
 
In appeal to the Supreme Court, a bench comprising of Justices A.D. Koshal, Jaswant Singh, 
and P.S. Kailasam set aside the conviction on the grounds that the said sexual intercourse was 
not proved to have amounted to rape. It further held that there were no circumstances 
available which made out a case of fear on the part of the girl and there was no finding that 
she was put to fear of death or hurt. The Supreme Court pointed out that Mathura had raised 
no alarm and there were no visible marks of injury on her person, suggesting no struggle and 
                                                        
119This term is the political name of the lowest castes in India, commonly grouped under the Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes, who are historically disadvantaged communities that were traditionally excluded from 
society as “untouchables”. The term means “broken”. 
129 
 
therefore no rape. It said that unless the fear was of hurt or death, it would not vitiate consent 
and in this case the circumstantial evidence proves that the fear, if any, was not the kind to 
vitiate consent. The medical evidence adduced also proved that Mathura was used to sexual 
intercourse. Therefore, section 375 (3) IPC was held not apply in this case. 
The 84th Law Commission Report of 1980 and the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1983 
The Mathura case decision by the Supreme Court was vehemently protested against by 
women’s organisations in various cities in India. Thereafter, the 84th Law Commission 
Report of 1980 on “Rape and Allied Offences: Some Questions of Substantive Law, 
Procedure and Evidence” was submitted to the government. It stated that consent is vitiated 
not only when a woman is put in fear of death or hurt, but also when she is put in fear of any 
injury being caused to any person (including herself) in body, mind, reputation or property 
and also when her consent is obtained by criminal intimidation – that is to say, by any words 
or acts intended or calculated to put her in fear of any injury or danger to herself or to any 
person in whom she is interested or when she is threatened with any injury to her reputation 
or property or to the reputation of anyone in whom she is interested. Thus, if the consent is 
given after threatening to spread false and scandalous rumours about her character, or 
destruction of her property, or injury to her children or parents, or by holding out threats of 
other injury to her person, reputation or property that consent will not be consent under the 
third description of Section 375 IPC.120 
Pursuant to the 84th Law Commission Report, the third description of section 375 IPC was 
widened by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1983 by the insertion of the words “or any 
person in whom she is interested” after the words “putting her” in fear of death or hurt in the 
clause. Consent to sexual intercourse obtained by putting the woman or anyone she is 
interested in – such as her children, husband or parents – into fear of death or hurt is treated 
as no consent. Hence, such kind of sexual intercourse would be treated as rape of the 
woman.121 
                                                        
120Law Commission of India (1980). 84th Report on Rape and allied offences some questions of Substantive 
Law, Procedure and Evidence. (Para 2.9 at p. 6) http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/51-100/Report84.pdf. 
121 The Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act 1983 also added section 114 (A) of the Evidence Act to state that 
if the victim says that she did not consent to the sexual intercourse, the Court shall presume that she did not 
consent, which shall be a rebuttable presumption. New sections were added to the Indian Penal Code 1860: 
sections 376(A), 376(B), 376(C) and 376(D), which made custodial rape punishable. It also added provisions for 
in-camera trials, the prohibition on the victim identity disclosure, and tougher sentences in the Code of Criminal 
Procedure. 
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Socio-cultural contexts regarding the plight of a female victim of a sexual offence: 
Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai (1983) 
In Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v State of Gujarat,122two young girls visited the 
appellant’s house in order to play with his daughter who was their friend. She was not at 
home, but her father falsely induced them to enter the house. Once they were inside, the 
appellant closed the door, undressed himself in the presence of both the girls, and exposed 
himself. He asked one of the girls to indulge in an indecent act, whereupon she fled from the 
house. The other girl could not escape. She was pushed into a cot and was made to undress. 
The appellant sexually assaulted her. The parents of both assaulted girls wanted to keep the 
matter quiet. However, the residents of the locality came to know about the incident and took 
up the cause. The Sessions Judge found the appellant guilty of serious charges of sexual 
misbehaviour with the two girls and convicted the appellant for the offence of rape, outraging 
the modesty of women, and wrongful confinement. The High Court affirmed the order 
regarding wrongful confinement and outraging the modesty, but modified the conviction 
under rape to attempt to rape (section 376 read with section 511 of the IPC).123 The appellant 
appealed to the Supreme Court. 
 
Supreme Court appeal 
 
Justices M.P. Thakkar and A.P. Sen rejected his appeal, and made a number of crucial 
observations on the plight of an Indian girl or woman who is a victim of sexual assault. These 
observations laid down, for the first time, the socio-psychological reasons which make the 
average Indian female cry “rape”. The Supreme Court observed that rarely will a girl or 
woman in India make false allegations of sexual assault, regardless of her position in society. 
An exception or two may exist, possibly from the urban elites. The learned judges of the 
Supreme Court listed several reasons for this observation: 
(1) A girl or woman in the tradition-bound non-permissive society of India would be extremely reluctant 
even to admit that any incident which is likely to reflect on her chastity had ever occurred. 
(2) She would be conscious of the danger of being ostracised by the society or being looked down by her 
own family members, relatives, friends and neighbours. 
(3) She would have to brave the whole world. 
(4) She would face the risk of losing the love and respect of her own husband and near relatives, and of 
her matrimonial home and happiness being shattered. 
(5) If she is unmarried, she would apprehend that it would be difficult to secure an alliance with a 
suitable match from a respectable or an acceptable family. 
(6) It would almost inevitably and almost invariably result in mental torture and suffering to herself. 
(7) The fear of being taunted by others will always haunt her. 
                                                        
122 1983 (3) SCC 566. 
123Section 511 of the IPC deals with attempt to commit an offence under the IPC. 
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(8)She would feel extremely embarrassed in relating the incident to others being overpowered by a 
feeling of shame on account of the upbringing in a tradition-bound society where, by and large, sex is a 
taboo. 
(9) The natural inclination would be to avoid giving publicity to the incident lest the family name and 
family honour is brought into controversy. 
(10) The parents of an unmarried girl, as also the husband and members of the husband’s family of a 
married woman, would also more often than not, want to avoid publicity on account of the fear of social 
stigma on the family name and the family honour. 
(11) The fear of the victim herself being considered to be promiscuous or in some way responsible for 
the incident regardless of her innocence. 
(12) The reluctance to face interrogation by the investigating agency, to face the court, to face the cross-
examination by counsel for the culprit, and the risk of being disbelieved, acts as a deterrent.124 
 
Satish (2017) comments that the Court stereotypes a rape victim whose testimony could be 
believed and acted upon without corroboration as a person from a rural area and a traditional 
and conservative background, who treasures her chastity and is ashamed to speak about it in 
public, who if unmarried would fear that her prospects of getting married would be 
hampered, and who exhibits visible signs of emotional trauma, agony and suffering on 
account of the rape.125 
A procedural shift in the trial of rape cases: A change to protect the victim against 
stereotypical branding and prosecution as “immoral”: Gurmit Singh(1996) 
State of Punjab v Gurmit Singh 126 was the first case in which the Supreme Court laid down 
guidelines to be followed by trial courts in cases of rape, due to the trial court adding to the 
trauma of the victim by branding her as a person of loose morals and acquitting the accused 
on the basis of her delay in filing the case. This case is a glaring example of secondary 
victimization when the victim, who is being “protected” by the criminal justice 
administration system, finds this experience more traumatic than the alleged abuse 
In this case, a young girl below the age of 16 years was abducted from her school by the three 
accused. She was repeatedly raped by each one of them in turn under the threat of death if she 
raised an alarm. Hence, she kept quiet. The delay in filing the First Information Report with 
the police as well as slight discrepancies in her testimony led the Sessions Court in Ludhiana 
to acquit all the accused on both counts of abduction and rape. The trial court referred to the 
young village girl as a person of loose character who had invented the story of rape in order 
to justify spending a night out of home. It refused to rely on her statement. 
Supreme Court appeal 
                                                        
124 At para 10. 
125Satish, M. (2017). Discretion, Discrimination and the Rule of Law- Reforming Rape Sentencing in India. 
Delhi: Cambridge University Press, p. 42–43. 
126 MANU/SC/0366/1996. 
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The Supreme Court bench comprising of Justice A.S. Anand and Justice Ahmad Saghir S. 
observed that the appreciation of evidence by the trial court was “not only unreasonable but 
perverse”. The Supreme Court held that the sexual intercourse was against the girl’s will for 
which the accused were liable for rape under section 376 of the IPC. Gurmit Singh is 
important because it was the first time the Supreme Court laid down guidelines for trial in 
cases of rape: 
1. Delay in lodging First Information Report is not material when properly explained. 
2. The Court should find no difficulty in convicting the accused on the prosecutrix’s testimony alone. 
Corroboration of the victim’s testimony would be necessary only if there are compelling reasons. 
3. The trial of sexual offences should be in camera and invariably by a lady judge whenever available. 
4. The Court must refrain from making derogatory observations of the prosecutrix. 
5. In a rape trial, the Court is under an obligation to ensure that the prosecutrix is not harassed and 
humiliated in cross-examination. 
The 156th Law Commission Report (1997): A legal definition of the term “child sexual 
abuse” 
This Report put forth a definition of child sexual abuse: 
“Accordingly, child sexual abuse could be any kind of ‘physical or mental violation of the child with sexual 
intent usually by an elder person who is in a position of trust or power viz-a-viz the child”. 127 
This definition was based on those provided by Schwartz et. al(1990) and Amod Kanth 
(1996).,128The 156th Report stated that child sexual abuse may be committed in various forms, 
such as sexual intercourse, carnal intercourse and sexual assault. The cases involving penile 
penetration into vagina are covered under section 375 of the IPC. Cases of penile/oral 
penetration and penile penetration into the anus are covered under section 377 of the IPC, 
whereas acts such as penetration of finger or any inanimate object into vagina or anus against 
a woman or a female child would be covered under an amended section 354 of the IPC. The 
Commission felt that a distinction has to be naturally maintained between sexual assault/use 
of criminal force falling under section 354, sexual offences falling under section 375 and 
                                                        
127 Section 9.52 of the 156th Law Commission Report (1997) on the Indian Penal Code 1860 at p.175 refers here 
to Gomes-Schwartz, B., Horowitz, J.M., Cardarelli, A.P. (1990) Child Sexual Abuse: The initial effects,  
Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, pp.58-59. 
128The experience may vary from an adult exposure of genitals to the child or to persuade the child to do the 
same, the adult touching the child’s genital or making the child to touch his own, involving the child in 
pornography – both printed and visual, having oral, vaginal or anal intercourse with the child, making verbal or 
other sexual suggestions or indecent overtures. In addition, fondling or fingering, touching or voyeurism or any 
such attempt could also be child sexual abuse. Section 9.52 of the 156th Law Commission Report (1997) on the 
Indian Penal Code 1860 at pp.175-176 refers here to Amod Kanth (1996), ‘CSA Legal and Investigative 
Perspective” in Sheela Barse (Ed) Child Victim’s Rights: Report of International Conference on Child Sex 
Abuse, Victim Protective Investigation and Trial Procedure, p.13. 
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unnatural offences falling under section 377 IPC. It stated it would not be appropriate to 
bring unnatural offences punishable under section 377 or mere sexual assault or mere sexual 
use of criminal force which may attract section 354 within the ambit of “rape”, as rape is a 
distinct and grave offence with a definite connotation. 
A case for gender-neutrality: Sudhesh Jhaku (1998) 
 
In Sudhesh Jhaku v KC. Jhaku 129 the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the 
definition of rape could include non-penetrative sexual acts. The Court stated it was for the 
legislature to make such an interpretation. Sikri, J stated that he preferred the offence of rape 
to be redefined in gender-neutral terms. He quoted Legrand (1973) who stated that men who 
are sexually assaulted should have the same protection as female victims, and that women 
sexual assaulters should be as liable for conviction as conventional (male) rapists. If rape 
were to be considered as a sexual assault, rather than a special crime against women, rape law 
could be put in a healthier perspective and reduce the mythical elements that have tended to 
make rape laws a means of reinforcing the status of women as sexual possessions.130 
 
The definition of “sexual intercourse” in section 375 IPC: Sakshi (1999, 2004) 
Persuant to the Sakshi case which sought clarification of the meaning of the term “sexual 
intercourse” used in section 375 IPC, the Supreme Court directed the Law Commission to 
make recommendations regarding the same. The Law Commission submitted its 172nd report 
in 2000 recommending an expanded definition to the offence under section 375 IPC, and 
proposed renaming it as “Sexual Assault” instead of “Rape”. 
 
Sakshi v Union of India (1999)131 
In Writ Petition (Crl.) No.33 of 1997, the petitioner, “Sakshi”, an organisation interested in 
issues concerning women, approached the Supreme Court of India for directions concerning 
the definition of “sexual intercourse” as contained in section 375 IPC. The Law 
Commission’s reply was that such issues had already been dealt with by the 156th Law 
Commission Report. The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Dr. A. S. Anand, Justice Sujata 
V. Manohar and Justice B. N. Kirpal, felt that the precise issues raised in the writ petition had 
                                                        
129MANU/DE/0153/1996. 
130Legrand C.E. (1973). Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and the Law. California Law Review, 61 (3), 
pp. 919 -941 at p.941 (quoted in Id at para 29). 
131 MANU/SC/1007/1999. 
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not been dealt with by the 156th Law Commission Report. Therefore, the Supreme Court 
disposed of the case by directing the Law Commission, 
to examine the issues submitted by the petitioners and examine the feasibility of making 
recommendations for amendment of the Indian Penal Code 1860 or deal with the same in any other 
manner so as to plug the loopholes. 
The 172nd Law Commission Report 2000 
Thereafter, a copy of the draft of comments prepared by the Law Commission was forwarded 
to Sakshi, and other women’s organisations; namely, Interventions for Support, Healing and 
Awareness (IFSHA), All India Democratic Women’s Association (AIDWA) and the National 
Commission for Women (NCW) inviting their views for changes of a procedural nature, 
whether in the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 or the Indian Evidence Act 1872. 
After detailed discussions, the Law Commission recommended, in its 172nd report submitted 
to the Government of India in 2000, that the law relating to rape is to be made gender-neutral, 
wider, and more comprehensive in order to bring it in line with current thinking. 
Various other changes were recommended to sections 376, 376A to 376D IPC. It 
recommended the insertion of a new section 376F dealing with unlawful sexual contact, 
deletion of section 377 IPC and enhancement of punishment in section 509 IPC. The 
proposed section 375 IPC read as: 
Section 375. Sexual Assault: 
Sexual assault means- 
(a) penetrating the vagina (this term shall include the labia majora), the anus or urethra of any person with 
any part of the body of another person, or 
an object manipulated by another person except where such penetration is carried out for proper hygienic or 
medical purposes; 
(b) manipulating any part of the body of another person so as to cause penetration of the vagina (which shall 
include the labia majora ), the anus or urethra of the offender by any part of the other person’s body;  
(c)introducing any part of the penis of a person into the mouth of another person; 
(d) engaging in cunnilingus or fellatio; or 
(e)containing sexual assault as defined in clauses (a) to (d) above in circumstances falling under any of the six 
following descriptions: 
First - Against the other person’s will. 
Secondly - Without the other person’s consent. 
Thirdly - With the other person’s consent when such consent has been obtained by putting such other person or 
any person in whom such other person is interested, in fear of death or hurt. 
Fourthly - Where the other person is a female, with her consent, when the man knows that he is not the husband 
of such other person and that her consent is given because she believes that the offender is another man to whom 
she is or believes herself to be lawfully married. 
Fifthly - With the consent of the other person, when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of 
unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by the offender personally or through another of any 
stupefying or unwholesome substance, the other person is unable to understand the nature and consequences of 
that to which such other person gives consent. 
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Sixthly - With or without the other person’s consent, when such other person is under sixteen years of age. 
Explanation: Penetration to any extent is penetration for the purpose of this section. 
Exception: Sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under sixteen years of age, is not 
sexual assault. 
 
The 172nd Law Commission Report recommended using a gender-neutral term – namely 
“sexual assault”– in place of the offence of rape under section 375 IPC, and deletion of the 
existing section 377 IPC which punishes unnatural offences. However, these 
recommendations were not incorporated into legislation.132 
Only penile penetration constitutes rape: Sakshi (2004)133 
 
In its 1999 decision on the Sakshi case, the Supreme Court referred the matter on 13 January 
1998 to the Law Commission of India for its opinion as to whether all forms of penetration 
would come within the ambit of section 375 IPC or whether any change in statutory 
provision need to be made, and if so in what respect. However, in its 2004 judgment, the 
Supreme Court under Chief Justice S. Rajendra Babu and Justice G. P. Mathur held that only 
penile penetration would constitute rape, and no other forms of penetration would attract the 
offence under section 375 IPC. The Supreme Court held that prosecution of an accused for an 
offence under section 376 IPC on a radically enlarged meaning of section 375 IPC may 
violate the guarantee enshrined in Article 20(1) of the Constitution, which states that no 
person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of 
the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than 
that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of 
the offence. The Supreme Court held "it will not be in the larger interest of the State of the 
people to alter the offence of rape as contained in Section 375 IPC to include penetration 
other than penile penetration, by a process of a judicial interpretation as is sought to be done 
by the petitioner" in that case.” Thus, despite the recommendations of the 172ndLaw 
                                                        
132It was after 12 years that the Protection of Children Against Sexual Offences Act 2012 criminalised sexual 
violence against children by using the terms “aggravated sexual assault” and “sexual assault”. Thereafter, the 
Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill 2012 (introduced on 4 December 2012) also used the term “sexual assault” in 
place of the existing term “rape” for defining the offence under section 375 of the IPC which, post the Delhi 
Rape Incident on 16 December 2012, found place in the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance 2013 
(promulgated on 3 February 2013). However, the J.S. Verma Committee Report submitted on 23 January 2013 
recommended the retention of the offence of “rape” instead of using the term “sexual assault”. Rape was defined 
by this Report as an offence by a man (the offender) upon a “person” (the victim), which included “all forms of 
non-consensual penetration of a sexual nature”, again preferring a partly gender-neutral definition of the victim, 
thereby expanding the traditional understanding of the term “rape”. Ultimately, however, the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act 2013 retained the traditional interpretation of male offender upon female victim. As a result, 
the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 once again defines rape as an offence perpetuated by a man against a 
woman, which includes all forms of non-consensual penetration, both penile and non-penile. 
133MANU/SC/0523/2004. 
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Commission, the Supreme Court refused to tamper with the existing interpretation of the 
offence of rape in section 375 IPC. 
Unfortunately, the recommendations of the Law Commission were not taken into 
consideration by the Indian Parliament and no amendments to the IPC and allied laws were 
made. It took almost 13 years for parliamentary change to be wrought in the IPC and related 
laws regarding sexual offences, mainly due to the public outrage propagated through social 
media regarding the Delhi Rape Incident in 2012. 
Further recommendations to reform the law in Section 375 IPC 
The Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill 2012 definition of rape 
Section 375 IPC was defined as follows: 
Section 375, Indian Penal Code 1860. 
A person is said to commit “sexual assault” if that person— 
(a) penetrates, for a sexual purpose, the vagina or anus or urethra or mouth of another person with— 
(i) any part of the body including the penis of such person; or 
(ii) any object manipulated by such person, 
except where such penetration is carried out for proper hygienic or medical purposes; 
(b) manipulates any part of the body of another person so as to cause penetration of the vagina or anus 
or urethra or mouth of such person by any part of the other person’s body; 
(c) engages in “cunnilingus” or “fellatio”, 
under the circumstances falling under any of the following six descriptions:— 
Firstly.—Against the other person’s will. 
Secondly.— Without the other person’s consent. 
Thirdly.— With the other person’s consent when such consent has been obtained by putting such other 
person or any person in whom such other person is interested, in fear of death or of hurt. 
Fourthly.—When the person assaulted is a female, with her consent, when the man knows that he is not 
her husband and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or 
believes to be lawfully married. 
Fifthly.—With the consent of the other person when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of 
unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by that person personally or through another 
of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, the other person is unable to understand the nature and 
consequences of that action to which such other person gives consent. 
Sixthly.—With or without the other person’s consent, when such other person is under eighteen years 
of age. 
Explanation I.—Penetration to any extent is “penetration” for the purposes of this section. 
Explanation II.—For the purposes of this section, “vagina” shall also include labia majora. 
Exception.—Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under 
sixteen years of age, is not sexual assault. 
The J.S. Verma Committee Report definition of “rape” 
The Committee objected to the use of the term “sexual assault” over “rape” in section 375 
IPC. It stated that the Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill 2012 uses the term “sexual assault” in 
lieu of “rape” to cover a wider gamut of offences including penetrative sexual assault which 
has thus far been called “rape” in the IPC. However, the Committee found POCSO defines 
the term “sexual assault” in a limited context. Section 7 POCSO confines sexual assault to 
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acts that involve physical contact without penetration. Hence, if rape were to be redefined as 
“sexual assault” in relation to the IPC then there would be a clear contradiction between that 
and the POCSO. The Committee recommended that the term “rape” be retained in the IPC to 
denote the highest categorisation of sexual assault of penetrative sexual assault.134 
The Committee opined that rape and sexual assault are not merely crimes of passion but an 
expression of power.135Rape should be retained as a separate offence.136 It is not to be limited 
to penetration of the vagina, mouth or anus. Any non-consensual penetration of a sexual 
nature should be included in the definition.137 The offender is to be retained as male, but the 
victim should be changed from women to “a person”. This Report advocated male gender-
specificity for the offender, and gender-neutrality in the case of the victim. 
 
The J.S. Verma Committee Report defined rape in the IPC as follows:138 
375. A man is said to commit rape if he— 
(a) penetrates the vagina or anus or urethra of a person with— 
(i) any part of his body including his penis or, 
(ii) any object manipulated by him, except where such penetration is carried out for proper 
hygienic or medical purposes; or, 
(b) manipulates any part of the body of a person so as to cause penetration of the vagina or anus or 
urethra of another person; or, 
(c) engages in “cunnilingus” or “fellatio”, 
under the circumstances falling under any of the following six descriptions:— 
Firstly.—Against the person’s will; or, 
Secondly.— Without the person’s consent; or, 
Thirdly.—With the person’s consent, where such consent has been obtained by putting the person, or 
any other person in whom the person is interested, in fear of death or of hurt; 
or, 
Fourthly.— With the person’s consent, when the man induces the person to consent to the relevant act 
by impersonating another man to whom the victim would have otherwise knowingly consented to; or, 
Fifthly.— With the person’s consent, when at the time of giving such consent, by reason of 
unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by the man personally or through another of 
any stupefying or unwholesome substance, the person is unable to understand the nature and 
consequences of the action to which he/she gives consent; or, 
Sixthly.— When the person is unable to communicate consent either express or impliedly. 
Explanation I.— For the purposes of this section, “penetration” means penetration of the vagina, anus 
or urethra to any extent. 
Explanation II.—For the purposes of this section, “vagina” shall also include labia majora. 
Explanation III.—Consent will not be presumed in the event of an existing marital relationship between 
the complainant and the accused. 
Explanation IV.—Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the person by words, 
gestures or any form of non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the 
specific act. 
                                                        
134Verma, J.S., Justice, Seth, L., Justice, & Subramaniam, G. (2013). Report of the Committee on Amendments 
to Criminal Law. New Delhi: Government of India, p.434. 
135Id, at p.220, Para 37. 
136Id, at p. 111, Para 67. 
137Id, at p. 111, Para 68. 
138 Id at pp.439-440, Appendix 4, sub-heading 7, Section 375. 
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Provided that, a person who does not offer actual physical resistance to the act of penetration is not by 
reason only of that fact, to be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity 
The Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance 2013 
As per the recommendation of the J.S. Verma Committee Report, the President of India 
promulgated this Ordinance on 3 February 2013. Section 375 IPC read as follows: 
375. A person is said to commit "sexual assault" if that person– 
(a) penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth urethra or anus of another person or 
makes the person to do so with him or any other person; or 
(b) inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the 
urethra or anus of another person or makes the person to do so with him or any other person; or 
(c) manipulates any part of the body of another person so as to cause penetration into the vagina, 
urethra, anus or any part of body of such person or makes the person to do so with him or any other 
person; or 
(d) applies his mouth to the penis, vagina, anus, urethra of another person or makes such person to do 
so with him or any other person; 
(e) touches the vagina, penis, anus or breast of the person or makes the person touch the vagina, penis, 
anus or breast of that person or any other person, 
except where such penetration or touching is carried out for proper hygienic or medical purposes under 
the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions:- 
First.— Against the other person’s will. 
Secondly. — Without the other person’s consent. 
Thirdly. — With the other person’s consent when such consent has been obtained by putting such other 
person or any person in whom such other person is interested, in fear of death or of hurt. 
Fourthly. — When the person assaulted is a female, with her consent, when the man knows that he is 
not her husband and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she 
is or believes to be lawfully married. 
Fifthly.— With the consent of the other person when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of 
unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by that person personally or through another 
of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, the other person is unable to understand the nature and 
consequences of that action to which such other person gives consent. 
Sixthly. — With or without the other person’s consent, when such other person is under eighteen years 
of age. 
Seventhly. — When the person is unable to communicate consent. 
Explanation 1.— Penetration to any extent is "penetration" for the purposes of this section. 
Explanation 2.— For the purposes of this section, "vagina" shall also include labia majora. 
Explanation 3.— Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the person by words, 
gestures or any form of non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the 
specific act: 
Provided that, a person who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason 
only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity. 
Exception.— Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under 
sixteen years of age, is not sexual assault. 
The 167th Report On The Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill 2012139 
A Report by the Parliamentary Standing Committee On Home Affairs on the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Bill 2012 was presented to the Rajya Sabha on 1March 2013 and laid on the 
table of the Lok Sabha on 4 March 2013. This Report stated thus: 
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While discussing about Section 375, some Members felt that the word ‘rape’ should also be kept within 
the scope of sexual assault. The Home Secretary clarified that there is a change of terminology and the 
offence of 'rape' has been made wider. Some Members also suggested that somewhere there should be 
some room for wife to take up the issue of marital rape. It was also felt that no woman takes marriage 
so simple that she will just go and complain blindly. Consent in marriage cannot be consent forever. 
However, several Members felt that the marital rape has the potential of destroying the institution of 
marriage. The Committee felt that if a woman is aggrieved by the acts of her husband, there are other 
means of approaching the court. In India, for ages, the family system has evolved and it is moving 
forward. Family is able to resolve the problems and there is also a provision under the law for cruelty 
against women. It was, therefore, felt that if the marital rape is brought under the law, the entire family 
system will be under great stress and the Committee may perhaps be doing more injustice. Some 
Members also suggested that the age mentioned in the exception to the Section may be raised to 18 
years from 16 years.  The exception provides that sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his 
own wife, the wife not being under 16 years of age, is not sexual assault. The Home Secretary, 
responding to this suggestion, stated that by doing so by one stroke, the marriages in thousands in 
different States would be outlawed. One Member again suggested that for the words ‘with or without 
the other person’s consent, the words ‘with or without the complainant’s consent’ may be used. The 
Committee, however, felt that by using complainant, a proper message will not go and existing 
formulation may continue.140 
 
The Parliamentary Standing Committee recommended the following definition for the 
offence under section 375 IPC: 
Section 375. Sexual assault 
A person is said to commit “sexual assault” if that person–– 
(a)penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of another person or 
makes the person to do so with him or any other person; or 
(b)inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the 
urethra or anus of another person or makes the person to do so with him or any other person; or 
(c) manipulates any part of the body of another person so as to cause penetration into the vagina, 
urethra, anus or any part of body of such person or makes the person to do so with him or any other 
person; or 
(d) applies his mouth to the penis, vagina, anus, urethra of another person or makes such person to do 
so with him or any other person; 
(e)touches the vagina, penis, anus or breast of the person or makes the person touch the vagina, penis, 
anus or breast of that person or any other person, 
except where such penetration or touching is carried out for proper hygienic or medical purposes under 
the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions. 
First.–– Against the other person’s will. 
Secondly.–– Without the other person’s consent. 
Thirdly. –– With the other person’s consent when such consent has been obtained by putting such other 
person or any person in whom such other person is interested, in fear of death or of hurt. 
Fourthly. –– When the person assaulted is a female, with her consent, when the man knows that he is 
not her husband and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she 
is or believes to be lawfully married. 
Fifthly.–– With the consent of the other person when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of 
unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by that person personally or through another 
of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, the other person is unable to understand the nature and 
consequences of that action to which such other person gives consent. 
Sixthly.–– With or without the other person’s consent, when such other person is under eighteen years 
of age. 
Seventhly.–– When the person is unable to communicate consent. 
Explanation 1.–– Penetration to any extent is “penetration” for the purposes of this section. 
Explanation 2.–– For the purposes of this section, “vagina” shall also include labia majora. 
Explanation 3.–– Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the person by words, 
gestures or any form of non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the 
specific act: 
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Provided that, a person who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason 
only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity. 
Exception.–– Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under 
sixteen years of age, is not sexual assault.141 
 
Post–Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 
The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 gave the offence of rape a wider meaning. Rape is 
no longer confined to penile-vaginal penetration. It includes penile penetration, or insertion of 
any object or non-penile body part, or manipulation of a body part of a woman, by a man, or 
application of his mouth, into the vagina, mouth, urethra and anus of the woman. When a 
woman is forced to perform such penetration, insertion etc with him or any other person, this 
would also amount to rape. 
Section 375 IPC states thus: 
Rape: 
A man is said to commit “rape” if he- 
(a)penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a woman or makes her 
do so with him or any other person; or 
(b) inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the 
urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or 
(c) manipulates any part of the body of a woman so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, 
anus or any part of body of such woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or 
(d) applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any 
other person, under circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions: 
First.— Against her will. 
Secondly.— Without her consent. 
Thirdly.— With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in 
whom she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt. 
Fourthly.— With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her consent is 
given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully 
married. 
Fifthly.— With her consent when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of 
mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or 
unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she 
gives consent. 
Sixthly.— With or without her consent, when she is under eighteen years of age. 
Seventhly.— When she is unable to communicate consent. 
Explanation 1.—For the purposes of this section, “vagina” shall also include labia majora 
Explanation 2.— Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by words, 
gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate 
in the specific sexual act: 
PROVIDED that a woman who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by the 
reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity. 
Exception 1.— A medical procedure or intervention shall not constitute rape. 
Exception 2.— Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being 
under fifteen years of age, is not rape. 
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The amended section is a copy of various instances of penile and non-penile penetration, 
which has been defined as “penetrative sexual assault” under the POCSO. The difference is 
while the perpetrator in POCSO is gender-neutral, the perpetrator in the amended IPC is a 
man, as in the original IPC, and the offence continues to be termed as “rape”. It can be seen 
that the first five instances of the circumstances which would constitute rape is the same as in 
the pre-2013 IPC. However, in the sixth instance, the age of the consent has been raised to 
18years. Hence, whether she consents or not, if she is under 18years of age, her consent to 
sexual intercourse is immaterial and such sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of 
18will be construed as rape. 
A seventh instance of rape has been added. If a woman is unable to communicate her consent, 
it will be deemed that she did not consent and hence the act of sexual intercourse will be 
construed as rape. 
The first Explanation to Section 375 states that vagina includes labia majora. The second 
Explanation defines the term consent as an “unequivocal voluntary agreement when the 
woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, 
communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act”. A proviso to the 
Explanation states that just because a woman does not physically resist the act of penetration, 
she shall not, by the reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity. 
The first Exception to Section 375 IPC states that a medical procedure or intervention shall 
not constitute rape. 
Marital rape under section 375, post-2013 
Prior to the 2013 Amendment, there was only a single Exception to Section 375 IPC, which 
exempted sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under 15years of 
age, from the ambit of rape. Currently, this Exception is numbered as the second Exception to 
Section 375 IPC. No change has been made regarding the content of this exception, which 
repeats the statement that sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife who is 
above 15years of age is not rape. 
Question of culpability of a child engaged in sexual activities below the age of consent 
In the pre-2013 IPC, the question of consent to sexual intercourse had to be addressed before 
arriving at a conclusion of rape in cases involving girls above the age of 16years. The Penal 
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Code puts the legal age of exoneration of a child from unlawful activities as below seven 
years.142 Children above the age of seven and below the age of 12can be made criminally 
responsible if found to be having sufficient mental capacity to understand the implication of 
their criminal act.143 Criminal responsibility for offences accrues to all persons above the age 
of 12. A reading of section 375 IPC shows the age of consent to sexual activity of a girl child 
as 16years of age. If she was married, her age of consent to sexual activity is 15as per the 
second Exception to Section 375 IPC. Therefore, it may be understood that under the prior 
law girl-children were not held criminally responsible for indulging in sexual activities below 
the age of 16years if unmarried and below 15years if married, as all their sexual activity with 
men is regarded as statutory rape.144 However, this principle does not apply in the case of 
boy-children above the age of seven years, who can be held criminally responsible for 
committing rape under section 375 IPC. On the other hand, criminal responsibility for both 
male and female children may accrue in the case of unnatural offences under section 377 
IPC. 
The POCSO criminalises penetrative and non-penetrative sexual assault of children below the 
age of 18. The Criminal Law Amendment Bill 2012 also stated that “sexual assault” under 
section 375 IPC would occur if the person is below the age of 18, irrespective of consent. The 
J.S. Verma Committee Report lamented the fact that such increase in the age of consent for 
children to engage in consensual sexual activity has criminalized all consensual sexual 
activity of children below the age of 18, and goes against the spirit of the UNCRC.145 
Thereafter, the Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill 2013, in section 375 IPC, put the age of 
consent at 16 years. But this was reversed to 18 years in the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 
2013. 
It has been questioned whether Indian law recognizes 18 as the legal age of adulthood.146 A 
perusal of pre-1950 enactments made during the British rule, and post-1950 enactments made 
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after Indian Independence point to the fact that the age of 18 has been adopted. Under the Age 
of Majority Act 1875, every person domiciled in India shall attain the age of majority on 
completion of 18 years and not before. However, in the case of a minor for whose person or 
property, or both, a guardian has been appointed or declared by any court of justice before the 
age of 18 years, and in case of every minor the superintendence of whose property has been 
assumed by the Court of Wards, the age of majority will be 21 years and not 18. The Child 
Marriage Restraint Act 1929 is another piece of legislation which defined “child” as a person 
who, if a male, has not completed 21 years of age, and if a female, has not completed 18 
years of age, and the definition remains the same even after repeal through the recent 
Prohibition of Child Marriage Act 2006. However, other recent legislation has fixed the 
definition of child to 18years, irrespective of gender. Under the Juvenile Justice (Care and 
Protection of Children) Act 2000, the age is 18for both boys and girls. The Protection of 
Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005 defines a child as any person below the age of 18. 
The POCSO also defines a child as a person under the age of 18. 
The inconsistency in the Indian Penal Code 1860 between the genders regarding age of 
sexual consent, the context of child marriage, and the need for specific legislation dealing 
with the age for sexual consent have been analyzed in Chapter 4. 
Case law 
 
A synthesis of recent case law demonstrates that judges favour non-criminalisation of sexual 
activity when the child is mature and responsible enough to understand the implications of 
his/her sexual act. The following are case law which shows the intersection between child 
marriage, sexual consent of children below the age of 18, and Indian criminal law: 
1. Marimuthu v The Inspector of Police, Ayakudi Police Station and Others(2016)147 
This case was decided by Justice Dr. S. Vimala of the High Court of Madras (Madurai 
bench).The father of a minor girl aged 17 years 8 months complained that his daughter had 
been kidnapped by the accused, aged 17 years 6 months. Investigation found that the girl 
married the accused out of her own free volition and became pregnant with his child. Her 
father presented a writ petition before the High Court asking for the abortion of his 
daughter’s foetus, while she herself did not wish to terminate her pregnancy. The Court 
                                                                                                                                                                            
http://infochangeindia.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6472:who-is-a-
child&catid=245:child-rights-in-india&Itemid=149. 
147 MANU/TN/2236/2016. 
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examined the matter and found that the marriage was not void under section 12 (a) to (c), of 
the Prohibition of Child Marriages Act, 2006, which nullifies marriages when a minor: (a) is 
taken or enticed out of the keeping of the lawful guardian; or (b) by force compelled or 
deceitfully induced to go from any place; or (c) sold for the purpose of marriage and made to 
go through a form of marriage or if the minor is married after which the minor is sold or 
trafficked or used for immoral purposes. Hence, the request of the father to terminate the 
pregnancy of the daughter without her consent was not permitted by the Court. 
The Court referred to the study by the National Law School, Bangalore where it stated that 
the tragedy of POCSO lies in the fact that under the guise of protecting children, minors are 
being dragged into the criminal justice system, which results in trauma. The Court quoted the 
National Commission for Protection of Child Rights which had proposed in 2010 that any 
consensual sexual act should not be an offence when it involves two persons who are both 
above 14 and are either of the same age or the age difference is not more than three years. 
The Court stated that the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act 2006 is silent on sexual relations 
in a child marriage, and extends legitimacy to children born of child marriages, thereby 
indirectly acknowledging sexual intercourse within a child marriage. Under the IPC, sexual 
intercourse by a man with his wife above 15 years is an exception to rape. The Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act 2013 raised the age of consent to 18 years but did not disturb this 
exception. As a result, sexual intercourse with a wife above 15 years and below 18 years of 
age will not amount to rape under the IPC. The Courts stated that it is time that child 
marriage be prohibited, but it is unclear what happens to the marriage which is already 
performed due to lack of awareness. The Court dismissed the petition stating that this case 
has ramifications which touch upon the constitutional validity of the POCSO and hence 
cannot be decided by the single bench of this Court. 
2. Satpal v State of H.P. and Others (2015)148 
This case was decided by Justice Rajiv Sharma in the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at 
Shimla. The petitioner was in love with a woman named Pooja who was below the age of 18. 
A case was charged against the petitioner under sections 363 IPC (punishment for 
kidnapping) and 366 IPC (kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel her marriage, 
etc.), as well as section 4 (penetrative sexual assault) of the POCSO. A baby daughter was 
born to them the following year. The petitioner was before the High Court to invoke section 
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482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 in order to quash the pending criminal 
proceedings before him. The High Court upheld the principle enunciated by the Supreme 
Court in Jitendra Raghuvanshi and others v Babita Raghuvanshi & Another149 that even in 
non-compoundable offences pertaining to matrimonial disputes, if the Court is satisfied that 
the parties have settled the disputes amicably and without any pressure, then criminal 
proceedings with respect to offences can be quashed in order to secure the ends of justice. 
Hence it allowed the petition. 
3. Yunusbhai Usmanbhai Shaikh v State of Gujarat and Others (2015)150 
This case was decided by Justice J.B. Pardiwala of the High Court of Gujarat. The daughter 
of the complainant, a 16-year-old girl, got married to the accused according to Muslim rites. 
The accused was 12 years older than her. He was charged under sections 363(punishment for 
kidnapping), 366 (kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel her marriage, etc.) 
and 376 (punishment for rape) IPC and section 18 (attempt to commit an offence) POCSO. It 
was found that the daughter of the complainant admitted she had accompanied the accused of 
her own free will. It could not be proved that she had received any promise or assurance or 
any tempting offer from the accused for which she was forced or enticed to leave her parental 
home. Hence it could not be proved that he had kidnapped her, nor could rape be proved. 
Pending criminal proceedings against him were liable to be quashed. In paragraph 30, the 
Court stated that the object of enacting the Prohibition of Child Marriages Act 2006 was to 
curb the menace of child marriages, which is most common among the Muslim community 
and in rural areas. It quoted the case of Association for Social Justice and Research v Delhi 
High Court151which cited poverty, culture, tradition and values based on patriarchal norms as 
reasons for child marriage. Low level of education of girls, lower status of girls, considering 
girls as a financial burden, social customs, and a mixture of these causes result in the 
imprisonment of girls in marriage without consent. The Delhi High Court cited some of the 
ill- effects of child marriage: 
(i) Girls who get married at an early age are often more susceptible to the health risks associated with 
early sexual initiation and child bearing, including HIV and obstetric fistula. 
(ii) Young girls who lack status, power and maturity are often subjected to domestic violence, sexual 
abuse and social isolation. 
(iii) Early marriage almost always deprives girls of their education or meaningful work, which 
contributes to persistent poverty. 
(iv) Child marriage perpetuates an unrelenting cycle of gender inequality, sickness and poverty. 
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(v) Girls who marry at an early age when they are not physically mature leads to highest rates of 
maternal and child mortality. 
It was held by the High Court of Gujarat that no case was made out for the offences charged 
upon the accused husband. Instead, if during investigation it is found out that a particular 
person had performed, conducted, directed or abetted the marriage, such person would be 
accused under section 10 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act 2006. 
4. Renu v State of U.P. and Others (2015)152 
 
This case was decided by Justice Ajai Lamba and Justice Ashok Pal Singh of the Allahabad 
High Court (Lucknow Bench).The petitioner had eloped with her husband and was pregnant 
with child. She was detained by order of a magistrate to a protection home, by initiation of 
criminal proceedings by her mother, stating that the petitioner’s husband induced and 
kidnapped her into marriage. He was charged under sections 363 (punishment for 
kidnapping) and 366 (kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel her marriage, 
etc.) of the IPC and sections 3 (penetrative sexual assault) and 4 (punishment for penetrative 
sexual assault) of the POCSO. The High Court directed the petitioner to be released from the 
protection home and be reunited with her husband, as she did not want to go with her parents. 
It was stated by the Court that a large number of cases occur when parents do not accept their 
daughter’s choice of marriage on grounds of caste, financial conditions, social status, or 
religion. Even though the girl elopes voluntarily, criminal proceedings are initiated on 
grounds of abduction, kidnapping or inducing the girl to get married. In most cases, the 
complainant takes a ground that the daughter is a minor, for which school certificates are 
relied upon. 
 
5. Keerti Gupta and Others v State of U.P. and Others (2016)153 
 
This was decided before the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) by Justice Ajai Lamba 
and Justice Aditya Nath Mittal. The first petitioner, who was a minor girl just a few months 
shy of 18, left her parental home and eloped with her boyfriend, the second petitioner. After 
living together for a month, they got married in a temple. The parents of the first petitioner 
charged the second petitioner with offences under sections 363 (punishment for kidnapping), 
366 (kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel her marriage, etc.), 504 
(intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace) and 506 (punishment for 
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criminal intimidation) of the IPC as well as sections 7 (sexual assault) and 8 (punishment for 
sexual assault) of the POCSO. The High Court stated that the impugned proceedings have 
been initiated in abuse of process of the Court and process of the law. A personal grudge 
against the daughter’s marriage of choice was being settled by virtue of initiating criminal 
proceedings, which would abrogate the constitutional right of the petitioners to get married as 
per their discretion, especially since there is no evidence to indicate that the marriage is void. 
The High Court quashed criminal proceedings against the second petitioner. 
 
6. Sunil Mahadev Patil v The State of Maharashtra (2015)154 
 
This was decided by Justice Mridula Bhatkar of the High Court of Bombay. The 15-year-old 
prosecutrix and the 20-year-old applicant were in love, so they eloped. They performed a 
ceremony in lieu of marriage and started residing together in a relative’s home. The applicant 
was charged by the prosecutrix’s father of having committed the offences of sections 376 
(punishment for rape), 363(punishment for kidnapping) and 366A (procuration of minor girl) 
of the IPC as well as offences under sections 3 and 4 (penetrative sexual assault), 5 and 6 
(aggravated penetrative sexual assault) of the POCSO. The High Court stated that 
biologically, whenever a child reaches puberty, the child starts understanding his or her 
sexual needs. Some sects and religions acknowledge this biological factor and perform early 
age marriages in order to regularise sexual behaviour in the community. These social and 
biological factors meant that the lawmakers used the age of 15 as the age of consent for 
marriage. In such cases, the trial judges ought to pass orders of bail. The High Court allowed 
the bail application and summed up the considerations regarding applications of bail as 
follows: 
When a boy and a minor girl are in love with each other and chose to live together without consent of 
their parents, then the following factors are to be considered: 
(i) What is the age of the prosecutrix, who is minor 
(ii) Whether the act is violent or not. 
(iii) Whether there are antecedents or not. 
(iv) Whether the offender is capable of repeating the Act or not. 
(v) Whether there is likelihood of threats or intimidation, if at all the boy is released. 
(vi) Whether any chance of tampering with the material witnesses when their statements are 
recorded. 
(vii) It is also to be taken into account in such cases that a boy in his early 20s deserves to get 
employment and to plan, stabilize and secure his future. 
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3.A.2.h. Section 376 IPC: Punishment for rape 
Sub section (1) of this section is a continuation of the previous section 375 IPC and lays 
down the punishment for rape. In addition, a second sub section punishes aggravated 
instances of rape with additional punishment. 
Pre-Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 
The law on punishment for rape under section 376 IPC previously stated: 
Section 376: (1) Whoever, except in the cases provided for by sub-section (2), commits rape shall be 
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years but 
which may be for life or for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine unless 
the woman raped is his own wife and is not under twelve years of age, in which cases, he shall be 
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or with fine 
or with both: 
Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a 
sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than seven years. 
(2) Whoever: - 
(a) Being a police officer commits rape- 
(i) Within the limits of the police station to which he is appointed; or 
(ii) In the premises of any station house whether or not situated in the police station to which he is 
appointed; or 
(iii) On a woman is his custody or in the custody of a police officer subordinate to him; or 
(b) Being a public servant, takes advantage of his official position and commits rape on a woman in his 
custody as such public servant or in the custody of a public servant subordinate to him; or 
(c) Being on the management or on the staff of a jail, remand home or other place of custody established 
by or under any law for the time being in force or of a woman's or children's institution takes advantage 
of his official position and commits rape on any inmate of such jail, remand home, place or institution; or 
(d) Being on the management or on the staff of a hospital, takes advantage of his official position and 
commits rape on a woman in that hospital; or 
(e) Commits rape on a woman knowing her to be pregnant; or 
(f) Commits rape when she is under twelve years of age; or 
(g) Commits gang rape, 
Shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which 
may be for life and shall also be liable to fine: 
Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a 
sentence of imprisonment of either description for a term of less than ten years. 
Explanation 1 
Where a woman is raped by one or more in a group of persons acting in furtherance of their common 
intention, each of the persons shall be deemed to have committed gang rape within the meaning of this 
sub-section. 
Explanation 2 
"Women's or children's institution” means an institution, whether called an orphanage or home for 
neglected women or children or a widows' home or by any other name, which is established and 
maintained for the reception and care of women or children. 
Explanation 3 
"Hospital" means the precincts of the hospital and includes the precincts of any  institution for the 
reception and treatment of persons during convalescence or of persons requiring medical attention or 
rehabilitation. 
The offence has been classified as cognizable, non-bailable, non-compoundable and triable 
by a Court of Session.155 
                                                        
155 As per the First Schedule read with section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. 
149 
 
Here, the punishment for the section 375 offence of rape is given in section 376(1). An 
aggravated punishment for certain kinds of rape is given in section 376(2). This is 
problematic in that it does not allow for conceptual clarity. Whereas, in the POCSO, 
aggravated punishment is given for a defined aggravated offence. 
Marital rape of a child-wife under section 376 IPC, pre-2013 
 
Before the 2013 amendment to the IPC, under sub-section (1) of section 376, if the woman 
raped is his own wife and the wife is above the age of 12and below the age of 15 the 
punishment would be imprisonment up to two years or fine or both. Such an offence was a 
non-cognizable, bailable, non-compoundable offence triable by a Court of Session as per the 
First Schedule read with section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Unlike the IPC, 
which does not recognise marital rape as an offence, in the case of child marriages where the 
wife is above the age of 12 and below the age of 15, rape was a punishable offence, even 
though the punishment was mild compared to the general punishment for rape. Once the 
child-wife is 15, sexual intercourse with her husband without her consent is not considered 
rape. However, if a husband has sexual intercourse with his child-wife who is below the age 
of 12, consent was immaterial and such sexual intercourse would be considered as statutory 
rape. 
 
Pre-Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, enhanced punishment was prescribed for rape of a 
woman below 12 years of age under section 376(2)(f) IPC; namely, rigorous imprisonment 
for a term which shall not be less than 10 years but which may be for life and also fine. 
However, the proviso to section 376(2) IPC stated that the court may also, for adequate and 
special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment of either 
description for a term of less than 10 years. 
 
Under the prior law, that is, the pre-Criminal Law Amendment Section 367(1) IPC, all sexual 
intercourse with girl children falling within the category of 12 to 16 years of age is statutory 
rape as defined in section 375 IPC. The punishment is imprisonment of either description for 
a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may be for life or for a term which 
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may extend to 10 years and also liable to fine. A term lesser than seven years could be 
imposed so long as adequate and special reasons are mentioned in the judgment.156 
Sub-section (2) of section 376 IPC: Aggravated punishment in certain cases 
This has seven parts. Clause (a) applies to police officers committing rape. Clause (b) applies 
to public servants committing rape on a woman in his custody or in the custody of a 
subordinate public servant by taking advantage of his official position. Clause (c) applies to a 
man on the management or on the staff of a jail, remand home, a women’s or children’s 
institution, or other place of custody of a woman or child, who takes advantage of his official 
position and commits rape on any inmate of such place of custody. Explanation 2 states that 
“women’s or children’s institution” means an institution which is established and maintained 
for the reception and care of women and children. It may be called an orphanage or a home 
for neglected women or children or a widow’s home or any other name. Clause (d) applies to 
a man on the management or on the staff of a hospital who commits rape on a woman in that 
hospital by taking advantage of his official position. Explanation 3 states that hospital means 
the precincts of the hospital and includes the precincts of any institution for the reception and 
treatment of persons during convalescence or of persons requiring medical attention or 
rehabilitation. Clause (e) applies to a man who rapes a pregnant woman knowing her to be 
pregnant. Clause (f) applies to a man who commits rape on a woman under the age of 12. 
Clause (g) applies to men who commit gang rape. Explanation 1 defines the term gang rape 
as rape of a woman by a group of persons acting in furtherance of their common intention, 
and that culpability accrues upon each of them within the meaning of this sub-section. 
The J.S. Verma Committee Report 
The provision was framed as such: 
376. (1) Punishment for Rape 
Whoever, except in the cases provided for by sub-section (2), commits the offence of rape shall be 
punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may 
extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to pay compensation to the victim, which shall be 
adequate to meet at least the medical expenses incurred by the victim. 
                                                        
156An interesting remainder to section 376 (1) IPC continued to exist even after the Prohibition of the Child 
Marriage Act 2006 legally abolished child marriages in India, namely, “unless the woman raped is his own wife 
and is not under twelve years of age, … he shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term 
which may extend to two years or with fine or with both…”. This means that if a married man rapes his wife of 
above 12to below 15years, it would not be treated as statutory rape in normal circumstances, and the punishment 
would be imprisonment of either description (“Imprisonment of either description” means either simple 
imprisonment or rigorous imprisonment which is left to the discretion of the court) of up to two years or with 
fine or with both. It is also subject to the proviso for imposition of a lesser term for adequate and special reasons 
mentioned. 
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(2) Whoever,— 
(a) being a police officer, whether on duty or otherwise, commits rape — 
(i) within the limits of the police station to which such police officer is appointed; or, 
(ii) in the premises of any station house; or, 
(iii) on a person in such police officer’s custody, or in the custody of a police officer subordinate to 
such police officer; or, 
(b) being a member of the armed forces is in the area by virtue of deployment by the Central or a State 
government, and commits rape; or 
(c) being a public servant, commits rape of a person in his custody or in the custody of a public servant; 
or 
(d) being on the management or on the staff of a jail, remand home or other place of custody established 
by or under any law for the time being in force or of a women’s or children’s institution, commits rape on 
any inmate of such jail, remand home, place or institution; or 
(e) being on the management or on the staff of a hospital, commits rape on a patient in that hospital; or 
(f) commits rape on a woman knowing her to be pregnant; or 
(g) being a relative, guardian or teacher of, or a person in a position of trust or authority towards the 
person assaulted, commits rape; or 
(h) commits rape, where the person assaulted is incapable of giving consent including in circumstances 
defined under Section 375 Thirdly, Fifthly and Sixthly. 
(i) while committing rape causes grievous bodily harm or maims or disfigures or endangers the life of the 
person assaulted; or 
(j) commits rape repeatedly on the same person, 
shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which 
may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to pay compensation to the victim which 
shall be adequate to meet at least the medical expenses incurred by the victim. 
Explanation 1: For the purposes of this Section, “rape” shall mean any of the acts mentioned in clauses 
(a) to (c) of section 375. 
Explanation 2: For the purposes of this Section, “women’s or children’s institution” includes an 
institution, whether called an orphanage or a home for neglected women or children or a widow’s home 
or an observation home, beggar home or a halfway home or an institution called by any other name, 
which is established and maintained for the reception and care of women or children; 
Explanation 3: For the purposes of this Section, “hospital” means the precincts of the hospital and 
includes the precincts of any institution for the reception and treatment of persons during convalescence 
or of persons requiring medical attention or rehabilitation. 
Explanation 4: In sub-clause (a) of clause (2), “police officer” shall have the same meaning as the word 
“Police” under The Police Act, 1861. 
Explanation 5: For the purposes of this section ‘custody’ includes any form of physical, mental or 
psychological restraint to inhibit the exercise of free will by the person in custody. 
Explanation 6: For the purposes of this section, ‘armed forces’ means the naval, military and air forces 
and includes any member of the Armed Forces enumerated in the Schedule, including the paramilitary 
forces and any auxiliary forces that are under the control of the Central or State Government. 
 
The Committee recommended the creation of a new offence punishing rape of an underage 
person below 16 years of age with rigorous imprisonment of a minimum of 10 years and a 
maximum of life imprisonment. If rape of an underage person resulted in the death or 
persistent vegetative state, the minimum punishment would be 20 years.157 
 
The Committee recommended that, based on the interpretation of Article 34 of the UNCRC, 
the age of consent be reduced to 16, and necessary amendments be made to the POCSO , in 
order to avoid contradictions with the IPC. The Committee commented that both the POCSO 
                                                        
157Section 376(B) IPC, sub-heading 12, Appendix 4, Verma, J.S., Justice, Seth, L., Justice, & Subramaniam, G. 
(2013). Report of the Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law. New Delhi: Government of India, p.443. 
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and the Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill 2012 had earmarked 18 as the age of consent for the 
purposes of section 375 IPC, thereby achieving the result of criminalising all sexual activity 
whether consensual or non-consensual where one person is below the age of 18. The 
Committee stated that the UNCRC aimed to protect children from sexual assault and abuse 
and not to criminalise consensual sex between two individuals even if they are below 18 
years of age.158 
 
Post-Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 
After the 2013 amendment to the IPC, the provision in sub-section (1) of section 376 IPC 
regarding punishment for marital rape was removed. The part “or for a term which may 
extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine” was removed. Also removed is the proviso 
in sub-section (1) stating that the court may impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of 
less than seven years provided adequate and special reasons for giving such lesser 
punishment are mentioned in the judgment. 
 
A total of 14 clauses have been placed under sub-section (2) for which punishment is the 
same as that before the 2013 amendment: rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not 
be less than 10 years but which may be for life and shall also be liable to fine. However, it is 
a matter of significance that life imprisonment for rape under this sub-section has been stated 
to mean imprisonment for the remainder of the convict’s natural life. Life imprisonment 
usually meant incarceration for 14 years when life sentence convicts become entitled to 
remission of the rest of the sentence as per Prison Manual provisions.159 Sections 432, 433 
and 433-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973(referred to as CrPC) state that state 
governments can grant remission and commutation to the sentence awarded by the court. 
There are many instances where life convicts have been allowed to go free after a limited 
period using these provisions. The Supreme Court has reiterated that life imprisonment 
means imprisonment for the entire period of the convict’s life.160 The 2013 amendment 
                                                        
158Verma, J.S., Justice, Seth, L., Justice, & Subramaniam, G. (2013). Report of the Committee on Amendments 
to Criminal Law., New Delhi: Government of India, pp.443-444. 
159 Rule 18.06 (iv): Life convicts (men and adolescent offenders) on completion of 10 years of imprisonment, 
including remission, except those covered under Section 433-A of CrPC 1973, whose cases will be considered 
after completing 14 years of actual imprisonment. Model Prison Manual for the Superintendence and 
Management of Prisons in India (2003). Bureau of Police Research and Development, Ministry of Home 
Affairs. Government of India, New Delhi.   
160Gopal Vinayak Godse v The State of Maharashtra and Ors AIR 1961 SC 600; State of Madhya Pradesh v 
Ratan Singh (1976) 3 SCC 470; Maru Ram v Union of India &Ors. (1981) 1 SCC 107;Shri Bhagwan v State of 
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clarifies that a rape convict under section 376(2) IPC who has been granted life imprisonment 
is to serve imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life. When the court does not lay 
down a mandatory sentence, a question arises whether the state government can exercise its 
powers of remission or commutation under sections 432, 433 and 433A CrPC. 
 
Clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the former sub-section (2) of section 376 IPC have been 
retained with slight changes in expression. Clause (b) states the punishment for armed forces 
personnel deployed in an area by the central or state government who commit rape in that 
place. The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act 1958 (AFSPA) requires a sanction by the 
central government for initiating prosecution against armed forces personnel. However, the 
new clause (c) in sub-section (2) strips security forces of the special immunity that they enjoy 
in conflict areas in cases of rape on women, and brings them under the purview of the 
ordinary criminal law. Another insertion is enhanced punishment for a rapist who is a 
relative, guardian or teacher of, or a person in a position of trust or authority towards the 
woman, under clause (f). Clauses of the same sub-section give enhanced punishment for 
other categories of rape – rape during communal or sectarian violence(s.375(2)(g)); raping a 
woman under sixteen years of age (s.375(2)(i)); raping a woman incapable of giving consent 
(s.375(2)(j)); or raping a woman while being in a position of dominance or control over a 
woman (s.375(2)(k)); raping a woman suffering from physical or mental disability(s. 
375(2)(l)); while raping a woman, causing grievous bodily harm or maiming or disfiguring or 
endangering the life of a woman(s.375(2)(m)); or repeatedly committing rape on the same 
woman(s.375(2)(n)). The previous clause (e) concerning committing rape on a woman 
knowing her to be pregnant has been reproduced verbatim in clause (h). 
 
In the Explanation part of the section, the terms “armed forces”, “hospital”, “police officer” 
and “women’s and children’s institution” have been defined. The previous definition of the 
term “gang rape” has been substituted by the definition of the term “armed forces”. The term 
“police officer” has also been newly defined. The previous definitions of the terms “hospital” 
and “women’s and children’s institution” have been retained verbatim. 
 
The punishment for rape is given as follows: 
Section 376. Punishment for rape 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Rajasthan (2001) 6 SCC 296; Mohd. Munna with Kartik Biswas v Union of India (2005) 7 SCC 417, 
SwamyShraddananda v State Of Karnataka AIR 2008 SC 3040. 
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(1) Whoever, except in the cases provided for by sub-section (2), commits rape shall be punished with rigorous 
imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to 
imprisonment for life, and shall be liable to fine. 
(2) Whoever, - 
(a) Being a police officer commits rape- 
(i) within the limits of the police station to which such police officer is appointed; or 
(ii) in the premises of any station house; or 
(iii) on a woman is such police officer’s custody or in the custody of a police officer subordinate to such police 
officer; or 
(b) being a public servant, commits rape on a woman in  such public servant’s custody or in the custody of a 
public servant subordinate to such public servant; or 
(c) being a member of the armed forces deployed in an area by the Central of a State Government commits rape 
in such area; or 
(d) being on the management or on the staff of a jail, remand home or other place of custody established by or 
under any law for the time being in force or of a woman's or children's institution, commits rape on any inmate 
of such jail, remand home, place or institution; or 
(e)being on the management or on the staff of a hospital, commits rape on a woman in that hospital; or 
(f) being a relative, guardian or teacher of, or a person in a position of trust or authority towards the woman, 
commits rape on such woman; or 
(g) commits rape during communal or sectarian violence; or 
(h) commits rape on a woman knowing her to be pregnant; or 
(i) commit rape on a woman when she is under sixteen years of age; or 
(j)commits rape, on a woman incapable of giving consent; or 
(k)being in a position of dominance or control over a woman, commits rape on such woman; or 
(l) commits rape on a woman suffering from physical or mental disability; or 
(m) while committing rape causes grievous bodily harm or maims or disfigures or endangers the life of a 
woman; or 
(n) commits rape repeatedly on the same woman, 
shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may be 
for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural life, and shall also be liable to 
fine. 
Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section,— 
a.     "armed forces" means the naval, military and air forces and includes any member of the Armed Forces 
constituted under any law for the time being in force, including the paramilitary forces and any auxiliary forces 
that are under the control of the Central Government, or the State Government; 
b.    "hospital" means the precincts of the hospital and includes the precincts of any institution for the reception 
and treatment of persons during convalescence or of persons requiring medical attention or rehabilitation; 
c.     "police officer" shall have the same meaning as assigned to the expression "police" under the Police Act, 
1861; 
d.    "women's or children's institution" means an institution, whether called an orphanage or a home for 
neglected women or children or a widow's home or an institution called by any other name, which is established 
and maintained for the reception and care of women or children 
The offence continues to be classified as cognizable, non-bailable, non-compoundable and 
triable by a Court of Session.161 
 
Table 1 details the differences between the previous and current versions of this offence 
before and after the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013. For example, the proviso of 
adequate and special reasons given by a judge to commute the sentence to less than seven 
years has been deleted. 
                                                        
161 As per the First Schedule read with section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973.  
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Despite the recommendations of the J.S. Verma Committee Report to lower the age of 
consent for sexual activity to 16,162the law regarding the age of consent of a girl child has 
been harmonised with other national legislation through the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 
2013. Section 375 IPC criminalises sexual intercourse with or without consent, when a girl is 
under 18years of age. Section 376 IPC punishes the same with rigorous imprisonment of 
either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years, but which may extend 
to imprisonment for life, and liability of fine. 
Despite the POCSO  providing for aggravated punishment for a separately defined aggravated 
offence, the punishment for the section 375 IPC offence of rape is retained in section 376 (1) 
IPC, with aggravated punishment for certain kinds of rape in Section 376(2) IPC. When there 
are two separate punishments for two different degrees of the same offence, combining them 
creates confusion to the reader. This lack of conceptual clarity in sections 375 and 376 of the 
IPC is discussed in Chapter 3. 
Marital rape of a child-wife, post-2013 
The J. S. Verma Committee dealt with the issue of marital rape in detail. The IPC 
differentiates between rape within marriage and outside marriage. Under the IPC sexual 
intercourse without consent is prohibited. However, an exception to the offence of rape exists 
in relation to un-consented sexual intercourse by a husband upon a wife. The Committee 
recommended that the exception to marital rape be removed. Marriage should not be 
considered as an irrevocable consent to sexual acts. As seen in Explanation III of the 
Committee’s draft of section 375 IPC, the relationship between the victim and the accused 
should not be relevant with regard to an inquiry about whether the complainant consented to 
the sexual activity.163 
Sub section (1) of the pre-2013 section 376 IPC awarded a lesser punishment of 
imprisonment up to two years or fine or both if the woman who is raped by her husband is 
not under 12 years of age. This was removed by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013. 
The present position is that a married woman above the age of 15cannot be raped by her 
husband. Non-consensual sexual intercourse of a woman above the age of 15 with her 
husband does not amount to rape, as in the case of an 18-year-old married woman, because 
                                                        
162Verma, J.S., Justice, Seth, L., Justice, & Subramaniam, G. (2013). Report of the Committee on Amendments 
to Criminal Law. New Delhi: Government of India, pp.443-444. 
163 Id at p.117, Para 79.  
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the Penal Code does not recognise an offence of marital rape for non-consensual intercourse. 
Post-2013, Clause (i) of sub-section (2) of section 376 IPC raised the threshold age from 12 
to 16 for awarding aggravated punishment for rape of a woman when she is under 16years of 
age. So in the case of a married woman below the age of 15, sexual intercourse with her by 
her husband invokes punishment of rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less 
than 10 years but which may be for life – which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder 
of that person’s natural life – and shall also be liable to fine. 
Now, sexual intercourse with an unmarried girl above the age of 16 incurs punishment under 
Section 376(1) IPC. She cannot consent to sexual intercourse until she reaches the age of 18. 
Whereas, a married girl of 15 years and above can enter into sexual intercourse with her 
husband without her husband attracting punishment under section 376(1) IPC. The 
predicament of a child-wife above the age of 15 –who does not get the protection against rape 
that an unmarried girl below the age of 18 is entitled to merely because the rapist happens to 
be her husband – is discussed in Chapter 4, along with the grey area regarding legal consent 
of children for sexual activity. 
Kannabiran (2009) comments that while criminal law does not recognise marital rape as rape, 
the new civil law on domestic violence - the Protection of Women against Domestic Violence 
Act 2005 -– includes marital rape within the meaning of domestic violence, against which 
women can seek protection and remedy.164 Though the term “marital rape” has not been 
specifically used in this enactment, section 3 of the Protection of Women Against Domestic 
Violence Act 2005 includes “sexual abuse” within the term “domestic violence”, and defines 
"sexual abuse" to include any conduct of a sexual nature that abuses, humiliates, degrades or 
otherwise violates the dignity of woman (Explanation 1(ii) of section 3). The civil remedies 
available under this enactment include protection orders, residence orders, monetary relief, 
custody orders, compensation orders, interim and ex parte orders. 
3.A.2.i. Certain Offences Of Rape From Sections 376A To 376E IPC 
 
The following provisions are relevant because they deal with rape of a woman in various 
circumstances: 
1. Section 376A IPC: Punishment for causing death or resulting in persistent vegetative 
state of victim 
                                                        
164Kannabiran, K. (2009). Sexual assault and the Law. Kannabiran, K. and  Singh, R. (eds.), Challenging the 
Rule(s) of Law: Colonialism, Criminology and Human Rights in India. New Delhi: SAGE, pp. 78-118. 
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This is a new provision which provides for punishment for causing death or resulting in 
persistent vegetative state of victim. It replaces the previous section 376A IPC which 
punished the husband for sexual intercourse with a wife during separation as rape. Post-
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, section 376A IPC states: 
 
Whoever commits an offence punishable under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 376 and in 
the course of such commission inflicts an injury which causes the death of the woman or causes the 
woman to be in a persistent vegetative state, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term 
which shall not be less than twenty years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall 
mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural life, or with death. 
 
This offence is classified as a cognizable, non-bailable, non-compoundable offence triable by 
a Court of Session.165 
2. Section 376B IPC: Sexual intercourse by husband upon his wife during separation 
This section is a modified version of the pre-2013 section 376A IPC, which punishes sexual 
intercourse with wife during separation, with imprisonment which may extent up to two years 
and fine. Section 376A IPC, pre-2013, read as follows: 
Whoever has sexual intercourse with his own wife, who is living separately from him under a decree of 
separation or under any custom or usage without her consent shall be punished with imprisonment of 
either description for a term which may extend to two years and shall also be liable to fine. 
In the newly amended section, punishment for the same offence carries a minimum 
mandatory punishment of two years and a maximum of seven years, along with fine. Also, 
the act of sexual intercourse has been defined as any of the acts mentioned in clauses (a) to 
(d) of section 375 IPC, which means penile penetration, or insertion of any object or non-
penile body part, or manipulation of a body part of a woman, by a man, or application of his 
mouth, into the vagina, mouth, urethra and anus of the woman. When a woman is forced to 
perform such penetration, insertion etc with him, this would also amount to an offence under 
this section. Post-2013, it states as follows: 
Whoever has sexual intercourse with his own wife, who is living separately, whether under a decree of 
separation or otherwise, without her consent, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description 
for a term which shall not be less than two years but which may extend to seven years, and shall also be 
liable to fine. 
Explanation.—In this section, "sexual intercourse" shall mean any of the acts mentioned in clauses (a) 
to (d) of section 375. 
3. Section 376C IPC: Punishment for sexual intercourse by a superintendent/manager 
of a jail 
 
                                                        
165 As per the First Schedule read with section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. 
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This provides punishment for sexual intercourse by person in authority. Pre-Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act 2013, section 376C IPC provided punishment for intercourse by 
superintendent of jail, remand home, etc. as follows: 
Whoever, being the superintendent or manager of a jail, remand home or other place of custody 
established by or under any law for the time being in force or of a woman's or children's institution 
lakes advantage of his official position and induces or seduces any female inmate of such jail, remand 
home, place or institution to have sexual intercourse with him, such sexual intercourse not amounting 
to the offence of rape, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may 
extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine. 
Explanation I.--"Superintendent" in relation to jail, remand home or other place of custody or a 
women's or children's institution includes a person holding any other office in such jail, remand home, 
place or institution by virtue of which he can exercise any authority or control over its inmates. 
Explanation 2.--The expression "women's or children's institution" shall have the same meaning as in 
Explanation 2 to sub-section (2) of section 376. 
 
Post-Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, this offence deals with certain instances of sexual 
intercourse which does not amount to rape, as the element of consent of the woman involved 
is present. The new offence in section 376D IPC combines three former offences under 
sections 376B, 376C and 376D of the IPC.166 
Post-Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, section 376C IPC states thus: 
Whoever, being— 
a.     in a position of authority or in a fiduciary relationship; or 
b.    a public servant; or 
c.     superintendent or manager of a jail, remand home or other place of custody established by or 
under any law for the time being in force, or a women's or children's institution; or 
d.    on the management of a hospital or being on the staff of a hospital, abuses such position or 
fiduciary relationship to induce or seduce any woman either in his custody or under his charge or 
present in the premises to have sexual intercourse with him, such sexual intercourse not amounting 
to the offence of rape, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either description for a 
term which shall not be less than five years, but which may extend to ten years, and shall also be 
liable to fine. 
Explanation l.—In this section, "sexual intercourse" shall mean any of the acts mentioned in clauses (a) to 
(d) of section 375. 
Explanation 2. —For the purposes of this section, Explanation I to section 375 shall also be applicable. 
Explanation 3.—"Superintendent", in relation to a jail, remand home or other place of custody or a women's 
or children's institution, includes a person holding any other office in such jail, remand home, place or 
institution by virtue of which such person can exercise any authority or control over its inmates. 
Explanation 4.—The expressions "hospital" and "women's or children's institution" shall respectively have 
the same meaning as in Explanation to sub-section (2) of section 376. 
 
This offence is a cognizable, non-bailable, non-compoundable offence triable by the Court of 
Sessions.167Under the First Schedule of the CrPC, it used to be classified as a bailable 
                                                        
166 Under the former section 376B IPC, which provided punishment for intercourse by a public servant with 
woman in his custody, section 376C IPC, which provided punishment for intercourse by a superintendent of a 
jail, remand home etc, and section 376D IPC which provided punishment for intercourse by manager or staff of 
the hospital with a woman in that hospital, the punishment was imprisonment for five years and fine. 
167Ibid. 
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offence, triable by the Court of Session. It was a cognizable offence but no arrest was to be 
made without a warrant or without an order of a Magistrate. 
4. Section 376D IPC: Punishment for gang rape 
This provides punishment for gang rape. Formerly, Clause (g) of sub-section (2) of section 
376 IPC stated that whoever commits gang rape shall be punished with imprisonment for a 
term for a term which shall not be less than 10 years but which may be for life and shall also 
be liable to fine, which could be lessened by the court provided adequate and special reasons 
are mentioned in the judgment. Explanation 1 defined gang rape as where a woman is raped 
by one or more in a group of persons acting in furtherance of their common intention, each of 
the persons shall be deemed to have committed gang rape within the meaning of this sub-
section. 
Pre-Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, section 376D IPC provided punishment for 
intercourse by any member of the management or staff of a hospital with any woman in that 
hospital, as follows: 
Whoever, being on the management of a hospital or being on the staff of a hospital lakes advantage of 
his position and has sexual intercourse with any woman in that hospital, such sexual intercourse not 
amounting to the offence of rape, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term 
which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine. 
Explanation.--The expression "hospital" shall have the same meaning as in Explanation 3 to sub-
section (2) of section 376 
The new section 376D IPC punishes gang rape with minimum imprisonment of twenty years 
and a maximum of life imprisonment till the remainder of that person’s natural life, and with 
fine. The fine imposed shall be imposed taking account the cost of medical expenditure and 
rehabilitation of the victim. Also, it is clearly stipulated that the fine imposed under this 
section shall be paid to the victim. 
Post-Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, section 376D IPC states thus: 
Where a woman is raped by one or more persons constituting a group or acting in furtherance of a 
common intention, each of those persons shall be deemed to have committed the offence of rape and 
shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than twenty years, but 
which may extend to life which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life, 
and with fine: 
Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of 
the victim: 
Provided further that any fine imposed under this section shall be paid to the victim. 
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This offence is a cognizable, non-bailable, non-compoundable offence triable by the Court of 
Sessions.168 
5. Section 376E IPC: Punishment for repeat offenders 
Post-Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, a new section was inserted into the IPC. It states 
thus: 
Whoever has been previously convicted of an offence punishable under section 376 or section 376A or 
section 376D and is subsequently convicted of an offence punishable under any of the said sections 
shall be punished with imprisonment for life which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that 
person's natural life, or with death. 
This offence is a cognizable, non-bailable, non-compoundable offence triable by the Court of 
Sessions.169 Accordingly, repeat offenders are to be punished with life imprisonment for the 
remainder of that person’s natural life, or with death. 
3.A.2.j. Section 377 IPC: Unnatural offences 
Before the advent of the POCSO, there was no provision in Indian law to specifically punish 
sexual crimes against male children. Section 377 IPC was generally used for this purpose. 
The ambit of section 377 IPC extends to any sexual union involving penile insertion, which 
can be understood to include homosexual acts, bestiality, as well as consensual heterosexual 
acts such as oral and anal penetration. Table 1 provides information regarding this offence in 
the context of certain selected provisions on sexual offences in the IPC. 
Section 377 IPC states thus: 
Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animal, 
shall be punished with imprisonment for life170, or with imprisonment of either description for term 
which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
Explanation: Penetration is sufficient to constitute the carnal intercourse necessary to the offense 
described in this section. 
This offence is classified as a cognizable, non-bailable, non-compoundable offence, triable by 
a Magistrate of the first class.171 
The terms “carnal intercourse” and “penetration” are not defined in the IPC. However, Indian 
courts have sought to distinguish the elements are necessary to constitute an offence under 
this section as: (i) The accused must have carnal intercourse with a man, or a woman or an 
animal; (ii) The act must be against the order of nature; (iii) The act must have been done 
voluntarily by the accused; and (iv) There was penetration. The Explanation states that 
                                                        
168Ibid. 
169Ibid. 
170Substituted for the words “transportation for life”by Act 26 of 1955. 
171As per the First Schedule read with section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. 
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penetration is required to constitute the carnal intercourse. Hence, penetration, however 
minimal, is required as in the case of the pre-2013 definition of rape under section 375.172 In 
another case, it was observed that even mere penetration will be sufficient to constitute the 
carnal intercourse and there need not be necessary a seminal discharge for constituting the 
carnal intercourse.173 Adenwalla (2000) stated that sodomy or carnal copulation amounts to 
‘carnal intercourse against the order of nature’ as the natural object of carnal intercourse is 
supposed to be the possibility of conception.174 
The following are case laws which are referred to in order to define what constitutes “carnal 
intercourse against the order of nature”: 
Khanu v Emperor (1925)175 
The court was required to determine whether fellatio constituted an act of “carnal intercourse 
against the order of nature” for the purpose of section 377 IPC. It stated: 
Section 377 punished certain persons who have carnal intercourse against the order of nature with inter 
alia human beings. Is the act here committed one of carnal intercourse; if so it is clearly against the order 
of nature, because the natural object of carnal intercourse is that there should be the possibility of 
conception of human beings, which in the case of coitus per os fellatio is impossible. 
 
Khandu v Emperor (1934)176 
The accused was convicted for the carnal intercourse by placing his penis into the nostril of a 
bullock. 
Lohana Vasantlal Devchand v The State (1968)177 
In the course of forcible anal intercourse with a boy, one of the accused voluntarily put his 
male organ in the mouth of the boy. The question was whether the insertion of the male organ 
by the second accused into the orifice of the mouth of the boy amounted to an offence under 
section 377 IPC. It was held by the Court that the act was the actual replacement of desire of 
coitus and would, therefore, amount to an offence punishable under section 377 IPC: “There 
was an entry of male penis in the orifice of the mouth of the victim. There was the enveloping 
                                                        
172Calvin Francis v Orissa1992 (2) Crimes 455 (Ori) 
173Lohana Vasantlal Devchand v State of Gujarat AIR 1968 Guj. 252.  
174 Examples cited by Adenwalla(2000) are thrusting the penis into the anus of a male or female, sexual 
intercourse through the mouth. Adenwalla, M. (2000). Child Sexual Abuse and the Law. (p.50), India Centre for 
Human Rights and the Law, Mumbai. 
175(1925) 26 CrLJ 945. 
176AIR 1934 Lah. 261. 
177 AIR 1968 Guj 252. 
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of a visiting member by the visited organism. There was thus reciprocity; intercourse 
connotes reciprocity”.178The Court held that the act in question amounted to an offence 
punishable under section 377 IPC. 
State of Kerala v K. Govindan (1969)179 
The Kerala High Court held that an act of inserting the male organ between the thighs of 
another amounts to an unnatural offence contrary to section 377 IPC. It observed: 
The word ‘intercourse’ ….is the temporary visitation of the organisms by a member of the other 
organism ….There is no intercourse unless the visiting member is enveloped at least partially by the 
visited organism, for intercourse connotes reciprocity. Therefore, to decide whether there is intercourse 
or not, what is to be considered is whether the visited organ is enveloped at least partially by the visiting 
organism. 
 
Fazal Rab Choudhary v State of Bihar (1982)180 
A reduced sentence of six months rigorous imprisonment was granted to the appellant who 
was convicted for having committed an offence under section 377 of the IPC upon a young 
boy who had come to his house to take a syringe. The Sessions Court had awarded him three 
years rigorous imprisonment, specifically denying him the benefit of probation. The reason 
for reduction, though not specifically stated, seems to be that no force was used upon the boy 
in order to make him comply. 
Kedar Nath S/o Bhagchand v State of Rajasthan (1985)181 
The Rajasthan High Court came to a finding that the presence of human spermatozoa in the 
rectum of the deceased, who was a young boy, leads to the conclusion that he was subjected 
to carnal intercourse against the course of nature. 
Calvin Francis v State of Orissa (1992)182 
It was held that the person is guilty of carnal intercourse against the order of nature when he 
puts his sex organ into the victim’s mouth as an initiative act of sexual intercourse. 
                                                        
178Id at Para 10. 
179(1969) Cr.LJ 818. 
180 (1982) 3 SCC 9. 
1811985 (2) WLN 560. 
182(1992) 2 Crimes 455 (Ori.). 
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Brother John Antony v State (1992)183 
It was alleged that the petitioner, a sub-warden of a boarding home, had committed unnatural 
offences with the minor boys who were inmates of the home. These acts were of two kinds: 
(i) insertion of the penis into the mouth of the victim boy and doing the act of carnal 
intercourse up to the point of ejaculation of semen into the mouth; and (ii) manipulation and 
movement of the penis of the petitioner whilst being held by the victim boys in such a way as 
to create an orifice like thing for making the manipulated movements of insertion and 
withdrawal upto the point of ejaculation of semen. It was held that both the above categories 
of acts fall within the sweep of unnatural carnal offences under section 377 IPC. 
Smt. Sudesh Jhaku v State (1998)184 
It was held that penile-mouth penetration amounts to an act contrary to section 377 IPC. 
The 172nd Law Commission Report (2000) 
The Law Commission made the following recommendations in its Report submitted in 2000 
to the Supreme Court: 
3.5.1. Insertion  of  new  section  376E recommended.- We   therefore recommend that a new  section, 
namely,  section  376E be inserted in the IPC in the following terms: 
 
"376E. Unlawful  sexual  contact (1) Whoever, with sexual  intent, touches, directly or indirectly, with  
a  part  of  the  body  or  with  an  object,  any  part of the body of another person, not  being  the  
spouse  of  such  person,  without  the  consent  of  such  other  person,  shall  be punished with simple 
imprisonment for  a  term  which  may extend to two years or with fine or with both. 
(2)    Whoever,  with sexual intent, invites, counsels or  incites a young person to touch, directly  or  
indirectly, with a part of the body or with an object, the body of any person,  including  the body of the 
person who so invites, counsels or  incites,  or  touches,  with  sexual  intent, directly or indirectly, with 
a part of the body or with an object  any  part  of the body of a young person, shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either description which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. 
(3)    Whoever being in a position of trust or  authority towards  a young person or is a person with 
whom the young  person  is  in  a  relationship  of  dependency,  touches, directly or indirectly, with 
sexual intent, with a part of the  body  or with an object, any part of the body of such young person,  
shall  be  punished  with  imprisonment  of either  description  which  may  extend to seven years and 
shall also be liable to fine. 
Explanation:   "Young person” in this sub-section and sub-section (2) means a person below the age of 
sixteen years." 
3.6.   Deletion of section 377: In the light of  the  change  effected  by  us  in  section  375,  we  are  of  
the  opinion  that section 377 deserves to be deleted.  After the changes effected by  us  in  the  preceding  
provisions (sections 375 to 376E), the  only content left  in  section  377  is  having  voluntary carnal 
intercourse  with  any  animal. We may leave such persons to their just deserts. 
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Sakshi v Union of India (2004)185 
After the 172nd Law Commission Report (2000), the Division Bench of the Supreme Court, 
comprising of Chief Justice Rajendra Babu and Justice G.P. Mathur, stated that penetration 
other than penile/vaginal penetration are unnatural sexual offences. Penile/anus penetration, 
penile/oral penetration, finger/anal penetration, finger/vaginal penetration or object/vaginal 
penetration are serious sexual offences of unnatural nature to be covered under section 377 
IPC, which prescribes stringent punishment. 
Naz Foundation v Govt. of NCT of Delhi (2010)186 
The NAZ Foundation (India) Trust (NI) is a New Delhi-based NGO that works on HIV/AIDS 
and sexual health issues. The Foundation filed a writ petition in the Delhi High Court 
challenging the constitutional validity of section 377 IPC for penalizing unlawful sexual acts 
“against the order of nature” which results in criminalizing even consensual sexual 
intercourse between two adults of the same sex or even of the opposite sex indulging in 
penile non-vaginal sexual activities. The petitioner contended that section 377 IPC 
encroached upon Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India and also that the 
section ought not to criminalise consensual penile non-vaginal sex between two consenting 
adults of the same sex. A Division Bench comprising of Chief Justice Ajit Prakash Shah and 
Justice S. Muralidhar decided that section 377 IPC violates various fundamental rights, 
including the right to privacy and right to dignity under the fundamental right to life and 
liberty (Article 21), the right to equality (Article 14), and forbiddance of separation on 
grounds of sex (Article 15). 
Suresh Kumar Koushal & Another. v Naz Foundation & Others (2014)187 
This case challenged the 2009 Delhi High Court judgment striking down section 377 IPC as 
unconstitutional in so far as it criminalises consensual sexual acts of adults in private. The 
judgment of the Delhi High Court in 2009 kept intact the provision insofar as it applies to 
non-consensual non-vaginal intercourse and intercourse with minors. The appellants 
contended that section 377 IPC is too broadly phrased, as it may include: (1) Carnal 
intercourse between husband and wife; (2) Carnal intercourse between man and woman for 
pleasure without the possibility of conception of a human being; (3) Use of contraceptives 
between man and woman; (4) Anal sex between husband and wife; (5) Consenting carnal 
                                                        
185MANU/SC/0523/2004. 
186(2010) CriLJ 94. 
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intercourse between man and man; (6) Non-consenting carnal intercourse between man and 
man; (7) Carnal intercourse with a child with or without consent. The Bench comprising of 
Justices G.S. Singhvi and Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhayar examined various cases in detail to 
find out what exactly comprises acts of “carnal intercourse against the order of nature”, and 
found that it is not possible to lay down a uniform test for classifying such acts. They opined 
that the acts which fall within the ambit of the section can only be determined with reference 
to the act itself and the circumstances in which it is executed. They stated that all the cases 
examined by them referred to non-consensual and markedly coercive situations and that the 
keenness of the court in bringing justice to the victims who were either women or children 
cannot be discounted while analyzing the manner in which the section has been interpreted. 
However, in a case of proved consensual intercourse between adults, such a sympathetic 
approach may not be taken. It held that the Delhi High Court was wrong in its findings and 
was also wrong in reading down the section to allow consensual homosexual activities 
between two adults of the same sex. The Bench stated that it difficult to prepare a list of acts 
which would be covered by section 377 IPC. It was ruled that section 377 IPC would apply 
irrespective of age and consent in light of the plain meaning and legislative history of the 
section. The Supreme Court held that amending or repealing section 377 IPC is a matter that 
should be left to Parliament, not the judiciary. 
Shankar Kisanrao Khade v State of Maharashtra (2013)188 
The first accused and his wife were convicted for kidnapping, rape and murder by 
strangulation of a minor girl. Additional Sessions Court convicted the first accused and 
sentenced him to death under section 302 IPC189 and the second accused/wife was convicted 
for offences punishable under section 363A IPC 190and section 34 IPC.191 An appeal was 
made to the Supreme Court. 
 
Supreme Court appeal 
 
In appeal, the question before the Supreme Court under Justices K.S. Radhakrishnan and 
Madan B. Lokur was whether the matter in question fell in category the rare cases warranting 
                                                        
188 MANU/SC/0476/2013. 
189Punishment for murder. 
190Kidnapping or maiming a minor for purposes of begging. 
191Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention. 
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capital punishment. The Supreme Court converted the death sentence to rigorous 
imprisonment for life. 
The Supreme Court evaluated that the cause of the death was asphyxia due to strangulation 
and though there was clear evidence of carnal intercourse, the accused was not charged for 
that offence. The deceased girl was subjected to the acts of rape for more than one occasion 
by the accused. The Supreme Court found that any other punishment other than life 
imprisonment would be completely inadequate. The Supreme Court further observed that 
police, after charging the accused under section 377 IPC, failed to charge sheet him, in spite 
of the fact the medical evidence had clearly established the commission of carnal intercourse 
on a minor girl with moderate intellectual disability. Article 39 of the Indian Constitution 
provides that the State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing that the tender 
age of children are not abused and their childhood and youth are protected against 
exploitation and they are given facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of 
freedom and dignity. The Supreme Court established that in a case of child abuse, the best 
interests of the child standard must be applied. The conduct of the police for not registering 
the charge under section 377 IPC against the accused, the agony undergone by child of 11 
years with moderate intellectual disability, the non-reporting of offence of rape committed on 
her either to the local police or to the Juvenile Justice Board, were unjustified. It was stated 
that the Court as parens patriae has a duty to protect children from sexual abuse as the Court 
has guardianship over minor children, especially for children with intellectual disability. 
Justice K.S. Radhakrishnan in Paragraph 55 made the following directions in compliance 
with POCSO (referred to in this judgment as the Act 32 of 2012): 
(1) The persons in-charge of the schools/educational institutions, special homes, children homes, 
shelter homes, hostels, remand homes, jails etc, or wherever children are housed, if they come across 
instances of sexual abuse or assault on a minor child which they believe to have committed or come to 
know that they are being sexually molested or assaulted are directed to report those facts in secret to 
the nearest S.J.PU.192 or local police, and depending upon the gravity of the complaint and its 
genuineness, the police is take appropriate follow up action in a manner which casts no stigma upon the 
child or upon his family members. 
(2) Media personnel, persons in charge of hotels, lodges, hospitals, clubs, studios, and institutions 
having photograph facilities have to duly comply with the provision of Section 20 of the Act 32 of 
2012 and provide information to the S.J.PU., or to the local police. Media has to strictly comply with 
Section 23 of the Act as well. 
(3) Children with intellectual disability are more vulnerable to physical, sexual and emotional abuse. 
Institutions which house them or persons in care and protection have a duty to bring any case of sexual 
abuse to the notice of the J.J. Boards193/ S.J.PU. or local police and they in turn be in touch with the 
competent authority and take appropriate action. 
                                                        
192 Abbreviated form of the term ‘Special Juvenile Police Unit’ as defined in the Juvenile Justice (Care and 
Protection of Children) Act 2000. 
193 Abbreviated form of the term ‘Juvenile Justice Board’ as defined in the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection 
of Children) Act 2000. 
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(4) Further, it is made clear that if the perpetrator of the crime is a family member himself, then utmost 
care be taken and further action be taken in consultation with the mother or other female members of 
the family of the child, bearing in mind the fact that best interest of the child is of paramount 
consideration. 
(5) Hospitals, whether Government or privately owned or medical institutions where children are being 
treated, are to immediately report incidents of sexual abuse of children to the nearest Juvenile Justice 
Board/State Juvenile Police Unit. The J.J. Board, in consultation with the S.J.P.U., should take 
appropriate steps in accordance with the law safeguarding the interests of child. 
(6) The non-reporting of the crime by anybody, after having come to know that a minor child below the 
age of 18 years was subjected to any sexual assault, is a serious crime and by not reporting they are 
screening offenders from legal punishment and hence be held liable under the ordinary criminal law 
and prompt action be taken against them, in accordance with law. 
(7) Complaints received by the NCPCR, S.C.P.C.R. Child Welfare Committee (CWC) and Child 
Helpline, NGO’s or Women’s Organizations etc., may be followed up in consultation with the nearest 
J.J. Board, S.P.J.U. or local police in accordance with law. 
(8) The Central Government and the State Governments are directed to constitute SJPUs in all the 
Districts, if not already constituted. They have to take prompt and effective action in consultation with 
J.J. Board to take care of child and protect the child and also take appropriate steps against the 
perpetrator of the crime. 
(9) The Central Government and every State Government should take all measures as provided under 
Section 43 of the Act 32/2012 in order to give wide publicity to the provisions of the Act through 
media including television, radio and print media, at regular intervals, to make the general public, 
children as well as their parents and guardians, aware of the provisions of the Act. 
The scope of the offence under section 377 IPC 
This section examines whether section 377 IPC is sufficient to accommodate the various 
forms of sexual violations of all children, both male and female. 
1. Carnal intercourse with any man or woman 
The section punishes whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature 
with any man or woman. The Explanation to section 377 IPC states that penetration is 
necessary to constitute the carnal intercourse necessary to the offence. The Sakshi case (2004) 
interpreted “penetration” to mean the types of penetration other than penile/vaginal 
penetration, which were enumerated as penile/anus penetration, penile/oral penetration, 
finger/anal penetration, finger/vaginal penetration or object/vaginal penetration. In the Naz 
case (2009), decided by the Delhi High Court, it was reiterated that this was the only 
legislation at that time which could deal with sexual violations against children. The Delhi 
High Court observed that section 377 IPC, whatever its present pragmatic application, was 
not enacted for instances of child sexual abuse or to fill the lacuna in a rape law, but was 
instead based on a conception of sexual morality specific to the Victorian era, drawing on 
notions of carnality and sinfulness. It struck down section 377 IPC as unconstitutional. 
Suresh Kumar Koushal & Another v Naz Foundation & Ors (2013) challenged the 2009 
Delhi High Court judgment striking down section 377 IPC as unconstitutional in so far as it 
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criminalises consensual sexual acts of adults in private. The Supreme Court ultimately upheld 
the constitutionality of section 377 IPC because it found that the provision has been largely 
used to prosecute instances of child sexual abuse. The allegation of the respondents that this 
section was used to perpetuate harassment, blackmail and torture on certain persons, 
especially those of the LGBT community, is not a treatment mandated by the section or 
condoned by it. The fact that it is misused by police authorities and others is not a reflection 
of the vires of the section, but might be, instead, a relevant factor for the legislature to 
consider while considering the desirability of amending section 377 IPC.194 The Court 
reiterated that all penetrative non-penile-vaginal sex, including oral and anal sex, irrespective 
of gender and consent, comes within the purview of unnatural offences criminalised by 
section 377 IPC. 
However, Shankar Kisanrao Khade v State of Maharashtra,195 discussed earlier in this 
chapter, showed that a charge of carnal intercourse upon a young girl under section 377 IPC– 
who was also raped and subsequently murdered – was not even registered by the police. The 
Supreme Court reprimanded the police for their inaction and set out various guidelines 
regarding the protection of minor children, which included the principle of mandatory 
reporting under the POCSO. 
Although the Supreme Court insists that section 377 IPC is adequately worded for dealing 
with crimes excluding penile-vaginal intercourse, this offence has not been used by the police 
in charging those for carnal abuse of children. Earlier in this chapter, the case of State of 
Punjab v Major Singh196 was cited, where the accused caused injuries to the vagina of the 7.5 
month old child by fingering. The trial court convicted the accused for voluntary causing hurt 
under section 323 IPC. The Supreme Court altered the conviction of the respondent under 
section 323 IPC to one under section 354 IPC for the offence of outraging the modesty of a 
woman, despite the existence of section 377 IPC. It did not occur to the eminent judges that 
this was an unnatural offence under section 377 IPC, and not one of outraging the modesty of 
a woman. 
Lack of clarity regarding ingredients of an “unnatural offence” involving a child 
The concept of what constitutes an act of outraging the modesty of a woman and what  would 
be the ingredients of an unnatural offence are not clear from the wordings of the IPC, as a 
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result of which children are not offered adequate protection under that legislation. A reading 
of the case law on the topic suggests that a case of sexual violation of a child would be an 
offence under section 377 IPC only if it has an “unnatural” or “non-penile-vaginal” element 
involving penile/anus penetration, penile/oral penetration, finger/anal penetration, 
finger/vaginal penetration or object/vaginal penetration as per Sakshi case (2004).Hence, 
sexual abuse of a boy-child by a woman would an offence under section 377 IPC, only if it is 
“unnatural” or “non-penile-vaginal” intercourse. The law is silent regarding the abuse of boys 
by adult women. Penile-vaginal intercourse between a boy and an adult woman is not 
punishable under any other provision in the IPC.197 
Non-criminalisation of sexual abuse of boys by adult women in the IPC 
The 42nd Law Commission Report of 1971 debated whether a mature woman who compels 
or seduces a boy under the age of 16 to sexual intercourse should be as severely punished as a 
man in the converse case. The Commission stated that apart from the physiological fact that 
forcing a boy, in the strict sense, to perform the act is impossible, complaints of a woman 
forcing or seducing minor boys to illicit intercourse is unheard of. Such lascivious acts on the 
part of a woman are not so evil as to merit a penal provision.198 This mentality persists even to 
date, and the general criminal law fails to law criminalise sexual abuse of boys by women. 
2. Carnal intercourse with any animal 
Section 377 IPC brings sexual intercourse with any animal within the purview of an 
“unnatural offence, but no explanation has been given regarding this. For this reason, this 
researcher conducted an internet search for legal material in other countries regarding the 
offence of bestiality. It was found that the Canadian Criminal Code contained provisions on 
the same. 
Section 160 of the Canadian Criminal Code maintains three different bestiality offences: the 
commission of bestiality, which carries a maximum prison term of ten years; compelling 
bestiality, which carries the same penalty; and bestiality in presence of or by child — 
prohibiting both the act in the presence of a minor below 16 years of age, or inciting the child 
                                                        
197Dutta, N.N.(2015). “16-year-old boy raped by woman in Mumbai – can a man be sexually assaulted?” 
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198 Law Commission of India (1971). The Indian Penal Code 1860, Para 16.121, p.279 
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to commit the act — which carries a minimum of one year, with a maximum of 14 years, on 
indictment.199 
There is an absence of a clear definition of the acts which comprise “unnatural offences” as 
well as the act of bestiality which is an unnatural offence in the IPC. 
3.A.2.k. Section 511 IPC: Punishment for attempting to commit offences punishable 
with imprisonment for life or other imprisonment 
This section punishes any attempt to commit any offence under the IPC. Attempts to commit 
any crimes under sections 354, 375, 377 and 509 IPC are punishable under this section. The 
section states: 
Whoever attempts to commit an offence punishable by this Code with imprisonment for life or 
imprisonment, or to cause such an offence to be committed, and in such attempt does any act towards 
the commission of the offence, shall, where no express provision is made by this Code for the 
punishment of such attempt, be punished with imprisonment of any description provided for the 
offence, for a term which may extend to one-half of the imprisonment for life or, as the case may be, 
one-half of the longest term of imprisonment provided for that offence, or with such fine as is provided 
for the offence, or with both. 
In the light of Supreme Court rulings clarifying that life imprisonment means imprisonment 
to the end of a person’s natural life, the question arises as to how the interpretation of the 
words in this section is be made; namely “be punished with imprisonment of any description 
provided for the offence, for a term which may extend to one-half of the imprisonment for 
life.” Section 511 IPC needs to be clarified regarding the term one-half of the imprisonment 
for life. 
3.A.2.l. Conclusion 
 
The absence of empirical studies analysing the nature, incidence, prevalence and effects of 
child sexual abuse in India is a glaring anomaly. Despite the lack of statistical data, the upper 
judiciary has been able to accurately observe and record the social science dimensions in 
sexual offences. Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v State of Gujarat200 attempted to throw 
light on the socio-psychological reasons which make an average Indian female to cry “rape”. 
The judges opined that rarely will a girl or woman in India make false allegations of sexual 
assault, regardless of the sophistication of her society. Her allegation of rape must be given 
due consideration. The reasons for attributing truth to such an allegation of rape was that non-
disclosure is the norm in the case of sexual offences. Factors that would press the average 
                                                        
199 This shall be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
200 1983 (3) SCC 566 
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Indian female towards non-disclosure were identified in this judgment. Despite the Justice 
Verma Committee Report expressing its regret regarding such profiling of an Indian girl, as it 
would not be accurate or scientific to test the testimony of an Indian woman with reference to 
the criteria mentioned in this case,201 this judgment is significant because it discloses the 
general attitude, and in turn, the judicial attitude towards women in India. 
 
These attitudes are reflected by the lower judiciary in State of Punjab v Gurmit Singh202 
where the legal effects of abuse discussed in Chapter 2 are portrayed. In this case, the trial 
court inhumanly branded the female victim as a person of loose morals and acquitting the 
accused on the basis of her delay in filing the case. The victim who was supposedly being 
protected by the criminal justice system had to experience defamation, harassment and non-
application of existing law from the trial court, which was more traumatic than the alleged 
abuse (Mudaly & Goddard, 2006). 
The issues identified in this chapter are analysed in Chapter 4. 
3.A.3.  National Special Legislation: The Protection of Children From Sexual Offences 
Act 2012 
What is special legislation in India? 
Special legislation consist of legislation enacted on specific subjects, such as food safety, 
narcotics and psychotropic substances, domestic violence, information technology, juvenile 
justice, and labour welfare legislation. Some of these enactments may have jurisdiction 
within a specific state or states. Acts of Parliament which deal with specific matters and apply 
nationally are referred to as national special legislation. In these forms of legislation, 
substantive definitions of the civil/criminal wrongs and their penalties/punishments, 
respectively, as well as the relevant legal procedure, are laid down within the single 
enactment. The law in the substantive laws as well as the Codes of Civil or Criminal 
Procedure take a secondary place when a wrong comes within the purview of special 
legislation, unless it is specified by law that the general law should prevail. 
                                                        
201See Chapter III, Para 26, Verma, J.S., Justice, Seth, L., Justice, & Subramaniam, G. (2013). Report of the 
Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law. New Delhi: Government of India, p.83. 
202MANU/SC/0366/1996. 
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-3.A.3. The Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Act 2012 (POCSO) 
 
This special legislation changed the nature and scope of children’s rights against sexual abuse 
in India. This legislation overrides general substantive and procedural law with regard to 
offences of child sexual abuse. This legislation was enacted after the MWCD Report (2007), 
which was first official study on child abuse, showed high prevalence rates of sexual abuse 
nationally. This law applies nationally, and overrides all laws, including the Goa’s Children’s 
Act 2003 in the State of Goa. This law is extremely important in the history of child rights 
because various sexual offences against children were defined and criminalised for the first 
time. This sub-section of this thesis deals with the history of the legislation, lists the sexual 
offences against children as defined by the legislation, and clarifies the position of this 
special enactment over existing legislation. 
 
(i) History of the legislation 
The need for legislation to address offences against children came to the forefront during 
discussions relating to the commissioning of the Study on Child Abuse: India 2007, which 
identified widespread abuse of children. This study was conducted by the Ministry of Women 
and Child Development. It examined the extent and characteristics of physical, sexual, 
emotional child abuse and girl child neglect. The report from this study revealed statistics on 
the extent and magnitude of forms of child abuse and generated data on variations among 
different age groups, gender variations, state variations and variations within evidence 
groups. It stated that children on the street, children at work, and children in institutional care 
reported the highest incidence of sexual assault, while the majority of abuse cases take place 
within the family environment with the perpetrators being close family relatives.203 
 
Extensive consultations were held by the then Department of Women and Child Development 
in 2005, which led to the conclusion there was a need for legislation on child abuse. The 
Department prepared a Draft Offences against Children Bill 2005 (“Draft Bill”) in 
consultation with civil society participants and experts which covered various offences 
against children, including sexual offences. The Draft Bill was sent to the Ministry of Home 
Affairs for review in November 2005. The Ministry of Home Affairs was requested to 
                                                        
203 Save the Children, Study on Child abuse: India 2007 http://resourcecentre.savethechildren.se/library/study-
child-abuse-india-2007 
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consider amendment to the IPC by incorporating the provisions of the Draft Bill. However, 
the Ministry opined that as amendment to the IPC was a long process, a comprehensive 
legislation on child abuse may be considered by the Department. The Draft Bill was 
circulated to the State Governments for their views and received their support. Subsequently, 
the Draft Bill was discussed through inter-ministerial consultations in 2006-2007. The 
Department of Legal Affairs returned the Draft Bill with the observation that most of the 
offences were already covered under the existing laws, and the purpose of bringing a new law 
was not clear. The Ministries of Home Affairs and Labour and Employment made additional 
suggestions to the Draft Bill. The Bill was, accordingly, revised and sent to the Department of 
Legal Affairs, with the clarification that the purpose of the proposed legislation was to 
provide stringent punishment for various offences which were already punishable under 
existing acts such as the IPC, Immoral Traffic Prevention Act 1956, Information and 
Technology Act 2000, and the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act 1986, etc. 
 
During mid-2007, consultations were held by the National Commission for Protection of 
Child Rights (NCPCR) with the India Alliance for Child Rights, HAQ Centre for Child 
Rights, UNICEF, and TULIR. The consensus was that instead of having a separate Draft Bill, 
appropriate changes could be made to the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 and the Indian 
Evidence Act 1872, and that an additional chapter or provision could be added to the IPC in 
order to address the requirements adequately.204 However, in view of the findings of the Study 
on Child Abuse 2007 and the specific advice given by the Ministry of Home Affairs on the 
need for a separate law, the Draft Bill was revised by the NCPCR between January and 
September 2009. In January 2010, the NCPCR held consultations with NGOs, legal experts, 
child rights activists and concerned government officers. It emerged from these consultations 
that instead of a general legislation covering all offences against children, the focus should be 
on legislation for the protection from sexual offences against children. The relevant sections 
of the IPC, the Criminal Procedure Code 1973, the Indian Evidence Act 1872 and other laws 
could be amended concurrently in order to ensure that children were not victimized further 
and that justice was rendered in a timely manner.205 
 
                                                        
204Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee On Human Resource Development (2011).Two 
Hundred Fortieth Report On The Protection Of Children From Sexual Offences Bill, 2011. New Delhi: Rajya 
Sabha Secretariat (Para 2.2) 
http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Protection%20of%20children/SCR%20Protection%20of%20Children%
20from%20Sexual%20Offences%20Bill%202011.pdf  
205Id at Para 2.3. 
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The Ministry of Law and Justice, in consultation with non-governmental organisations, 
prepared a draft Bill on Sexual Offences against Children and sent it to the Ministry of 
Women and Child Development (MWCD). In September 2010, the MWCD, along with other 
Ministries and the NCPCR, prepared a draft of the Protection of Children from Sexual 
Offences Bill 2010. Another draft bill was prepared by the NCPCR and submitted to the 
MCWD in November 2010. Thereafter the MWCD prepared a new bill based on the 
recommendations of the other Ministries, State Governments/Union territories and the 
NCPCR. 206 The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Bill 2011 (POCSO) was 
introduced in the Rajya Sabha – the Upper House of Parliament – on 23 March 2011. The 
Rajya Sabha referred the Bill to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Human Resource 
Development on 28 March 2011 for examination and report. This report was presented to the 
Rajya Sabha on 21December 2011 and laid on the table of the Lok Sabha– the Lower House 
of Parliament – on the same day.207 Thereafter, the POCSO was passed by the Rajya Sabha on 
10 May 2012 and by the Lok Sabha on the 22 May 2012. It received Presidential assent on 
19June 2012. It entered into force on 14 November 2012, November 14 being Children’s Day 
in India.208 
 
The POCSO consists of 10 chapters. It lays down the law regarding offences and their 
punishments, mandatory reporting and punishments for non-reporting and false complaints, 
procedure to be followed in recording the child’s statement by both police and magistrate, 
procedure regarding medical examination of the child, constitution of special courts and 
procedure to be followed, right to free legal aid for the indigent, imposition of duty upon state 
governments guidelines regarding pre-trial and trial assistance to the victim to be framed by 
state governments, the role of the NCPCR and corresponding state commissions in 
implementation of the POCSO , as well as statements regarding the prevalence of POCSO  
over other legislation. 
(ii) The Protection of Children against Sexual Offences Act 2012 (POCSO) 
 
This legislation is novel because, for the first time in the history of Indian law, sexual 
offences against children which did not exist in criminal law were defined and criminalised. 
                                                        
206Id at Para 2.4. 
207Sanyal, K. (2011). Bill Summary, The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Bill, 2011. PRS 
Legislative Research, Centre for Policy Research: New Delhi http://www.prsindia.org/billtrack/the-protection-
of-children-from-sexual-offences-bill-2011-1598/ 
208 This is the birthday of India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, who introduced various welfare 
measures for the education and development of children in India.  
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Nine categories of offences against children were conceptualised, which did not previously 
exist in the IPC. These are the offences of penetrative sexual assault, aggravated penetrative 
sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, sexual harassment, using child for 
pornographic purposes, abetment of an offence, and attempt to commit an offence. The 
POCSO extends the scope of criminal law in significant ways. 
Table 3 discusses the various provisions of the POCSO. Table 4 compares these offences 
with the IPC, the Goa Children’s Act 2003, and the legislation applicable in Kerala. 
1. Penetrative sexual assault and punishment (sections 3 and 4 POCSO): 
 
Five types of penetrative acts constitute this offence under section 3: penile penetration; 
insertion of any object or body part into the body of the child; manipulation of any part of the 
body of a child so as to cause penetration; into vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of the child or 
making the child to do so with such person or any other person; or oral application to the 
penis, vagina, anus, urethra of the child; or making the child to do so to such person or any 
other person.209This offence is punishable under section 4 by imprisonment of either 
description from seven years to life and fine,210 
It can be seen that no specific amount has been prescribed as fine throughout the Act. 
CASE LAW 
Gaya Prasad Pal v State (2016)211: This case was decided by Justice Gita Mittal and Justice 
Gauba R.K of the High Court of Delhi. The appellant assaulted and committed forcible 
sexual intercourse with his step-daughter who was less than 14-years-old, causing her to 
become pregnant and subjecting her to criminal intimidation. He was charged under sections 
354A (sexual harassment and punishment for sexual harassment), 375 (rape) and 506 
(punishment for criminal intimidation) of the IPC, read with section 4 (punishment for 
                                                        
209 Section 3 POCSO. Penetrative sexual assault.- A person is said to commit "penetrative sexual assault" if- 
a.     he penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a child or makes the child 
to do so with him or any other person; or 
b.    he inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or 
anus of the child or makes the child to do so with him or any other person; or 
c.     he manipulates any part of the body of the child so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or 
any part of body of the child or makes the child to do so with him or any other person; or 
d.    he applies his mouth to the penis, vagina, anus, urethra of the child or makes the child to do so to such 
person or any other person. 
210Section 4 POCSO. Punishment for penetrative sexual assault.- Whoever commits penetrative sexual assault 
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years but 
which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. 
211 MANU/DE/3290/2016. 
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penetrative sexual abuse) of the POCSO. The Court dismissed the appeal, reprimanding the 
trial court for failing to correct the provisions under which the POCSO applied. The Court 
said that clause (n) of section 5 POCSO ought to have been attracted, as the step-daughter 
was living in a shared household with the appellant, along with clause (p) of section 5 
POCSO, as the appellant was her guardian. Instead, the trial court allowed the appellant to be 
put to trial under section 4, but awarded rigorous imprisonment for life under section 6, 
which was wholly impermissible and illegal. The Court states there is an overlap between the 
IPC and the POCSO  in the offences of assault or criminal force to a woman with intent to 
outrage her modesty, punishable under sections 354 IPC and of rape punishable under section 
376 IPC on one hand, and the offence of sexual assault defined in section 7 POCSO  and 
made punishable under section 8 POCSO  and the offences of penetrative sexual assault 
punishable under section 4 POCSO  and aggravated penetrative sexual assault under section 5 
POCSO  on the other. The Court states that what is defined by law as “rape” (section 375 
IPC) may also constitute “penetrative sexual assault” (section 3 POCSO) in the case of a 
child. Conversely, acts constituting “penetrative sexual assault” against a girl-child also 
amount to rape. The distinction between the two offences is that “penetrative sexual assault”, 
an offence under the special law (POCSO), is gender-neutral and for it the victim must be a 
child, while the offence of “rape” under the general law (IPC) must be against a woman 
irrespective of her age. Since the issue of consent does not arise in the case of offence against 
a child, the definition in the POCSO omits any reference to it. Acts constituting the offence of 
aggravated penetrative sexual assault under the POCSO or rape under the IPC were 
committed by the step-father. Section 42 of the POCSO expects the court to invoke the 
offence attracting graver punishment: the higher the prescription of punishment, the graver 
the offence. The Court stated that section 376 (2) clauses (f), (i) and (k) of the IPC would 
apply in this case, and since section 375(2) IPC prescribes punishment that may extend to 
“imprisonment for life” which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of such person’s 
“natural life” and “shall also be liable to fine”; section 42 POCSO  would apply and the Court 
shall punish the offender for the offence under section 376 (2) clauses (f), (i) and (k) IPC, 
which is greater in degree in comparison to the offence under section 4 POCSO . 
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2. Aggravated penetrative sexual assault and punishment (sections 5 and 6 POCSO): 
Commission of this offence is based on the class of perpetrators, certain types of acts and 
certain types of victims. This is laid down in section 5 POCSO.212 
When persons in certain positions of trust and responsibility commit the act of penetrative 
sexual assault, then they get aggravated punishment under sections 5 and 6 POCSO. Those 
who come under this category of offenders are: 
1. Police officers 
2. Members of the armed forces/security forces, 
                                                        
212 Section 5 POCSO. Aggravated Penetrative Sexual Assault: (a) Whoever, being a police officer, commits 
penetrative sexual assault on a child — (i) within the limits of the police station or premises at which he is 
appointed; or (ii) in the premises of any station house, whether or not situated in the police station, to which he 
is appointed; or (iii) in the course of his duties or otherwise; or (iv) where he is known as, or identified as, a 
police officer; or   
(b) whoever being a member of the armed forces or security forces commits penetrative sexual assault on a  (i) 
within the limits of the area to which the person is deployed; or  (ii) in any areas under the command of the 
forces or armed forces; or  (iii) in the course of his duties or otherwise; or  (iv) where the said person is known 
or identified as a member of the security or armed forces; or 
(c) whoever being a public servant commits penetrative sexual assault on a child; or (d) whoever being on the 
management or on the staff of a jail, remand home, protection home, observation home, or other place of 
custody or care and protection established by or under any law for the time being in force, commits penetrative 
sexual assault on a child, being inmate of such jail, remand home, protection home, observation home, or other 
place of custody or care and protection; or (e) whoever being on the management or staff of a hospital, whether 
Government or private, commits penetrative sexual assault on a child in that hospital; or (f) whoever being on 
the management or staff of an educational institution or religious institution, commits penetrative sexual assault 
on a child in that institution; or Explanation.—When a child is subjected to sexual assault by one or more 
persons of a group in furtherance of their common intention, each of such persons shall be deemed to have 
committed gang penetrative sexual assault within the meaning of this clause and each of such person shall be 
liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone; or (g) whoever commits gang penetrative 
sexual assault on a child. (h) whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on a child using deadly weapons, fire, 
heated substance or corrosive substance; or (i) whoever commits penetrative sexual assault causing grievous 
hurt or causing bodily harm and injury or injury to the sexual organs of the child; or (j) whoever commits 
penetrative sexual assault on a child, which— (i) physically incapacitates the child or causes the child to become 
mentally ill as defined under clause (b) of section 2 of the Mental Health Act 1987 or causes impairment of any 
kind so as to render the child unable to perform regular tasks, temporarily or permanently; (ii) in the case of 
female child, makes the child pregnant as a consequence of sexual assault; (iii) inflicts the child with Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus or any other life threatening disease or Infection which may either temporarily or 
permanently impair the child by rendering him physically incapacitated, or mentally ill to perform regular tasks; 
or (k) whoever, taking advantage of a child's mental or physical disability, commits penetrative sexual assault on 
the child; or (l) whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on the child more than once or repeatedly; or (m) 
whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on a child below twelve years; or (n) whoever being a relative of 
the child through blood or adoption or marriage or guardianship or in foster care or having a domestic 
relationship with a parent of the child or who is living in the same or shared household with the child, commits 
penetrative sexual assault on such child; or (o) whoever being, in the ownership, or management, or staff, of any 
institution providing services to the child, commits penetrative sexual assault on the child; or (p) whoever being 
in a position of trust or authority of a child commits penetrative sexual assault on the child in an institution or 
home of the child or anywhere else; or (q) whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on a child knowing the 
child is pregnant; or (r) whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on a child and attempts to murder the child; 
or (s) whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on a child in the course of communal or sectarian violence; or 
(t) whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on a child and who has been previously convicted of having 
committed any offence under this Act or any sexual offence punishable under any other law for the time being 
in force; or (u) whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on a child and makes the child to strip or parade 
naked in public, is said to commit aggravated penetrative sexual assault. 
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3. A public servant or the management/staff of a jail, remand home, protection home, 
observation home, other place of custody or care and protection 
4. Management/staff of a hospital (both government-run as well as private hospitals) 
5. Management /staff of an educational institution or religious institution 
6. A relative of the child through blood/adoption/marriage/guardianship/in foster 
care/domestic relationship with parent/living in same or shared household 
7. Anyone having ownership or management or staff of any institution providing services 
to the child 
8. Anyone, being in a position of trust or authority of a child in an institution or home 
9. Anyone, who knows the child is pregnant and commits penetrative sexual assault on a 
child 
Certain types of acts qualify for aggravated punishment. They are: 
1. Committing gang penetrative sexual assault on a child 
2. Use of deadly weapons, fire, heated/corrosive substance for committing penetrative 
sexual assault on a child 
3. Causing grievous hurt/bodily harm/injury to sex organs of child 
4. Physically incapacitating a child or 
4. Causing a child to become mentally ill 
5. Causing impairment of child temporarily or permanently 
6. Making a female child pregnant 
7. Inflicting the child with HIV or other life threatening disease 
8. Committing penetrative sexual assault more than once or repeatedly on a child 
9. Attempting to murder the child while committing penetrative sexual assault on a child 
10. Committing penetrative sexual assault on a child in the course of communal or 
sectarian violence 
11. Committing penetrative sexual assault on a child who has been previously convicted 
of offence under this Act or any sexual offence punishable under any other law for the 
time being in force 
12. Committing penetrative sexual assault upon a child and making the child to strip or 
parade naked in public. 
When a child belongs to a certain category of victims, committing penetrative sexual assault 
on a child would qualify for the commission of the offence of aggravated penetrative sexual 
assault: 
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1. Mentally or physically disabled children 
2. A child below 12 years of age. 
Punishment under section 6 for the offence of aggravated penetrative sexual assault is 
rigorous imprisonment for a term not less than ten years to imprisonment for life and fine.213 
CASE LAW 
Akshay Sarma v State of Assam and Others (2016)214: This was decided by the High Court 
of Gauhati by Justice Rumi Kumari Phukan. The accused penetrated his finger into the 
vagina of a 5-year-old girl. He was charged under section 376(2)(l) of the IPC read with 
section 6 of the POCSO  (punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault). He was 
convicted by the trial court to undergo rigorous imprisonment of 10 years and to pay a fine of 
Rs. 10,000, in default of which to suffer rigorous imprisonment for further period of two 
months. The High Court upheld the validity of the sentence. 
Nar Bahadur Subba v State of Sikkim (2016)215: This was decided by Justice Meenakshi 
Madan Rai of the High Court of Sikkim. The 72-year-old accused committed penetrative 
sexual assault upon an 11-year-old girl. He was convicted by the trial court for aggravated 
penetrative sexual assault under section 5(l) POCSO  for committing penetrative sexual 
assault on the child more than once and section 5(m) POCSO  for committing penetrative 
sexual assault on a child below 12 years. Despite the fact that the child’s hymen was intact, 
the High Court reiterated that the principle enunciated in Das Bernard v State216, that in the 
case of penetrative sexual assault under section 3 POCSO, for the offence of rape to be 
committed, it is not necessary there should be complete penetration, and that partial 
penetration within the labia majora of the vulva or pudendum with or without emission of 
semen is quite sufficient under the law. 
It is of relevance to note that even though four years have passed since the POCSO came into 
force, at times, the police and courts still omit to charge offenders under the provisions of the 
POCSO.217 
                                                        
213Section 6 POCSO. Punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault: Whoever, commits aggravated 
penetrative sexual assault, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than 
ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine. 
214 MANU/GH/0572/2016. 
215 MANU/SI/0055/2016. 
216 1974 CriLJ 1098. 
217In State of Himachal Pradesh v Sanjay Kumar (MANU/SC/1599/2016) decided by Justice A.K. Sikri and 
Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre of the Supreme Court of India , the accused committed penetrative sexual assault 
upon his nine-year-old niece repeatedly in2009 for which the offences under sections 376(2)(f) (punishment for 
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3. Sexual assault and punishment (Sections 7 and 8 POCSO): 
 
Two elements need to be present in an act in order to come within the ambit of this offence: 
physical contact without penetration and sexual intent. 
The following acts by a person would qualify under section 7 POCSO: 
1. Touching the vagina, penis, anus or breast of a child with sexual intent. 
2. Making a child touch the vagina, penis, anus or breast of such person or any other 
person. 
3. Doing any other act with sexual intent which involves physical contact without 
penetration. 218 
The punishment under section 8 POCSO for sexual assault is imprisonment from three years 
to five years and fine.219 
4. Aggravated sexual assault and punishment (Sections 9 and 10 POCSO): 
 
When persons in certain positions of trust and responsibility commit the act of sexual assault, 
then aggravated punishment under sections 9 and 10 POCSO apply. Those who come under 
this category of offenders are: 
 
1. Police officers 
2. Members of the armed forces/security forces 
3. Public servants 
4. The management/staff of a jail, remand home, protection home, observation home, 
other place of custody or care and protection 
5. Member/staff of a hospital (government and private) 
6. Member/staff of an educational institution or religious institution 
                                                                                                                                                                            
rape of a woman below twelve years of age) and 506 (punishment for criminal intimidation) of the Indian Penal 
Code 1860 were made out against him. The trial court convicted him, but this order was set aside by the High 
Court on the basis that the prosecution had failed to prove itself beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court 
restored the conviction of the trial court which had awarded rigorous imprisonment for a period of twelve years 
and fine of Rs. 50,000, in default of which a further period of one year would have to be served. 
218Section 7 POCSO. Sexual assault: Whoever, with sexual intent touches the vagina, penis, anus or breast of the 
child or makes the child touch the vagina, penis, anus or breast of such person or any other person, or does any 
other act with sexual intent which involves physical contact without penetration is said to commit sexual assault. 
219Section 8 POCSO. Punishment for sexual assault: Whoever, commits sexual assault, shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to 
five years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
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7. Anyone, being a relative of the child through blood/adoption/marriage/guardianship/in 
foster care/domestic relationship with parent/living in same or shared household 
8. Anyone who is in the ownership or management or staff of any institution providing 
services to the child 
9. Anyone who is in a position of trust or authority of a child in an institution or home 
10. Anyone who knows the child is pregnant and commits sexual assault on a child. 
 
Certain types of acts qualify for aggravated punishment: 
 
1. Committing gang sexual assault on a child 
2. Using deadly weapons, fire, heated/corrosive substance for committing sexual assault 
on a child 
3. Causing grievous hurt/bodily harm/injury to sex organs of child 
4. Physically incapacitating a child 
5. Causing a child to become mentally ill 
6. Causing impairment of child temporarily or permanently 
7. Making a female child pregnant 
8. Inflicting a child with HIV or other life threatening disease 
9. Committing sexual assault more than once or repeatedly on a child 
10. Attempting to murder the child 
11. Committing sexual assault on a child in the course of communal or sectarian violence 
12. Committing sexual assault on a child when previously convicted of any offence under 
the POCSO  or any sexual offence punishable under any other law for the time being 
in force 
13. Committing sexual assault on a child and making the child to strip or parade naked in 
public. 
When a child belongs to a certain category of victim, then committing sexual assault on such 
a child would qualify for the commission of the offence of aggravated penetrative sexual 
assault: 
1. Mentally or physically disabled children 
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2. A child below twelve years of age.220 
The punishment under section 10 POCSO for aggravated sexual assault is imprisonment for a 
term not less than five years up to seven years and fine.221 
5. Sexual harassment and punishment (Sections 11 and 12 POCSO): 
One essential element of all acts of sexual harassment is that there should be sexual intent. 
Various acts such as uttering words, making sounds or gestures, exhibiting objects or body 
parts, making a child exhibit his body, showing pornography to a child, stalking a child, 
                                                        
220 Section 9 POCSO. Aggravated sexual assault: (a) Whoever, being a police officer, commits sexual assault on 
a child— 
(i) within the limits of the police station or premises where he is appointed; or  (ii) in the premises of any station 
house whether or not situated in the police station to which appointed; or (iii) in the course of his duties or 
otherwise; or (iv) where he is known as, or identified as a police officer; or 
 (b) whoever, being a member of the armed forces or security forces, commits sexual assault on a child— 
(i) within the limits of the area to which the person is deployed; or (ii) in any areas under the command of the 
security or armed forces; or  (iii) in the course of his duties or otherwise; or  (iv) where he is known or identified 
as a member of the security or armed forces; or (c) whoever being a public servant commits sexual assault on a 
child; or (d) whoever being on the management or on the staff of a jail, or remand home or protection home or 
observation home, or other place of custody or care and protection established by or under any law for the time 
being in force commits sexual assault on a child being inmate of such jail or remand home or protection home or 
observation home or other place of custody or care and protection; or (e) whoever being on the management or 
staff of a hospital, whether Government or private, commits sexual assault on a child in that hospital; or (f) 
whoever being on the management or staff of an educational institution or religious institution, commits sexual 
assault on a child in that institution; or (g) whoever commits gang sexual assault on a child. Explanation.—when 
a child is subjected to sexual assault by one or more persons of a group in furtherance of their common 
intention, each of such persons shall be deemed to have committed gang sexual assault within the meaning of 
this clause and each of such person shall be liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him 
alone; or (h) whoever commits sexual assault on a child using deadly weapons, fire, heated substance or 
corrosive substance; or (i) whoever commits sexual assault causing grievous hurt or causing bodily harm and 
injury or injury to the sexual organs of the child; or (j) whoever commits sexual assault on a child, which— (i) 
physically incapacitates the child or causes the child to become mentally ill as defined under clause (l) of section 
2 of the Mental Health Act 1987 or causes impairment of any kind so as to render the child unable to perform 
regular tasks, temporarily or permanently; or (ii) inflicts the child with Human Immunodeficiency Virus or any 
other life threatening disease or infection which may either temporarily or permanently impair the child by 
rendering him physically incapacitated, or mentally ill to perform regular tasks; or (k) whoever, taking 
advantage of a child’s mental or physical disability, commits sexual assault on the child; or (l) whoever commits 
sexual assault on the child more than once or repeatedly; or (m) whoever commits sexual assault on a child 
below twelve years; or (n) whoever, being a relative of the child through blood or adoption or marriage or 
guardianship or in foster care, or having domestic relationship with a parent of the child, or who is living in the 
same or shared household with the child, commits sexual assault on such child; or (o) whoever, being in the 
ownership or management or staff, of any institution providing services to the child, commits sexual assault on 
the child in such institution; or (p) whoever, being in a position of trust or authority of a child, commits sexual 
assault on the child in an institution or home of the child or anywhere else; or (q) whoever commits sexual 
assault on a child knowing the child is pregnant; or (r) whoever commits sexual assault on a child and attempts 
to murder the child; or (s) whoever commits sexual assault on a child in the course of communal or sectarian 
violence; or (t) whoever commits sexual assault on a child and who has been previously convicted of having 
committed any offence under this Act or any sexual offence punishable under any other law for the time being 
in force; or (u) whoever commits sexual assault on a child and makes the child to strip or parade naked in 
public, is said to commit aggravated sexual assault. 
221Section 10. Punishment for aggravated sexual assault.-Whoever, commits aggravated sexual assault shall be 
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than five years but which 
may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
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blackmailing a child and enticing or giving gratification for pornographic purposes come 
under the ambit of the definition of sexual harassment. 
The following acts with sexual intent would constitute sexual harassment under section 11 
POCSO: 
1. Utterance of any word 
2. Making any sound or makes any gesture or exhibits any object or part of body with 
the intention that such word or sound shall be heard or such gesture or object or part 
of body shall be seen by the child 
3. Makes a child exhibit his body/any part 
4. Showing any object to a child in any form or media for pornographic purposes 
5. Repeatedly or constantly following or watching or constantly contacting a child either 
directly or through electronic, digital or any other means 
6. Threatening to use in any form of media, a real or fabricated depiction through 
electronic, film or digital or any other mode, of any part of the body of the child or the 
involvement of the child in a sexual act 
7. Enticing a child for pornographic purposes or giving gratification therefore.222 
The punishment under section 12 POCSO shall be imprisonment up to three years and fine.223 
6. Using a child for pornographic purposes and punishment (Sections 13 and 14 
POCSO): 
 
This offence exists in section 67B of the Information Technology Act 2000.224Section 67B of 
that Act punishes publishing material containing child pornography or creating text or 
                                                        
222Section 11. Sexual harassment: A person is said to commit sexual harassment upon a child when such person 
with sexual intent-   
utters any word or makes any sound, or makes any gesture or exhibits any object or part of body with the 
intention that such word or sound shall be heard, or such gesture or object or part of body shall be seen by the 
child; or      
makes a child exhibit his body or any part of his body so as it is seen by such person or any other person; or     
shows any object to a child in any form or media for pornographic purposes; or    
repeatedly or constantly follows or watches or contacts a child either directly or through electronic, digital or 
any other means; or      
threatens to use, in any form of media, a real or fabricated depiction through electronic, film or digital or any 
other mode, of any part of the body of the child or the involvement of the child in a sexual act; or     
entices a child for pornographic purposes or gives gratification therefore. 
Explanation: Any question which involves "sexual intent" shall be a question of fact. 
223Section 12 POCSO. Punishment for sexual harassment.-Whoever, commits sexual harassment upon a child 
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall 
also be liable to fine. 
224 Section 67 B Information Technology Act 2000. Punishment for publishing or transmitting of material 
depicting children in sexually explicit act, etc. in electronic form: Whoever,- (a) publishes or transmits or causes 
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browsing or downloading material containing child pornography, or contacting children 
online for sexual purposes or facilitating online child abuse or recording own abuse or abuse 
of others. However the POCSO defines this offence in greater detail. Sections 13, 14 and 15 
of POCSO is more extensive. Section 13 POCSO  punishes anyone who uses a child in any 
form of media (including programme or advertisement telecast by television channels or 
internet or any other electronic form or printed form, whether or not such programme or 
advertisement is intended for personal use or for distribution) for the purposes of sexual 
gratification, which includes—representation of the sexual organs of a child; usage of a child 
engaged in real or simulated sexual acts (with or without penetration); and the indecent or 
obscene representation of a child. 
 
An explanation is appended to section 13 POCSO regarding the expression “use a child”. 
This expression shall include involving a child though any medium like print, electronic, 
computer or any other technology for preparation, production, offering, transmitting, 
publishing, facilitation and distribution of the pornographic material.225 Punishments are 
many and varied, and have been extensively laid down in section 14 POCSO: 
1. For mere usage of a child for pornographic purposes, the punishment is imprisonment 
of either description up to 5 years and fine. In the event of subsequent conviction, 
                                                                                                                                                                            
to be published or transmitted material in any electronic form which depicts children engaged in sexually 
explicit act or conduct or (b) creates text or digital images, collects, seeks, browses, downloads, advertises, 
promotes, exchanges or distributes material in any electronic form depicting children in obscene or indecent or 
sexually explicit manner or (c) cultivates, entices or induces children to online relationship with one or more 
children for and on sexually explicit act or in a manner that may offend a reasonable adult on the computer 
resource or (d) facilitates abusing children online or (e) records in any electronic form own abuse or that of 
others pertaining to sexually explicit act with children, shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment 
of either description for a term which may extend to five years and with a fine which may extend to ten lakh 
rupees and in the event of second or subsequent conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term 
which may extend to seven years and also with fine which may extend to ten lakh rupees: Provided that the 
provisions of section 67, section 67A and this section does not extend to any book, pamphlet, paper, writing, 
drawing, painting, representation or figure in electronic form-(i) The publication of which is proved to be 
justified as being for the public good on the ground that such book, pamphlet, paper writing, drawing, painting, 
representation or figure is in the interest of science, literature, art or learning or other objects of general concern; 
or (ii) which is kept or used for bonafide heritage or religious purposes. Explanation: For the purposes of this 
section, "children" means a person who has not completed the age of 18 years. 
225Section 13 POCSO. Use of child for pornographic purposes: Whoever, uses a child in any form of media 
(including programme or advertisement telecast by television channels or internet or any other electronic form 
or printed form, whether or not such programme or advertisement is intended for personal use or for 
distribution), for the purposes of sexual gratification, which includes- 
a.     representation of the sexual organs of a child;  
b.    usage of a child engaged in real or simulated sexual acts (with or without penetration);  
c.    the indecent or obscene representation of a child, shall be guilty of the offence of using a child for 
pornographic purposes.  
Explanation: For the purposes of this section, the expression "use a child" shall include involving a child 
through any medium like print, electronic, computer or any other technology for preparation, production, 
offering, transmitting, publishing, facilitation and distribution of the pornographic material. 
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punishment shall be imprisonment of either description up to 7 years and fine (section 
14(1) POCSO). 
2. If a person uses the child for pornographic purposes coupled with penetrative sexual 
assault, by directly participating in the pornographic act, such person shall be liable 
for not less than ten years imprisonment of either description to life imprisonment and 
fine. If a person uses a child for pornographic purposes coupled with aggravated 
penetrative sexual assault, by directly participating in the pornographic act, the 
punishment is rigorous imprisonment for life and fine (section 14(2) POCSO). 
3. If any person uses a child for pornographic purposes coupled with sexual assault, by 
directly participating in the pornographic act, the punishment shall be imprisonment 
of either description for a term which is not less than 6 years imprisonment up to 8 
years and fine (section 14(3) POCSO). 
4. If any person uses a child for pornographic purposes coupled with aggravated sexual 
assault, by directly participating in the pornographic act, the punishment shall be 
imprisonment of either description for a term of not less than 8 years imprisonment up 
to 10 years and fine (section 14(4) POCSO). 
5. If any person commits the offence abetment of any offence under the POCSO, the 
punishment shall be as provided for the actual commission of the offence. If any 
person attempts to commit an offence under the POCSO, punishment is imprisonment 
for a term up to one half of the imprisonment for life or one half of the longest term of 
imprisonment provided for that offence or with fine or with both (section 14(5) 
POCSO). 226 
                                                        
226Section 14 POCSO. Punishment for using child for pornographic purposes: 
1.     Whoever, uses a child or children for pornographic purposes shall be punished with imprisonment of either 
description which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine and in the event of second or 
subsequent conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years and 
also be liable to fine. 
2.     If the person using the child for pornographic purposes commits an offence referred to in section 3, by 
directly participating in pornographic acts, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a 
term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be 
liable to fine. 
3.     If the person using the child for pornographic purposes commits an offence referred to in section 5, by 
directly participating in pornographic acts, he shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for life and shall 
also be liable to fine, 
4.     If the person using the child for pornographic purposes commits an offence referred to in section 7, by 
directly participating in pornographic acts, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a 
term which shall not be less than six years but which may extend to eight years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
5.     If the person using the child for pornographic purposes commits an offence referred to in section 9, by 
directly participating in pornographic acts, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a 
term which shall not be less than eight years but which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
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7. Punishment for storage of pornographic material involving child (Section 15 
POCSO): 
Section 15 POCSO  states that if any person, for commercial purposes, stores any form of 
child pornography, such person shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for 
a maximum period of three years or with fine or with both.227It is pertinent to point out that 
this provision departs from section 67B of the Information Technology Act 2000 by providing 
lesser punishment for storage of commercial child pornography.228 
8. Abetment of an offence and punishment (Sections 16 and 17 POCSO): 
A person abets an offence, who instigates any person to do that offence or engages in any 
conspiracy to do that offence or intentionally aids the doing of that offence is said to aid the 
doing of that offence (section 16 POCSO).229Punishment for abetment is the punishment for 
that offence.230 
                                                        
227Section 15 POCSO. Punishment for storage of pornographic material involving child: Any person, who 
stores, for commercial purposes any pornographic material in any form involving a child shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either description which may extend to three years or with fine or with both. 
228It is not clear why the POCSO has departed from awarding higher as laid down in section 67B of the 
Information Technology Act 2000. Originally, section 42 POCSO stated that in cases of conflict between 
POCSO  and another law regarding punishment of the same act or omission, the offender found guilty of such 
offence shall be liable to whichever law which provides for greater punishment. In that case, section 67B of the 
Information Technology Act 2000 would have prevailed over section 15 POCSO in offences of storage of child 
pornography. However, after the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, section 42 POCSO applies only to cases 
of conflict between the POCSO and certain provisions of the Indian Penal Code 1860. In cases of conflict 
between the POCSO  and any other law, section 42A POCSO  clarifies that the POCSO  would prevail over any 
other law. This makes it clear that a person found guilty of a crime of storing commercial child pornography 
would be entitled to a lesser punishment under section 15 POCSO . 
229Section 16 POCSO. Abetment of an offence: A person abets an offence, who: 
First.- Instigates any person to do that offence; or 
Secondly.- Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that offence, if 
an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that offence; 
or 
Thirdly.- Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that offence. 
Explanation I.- A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact, which he 
is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure a thing to be done, is said to 
instigate the doing of that offence. 
Explanation II.- Whoever, either prior to or at the time of commission of an act, does anything in order to 
facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of 
that act. 
Explanation III.-Whoever employs, harbours, receives or transports a child, by means of threat or use force or 
other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of a position, vulnerability or the giving 
or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for 
the purpose of any offence under this Act, is said to aid the doing of that act. 
230Section 17 POCSO. Punishment for abetment: Whoever abets any offence under this Act, if the act abetted is 
committed in consequence of the abetment, shall be punished with punishment provided for that offence. 
Explanation.- An act or offence is said to be committed in consequence of abetment, when it is committed in 
consequence of the instigation, or in pursuance of the conspiracy or with the aid, which constitutes the abetment. 
Explanation.- An act or offence is said to be committed in consequence of abetment, when it is committed in 
consequence of the instigation, or in pursuance of the conspiracy or with the aid, which constitutes the abetment. 
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9. Punishment for attempt to commit an offence (Section 18 POCSO): 
Attempt is punishable with imprisonment of any description provided for in the offence, for a 
term which may extend to one-half of the imprisonment for life or as the case may be, one-
half of the longest term of imprisonment provided for that offence or with fine or with both.231 
 
Table 2 outlines the list of offences in the POCSO. The defining provision as well as the 
punishing provision are laid down within the same row. 
 
 
 
                                                        
231 Section 18 POCSO . Punishment for attempt to commit an offence.-Whoever attempts to commit any offence 
punishable under this Act or to cause such an offence to be committed, and in such attempt, does any act 
towards the commission of the offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of any description provided for the 
offence, for a term which may extend to one-half of the imprisonment for life or, as the case may be, one-half of 
the longest term of imprisonment provided for that offence or with fine or with both. 
  
 
Table 3. Sexual offences in the POCSO 
 
Se
ria
l 
No
. 
Offence in the POCSO Provision 
1. Penetrative sexual assault (Sections 3 
and 4) 
It incurs when a person, by means of penile, object, body part, oral penetration or manipulation of child’s body to cause 
penetration, of the child’s vagina, mouth, urethra or anus, or when the child is made to penetrate the offender or any other 
person(section 3). This offence is punishable by imprisonment of either description from seven years to life and fine (section 
4). 
2. Aggravated penetrative sexual 
assault (Sections 5 and 6) 
It incurs when the offence of penetrative sexual assault is committed by a person in authority or position of responsibility or 
trust, or a relative of the child, through blood, adoption, marriage, guardianship, foster care etc. Other instances of this 
offence being attracted are if the child is below the age of twelve years, or is mentally or physically incapacitated or 
pregnant or sexually penetrated by a gang etc. (section 5). Punishment for the offence of aggravated penetrative sexual 
assault is rigorous imprisonment for a term not less than ten years to imprisonment for life and fine (section 6). 
3. Sexual assault (Sections 7 and 8) It incurs when a person touches, with sexual intent, the vagina, penis, anus or breast of a child or makes the child touch the 
vagina, penis, anus or breast of such person or any other person, or does any other act with sexual intent which involves 
physical contact without penetration (section 7). The punishment for sexual assault is imprisonment from three years to five 
years and fine (section 8). 
4. Aggravated sexual assault (Sections 9 
and 10) 
It incurs when a person sexually assaults a child by a person in a position of authority, responsibility or trust, or who is a 
relative of the child by blood or adoption or marriage or guardianship or foster care etc. Other instances of this offence 
include sexual assault upon a child below the age of twelve, gang sexual assault, sexual assault of a pregnant child etc. 
(section 9) The punishment for aggravated sexual assault is imprisonment for a term not less than five years up to seven 
years and fine (section 10) 
5. Sexual harassment (Sections 11 and 
12) 
It incurs when a person with sexual intent utters any word or makes any sound or makes any gesture or exhibits any object 
or part of body with the intention that such word or sound shall be heard or such gesture or object or part of body shall be 
seen by the child or makes a child exhibit his body/any part or shows any object to a child in any form or media for 
pornographic purposes or repeatedly or constantly follows or watches or constantly contacts a child either directly or 
through electronic, digital or any other means or threatens to use in any form of media, a real or fabricated depiction through 
electronic, film or digital or any other mode, of any part of the body of the child or the involvement of the child in a sexual 
act, or entices a child for pornographic purposes or giving gratification therefore (section 11). The punishment shall be 
imprisonment up to three years and fine (section 12). 
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6. Using a child for pornographic 
purposes (Sections 13 and 14). 
Section 13 punishes anyone who uses a child in any form of media (including programme or advertisement telecast by 
television channels or internet or any other electronic form or printed form, whether or not such programme or 
advertisement is intended for personal use or for distribution), for the purposes of sexual gratification, which includes—
representation of the sexual organs of a child; usage of a child engaged in real or simulated sexual acts (with or without 
penetration); the indecent or obscene representation of a child. An explanation is appended to section 13 stating that the 
expression “use a child” shall include involving a child though any medium like print, electronic, computer or any other 
technology for preparation, production, offering, transmitting, publishing, facilitation and distribution of the pornographic 
material. 
Section 14 lays down various punishments for different degrees of ‘using a child’ for pornographic purposes: 
1.            For mere usage of a child for pornographic purposes, the punishment is imprisonment of either description up to 5 
years and fine. In the event of subsequent conviction, punishment shall be imprisonment of either description up to 7 years 
and fine (Section 14(1)). 
2. If a person uses the child for pornographic purposes coupled with penetrative sexual assault, by directly 
participating in the pornographic act, such person shall be liable for not less than ten years imprisonment of either 
description to life imprisonment and fine. If a person uses a child for pornographic purposes coupled with aggravated 
penetrative sexual assault, by directly participating in the pornographic act, the punishment is rigorous imprisonment for life 
and fine (Section 14(2)). 
3. If any person uses a child for pornographic purposes coupled with sexual assault, by directly participating in the 
pornographic act, the punishment shall be imprisonment of either description for a term which is not less than 6 years 
imprisonment up to 8 years and fine (Section 14(3)). 
4. If any person uses a child for pornographic purposes coupled with aggravated sexual assault, by directly 
participating in the pornographic act, the punishment shall be imprisonment of either description for a term of not less than 8 
years imprisonment up to 10 years and fine (Section 14(4)). 
5. If any person commits the offence abetment of any offence under the POCSO, the punishment shall be as provided 
for the actual commission of the offence. If any person attempts to commit an offence under the POCSO, punishment is 
imprisonment for a term up to one half of the imprisonment for life or one half of the longest term of imprisonment provided 
for that offence or with fine or with both (Section 14(5)). 
7. Punishment for storage of 
pornographic material involving 
child (Section 15) 
If any person, for commercial purposes, stores any form of child pornography, such person shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either description for a maximum period of three years or with fine or with both. 
8. Abetment of an offence and 
punishment  (Sections 16 and 17) 
It incurs when anyone instigates another to do an offence or engages in any conspiracy to do that offence or intentionally 
aids the doing of that offence (Section 16). Punishment for abetment is the punishment for that offence. 
9. Punishment for attempt to commit an 
offence (Section 18) 
It is punishable with imprisonment of any description provided for the offence, for a term which may extend to one-half of 
the imprisonment for life or as the case may be, one half of the longest term of imprisonment provided for that offence or 
with fine or with both. 
  
 
 
(iii) Clarification regarding the prevalence of the POCSO over other legislation: 
Sections 42 and 42A POCSO: 
 
The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 inserted a new section 42 and section 42A into the 
POCSO. Section 42 POCSO provides for alternate punishment in cases where an act or 
omission constitutes an offence punishable under the POCSO and also under sections 166A, 
354A, 354B, 354C, 354D, 370, 370A, 375, 376, 376A, 376C, 376D, 376E or section 509 of 
the IPC. Then, notwithstanding anything contained in any law, the offender found guilty of 
such an offence shall be liable to punishment under the or under the IPC as it provides for 
punishment which is greater in degree. Also, section 42A POCSO states that the provisions of 
the POCSO shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for 
the time being in force and, in case of any inconsistency, the provisions of the POCSO shall 
have overriding effect on the provisions of any such law to the extent of the inconsistency. 
This means that the provisions of the POCSO shall prevail over the provisions of any other 
law in case of inconsistency. Table 4 gives a bird’s eye view of the same. This particular 
aspect of prevalence of law shall be analysed in detail in Chapter 4 in order to establish 
whether the POCSO, the IPC, or the Goa Children’s Act 2003 provisions would override the 
others for the same offence. 
 
One problem faced before the POCSO was enacted was the lack of clear gender-neutral laws 
protecting both boys and girls from various types of sexual abuse. In this context, this chapter 
examines whether the definitions of sexual offences in the POCSO and their punishments 
adequately protect both male and female children from sexual abuse. The situation in Goa, 
which had pre-existing special legislation against child sexual abuse since 2003, and in 
Kerala, which had none other than the national laws of India, has to be examined to ascertain 
the adequacy of protecting children through the POCSO. 
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3.B. SYNTHESIS OF LEGISLATION AND CASE LAW ON 
SEXUAL OFFENCES AGAINST CHILDREN IN GOA 
The state of Goa, as in all states within the Union of India, has its own independent 
legislature, elected by the people within its territorial limits who have been issued an electoral 
card by the Election Commission of India.232 
This section discusses the provisions in law applicable to Goa in the area of sexual offences 
against children. Relevant case law of the High Court of Bombay (Goa Bench) is also 
discussed. 
The purpose of this sub-section is to lay the foundation for a comparison of the sexual 
offences in the Goa Children’s Act 2003 with the POCSO and their corresponding IPC 
offences. Table 4 compares the IPC and POCSO with the Goa Children’s Act. 
3.B.1. Legislation on sexual offences against children in Goa 
 
Currently, cases of child sexual abuse in Goa come under provisions of national legislation: 
the IPC, the CrPC, the Indian Evidence Act 1872 and the POCSO. Before the advent of the 
POCSO, the Goa Children’s Act 2003 prevailed. However, presently, as per section 42A 
POCSO, the POCSO will prevail over any other law which is inconsistent with POCSO 
provisions. Section 42A POCSO states that the provisions of the POCSO shall be in addition 
to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force and, in 
case of any inconsistency, the provisions of the POCSO shall have overriding effect on the 
provisions of any such law to the extent of the inconsistency. So, as long as section 8(2) of 
the Goa Children’s Act 2003 is not inconsistent with POCSO, it can co-exist along with the 
POCSO. 
 
                                                        
232 Under the Indian constitutional framework, the President of India appoints the Governor as the constitutional 
head of the state, and all executive actions are taken in the name of the Governor. But he is only a de jure head. 
The real executive power vests in the Chief Minister. The legislature is headed by the Chief Minister, who is 
assisted by his Cabinet of Ministers. The Cabinet of Ministers is selected from the Members of the Legislative 
Assembly. It is from the state legislature that the executive controllers are selected. The State Legislature is 
allowed under the Constitution of India to legislate on subjects mentioned in the State List; that is, List II of the 
Constitution. In case there is any incidental overlapping between any subject matter present in State legislation 
and that present in Central or Union Legislation, it is the Central law that will prevail. The judiciary functions as 
an independent body. 
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The following sub-section explains the details of the Goa Children’s Act 2003, with emphasis 
on sexual offences against children. 
3.B.1.a. The Goa Children’s Act 2003 
 
The Goa Children’s Act 2003 (Goa Children’s Act 2003) is a piece of special legislation 
which guarantees the various rights of a child as envisaged in the International Convention 
on the Rights of the Child. Goa is the only state in India to have legislation of this nature at 
present. The statute addresses all issues relating to children including their right to education, 
health and safe environment as well as issues of trafficking, child labour and other pro-active 
measures. It is the first statute which mentions sexual abuse in the child abuse context. Under 
Section 2 (m)(i) of the Goa Children’s Act 2003, child abuse is defined to include sexual 
abuse; however, sexual abuse is not defined. 
Sexual Offences under section 2 Clauses (x) and (y ) of the Goa Children’s Act 2003 and 
punishments under section 8 
 
Section 2(x) states: 
“Sexual Offence” covers all forms of sexual abuse which constitute offences under the Act. 
Section 2(y) states: 
Sexual offences for the purposes of awarding appropriate punitive action means and includes 
(i) “Grave Sexual Assault” which covers different types of intercourse: vaginal, oral, anal, use of 
objects, forcing minors to have sex with each other, deliberately causing injury to the sexual 
organs, making children pose for pornographic photos or films; 
(ii) “Sexual Assault” which covers sexual touching with the use of any body part or object, 
voyeurism, exhibitionism, showing pornographic pictures or films to minors, making children 
watch others engaged in sexual activity, issuing of threats to sexually abuse a minor, verbally 
abusing a minor using vulgar and obscene language; 
(iii) Incest which is the commission of a sexual offence by an adult on a child who is a relative or 
is related by ties of adoption. 
 
Section 8(2) lays down the punishment for child sexual abuse as follows: 
Whosoever commits any child abuse or sexual assault as defined under this Act, shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either description for a term that may extend to three years and shall also be liable to 
fine of Rs. 1,00,000/-. Whoever commits any Grave Sexual Assault shall be punished with imprisonment 
of either description for a term that shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to life 
imprisonment and shall also be liable to a fine of Rs. 2,00,000. Whoever commits incest shall be 
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term that shall not be less than ten years but 
which may extend to life imprisonment and also a fine which may extend to Rs.2,00,000. Statement of 
the child victim shall be treated on par with the statement of a child rape victim under Section 375 of the 
IPC, as laid down by the Supreme Court of India. 
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Under the statute, adults staying with unrelated children are required to register with the 
government. Hotels are required to take measures to ensure the safety of children on their 
premises. Photo studios are required to report to the police if they find films or photos that 
contain objectionable material. It casts an obligation on the larger community to protect the 
safety of children. Children below the age of 14 are not allowed to enter into a cyber café 
without being accompanied by an adult. It authorises all governmental authorities to report 
suspicious circumstances. Proactive measures include setting up a victim assistance unity, 
sensitization of the police and law enforcement authorities, better investigation techniques 
evolving a child-friendly tourism code and setting up a child-friendly court. Such a court is to 
try adult offenders, but the court is required to be less formal so that a child witness finds the 
atmosphere less intimidating.233 
The Children’s Court under Goa Children’s Act 2003 is competent to try cases under the 
POCSO in Goa.234 The 11th Law Commission Report in 2010 suggested the creation of two 
Children’s Courts for the two districts of Goa. To date, this recommendation of the Law 
Commission has not been implemented. 
                                                        
233UNICEF (2007).Development of Law relating to Child Rights. Chennai. 
234It was the national enactments, viz, the Indian Penal Code 1860 and the Code of Criminal of Criminal 
Procedure 1973 that prevailed in Goa before the Children’s Act was passed in 2003. The Children’s Act 2003 
came into force in July 2003. Thereafter, a Children’s Court was formed accordingly with separate procedural 
rules: the Goa Children’s (Court) Rules 2004. Thereafter, the Children’s Court was started in December 2004.  
Section 31 lays down that the Children’s Court shall have all the powers of: 
(a) the Court of Sessions under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (2 of 1974); 
(b) a Civil Court for the purpose of summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses, compelling the 
discovery and production of documents and material objects, and administering oath and recording evidence.  
Also, every proceeding of the Children’s Court shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning 
of sections 195 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code 1860. 
Section 28 of the Goa Children’s Act 2003 states that a President of the Court shall be a person of District Judge 
rank, provided that the Government may also appoint any Sessions or Additional Sessions Judge as the 
President of the Children’s Court, but no appointment under this section shall be made except after consultation 
with the High Court. Section 29 of the Goa Children’s Act 2003 provides that the President of the Children’s 
Court shall hold office for a term of five years or up to the age of 65 years, whichever is earlier, and shall not be 
eligible for reappointment. 
Section 30 of the Goa Children’s Act 2003 lays down that all offences against children come under the 
jurisdiction of the Children’s Court, whether such offence is specified under this Act or not.  Hence, once the 
POCSO entered into force on 12 November 2012, it became binding on the state of Goa. Thereafter the existing 
Children’s Court in Goa was granted jurisdiction to try cases under the POCSO as well. 
Children’s Court gets powers under POCSO Act. Dated 07/12/2013 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/goa/Childrens-court-gets-powers-under-POCSO-
Act/articleshow/21027387.cms 
194 
 
3.B.2. Case laws on sexual offences against children in Goa 
This section deals with reported cases of the High Court of Bombay (Goa Bench). These 
cases are relevant to the three types of sexual offences discussed in the Goa Children’s Act 
2003. 
When the statutory provision specifically provides a fixed amount to be fined, once an 
offence is established, no discretion is left to the Court to fix a fine less than the statutory 
quantum. The reduction of mandatory fine is not possible, nor is it possible to increase the 
statutory fine and correspondingly decrease the statutory minimum imprisonment. It is also 
prohibited to reduce the term of imprisonment, while upholding the amount of fine. These 
case laws are relevant to the principle of restriction upon judicial subjectivity, which is 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
3.B.2.a. Maloji Patil v State of Goa(2008)235 
 
The appellant accused appealed against his conviction by the Children’s Court under sections 
354 and 509 IPC, as well as under section 8(2) of the Goa Children’s Act, whereby he was 
ordered to undergo the punishment of: (1) simple imprisonment for three months and a fine 
of Rs. 500 on account of the offence punishable under section 354 IPC; (2) one month simple 
imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 200/- for the offence punishable under section 509 IPC; and 
to suffer (3) simple imprisonment for 3 months and a fine of Rs. 2,000/- for the offence 
punishable under section 8(2) of the Goa Children’s Act. The state also filed appeal against 
the judgment of the Children’s Court, being dissatisfied with the punishment of fine to the 
extent of 2,000/- in spite of being convicted under section 8(2) of the Goa Children’s Act 
2003. The learned Single Judge, Justice R.M.S. Khandeparkar of the High Court of 
Maharashtra, held that when the statutory provision specifically provides a fixed amount to 
be fined, once an offence is established, no discretion is left to the Court to fix a fine less than 
the statutory quantum. While a discretion regarding the quantum of fine has been given to the 
Court in case of the offence of incest as a result of which the Court can impose any fine up to 
Rs. 2,00,000/- for incest alone, in case of sexual assault and grave sexual assault, he stated 
that no such discretion is left to the Court. Thereby, the appeal of the State was allowed and 
the quantum of fine payable by the accused was directed to be specified as Rs. 1,00,000/- 
instead of Rs. 2,000/-. 
                                                        
235 MANU/MH/1435/2008. 
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3.B.2.b. Dhannaram v State(2012)236 
The accused appealed against his conviction and sentence of life imprisonment and fine of 
Rs. 200000/- for grave sexual assault of a mentally retarded girl of seven years of age. 
Various factors were taken into consideration for reduction of his sentence to 12 years by the 
High Court of Bombay (Goa Bench),in a Division Bench comprising of Justices A.P. 
Lavande and U.V. Bakre. These factors were: the accused was young (19 years of age) at the 
time of the offence; the accused had no criminal antecedents; there was only slight 
penetration and the hymen was intact; the minimum prescribed punishment as per the Goa 
Children’s Act is 10 years.  However, the Court specified that reduction of the mandatory fine 
of Rs. 200000/- was not possible. 
 
3.B.2.c. Narshiv Usapkar v The State of Goa (2012)237 
The mother of the victim girl found the accused, a neighbor, holding the breasts of her 
daughter, who had been sleeping with her siblings. The trial court convicted and sentenced 
the accused to simple imprisonment for six months and fine of Rs. 1000/-, for the offence 
under section 452 IPC; simple imprisonment for one year and Rs. 100000/- fine, under 
section 354 IPC read with section 8(2) of the Goa Children’s Act 2003; and simple 
imprisonment for three months under section 506(ii) IPC. 
Before the High Court of Bombay (Goa Bench), the question was raised whether the Court 
can award a fine greater than the statutory quantum of Rs. 100000/- for the offence of sexual 
assault under section 8(2) of the Goa Children’s Act 2003 and correspondingly waive the 
term of imprisonment to be served by taking benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act 1958. 
This was rejected by the Court – headed by Justice A.P. Lavande – upholding the Goa 
Children’s Act 2003 verdict. 
3.B.2.d. Mansoor K. K. Mohammed v State (2014)238 
 
On 24 March 2009, the accused, a temporary worker in an estate, was seen fondling the 
genitals of a girl of four years, who was the daughter of a security guard on the estate. Two 
women sweepers saw this incident and reported the matter to the girl’s mother. The girl’s 
mother lodged a complaint against the accused on 25 March 2009. Investigation was 
                                                        
236 MANU/MH/0030/2012. 
237 MANU/MH/1651/2012. 
238 MANU/MH/0688/2014. 
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commenced immediately, the statements of the two sweepers were recorded as witnesses, and 
the accused arrested. Both the child and the accused were subjected to medical examination. 
At the time of trial, however, the complainant and her family had shifted to Nepal and were 
not available to depose before the court. Despite the fact that there was no medical evidence 
to corroborate the fact that the child had been sexually abused, the veracity of the depositions 
of the two witnesses and the police investigation report caused the trial court to sentence the 
accused to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay fine of Rs. 10,000/- under 
section 354 IPC. He was also convicted for an offence punishable under section 8(2) of the 
Goa Children’s Act 2003 and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment of six months with 
fine of Rs. 10,000/-. 
The question before the High Court of Bombay (Goa Bench) was whether the accused could 
be punished under section 354 IPC read with section 8(2) of the Goa Children’s Act 2003 and 
be awarded punishment of rigorous imprisonment for six month and fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in 
default, to undergo imprisonment for 10 days, in the absence of medical evidence of the child 
and corroboration from the child’s mother. The Learned Single Judge Justice T.V. Nalawade 
took into consideration the fact that the accused was a married man with a child. The absence 
of medical evidence in corroboration, and the absence of the evidence of the child’s mother 
who said that the child had disclosed the incident to her, were considered to be of relevance 
in this case, as the two women sweepers had witnessed the incident from some distance. In 
view of these circumstances, the High Court held that sending the accused behind bars for six 
months would be harsh. The appeal was partly allowed. 
Conviction for the offence under section 354 IPC was maintained. The accused was 
sentenced to pay fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default, to undergo imprisonment for 10 days. The 
conviction for offence punishable under section 8(2) of the Goa Children’s Act 2003 was 
maintained. For this offence, the accused was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 
one month and to pay fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default, to undergo imprisonment for 10 days. 
3.B.2.d. Madhu Nair v. State of Goa (2015)239 
On 23/04/2009 the appellant called his six year old neighbour to sit on his lap and inserted his 
finger into the vagina of his six year old neighbour. This happened when she was playing 
with her friends in the neighbourhood. Her mother found her suffering with fever in the 
evening. She reported the incident to the police the next day morning. Medical examination 
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found a reddish tender bruise on the child’s hymen opening. The Children’s court convicted 
the appellant to ten years imprisonment and two lakh rupees fine under section 2 (y) (i) of the 
Goa Children’s Act 2003 for grave sexual assault and its punishment under section 8(2) of 
the Act. The appellant approached the High Court pleading that the offence came only under 
section 2 (y)(ii) for Sexual Assault, and not under section 2 (y)(i), as the appellant had not 
‘deliberately’ caused injury as per section 2(y)(i). It was submitted that unless and until the 
prosecution is able to establish an intention on the part of the appellant to cause such an 
injury, no offence under Section 2(y)(i) of the Act can be said to be made out. Justice C.V. 
Bhadang rejected this contention, and upheld the verdict of the Children’s Court, as such 
injury caused to the sexual organ of the victim was a deliberate act, which is sufficiently 
established by the medical evidence, and certainly more than what is contemplated under 
Section 2(y)(ii) of the Act, namely of only sexually touching, with the use of any body part or 
object. 
3.B.3. Conclusion 
The High Court of Bombay (Goa Bench) has, for the most part, acted in a fair manner and 
upheld the rule of law. However, some recent decisions of the Goa Bench are not so 
commendable; for example, when the High Court was swayed in 2012 by the young age and 
lack of criminal antecedents of the offender despite the fact that the victim was a mentally 
retarded child. However, the High Court did not depart from the letter of the law, which 
prescribes imprisonment of not less than ten years and fine of Rs. 200000/- for grave sexual 
assault. The trial court sentenced the accused to life imprisonment and Rs 200000/-. Here the 
High Court reduced his sentence to 12 years imprisonment on the basis he was only 19 years 
of age at the time of the offence, had no criminal antecedents, and that the hymen of the child 
had not ruptured because of slight penetration alone. However, the court refused to reduce the 
fine. 
In a 2014 decision, the High Court seems to have clearly violated the letter of the law which 
prescribes a statutory mandatory fine of Rs. 100000/-. The trial court convicted the accused 
and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for six months with fine of Rs. 10,000/- based 
on the veracity of the depositions of two witnesses and the police investigation report, despite 
the fact that there was neither medical evidence to corroborate the fact that the victim child 
had been sexually abused, nor were the child or her parents available during trial for 
corroboration of the complaint. In appeal against conviction, the High Court took into 
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consideration the facts of absence of corroboratory evidence by the mother, the absence of 
medical evidence, and the fact that the accused was a married man with a child, and reduced 
the term of punishment to one month. It is pertinent to note that the statutory mandatory fine 
of Rs. 100,000 under the Goa Children’s Act 2003 was reduced to Rs. 10,000. 
 
However, the 2015 decision in Madhu Nair is highly commendable as the learned judge has 
acted in accordance with the rule of law, and rightly interpreted the word ‘deliberately’ in 
accordance with the prevailing circumstances. 
 
Thus, in Goa, it can be seen that the majority of decisions reflect a protective stance towards 
children, with few exceptions where the law is interpreted to protect sexual offenders.   
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3.C. SYNTHESIS OF LEGISLATION AND CASE LAW 
REGARDING SEXUAL OFFENCES AGAINST CHILDREN IN 
KERALA 
 
This section will examine the criminal court system as well as case law within the jurisdiction 
of the High Court of Kerala. As in Goa, the criminal court system of the states within the 
Union of India is based on the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. The hierarchy of courts in 
Kerala is the same the rest of India in accordance with national procedural law in the Code of 
Criminal Procedure 1973. In Kerala, there are two additional Sessions Courts at 
Thiruvananthapuram (the capital of Kerala) and Ernakulam to deal with sexual offences 
against women and children, and each have jurisdiction to try adult sexual offenders against 
children. 
 
3.C.1. Legislation on sexual offences against children in Kerala 
In 2009-2010, pressure groups engaged in consultations for developing a draft bill similar to 
on the Goa Children’s Act 2003 in order to punish crimes against children. During the 
beginning of my research, pressure groups within Kerala were holding consultations with 
governmental authorities for the enactment of regional legislation to protect children from 
sexual abuse. This was because the MWCD Report of 2007 reported a high prevalence rate of 
child sexual abuse in Kerala, and there was general consensus regarding the need for law and 
policy to combat this phenomenon. However, these initiatives lost relevance when a National 
Bill regarding Offences Against Children was mooted in 2010, which quickly 
metamorphosed into a specific legislation on sexual offences against children by the end of 
2011. Ultimately, there was no need for Kerala to have its own separate legislation on 
protection of children against sexual abuse, as this concern would be solved by the enactment 
of national legislation. 
Currently, cases of child sexual abuse in Kerala come under provisions of the IPC, the 
Criminal Procedure Code 1973, the Indian Evidence Act 1872 and the Protection of Children 
Against Sexual Offences Act 2012.Kerala is representative of all the other states and union 
territories in India which do not have special regional legislation for prosecuting child sexual 
abuse offences (the State of Goa alone is excluded from this list). 
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3. C. 2. Case law on sexual offences against children in Kerala 
Reported decisions of the High Court of Kerala have been cited in chronological order. It is 
relevant to note that the High Court of Kerala gives the reason for non-disclosure and 
consequent delay in filing a case of rape by the female victim as the fear of dishonour. This 
corroborates international studies on reasons for non-disclosure. The testimony of victims of 
sexual offences must be considered by the judge with full evidentiary value. Delay in filing a 
case involving a sexual offence is not a ground for acquittal of the accused. The pressure of 
social ostracism is evident in the instance of a mother who is willing to give an affidavit 
before the High Court of Kerala, stating that her husband did not sexually molest their 13-
year-old daughter. 
Also, within the definition of rape, the High Court of Kerala distinguished the section 375 
IPC offence of rape from the medical counterpart of the term, in that it is not necessary for 
there to be penile penetration of the vagina. Even in the absence of entry into the vagina or 
rupture of hymen, by the mere fact that the male organ “accessed” the female organ, rape 
under section 375 IPC can be attracted. Here, a broad definition of the offence of rape has 
been given, as the IPC is not clear as to how penetration should occur. The absence of 
definitions of sexual offences within the IPC invoked reiteration of the international 
obligations under Article 19 of the UN Convention on Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women 1979 and the UN Convention on Rights of the Child 1989. The need for psychological 
counselling is supported by the finding of the High Court of Kerala that there is no adequate 
provision for giving support to such victims of rape either at the cost of the offender or the 
state. 
3.C.1.2.a. Sunil v State of Kerala (2001)240 
 
A girl of 13 years was forcefully fondled by her neighbour. A medical certificate was issued 
stating that both breasts, vulva, labia majora and labia minora as oedematous. The next day a 
First Information Report (FIR) was registered in the police station. Even though certain 
prosecution witnesses turned hostile, the trial court accepted and acted upon the evidence of 
the victim girl holding that her evidence is reliable and suffers from no infirmity and is not 
tainted. It convicted the accused to rigorous imprisonment for two years under section 354 
                                                        
240MANU/KE/0399/2001. 
201 
 
IPC, rigorous imprisonment for six months under section 448 IPC241 and rigorous 
imprisonment for one year under section 506 IPC.242 The sentences imposed were ordered to 
run concurrently. A revision petition was filed before the High Court, alleging delay in filing 
the FIR. The High Court, under Justice T.M. Hassan Pilla, ruled that delay in lodging FIR in 
sexual offences is not a reason for acquitting the accused, and it is the duty of the judiciary to 
consider the testimony of victims of sexual offences with full evidentiary value. The revision 
petition was dismissed; however, the sentences given by trial courts under sections 354,448 
and 506 IPC were reduced to six months and a compensation of Rs 15000/- was awarded to 
the victim. 
3.C.1.2.b. State of Kerala v M. Ayoob (2005)243 
 
The accused promised to marry the prosecutrix who was a minor and she fell pregnant. Later, 
he withdrew from the promise. The alleged incident of rape was concealed by the prosecutrix 
for six months due to the accused threatening to kill her. The trial court acquitted the accused 
on the basis of delay of the prosecutrix in filing her case. The State filed an appeal against the 
acquittal before the High Court of Kerala. The issue was whether the delay in filing the case 
is a reason for the acquittal of the accused. Justice K.A Abdul Gafoor ruled that mere delay is 
not a reason. It is a common female tendency to conceal the sexual offences because of the 
fear of dishonour. The decision of the lower court acquitting the accused was reversed and he 
was convicted under section 376 IPC. 
3.C.1.2.c . Chenthamara v State of Kerala (2008)244 
 
A 12-year-old girl suffered attempted rape by the accused at his house. The Assistant 
Sessions Judge found the accused to be guilty of attempt to commit rape and convicted and 
sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years. On appeal to the 
Sessions Court, the conviction was confirmed but the sentence was reduced to rigorous 
imprisonment for a period of one year. The accused challenged the conviction and sentence 
in the revision petition before the High Court of Kerala. The issue was whether there was 
only an attempt to commit rape or was it rape itself or did the conduct amount to outraging 
the modesty of the woman. The High Court, headed by Justice K. Hema, found that the 
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243 2005(2)KLJ16; 2005(2)KLT 441. 
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offence of rape had been committed and the trial courts were mistaken in analysing the term 
“penetration” in section 376 of the IPC. It is clearly stated that even an attempt at penetration 
to the private part of the woman is sufficient for the purpose of sections 375 and 376 IPC. 
Penile accessing would clearly attract penetration that is sufficient to constitute offence of 
rape. "Penetration" referred to in section 375 IPC is something lesser in extent, nature and 
degree than what is ordinarily understood by the word "penetration" in common parlance, in 
the context of sexual intercourse. By virtue of the Explanation to Section 375 IPC, for the 
sexual intercourse necessary for the offence of rape, penile-vaginal entry is not essential, but 
even in the absence of such entry or rupture of hymen, the offence of rape can be committed. 
Reliance was placed on the following precedents regarding interpretation of the word 
"penetration" as used in section 375 IPC: 
In Mohammed v State of Kerala245 it was held that partial penetration of the penis with the 
labia majora or the vulva or pudendum with or without emission of semen was held sufficient 
for the purpose of law. 
In State of U.P. v Babulnath246, it was held that even partial or slight penetration of the male 
organ within labia majora or the vulva or pudendum with or without any emission of semen, 
or even an attempt at penetration into the private part of the victim would satisfy sections 375 
and 376 IPC. 
In Aman Kumar v State of Haryana247 the Supreme Court held that even a slight penetration 
in the vulva is sufficient to constitute the offence of rape and rupture of the hymen is not 
necessary. Vulva penetration with or without violence is as much rape as vaginal penetration. 
The statute merely requires evidence of penetration, and this may occur with the hymen 
remaining intact. In order to constitute penetration, there must be clear and cogent evidence 
to prove that some part of the virile member of the accused was within the labia of the 
pudendum of the woman, no matter how little. 
However, the decision of lower court was not reversed as there was no challenge by the 
prosecution. The State of Kerala did not challenge the conviction or the insufficiency of the 
sentence awarded. The revision petition was dismissed. 
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3.C.1.2.d. Santhosh Madhavan @ Amrutha Chaithanya v Circle Inspector of Police & 
Another(2008)248 
 
A god man named Swami Amrutha Chaithanya ran a hostel for students from poor families. 
He raped one of these students many times and videographed the events, using them to 
threaten her to remain silent. In 2008, following media reports he was wanted by Interpol for 
embezzlement of funds in another country, the victim felt confident to report the crime to the 
police. In his application for bail, the accused claimed medical records stated that the vagina 
admits only a single finger, so the offence of rape under section 375 IPC could not be made 
out. The learned judge of the High Court of Kerala, Justice K. Hema, pointed out the 
inadequacy of laws related to the sexual offences in sections 354, 376 and 377 IPC. The 
international obligations of India under Article 19 of the UN Convention on Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women 1979 and UN Convention on Rights of the Child 1989 were 
reiterated. The judge observed that victims of sexual offences are denied justice because the 
offences were not defined in the IPC. The petition for bail by the accused was dismissed by 
the High Court. The police were directed to conduct an investigation regarding whether there 
was rape or outraging the modesty of women. Direction was given to the State to consider 
whether suitable amendments could be made to section 354 IPC for protecting 
the child/woman from sexual assaults, other than those covered by section 375 IPC, as in the 
Andhra Pradesh Amendment Act1991, wherein punishment was enhanced and the offence 
under section 354 IPC is made a non-bailable one.249 
3.C.1.2.e. Kunjumon v State of Kerala (2011)250 
 
The accused was charged for the offence of committing rape on his 10-year-old daughter. 
Evidence revealed that before there could be emission of semen into vagina, the child’s 
grandmother came to scene and semen fell on the child’s thigh while accused withdrew from 
the act. The trial court convicted him with 10 years imprisonment and fine of Rs. 25000/-.On 
appeal, it was argued that as there was no instance of recent penetration, no rape had 
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249Andhra Pradesh Amendment Act1991. In the Indian Penal Code 1860, for section 354, the following section 
shall be substituted, namely: Section 354: Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her 
modesty. - Whoever assaults or used criminal force to any woman intending to outrage or knowing it to be 
likely that he will thereby outrage her modesty shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a 
term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine; 
Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a 
sentence of imprisonment of either description for a term which may be less than five years, but which shall not 
be less than two years. 
250 2011 (4) KHC 72. 
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occurred, and it was not section 376 but section 377 of the IPC that would apply. The 
medical examiner held the view that there was no rape as actual penetration did not occur. 
However, the High Court, headed by Justice K. Hema, took the view that rape in legal 
parlance is different from the medical definition of rape. The act by the accused father was 
rape as there was penile accessing. The Court held that the accused cannot be given pardon 
because he committed a heinous offence on his own daughter and caused her deep physical 
and psychological trauma. The Court upheld the conviction by the trial court. 
The issue of providing psychological assistance to the victim was discussed in this case.The 
Court lamented the fact that there is no adequate provision in law for providing support – at 
the very least, psychological counselling – to victims of rape  at the cost of the offender or the 
State. 
3.C.1.2.f. Noushad K. v State of Kerala (2014)251 
 
The petitioner was alleged to have made frequent sexual overtures towards his 13-year-old 
daughter. The daughter reported the matter to her mother. The petitioner was convicted under 
section 354 of the IPC and sections 7 and 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual 
Offences Act 2012. He issued a petition before the High Court to quash the proceedings on 
the basis of the affidavit given by his wife (the victim’s mother and the complainant) that no 
such incident occurred. The Court, under Justice B. Kemal Pasha, held the offence cannot be 
compounded on the basis of an agreement between the accused father and complainant 
mother. The protection of the child is the necessity, so the Court ordered that the 
investigation proceed. It was held that the inherent powers of the High Court to quash 
proceedings252cannot be invoked to shelter criminals. The petition was dismissed, and the 
Investigating Officer was directed to continue the investigation and file the final report as 
soon as possible. 
3.C.1.2.g. Shambu Thilak v State of Kerala and Others (2017)253 
The petitioner and the third respondent were school mates and deeply in love with each other. 
When the third respondent 17 years old, she went missing from her friend’s house, and found 
to have engaged in sexual intercourse with the petitioner, who was 20 years old. Her mother 
filed a case against the petitioner under section 376 IPC and under section 3(a) and 4 
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POCSO. In 2015, when both the petitioner and third respondent attained the age of majority, 
their marriage took place. 
The Court opined that this was a case of elopement of a girl with her lover against the wishes 
of her family members, and not one of those cases wherein the allegations reek of extreme 
depravity, perversity or cruelty. Hence the offence in this case does not fall in the category of 
offences that have a serious impact on society. The facts of the instant case when looked at 
dispassionately would reveal a long term love affair between two young people which 
weathered all storms and ended up in the altar of marriage. 
Justice Raja Vijayaraghavan of the High Court of Kerala exercised the extraordinary powers 
of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC to quash the criminal proceedings against the 
petitioner, citing the extreme hardship caused to the third respondent if criminal proceedings 
against her husband were to continue. The learned judge reasoned that when the third 
respondent has asserted that she does not desire to prosecute her husband any further, the 
prospects of an ultimate conviction is remote and bleak. 
3.C.1.2.h. Muhammed Fasil v. Sabira and Others (2017)254 
Here the petitioner and the daughter of the second respondent were in love with each other, 
and entered into sexual intercourse when the daughter of the second respondent was a minor. 
Fearing that the petitioner would not marry her daughter, the second respondent filed a case 
in 2014 against him under sections 376, 506 IPC and sections 3 and 4 POCSO. Thereafter 
both of them got married. Affidavits filed by respondents 1 and 2 state that continuance of 
proceedings against the petitioner will hinder congenial matrimonial relationship between the 
parties. Justice Vijayaraghavan of the High Court of Kerala pointed out that even though the 
Supreme Court of India has categorically stated that rape is an offence against society and 
hence it is a non-compoundable offence which cannot be settled between the parties, this 
particular case is not one of those cases wherein the allegations reek of extreme depravity, 
perversity or cruelty. It would not fall in the category of offences that have a serious impact 
on society. Hence the extraordinary powers of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC were 
invoked by the learned judge to quash the criminal proceedings against the petitioner. 
                                                        
254 MANU/KE/0122/2017. 
206 
 
3.C.1.3. Conclusion 
The legislation applicable in Kerala is the same as the rest of India. This is in contrast to the 
statutory provisions available for Goa, who developed its own legislation due to the onslaught 
of foreign tourists flowing in to obtain sexual services from children. The decisions of the 
High Court of Kerala portray a progressive and protective attitude towards the rights of 
children. In the absence of detailed statistical studies on Kerala, these High Court decisions 
clearly state fear of disclosure and social ostracism as a reason for delay in filing complaints 
in sexual offences, which corroborates scientific studies on the reasons for non-disclosure. 
The need for a system for overcoming structural barriers against disclosure – such as 
psychological services being available at the cost of the government or the offender – was 
highlighted by the High Court of Kerala in Kunjumon’s case. 
 
The need for broader legal definitions in the context of the various types of penetration 
possible within the section 375 IPC offence of rape has been documented by the High Court 
of Kerala. Interestingly, the High Court of Kerala in decisions rendered in January 2017 has 
circumvented the judicial precedents regarding non-compoundability of rape charges. The 
honourable Court has distinguished rape from sexual intercourse on the basis of love affairs 
with minors which have ended in marriage, and thereby invoked its extraordinary powers to 
quash criminal proceedings against adult males who have been charged with rape under 
Section 376 IPC along with penetrative sexual assault under section 3 and 4 POCSO, when 
their spouses have pleaded for quashing such proceedings in the interest of justice. 
 
Key sexual offences against children and the legislative framework: 
 
Table 4 compares provisions of the IPC, POCSO, and Goa Children’s Act 2003 along with 
the statutory laws in Kerala. The IPC is the general substantive criminal law applicable 
nationally. The POCSO is special legislation applicable nationally, confined specifically to 
child sexual abuse offences. Goa is bound by the IPC, the POCSO, and Goa Children’s Act. 
However, section 42A POCSO has inactivated the Goa Children’s Act in case of conflict 
between the POCSO and the Goa Children’s Act provisions. Kerala does not have any special 
legislation of its own, hence only the IPC and POCSO are applicable. This comparison 
clarifies the similarities and differences between the three pieces legislations. These key 
legislative provisions are analysed in detail in Chapter 4. 
  
Table 4. Key sexual offences against children and the legislative framework: A comparison between the IPC, the POCSO, Goa and 
Kerala 
Sl. 
No. 
Criminal 
offence 
National legislation: Indian Penal 
Code 1860 
National legislation: Protection of 
Children Against Sexual Offences Act 
2012 
Goa: Children’s Act 2003, IPC and 
POCSO 
Kerala: IPC and 
POCSO 
1.  Rape 1. Defined in s.375 to include penile, 
object, body part and oral penetration 
by a man, of the vagina, mouth, 
urethra or anus of a woman or 
making her penetrate the rapist or any 
other person. Punishment is rigorous 
imprisonment of either description 
for a term which shall not be less than 
seven years but which may extend to 
imprisonment for life, and shall be 
liable to fine (s.376(1)). 
2. S.376(2) grants greater punishment 
to cases of such penetration by a 
person in a position of responsibility, 
trust, family relationship etc, as well 
as raping a pregnant woman, woman 
under the age of sixteen etc. 
Punishment is rigorous imprisonment 
for a term which shall not be less than 
ten years but which may be for life, 
and fine. 
3. Rape causing death or persistent 
vegetative state, rape by a husband 
during separation, rape by a person in 
authority, gang rape and rape by 
repeated offenders are given separate 
punishments under ss.376A to E. 
No offence of rape exists in POCSO No offence of rape exists in Goa 
Children’s Act. The offence in 
ss.375,376 IPC applies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The offence in ss.375,376 IPC 
applies. 
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Sl. 
No. 
Criminal 
offence 
National Legislation-Indian Penal 
Code 1860 
National Legislation-Protection of 
Children Against Sexual Offences Act, 
2012 
Goa-Goa Children’s Act 2003, IPC 
and POCSO 
Kerala- IPC and 
POCSO 
2.  Penetrativ
e sexual 
assault 
No offence of penetrative sexual 
assault exists in the IPC. 
When a person, by means of  penile, 
object, body part, oral penetration or 
manipulation of child’s body to cause 
penetration, of the child’s vagina, mouth, 
urethra or anus, or when the child is made 
to penetrate the offender or any other 
person(s.3). Punishable by imprisonment 
of either description from seven years to 
life and fine (s. 4). 
No offence of penetrative sexual assault 
exists in the Goa Children’s Act. 
The offence in the POCSO applies. 
The offence of penetrative sexual 
assault in the POCSO applies. 
3.  Aggravate
d 
penetrativ
e sexual 
assault 
No offence of aggravated penetrative 
sexual assault exists in the IPC. 
S. 376(2) relates to this. 
When the offence of penetrative sexual 
assault is committed by a person in 
authority or position of responsibility or 
trust, or a relative of the child, through 
blood, adoption, marriage, guardianship, 
foster care etc. or if the child is below the 
age of twelve years, or is mentally or 
physically incapacitated or pregnant or 
sexually penetrated by a gang etc. (s. 5). 
Punishment is rigorous imprisonment for a 
term not less than ten years to 
imprisonment for life and fine (s.6). 
No offence of Aggravated penetrative 
sexual assault exists in the Goa 
Children’s Act. The offence in the 
POCSO applies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The offence of aggravated 
penetrative sexual assault in the 
POCSO applies. 
4.  Grave 
sexual 
assault 
No offence of grave sexual assault 
exists in the IPC. 
No offence of grave sexual assault exists 
in the POCSO. 
Covers vaginal, oral or anal intercourse, 
use of objects with children, forcing 
minors to have sex with each other, 
deliberately causing injury to the sexual 
organs of children, making children 
pose for pornographic photos or films, 
and rape (s.2(y)(i) of the Goa 
Children’s Act). Punishment of 
imprisonment of either description for a 
term that shall not be less than ten years 
but which may extend to life 
imprisonment and shall also be liable to 
a fine of Rs. 2, 00,000 (s. 8(2)of the 
Goa Children’s Act). 
No offence exists in the IPC and 
POCSO. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
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Sl. 
No. 
Criminal 
offence 
National Legislation-Indian Penal 
Code 1860 
National Legislation-Protection of 
Children Against Sexual Offences Act, 
2012 
Goa-Goa Children’s Act 2003, IPC 
and POCSO 
Kerala- IPC and 
POCSO 
5.  Sexual 
assault 
The offence incurs when a person 
assaults or use criminal force to any 
woman, intending to outrage or 
knowing it to be likely that he will 
thereby outrage her modesty. 
Punishment is imprisonment of either 
description for a term which shall not 
be less than one year but which may 
extend to five years, and shall also be 
liable to fine (s. 354). 
When a person touches, with sexual intent, 
the vagina, penis, anus or breast of a child 
or makes the child touch the vagina, penis, 
anus or breast of such person or any other 
person, or does any other act with sexual 
intent which involves physical contact 
without penetration (s. 7). The punishment   
for sexual assault is imprisonment from 
three years to five years and fine (s.8). 
Covers sexual touching with the use of 
any body part or object, voyeurism, 
exhibitionism, showing pornographic 
pictures or films to minors, making 
children watch others engaged in sexual 
activity, issuing of threats to sexually 
abuse a minor, and verbally abusing a 
minor using vulgar and obscene 
language (ss. 2(y)(ii) and 8(2) of the 
Goa Children’s Act). 
Even though both the IPC and POCSO 
apply to Goa, the POCSO prevails over 
the IPC and the Goa Children’s Act as 
per s. 42A of the POCSO. 
Even though both the IPC and 
POCSO apply to Kerala, the 
POCSO prevails over IPC as per s. 
42A of the POCSO. 
6.  Aggravate
d Sexual 
Assault 
No offence of aggravated sexual 
assault exists in the IPC. 
When a person sexually assaults a child by 
a person in a position of authority, 
responsibility or trust, or who is a relative 
of the child by blood or adoption or 
marriage or guardianship or foster care etc. 
Other instances of this offence include 
sexual assault upon a child below the age 
of twelve, gang sexual assault, sexual 
assault of a pregnant child etc. (s.9) The 
punishment for aggravated sexual assault 
is imprisonment for a term not less than 
five years up to seven years and fine (s.10 
of the POCSO ). 
No offence of aggravated sexual assault 
exists in the Goa Children’s Act. The 
offence under the POCSO applies in 
Goa. 
The offence of aggravated sexual 
assault in the POCSO applies. 
7.  Incest Even though no specific offence of 
incest has been defined in the IPC, 
certain elements of this wrong can be 
understood to be attracted under s. 
376(2)(f) which punishes rape by a 
relative. 
Even though no specific offence of incest 
exists in the POCSO , the offence can be 
understood to be attracted under s.5 (n), 
which punishes aggravated penetrative 
sexual assault by a relative by blood or 
adoption, and s.9(n), which punishes 
aggravated sexual assault by a relative by 
blood or adoption. 
The offence of incest is the commission 
of a sexual offence by an adult on a 
child who is a relative or who is related 
by ties of adoption (ss.2(y)(iii) and 8(2) 
of the Goa Children’s Act). As per 
s.42A of the POCSO, s.5(n) and s 9 (n) 
of the POCSO  prevail over the IPC and 
Goa Children’s Act. 
No specific offence of incest exists; 
however, it can attracted as per   
the POCSO, which prevails over 
the IPC under s.42A of the 
POCSO. 
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Sl. 
No. 
Criminal 
offence 
National Legislation-Indian Penal 
Code 1860 
National Legislation-Protection of 
Children Against Sexual Offences Act, 
2012 
Goa-Goa Children’s Act 2003, IPC 
and POCSO 
Kerala- IPC and 
POCSO 
8.  Marital 
rape of 
girl child 
above 
fifteen 
years of 
age 
A man can commit sexual intercourse 
or sexual acts with his wife who is 
above fifteen years of age. Such is 
not considered to be rape (s. 
375Exception 2). 
Not specified. No exemption as per ss. 3 
and 5. 
No offence of marital rape of a child 
exists in the Goa Children’s Act. 
POCSO applies over Exception 2 of 
s.375 of the IPC as per s.42 of the 
POCSO, as the POCSO provides for 
greater punishment (the IPC exempts 
punishment). 
POCSO applies over Exception 2 
of s. 375 of the IPC as per s.42 of 
the POCSO, as the POCSO 
provides for greater punishment 
(the IPC exempts punishment). 
9.  Carnal 
Intercour
se against 
the order 
of nature 
It is an offence to voluntarily have 
carnal intercourse against the order of 
nature with any man, woman or 
animal (s.377). 
Not specifically mentioned. Sections 3, 5, 
7 and 9 make penile penetration of non-
vaginal orifices of children and non-penile 
penetration of vaginal orifices of children 
unlawful. 
Not specifically mentioned. Sections 
2(y) and 8(2) of the Goa Children’s Act 
make penile penetration of non-vaginal 
orifices of children and non-penile 
penetration of vaginal orifices of 
children unlawful. 
Same as the IPC and POCSO. 
10.  Sexual 
activity 
between 
children 
It is an offence even though not 
specifically mentioned. Irrespective 
of age of perpetrator and victim and 
the presence of consent, any act of 
penetrative sexual intercourse by a 
male with a female child below the 
age of eighteen has been criminalised 
under the definition of rape in s. 375. 
Any voluntary act of penile 
penetration of non-vaginal orifices 
and non-penile penetration of vaginal 
orifices has also been criminalised 
under s.377, even when children of 
the same peer group are involved. 
It is an offence even though not 
specifically mentioned- can be understood 
as an offence until attainment of adulthood 
at eighteen as per ss. 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11. 
It is an offence even though not 
specifically mentioned as per IPC and 
POCSO. It can be understood as an 
offence until attainment of adulthood at 
eighteen as per ss. 2 (y) and 8(2) of the 
Goa Children’s Act. 
It is an offence even though not 
specifically mentioned in the IPC 
and POCSO. 
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3.D. UNCRC AND CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 
 
India acceded to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (UNCRC) in 
1992. This section deals with the rights under UNCRC in sub-section 3.D.1 and the effect of 
this Convention on domestic legislation in sub-section 3.D.2. This focuses on internationally 
recognised principles to be embodied in Indian law to develop a legal framework against 
child sexual abuse, and examines whether the principles in this Convention have been 
implemented. 
3.D.1 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (UNCRC) 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (UNCRC) is one of the most 
widely ratified human rights instruments. Currently, 196 countries are party to it, including 
every member of the United Nations except the United States. Its acceptance has resulted in 
greater recognition of the fundamental human dignity of all children and draws attention to 
the urgency of ensuring their wellbeing and development. The Convention makes clear that a 
basic quality of life is the right of all children. The UN General Assembly adopted the 
Convention and opened it for signature on 20 November 1989. It came into force on 2 
September 1990. Governments of countries under the Convention are required to report to, 
and appear before, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child periodically to 
be examined on their progress with regards to the advancement of the implementation of the 
Convention and the status of child rights in their country. 
India acceded to the UNCRC on 11 December 1992, with certain reservations on issues 
relating to child labour. The National Commission on Child Rights and the State 
Commissions on Child Rights are statutory bodies charged with ensuring justice in the area of 
child rights in India (See Appendix 1.4.). 
Various rights of children are protected by the UNCRC which can be understood in the 
context of rights of the child against sexual abuse. Some provisions have been selected based 
on their importance to this thesis. These Articles depict internationally recognised principles 
on child sexual abuse that need to be adopted into Indian domestic law. Comments have been 
made on how far the provision has been implemented: 
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Article 1 
For the purposes of the present Convention, a child means every human being below the age of 
eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier. 
The age of the child is relevant with regard to the age of consent and child marriage. Indian 
law fixes the age of consent to sexual activities as 18, age of marriage of girls as 18, and the 
age of boys as 21.255 While legislation prohibits child marriage, it does not make the marriage 
void ab initio. A Supreme Court ruling making registration of marriages compulsory256 
attempts to curb child marriage, but without proper enforcement methods the problem 
continues. 
Article 12 
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to 
express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due 
weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. 
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial 
and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative or an 
appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law. 
The State is obligated to make provisions ensure a child is free to express his own views in 
accordance with his age and maturity. Such a child shall be given an opportunity to be heard 
before any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child. This is particularly 
relevant in judicial proceedings involving relationships, when the age of consent has been 
fixed at 18 under the POCSO. 
Article 19 
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to 
protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent 
treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal 
guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the child. 
2. Such protective measures should, as appropriate, include effective procedures for the establishment 
of social programmes to provide necessary support for the child and for those who have the care of the 
child, as well as for other forms of prevention and for identification, reporting, referral, investigation, 
treatment and follow-up of instances of child maltreatment described heretofore, and, as appropriate, 
for judicial involvement. 
 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child (2011) defines sexual abuse and exploitation to 
include: 
(a) The inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful or psychologically harmful sexual 
activity; 
(b) The use of children in commercial sexual exploitation; and 
                                                        
255 As seen from the Protection of Children Against Sexual Offences Act 2012 and the Prohibition of Child 
Marriage Act 2006. 
256Smt. Seema v Ashwani Kumar AIR 2006 SC 1158. 
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(c) The use of children in audio or visual images of child sexual abuse; 
(d) Child prostitution, sexual slavery, sexual exploitation in travel and tourism, trafficking (within and 
between countries) and sale of children for sexual purposes and forced marriage. Many children 
experience sexual victimization which is not accompanied by physical force or restraint but which is 
nonetheless psychologically intrusive, exploitive and traumatic.257 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child (2011) states that sexual abuse comprises any 
sexual activities imposed by an adult on a child, against which the child is entitled to 
protection by criminal law. Sexual activities are also considered as abuse when committed 
against a child by another child, if the child offender is significantly older than the child 
victim or uses power, threat or other means of pressure. Sexual activities between children 
are not considered as sexual abuse if the children are older than the age limit defined by the 
State party for consensual sexual activities. 
This provision demands India take measures to protect children from sexual abuse. 
Legislative measures have been taken through the POCSO. A national programme called the 
Integrated Child Protection Scheme (ICPS) is being implemented at district, state and 
national levels in order to facilitate social systems for curbing child abuse.258 
 
Article 34 
States Parties undertake to protect the child from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. For 
these purposes, States Parties shall in particular take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral 
measures to prevent: 
(a) The inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity; 
(b) The exploitative use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices; 
(c) The exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and materials. 
 
India must protect its children from all types of sexual exploitation and abuse. This provision 
in the Convention is augmented by the Optional Protocol on the Sale Of Children, Child 
Prostitution And Child Pornography, which was signed by India on 15 November 2004 and 
ratified on 16 August 2005. The POCSO is national legislation for protection of children 
                                                        
257 See para 25 of General Comment No. 13 (2011). The right of the child to freedom from all forms of violence. 
CRC/C/GC/13<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/docs/CRC.C.GC.13_en.pdf> 
258 The Integrated Child Protection Scheme (ICPS) is a national programme run in collaboration with the 
UNICEF, intended to create a safe and secure environment in the country for comprehensive development of 
children in need of care and protection, children in conflict and contact with law, and any other vulnerable child 
such as children of migrant families, children of prisoners, children of women in prostitution, working children, 
children living on the streets, trafficked or sexually exploited children, etc. The Scheme, since its launch in 2009 
by the Central Government in partnership with State Governments and Union Territories, has, among other 
things, enhanced infrastructure for child protection services and provided financial assistance in implementing 
the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2000. See Ministry of Women and 
Child Development, Government of India, Revised Integrated Child Protection Scheme (2014) at p. 7. 
http://wcd.nic.in/icpsmon/pdf/icps/final_icps.pdf. 
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against sexual abuse, including the exploitative use of children in pornographic performances 
and materials. 
 
This provision is relevant in the case of child offenders below the age of 18who have engaged 
in sexual activities. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2000created a 
separate system for the trial of child offenders below the age of 18.259 Chapter 3 of this thesis 
discusses the issue of age of consent for sexual activities. 
 
Sub-section outlines the relevant provisions in the UNCRC, which have, to a large extent, 
been adopted either by legislation or by case law in the case of child sexual abuse. 
3.D.2. The domestic effect of UNCRC provisions on sexual abuse in India 
 
The legal basis upon which the UNCRC is adopted into domestic legislation varies from 
country to country. It is necessary to understand how international law is adopted into Indian 
law to find out the domestic effect of the UNCRC provisions on sexual abuse. 
 
In Jolly George v. Bank of Cochin,260 it was explained that India follows the dualist theory in 
adoption of international law. This means that treaties must be implemented by statute before 
their provisions may be given effect by the courts. Ratification/Accession/Adoption of an 
international treaty does not automatically cause the treaty to be incorporated into national 
law, as in monist states. International law must be translated into national law, and existing 
national law that contradicts international law must be modified or eliminated in order to 
conform to international law. 
 
In India, the implementation of international law takes place in three ways:261 
 
1. Article 73(1) of the Indian Constitution confers upon the government of India executive 
powers over all subjects in which the Parliament has legislative competence, which includes 
                                                        
259 As an aftermath of the Delhi Rape case in 2012, an amendment was made to this Act in 2016, removing 
children above the age of 16into the adult criminal justice system for commission of heinous crimes, which are 
punishable with imprisonment of seven years or more. However, a discussion on this is outside the scope of this 
thesis. 
260 AIR 1980 SC 470. 
261 Agarwal, S.K. (2010). Implementation of International Law in India: Role of Judiciary. SSRN Electronic 
Journal. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1864489. See also Agarwal, B.A. (2009). 
Enforcement Of International Legal Obligations In A National Jurisdiction. AIR 2009 (Journal Section) pp. 71-
78. http://brahmavtar.com/enforcement-of-international-legal-obligations-in-a-national-jurisdiction.doc. 
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the exercise of such rights, authority and jurisdiction as are exercisable by the Government of 
India by virtue of any treaty or agreement, under Articles 246 and 253 read with Entry 14 of 
List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Indian Constitution. 
 
2. Where the implementation of a treaty requires legislation, the Parliament has exclusive 
legislative powers to enact a statute or legislation under Article 253 of the Indian 
Constitution. Article 253 empowers the Parliament to make any law, for the whole or any 
part of the territory, for implementing international instruments. Legislation is required to 
give effect to a treaty where it provides for payment of money to a foreign power,262 where 
justiciable rights of the citizens or others are restricted or infringed,263 where laws of the State 
are modified,264 where implementation of a treaty would involve cession of Indian territory to 
a foreign power, but not when it merely involves the settlement of a boundary dispute not 
involving cession.265 
 
3. Article 51 (c) of the Constitution is a directive principle of state policy which enjoins the 
State to endeavour to foster respect for international law, and treaty obligations in the 
dealings of organized peoples with one another. Though a non-justiciable right, this 
Constitutional provision has been used by the judiciary in a plethora of cases interpreting 
India’s obligations under international laws when adjudicating on cases affecting human 
rights.266 
 
These provisions portray the constitutional basis for the adoption of international obligations 
into municipal law in India. With regard to the implementation of the UNCRC from the time 
it was acceded to in 1992 various measures have been taken by Parliament – such as 
repealing the existing Juvenile Justice Act 1986 and enacting the Juvenile Justice (Care and 
Protection of Children) Act 2000 to bring juvenile justice law in conformity with 
international obligations; the adoption of free and compulsory education for the age group of 
6–14 years by insertion of Article 21A into the Indian Constitution in 2002;the resultant 
legislation of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act 2009 and the 
                                                        
262 Union of India v Manmull Jain AIR 1954 Cal. 615. 
263Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel v Union of India AIR 1969 SC 783. 
264Ibid. 
265Ibid. 
266Nilabati Behera v State of Orissa AIR 1993 SC 1960; D.K. Basu v State of W.B AIR 1997 SC 610; People’s 
Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India AIR 1997 SC 1203 etc. 
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POCSO, which proclaims in its Preamble the adherence to India’s international obligations 
under the UNCRC. 
The establishment of the National Commission on Protection of Child Rights in 2007 as per 
the Commission for Protection of Child Rights Act 2005 demonstrates India’s commitment to 
upholding its international commitments under the UNCRC. The Commission is entrusted 
with the duty of ensuring that all laws, policies, programmes, and administrative mechanisms 
are in consonance with the child rights perspective as dictated by the Constitution and the 
UNCRC. In addition, the Commission produces and disseminates information about child 
rights, takes suo motu cognizance of violation of rights, and compiles and analyses data on 
children. Recent statutory obligations under the 2009 and 2012 special statutes include the 
monitoring of the fundamental right to free and compulsory education, as well as monitoring 
and coordinating the institutions that deal with protection of children against sexual offences, 
respectively. As per the Commission for Protection of Child Rights Act 2005, the states have 
legal obligation to set up state commissions for the protection of child rights in each state. In 
2007, the states of Karnataka and Goa established their state commissions. In 2013, Kerala 
established the Kerala State Commission for the Protection of Child Rights. 
India honours its commitment towards enforcement of UNCRC provisions into domestic law 
through legislation, policy-making, and case law. This is especially true with regard to 
protective mechanisms against child sexual abuse. 
3.IV. Conclusion 
 
There has been a range of developments in the law against child sexual offences in the IPC 
and POCSO, some of which have created sophisticated methods of dealing with sexual 
offences against children. Problematic areas identified from the synthesis of legislation and 
case law, both national and state, are: 
1 Has the nature and scope of the sexual offences in the POCSO made positive advances in 
responding to child sexual abuse? 
2. Has the nature and scope of the amended offence of rape in the IPC made positive 
advances in responding to child sexual abuse? 
3. Does the current interpretation of the offence of carnal intercourse in the IPC offer 
sufficient protection against child sexual abuse? 
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4. Is the current criminalisation of abusive and non-abusive sexual activity of children below 
the age of 18 a positive advance in responding to child sexual abuse? 
5. Does the present law on sexual assault in the IPC make positive advances in responding to 
child sexual abuse? 
6. Does the statutory exclusion of child-wife rape from the scope of the amended offence of 
rape in the IPC construe a positive advance in responding to child sexual abuse? 
 
These issues are analysed in Chapter 4 using the methodology of conventional legal analysis. 
The IPC, the POCSO, the Goa Children’s Act of 2003, and the Prohibition of Child 
Marriages Act 2006 are form the basis of this analysis. Case law of the Supreme Court and 
High Courts, and the High Courts of Goa and Kerala which were outlined in this chapter, are 
referred to in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 4: LEGAL ANALYSIS OF 
LEGISLATION AND CASE LAW 
 
 
 
 
4.I. Introduction 
 
This chapter conducts a legal analysis of the six key questions identified in Chapter 3. Each 
issue will be examined using relevant and applicable methods of doctrinal legal analysis. 
As stated in Chapter 1, legal analysis in this chapter is to be conducted using principles from 
the rule of law as a reference to determine how Indian statutes comply with the principles 
enshrined in the constitutions of modern governments. These principles are: First, the law 
must be accessible and so far as possible intelligible, clear and predictable. Second, questions 
of legal right and liability should ordinarily be resolved by application of the law and not the 
exercise of discretion. Third, the laws of the land should apply equally to all, save to the 
extent that objective differences justify differentiation. Fourth, the law must afford adequate 
protection of fundamental human rights. Fifth, adjudicative procedures provided by the state 
should be fair. Sixth, the existing principle of the rule of law requires compliance by the state 
with its obligations in international law (Bingham, 2007). 
Indices of reference for doctrinal analysis 
The methods of doctrinal analysis may include one or more of the following six indices: 
First, are the legislative provisions and/or case law consistent with each other? 
Second, are the legislative provisions and/or case law coherent; that is, are they 
understandable, clear, and certain; or are they indeterminate, vague or ambiguous and 
therefore difficult or impossible to apply consistently? 
Third, are the legislative provisions and/or case law correct in being uniform and congruent 
with general principles of statutory interpretation? 
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Fourth, are the legislative provisions and/or case law correct in being congruent with the 
principle of equality characteristic of a rule of law society in providing adequate protection to 
a person or class of persons, or in relation to a certain type of act? 
Fifth, are the legislative provisions and/or case law correct in being congruent with 
government policy principles? 
Sixth, are the legislative provisions and/or case law correct in not permitting undue judicial 
discretion and thereby upholding the principle of the rule of law? 
In Chapter 3, six issues were identified as posing difficulties in the current context. These 
shall be dealt with in this chapter. Numbered as Issues 4.1 to 4.6, the issues are: 
 
4.1 Have the nature and scope of the sexual offences in the POCSO made positive advances 
in responding to child sexual abuse? 
4.2. Has the nature and scope of the amended offence of rape in the IPC made positive 
advances in responding to child sexual abuse? 
4.3. Does the current interpretation of the offence of carnal intercourse in the IPC offer 
sufficient protection against child sexual abuse? 
4.4. Is the current criminalisation of abusive and non-abusive sexual activity of children 
below the age of 18 a positive advance in responding to child sexual abuse? 
4.5. Does the present law on sexual assault in the IPC make positive advances in responding 
to child sexual abuse? 
4.6. Does the statutory exclusion of child-wife rape from the scope of the amended offence of 
rape in the IPC construe a positive advance in responding to child sexual abuse? 
 
Each issue is divided into sub-issues, which are numbered accordingly as 4.1.1., 4.1.2., 4.1.3. 
etc. Each issue is examined to see whether it satisfies any of the six indices enumerated 
above. This chapter seeks to analyse the main issues and sub-issues using relevant indices. 
4.1 Have the nature and scope of the provisions on sexual offences in the POCSO made 
positive advances in responding to child sexual abuse? 
 
One major problem faced before the POCSO was enacted was the absence of clear gender-
neutral laws protecting both boys and girls from sexual abuse. This issue examines whether 
the definitions of sexual offences in the POCSO and the corresponding punishments 
adequately protect both male and female children from sexual abuse. This analysis shows that 
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the POCSO has, to a large extent, been drafted consistently, coherently, and correctly, in 
accordance with the rule of law principle. 
Effect of the Criminal Law Amendment 2013 upon sexual offences under the POCSO and 
the IPC: Evolution of four categories of sexual offences against children 
Four categories of sexual offences evolved as a result of the insertion of the amended sections 
42 and 42 A POCSO by virtue of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013. This gave clarity 
and certainty to the law on sexual offences against children. Within the IPC, those categories 
of offences evolved: those listed in section 42 POCSO  which were placed on par with similar 
POCSO  offences; those listed in section 42 POCSO 267 which had the same or lower 
punishment than corresponding POCSO  provisions; and those IPC offences which were not 
listed in section 42 POCSO  and rendered void by section 42A POCSO.268 The fourth 
category of sexual offences comprised on all non-IPC offences that were rendered void by 
virtue of section 42A POCSO. The three sexual offences defined and punished by the 
Information Technology Act 2000 and the Goa Children’s Act 2003 come under this fourth 
category of sexual offences. The application of both POCSO offences and the IPC to the 
Kerala situation will be examined in this section. 
All indices except the fifth index are used for analysis. These are: 
1. The legislative provisions are not consistent with one another. 
2. The legislative provisions are not coherent. 
3. The legislative provisions are not uniform and/or congruent with general principles of 
statutory interpretation. 
4. The legislative provisions do not provide adequate protection to a person or class of 
persons. 
5. The legislative provisions permit undue judicial discretion. 
                                                        
267Section 42 POCSO. Alternate punishment. Where an act or omission constitutes an offence punishable under 
this Act and also under sections 166A, 354A, 354B, 354C, 3540, 370, 370A, 375, 376, 376A, 376C, 376D, 
376E or section 509 of the Indian Penal Code 1860, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the 
time being in force, the offender found guilty of such offence shall be liable to punishment under this Act or 
under the Indian Penal Code 1860 as provides for punishment which is greater in degree. 
268Section 42A POCSO not in derogation of any other law. The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and 
not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force and, in case of any inconsistency, 
the provisions of this Act shall have overriding effect on the provisions of any such law to the extent of the 
inconsistency. 
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4.1.1. Whether the definitions and punishments of sexual offences offer protection to 
children as a class, with an examination of whether gender neutrality augments better 
protection. 
 
In the following section, each offence of the POCSO is compared with its corresponding 
provision in the IPC. The punishments for the offences of both statutes are compared against 
sections 42 and 42A POCSO in order to examine which provision prevails. Additionally, the 
various offences and their punishments are analysed on the basis of the indices of doctrinal 
analysis enumerated in the introductory section. 
(1). Penetrative Sexual Assault 
For the offence of penetrative sexual assault in section 3 POCSO, the provision is gender-
neutral in terms of offender and victim, and stipulates the four means by which this offence 
gets attracted.269 Section 375 IPC is a mirror copy of this provision, comprising of four 
stipulated acts;270 cosmetic changes have been carried out through the use of the gender-
specific terms “man” and “woman”. It can be analysed that its exclusion of male children as a 
class would render the law as incorrect in being incongruent with the principle of equality 
characteristic of a rule of law society. 
 
Section 42 POCSO , which was amended by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, states 
that where an act or omission constitutes an offence punishable under this Act and also under 
sections 375 and 376 IPC, then the offender found guilty of such offence shall be liable to 
whichever punishment is greater in degree. Section 4 POCSO and section 376(1) IPC 
respectively deal with punishment for penetrative sexual assault and rape. Section 4 POCSO 
punishes this offence by imprisonment of either description for a minimum term of seven 
years to life and fine. Section 376(1) IPC punishes rape under section 375 IPC with rigorous 
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to 
                                                        
269 (a) Penetration by penis (to any extent) of any person into vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a child or 
making the child to do so with him or any other person or; (b) Insertion (to any extent) of any object or part of 
the body of any person, not being the penis into vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a child or making the child to 
do so with him or any other person or; (c) Manipulation of any part of the body of a child so as to cause 
penetration, into vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of the child or making the child to do so with such person or any 
other person or; (d) Application of his mouth to the penis, vagina, anus , urethra of the child or making 
the child to do so to such person or any other person. 
270 (a) Penetration of his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a woman or makes her 
do so with him or any other person; or(b) Insertion, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being 
the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or  
(c) Manipulation of any part of the body of a woman so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, 
anus or any part of body of such woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (d) Application 
of his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person. 
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imprisonment for life, as well as fine. Since the IPC prescribes a greater punishment of 
rigorous imprisonment, it would seem that rigorous imprisonment under section 376(1) IPC 
would be granted in cases where a girl under the age of 18 is raped by a man. If a boy under 
the age of 18 years is subjected to penetrative sexual assault, or a girl under the age of 18 
years is subjected to penetrative sexual assault by a person who is not a man, then 
imprisonment of either description for a minimum term of seven years to life and fine under 
section 4 POCSO could be granted to such offender. 
This would result in the following situation as outlined in the table below: 
Table 1: Types of offenders, victims and punishments after application of section 42 
POCSO on section 375 IPC and Section 3 and 4 POCSO 
Type of minor 
victim 
Type of offender Type of offence Type of punishment 
Female Male Section 375 IPC: 
Rape 
Section 376(1) IPC: Rigorous 
imprisonment for a term which shall 
not be less than seven years but which 
may extend to imprisonment for life, as 
well as fine. 
Female Gender not 
specified 
Section 3, 
POCSO : 
Penetrative sexual 
assault 
Section 4 POCSO: Imprisonment of 
either description for a minimum term 
of seven years to life and fine. 
Male Gender not 
specified 
Section 3, 
POCSO : 
Penetrative sexual 
assault 
Section 4 POCSO: Imprisonment of 
either description for a minimum term 
of seven years to life and fine. 
 
Therefore, the amended section 42 POCSO renders the law incorrect as being incongruent to 
the equality principle, because offenders of minors, who belong to a single class, are treated 
differently by classifying them into three classes with regard to punishments for their 
offences: 
1. male offenders of female children 
2. non-male offenders of female children 
3. all types of offenders of male children. 
Sections 3 and 4 POCSO are succinct, consistent and correct in terms of being congruent with 
the equality principle. However, the application of the amended section 42 POCSO through 
the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 has rendered the POCSO law incoherent and 
inconsistent with the equality principle. 
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(2). Aggravated penetrative sexual assault 
When comparing the offence of aggravated penetrative sexual assault in section 5 POCSO 
and section 376(2) IPC, while the former is gender-neutral in terms of offender and victim, 
the latter is gender-specific in classifying the offender as male and the victim as female. 
Section 6 POCSO, as well as section 376(2) IPC, award the same punishment of rigorous 
imprisonment for a term not less than ten years to imprisonment for life and fine. Unlike 
sections 5 and 6 of the POCSO  which exist as separate sections defining the offence and 
prescribing the punishment, respectively –section 376(2) IPC has been combined with section 
376 (1) IPC. Section 376 (1) prescribes the punishment for section 375 IPC. Section 376(2) 
IPC ought to have been separated from the punishment in section 375 IPC and be enacted as 
a distinct offence along with its punishment. For example, the punishment for rape in Section 
376(1) could have been placed in Section 375 following its current definition of rape, while 
Section 376 could have dealt exclusively with the definition of aggravated cases of rape and 
their corresponding aggravated punishment. While sections 5 and 6 of POCSO are clear, 
consistent and congruent with the principle of equality, and do not permit judicial discretion 
due to clear prescription of a minimum mandatory punishment, section 376(2) IPC lacks 
clarity because it does not exist as a separate offence, and also is incorrect in being 
incongruent with the principle of equality characteristic of a rule of law society by its 
exclusion of male children as a class. 
 
Section 42 POCSO , which was amended by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, states 
that where an act or omission constitutes an offence punishable under this Act and also under 
sections 375 and 376 IPC, then the offender found guilty of such offence shall be liable to 
whichever punishment is greater in degree. Section 6 POCSO and section 376(2) IPC deal 
with punishment for penetrative sexual assault and rape. Section 6 POCSO punishes this 
offence by rigorous imprisonment for a term not less than ten years to imprisonment for life 
and fine. Section 376(2) IPC provides for the same punishment. Hence there is no 
inconsistency between the two laws, which satisfies the test of clarity and correctness in 
being consistent and uniform. 
(3). Sexual assault 
A comparison of the POCSO  offences of sexual assault in sections 7 and 8, with the offence 
of “assault or criminal force to a woman with intent to outraging her modesty” under section 
354 IPC shows that while the POCSO  is gender-neutral regarding both offender and victim, 
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the IPC is gender-neutral as regards the offender but gender-specific regarding the victim. 
Only women are protected from sexual assault of a non-penetrative under the IPC. 
Pertinently, the term “outraging the modesty of a woman” has neither been defined nor 
explained in the IPC. 
An examination of the amended section 42 POCSO, post-Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 
2013 shows that section 354 IPC is not within the listed IPC offences which have to be 
considered – along with POCSO offences on an equal basis – to determine whether the 
POCSO or the IPC prescribes greater punishment.271 Instead, section 42A POCSO applies, 
meaning that in case of conflict between section 354 of IPC and section 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the 
POCSO – it is the POCSO that prevails.272 
The IPC law regarding sexual assault is inconsistent and incongruent with the equality 
principle. However, the prevalence of the POCSO with regard to minors by virtue of section 
42A provides consistency, coherence and congruence to the equality principle with regard to 
the law relating to non-penetrative sexual assault of minors. 
(4). Aggravated sexual assault 
Section 9 and 10 of the POCSO define and punish aggravated non-penetrative sexual assault 
with a minimum of five years and a maximum of seven years imprisonment of either 
description. These sections do not have corresponding provisions in the IPC. The IPC does 
not separately punish an aggravated offence of assault or criminal force to woman with intent 
to outrage her modesty, unlike section 376(2) IPC.273The maximum punishment for a case of 
aggravated sexual assault cannot be more than five years imprisonment of either description 
and fine, as per section 354 IPC. 
 
The following table shows the categories of offenders and victims regarding non-penetrative 
sexual assault under the POCSO and the IPC: 
                                                        
271Supra, n. 266. 
272 Supra, n. 267. 
273 The J.S. Verma Committee Report (2013)  recommended punishment for the offence of sexual assault, with 
rigorous imprisonment up to five years, or with fine, or with both, for the act of intentional touching of another 
person when such act of touching is of a sexual nature and is without the recipient’s consent. However, no other 
recommendation for aggravated cases of sexual assault was made by this Commission. 
225 
 
225 
 
 
Table 2: Offenders and victims for non-penetrative sexual assault and punishment 
under the POCSO and IPC 
 
 
Offence Statutory 
provisions 
applicable 
Type of 
victim 
Type of offender Type of punishment 
Sexual 
assault 
Section 
354IPC,sections 
7, 8 POCSO 
Female Male Section 8 POCSO: 
imprisonment of either 
description for a term from 
three years up to five years 
and fine. This section 
prevails over section 354 
IPC which carries 
imprisonment of either 
description for a term 
which one year but which 
may extend to five years, 
and shall also be liable to 
fine. 
Female Female 
Sections 7, 8 
POCSO 
Male Male Section 8 POCSO: 
imprisonment of either 
description for a term not 
less than three years which 
may extend up to five years 
and fine. 
Male Female 
Aggravated 
sexual 
assault 
Sections 9,10 
POCSO 
Female Male Section 10 POCSO: 
imprisonment of either 
description for a term not 
less than five years up to 
seven years and fine. 
Female Female 
Male Male 
Male Female 
(5). Sexual harassment 
A comparison of the offence of sexual harassment in the POCSO and those offences in the 
IPC of a non-penetrative nature which do not amount to sexual assault shows that sexual 
harassment under section 11 POCSO 274 is a combination of the IPC offences of sexual 
                                                        
274 If anyone, with sexual intent utters any word or makes any sound or makes any gesture or exhibits any object 
or part of body with the intention that such word or sound shall be heard or such gesture or object or part of 
body shall be seen by the child, makes a child exhibit his body/any part, shows any object to a child in any form 
or media for pornographic purposes, repeatedly or constantly follows or watches or contacts a child either 
directly or through electronic, digital or any other means, threatens to use in any form of media, a real or 
fabricated depiction through electronic, film or digital or any other mode, of any part of the body of the child or 
the involvement of the child in a sexual act, entices a child for pornographic purposes or gives gratification 
therefore, such person shall have committed the offence of sexual harassment. Explanation.—Any question 
which involves “sexual intent” shall be a question of fact (Section 11 POCSO). 
Section 12 POCSO. Punishment for sexual harassment: Whoever, commits sexual harassment upon a child shall 
be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also 
be liable to fine. 
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harassment, stalking and “word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman” 
under sections 354A,275 354B,276 354C,277 354D278 and 509279 of the IPC respectively. 
 
With regard to offences pertaining to sexual harassment, the IPC has not consistently used 
gender-specificity of the perpetrator (as in section 509 IPC where the perpetrator is gender-
neutral) and victim (as in clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) of section 354A(1) IPC where the gender of 
the victim is not specified). However, section 11 POCSO has been framed in a gender-neutral 
manner that is coherent and consistent with the principle of equality. There is no material 
available regarding the rationale of Parliament behind the adoption of a mixture of gender-
specific and gender-neutral approaches in sections regarding sexual harassment in the IPC. 
This approach can be labelled as inconsistent and unreasonable and against Article 14 of the 
                                                        
275Section 354A IPC. Sexual Harassment and punishment for sexual harassment (1) A man committing any of 
the following acts—(i). physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures; or 
(ii) a demand or request for sexual favours; or (iii) showing pornography against the will of a woman; or (iv) 
making sexually coloured remarks, shall be guilty of the offence of sexual harassment. Any man who commits 
the offence specified in clause (i) or clause (ii) or clause (iii) of sub-section (1) shall be punished with rigorous 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. (2) Any man who commits 
the offence specified in clause (iv) of sub-section (1) shall be punished with imprisonment of either description 
for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both. 
276Section 354B IPC. Assault or use of criminal force to woman with intent to disrobe. Any man who assaults or 
uses criminal force to any woman or abets such act with the intention of disrobing or compelling her to be 
naked, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than three 
years but which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
277Section 354C IPC. Voyeurism: Any man who watches, or captures the image of a woman engaging in a 
private act in circumstances where she would usually have the expectation of not being observed either by the 
perpetrator or by any other person at the behest of the perpetrator or disseminates such image shall be punished 
on first conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than one year, but 
which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine, and be punished on a second or subsequent 
conviction, with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than three years, but 
which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
278 Section 354D IPC. Stalking: (1) Any man who— 
follows a woman and contacts, or attempts. to contact such woman to foster personal interaction repeatedly 
despite a clear indication of disinterest by such woman; or 
monitors the use by a woman of the internet, email or any other form of electronic communication, commits the 
offence of stalking: 
Provided that such conduct shall not amount to stalking if the man who pursued it proves that— 
it was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime and the man accused of stalking bad been 
entrusted with the responsibility of prevention and detection of crime by the State; or 
it was pursued under any law or to comply with any condition or requirement imposed by any person under any 
law; or in the particular circumstances such conduct was reasonable and justified. 
(2) Whoever commits the offence of stalking shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of either 
description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine; and be punished on a 
second or subsequent conviction, with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five 
years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
279Section 509 IPC. Word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman: Whoever, intending to 
insult the modesty of any woman, utters any word, makes any sound or gesture, or exhibits any object, intending 
that such word or sound shall be heard, of that such gesture or object shall be seen, by such woman, or intrudes 
upon the privacy of such woman, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to 
three years, and also with fine.  
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Constitution, as no intelligible differentia can be adduced by classifying the perpetrator as 
male in all instances except one, and the victim as female in all instances except three. 
Under section 354A IPC, a male person can sexually harass another male person in three 
ways, excluding the showing of pornography to him. Whether the courts will use the 
principle of generalis specialibus non derogant in stating that this offence was meant to apply 
to instances of sexual harassment of men upon women alone – as seen in the offences under 
sections 354, 354B, 354C, 354D, 375 and 376 IPC– remains to be seen. 
The following part is a dissemination of the various aspects of the offence of sexual 
harassment under section 11 POCSO , and a comparison with the offences under the IPC that 
relate to section 11 POCSO : 
1. The first part of section 11 POCSO contains wording similar to section 509 
IPC:“...anyone, with sexual intent utters any word or makes any sound or makes any gesture 
or exhibits any object or part of body with the intention that such word or sound shall be 
heard or such gesture or object or part of body shall be seen by the child...” . Since section 
509 IPC does not specify the gender of the offender – only that the victim be female –this 
section can be expanded to include words, gestures, or acts by a female intending to sexually 
harass another female. Hence, a male as well as a female perpetrator upon a girl-child would 
not only attract the ambit of section 11 POCSO, but also come under section 509 IPC. An 
application of section 42 POCSO regarding punishment shows that section 12 POCSO will 
prevail as it has scope to provide for imprisonment of either description, while section 509 
IPC can award only simple imprisonment. Section 509 IPC is incorrect because of 
incongruence to the equality principle, as it excludes male children from its scope. 
 
2. “....makes a child exhibit his body/any part....”. This can be included within clause (ii) 
of section 354A (1) IPC regarding the offence of when a man makes “a demand for sexual 
favours” upon a child of any gender, which is punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a 
term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both, as per section 354A(2) IPC. 
An application of section 42 POCSO  makes it clear that section 354A(2) IPC applies in such 
cases of abuse under section 354A(1)(ii) IPC. If a man makes a girl-child disrobe and exhibit 
her body by using criminal force, then section 354B IPC would be attracted, with a 
punishment of imprisonment of either description, which may range from three years to seven 
years and fine. An application of section 42 POCSO shows that the punishments under 
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sections 354A and 354B IPC is greater than that under section 12 POCSO. If a child of any 
gender is caused to exhibit his/her body parts by a woman, section 12 POCSO would apply. 
This differential treatment to the same classes of persons shows incongruence to the principle 
of equality. 
3. “... shows any object to a child in any form or media for pornographic purposes....”. 
Section 354A(1)(iii) IPC applies when a male person shows pornography to a girl. This 
carries a punishment of rigorous imprisonment upto three years, and/or with fine under 
section 354A(2), which is a more severe punishment than that laid down in section 12 
POCSO . Hence, an application of section 42 POCSO means that section 354A(2) IPC would 
prevail when a male shows pornography to a female child. However, when a male shows 
pornography to male children, or females show pornography to male children, or females 
show pornography to female children, then section 12 POCSO would prevail. Such 
differential treatment to the same classes of persons shows incongruence to the principle of 
equality. 
4. “...repeatedly or constantly follows or watches or contacts a child either directly or 
through electronic, digital or any other means, threatens to use in any form of media, a real or 
fabricated depiction through electronic, film or digital or any other mode, of any part of the 
body of the child or the involvement of the child in a sexual act, entices a child for 
pornographic purposes or gives gratification therefore....”. The element of watching or 
capturing the image of a woman engaging in a private act is embodied in the offence of 
voyeurism by a man of a woman in section 354C IPC.280 The element of following a woman 
and contacting a woman despite a clear indication of disinterest by the woman is embodied in 
the offence of stalking by a man of a woman in section 354D IPC.281 
 
                                                        
280 Section 354C IPC defines the offence of ‘voyeurism’ as being done by any man who watches or captures the 
image of a woman engaging in a private act in circumstances where she would usually have the expectation of 
not being observed either by the perpetrator or by any other person at the behest of the perpetrator, or who 
disseminates such image. The punishment on first conviction is imprisonment of either description for a term 
which shall not be less than one year, but which may extend to three years, and fine. Punishment on a second or 
subsequent conviction shall be with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than 
three years, but which may extend to seven years, and fine. 
281Section 354D IPC punishes any man who commits the offence of ‘stalking’ by engaging in the any of the two 
acts against a woman: (i) following a woman and contacting, or attempting to contact such woman to foster 
personal interaction repeatedly despite a clear indication of disinterest by such woman; or (ii) monitoring the use 
by a woman of the internet, e-mail or any other form of electronic communication. The punishment on first 
conviction shall be imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and fine. 
Punishment on second or subsequent conviction has also been specified – imprisonment of either description for 
a term which may extend to five years and fine. 
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While punishment under section 12 POCSO is imprisonment of either description for a term 
which may extend upto three years and also fine, under section 354C IPC it is imprisonment 
of either description for a term from one to three years and fine for first conviction, and 
imprisonment of either description for a term from to seven years and fine on second 
conviction. Under section 354D IPC, punishment on first conviction shall be imprisonment of 
either description for a term which may extend to three years and fine. Punishment on second 
or subsequent conviction has also been specified: imprisonment of either description for a 
term which may extend to five years and fine. An application of section 42 POCSO  shows 
that in the case where a male watches or stalks a female child, the punishment under sections 
354C and 354D IPC apply, instead of section 12 POCSO , as the quantum of punishment for 
the IPC offences are greater. However, if a male watches or stalks a male child, or a female 
watches or stalks a male child, or if a female watches or stalks a female child, then section 12 
POCSO would apply. Such differential treatment to the same classes of persons shows 
incongruence to the principle of equality. 
 
It is evident that with regard to various offences under the category of non-penetrative sexual 
offences not amounting to penetrative and non-penetrative assault, the IPC has not 
consistently stuck to gender-specificity of the perpetrator (as in section 509 IPC where the 
perpetrator is gender-neutral) and victim (as in clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) of section 354A(1) 
IPC where the gender of the victim is not specified). There is no material available regarding 
the rationale of Parliament behind the adoption of such a mixture of gender-specific and 
gender-neutral approaches in sections regarding sexual abuse in the IPC. This approach can 
be labelled as inconsistent, unreasonable and against Article 14 of the Constitution, as no 
intelligible differentia can be adduced by the classifying the perpetrator as male in all 
instances except one (section 509 IPC), and the victim as female in all instances except three 
(clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) section 354A(1) IPC). 
Sections 11 and 12 POCSO are coherent and consistent and in accordance with the equality 
principle. However, the absence of a minimum mandatory punishment in section 12 POCSO 
renders it incorrect to the extent that it permits judicial discretion. 
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Table 3: Offenders, victims and punishment under the POCSO and IPC 
 
Offence Statutory 
provisions 
applicable 
Type of minor 
victim 
Type of offender Type of punishment 
The utterance of 
any word, 
making any 
sound or gesture 
or exhibition of 
any object 
intending that 
such word or 
sound shall be 
heard or such 
gesture or object 
shall be seen by 
the child 
 
Section 509 IPC 
Sections 11 and 
12 POCSO 
Female Male and female Section 12 POCSO will prevail over Section 
509 IPC as it has greater punishment and 
provides for imprisonment of either description 
upto three years and fine, while Section 509 can 
award only simple imprisonment for the same 
term and fine. 
Sections 11 and 
12 POCSO 
Male Male and female Section 12 POCSO will apply, with 
imprisonment of either description upto three 
years and fine. 
Making a child 
exhibit his 
body/any part 
Section 
354A(1)(ii) IPC 
and Sections 11 
and 12 POCSO 
Gender-neutral Male Section 354(2) IPC will prevail over section 12 
POCSO , as it provides for the punishment of 
rigorous imprisonment upto three years, and/or 
with fine. 
Showing 
pornography to a 
child 
Section 354 
(1)(iii) IPC, 
Sections 11 and 
12 POCSO 
Female Male Section 354(2) IPC will prevail over section 12 
POCSO , as it provides for the punishment of 
rigorous imprisonment upto three years, and/or 
with fine. 
Sections 11 and 
12 POCSO 
 
Female Female Section 12 POCSO will apply, with 
imprisonment of either description upto three 
years and fine. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Male Male 
Male Female 
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Offence Statutory 
provisions 
applicable 
Type of minor 
victim 
Type of offender Type of punishment 
Repeatedly or 
constantly 
following or 
watching or 
contacting a child 
either directly or 
through 
electronic, digital 
or any other 
means, 
threatening to use 
in any form of 
media, a real or 
fabricated 
depiction through 
electronic, film or 
digital or any 
other mode, of 
any part of the 
body of the child 
or the 
involvement of 
the child in a 
sexual act, 
enticing a child 
for pornographic 
purposes or 
giving 
gratification 
therefore 
Section 354C 
IPC 
Sections 11 and 
12POCSO 
Female Male Section 354C IPC will prevail over section 12 
POCSO, as it provides for imprisonment of 
either description from three years to seven 
years, and fine. 
Section 354D 
IPC 
Sections 11 and 
12 POCSO 
 
Female Male Section 354D IPC will prevail over section 12 
POCSO , as it provides on first conviction for 
imprisonment of either description upto three 
years and fine, and on a second or subsequent 
conviction, for imprisonment of either 
description upto five years and fine. 
Sections 11 and 
12 POCSO 
 
Female Female Section 12 POCSO alone will apply, with 
imprisonment of either description upto three 
years and fine. 
  Male Female  
Male Male 
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(6). Using a child for pornographic purposes 
 
Child pornography has been defined and punished in sections 13 and 14 of the POCSO.282 
The IPC does not specifically criminalise child pornography, even though the sale of obscene 
material and the sale of obscene objects to young persons are specific offences under sections 
292 and 293 of the IPC. However, section 67B of the Information Technology Act 2000 
makes child pornography a punishable offence.283 Punishment on first conviction shall be 
                                                        
282Section 13 POCSO defines the offence of using a child for pornographic purposes. If anyone uses a child in 
any form of media (including programme or advertisement telecast by television channels or internet or any 
other electronic form or printed form, whether or not such programme or advertisement is intended for personal 
use or for distribution), for the purposes of sexual gratification, which includes—(a) representation of the sexual 
organs of a child; (b) usage of a child engaged in real or simulated sexual acts (with or without penetration); (c) 
the indecent or obscene representation of a child, such person shall be guilty of the offence of using a child for 
pornographic purposes. An explanation is appended to the relevant section regarding the expression “use a 
child”. This expression shall include involving a child though any medium like print, electronic, computer or 
any other technology for preparation, production, offering, transmitting, publishing, facilitation and distribution 
of the pornographic material.  
Punishments are many and varied. These are laid down in Section 14 POCSO. For mere usage of a child for 
pornographic purposes, the punishment is imprisonment of either description up to 5 years and fine. In the event 
of subsequent conviction, punishment shall be imprisonment of either description up to 7 years and fine (Clause 
1). 
If a person uses the child for pornographic purposes coupled with penetrative sexual assault, by directly 
participating in the pornographic act, such person shall be liable for not less than ten years imprisonment of 
either description to life imprisonment and fine (Clause 2).  
If a person uses a child for pornographic purposes coupled with aggravated penetrative sexual assault, by 
directly participating in the pornographic act, the punishment is rigorous imprisonment for life and fine (Clause 
3). 
If any person uses a child for pornographic purposes coupled with sexual assault, by directly participating in the 
pornographic act, the punishment shall be imprisonment of either description for a term which is not less than 6 
years imprisonment up to 8 years and fine (Clause 4). 
If any person uses a child for pornographic purposes coupled with aggravated sexual assault, by directly 
participating in the pornographic act, the punishment shall be imprisonment of either description for a term of 
not less than 8 years imprisonment up to 10 years and fine (Clause 5). 
283Section 67B, Information Technology Act 2000.Punishment for publishing or transmitting of material 
depicting children in sexually explicit act, etc. in electronic form. 
Whoever: 
(a) publishes or transmits or causes to be published or transmitted material in any electronic form which depicts 
children engaged in sexually explicit act or conduct or 
(b) creates text or digital images, collects, seeks, browses, downloads, advertises, promotes, exchanges or 
distributes material in any electronic form depicting children in obscene or indecent or sexually explicit manner 
or 
(c) cultivates, entices or induces children to online relationship with one or more children for and on sexually 
explicit act or in a manner that may offend a reasonable adult on the computer resource or 
(d) facilitates abusing children online or 
(e) records in any electronic form own abuse or that of others pertaining to sexually explicit act with children, 
shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 
five years and with a fine which may extend to ten lakh rupees and in the event of second or subsequent 
conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years and also with 
fine which may extend to ten lakh rupees: 
Provided that the provisions of section 67, section 67A and this section does not extend to any book, pamphlet, 
paper, writing, drawing, painting, representation or figure in electronic form- 
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with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years and with a 
fine which may extend to 10 lakh rupees and in the event of second or subsequent conviction 
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years and also 
with fine which may extend to 10 lakh rupees. 
Analysing this provision in accordance with section 42A POCSO , in any case which attracts 
sections 13 and 14 POCSO , section 14 POCSO  prevails regarding punishment, not section 
67B of the Information Technology Act 2000. These provisions are consistent with one 
another, coherent and congruent with general principles of statutory interpretation and 
fundamental legislative principles characteristic of a rule of law society. 
However, within the POCSO itself, a glaring anomaly exists. Section 15 of the POCSO 
punishes the storage of any form of child pornography for commercial purposes by any 
person. The punishment may be any of the following categories: 
1. with imprisonment of either description for a maximum period of three years or 
2. with fine or 
3. with both. 
Thus, an offender gets a lighter punishment when compared to a person who stores child 
pornography for non-commercial purposes. Also, imprisonment is optional, and an offender 
can escape by payment of fine alone, as it is not compulsory that payment of fine need 
accompany imprisonment. 
The legislative intention here is highly questionable. Is it that Indian law seeks to protect 
persons who store child pornography for commercial purposes? Or perhaps legislature felt 
that “storage” of child pornography material for commercial purposes does not involve 
“using the child”? The Explanation in Section 13 POCSO  states that the expression “using 
the child” includes “involving a child though any medium like print, electronic, computer or 
any other technology for preparation, production, offering, transmitting, publishing, 
facilitation and distribution of the pornographic material”. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
(i) The publication of which is proved to be justified as being for the public good on the ground that such book, 
pamphlet, paper writing, drawing, painting, representation or figure is in the interest of science, literature, art or 
learning or other objects of general concern; or 
(ii) which is kept or used for bonafide heritage or religious purposes 
Explanation: For the purposes of this section, "children" means a person who has not completed the age of 18 
years. 
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It is appropriate to refer to section 67B of the Information Technology Act 2000 when 
examining what could be meant by “storage” of child pornography. Sub-section (a) of section 
67B creates the offence of “causing to be published or transmitted” material in any electronic 
form which depicts children engaged in sexually explicit act or conduct. Additionally, sub-
section (b) criminalises “collecting”, “seeking”, “browsing”, “downloading”, “exchanging” 
or “distributing” of material in any electronic form depicting children in obscene or indecent 
or sexually explicit manner. 
Section 15 POCSO is inconsistent with provisions in section 14 POCSO as well as section 
67B of the Information Technology Act 2000. Section 15 POCSO does not seem correct in 
being congruent with government policy principles as set out in parliamentary reports.284 
 
It is not possible to differentiate storage of child pornography for commercial purposes and 
storage of child pornography for non-commercial purposes. Children used in both categories 
constitute a single class of minors who have been sexually abused. If such a differentiation 
were to be made, the law should have granted greater punishment to a person who stores 
child pornography for commercial purposes. Such a provision is inconsistent with the rest of 
the offences in the POCSO and the Information Technology Act 2000. It also violates the 
spirit of the law, as embodied in corresponding storage offences relating to commercial 
trafficking of women and children in the IPC and the Immoral Trafficking (Prevention) Act 
1956. Applying the various indices for doctrinal analysis, the existence of such a provision 
shows inconsistency with legislative provisions, incorrectness due to incongruence with 
governmental policy principles set out in parliamentary debates, and incongruence with the 
                                                        
284See para 24 at pp. 56-57 of “The Information Technology (Amendment) Bill 2007”, 50th Report of the 
Standing Committee on Information Technology (2007–2008) 
http://164.100.40.18/parliament/standing_reports/loksabha14/REPORT-I.T.-50E.pdf.  This is quoted here: 
Child Pornography 24. The Committee note that Clause 31 of the Bill intends to insert a new Section 67A which 
provides for stringent punishment for publishing or transmitting of material containing sexually explicit acts in 
electronic form. But the Committee are concerned to find that the term ‘child pornography’ has nowhere been 
mentioned in the proposed Section. The Department’s argument that the Section while covering ‘pornography’ 
will automatically cover child pornography does not convince the Committee as there should be no scope for 
assumption or presumption when fresh amendments are being proposed. The Committee, therefore, impress 
upon the Department to include the term ‘child pornography’ in the proposed Section 67A in view of its 
growing menace. They also desire that specific provisions should be incorporated in this Section to criminalise 
child pornography in tune with the laws prevailing in the advanced Countries and Article 9 of the Council of 
Europe Convention on Cyber Crimes. In view of the several manifestations of sexual abuse of the children and 
its loathsome ramifications, the Committee desire that the act of grooming the child for sexual relationship 
through online enticement or distributing/showing pornography or through any other online means should also 
be made a criminal offence and a suitable provision be made in this regard in the proposed Section 67A. 
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principle of equality. The absence of a minimum mandatory punishment in section 15 of 
POCSO renders it incorrect to the extent that it also permits judicial discretion. 
 
It is clear that the criminal law regarding prohibitions upon sexual assault is vague. Use of 
gender-neutral classifications for both offender and victim within the definitions of sexual 
offences has adequately strengthened the rule of law. 
 
A brief summary of the points analysed with regard to the various offences is given below: 
 
(a) Penetrative sexual assault: Sections 375 and 376 IPC do not provide adequate 
protection to a class of persons – namely, male minors – regarding penetrative acts by men or 
women. Sections 375 and 376 IPC are not correct as they are not congruent with fundamental 
legislative principles characteristic of a rule of law society. With regard to a comparison 
between specific legislation, sections 375 and 376 IPC suffer from various defects like 
inconsistency, ambiguity and incongruence with the principle of equality; Sections 3 and 4 of 
the POCSO , which define and punish the offence of penetrative sexual assault respectively, 
are succinct, consistent and congruent with the equality principle. However, an application of 
the amended section 42 POCSO  through the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 has 
rendered the law incoherent and inconsistent with the equality principle by creating three 
classes of offenders with different punishments under section 376(1) IPC for of rape and 
sections 3 and 4 POCSO  for penetrative sexual assault. These are: 
i. male offenders of female children: punishment under Section 376(1). Rigorous 
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may 
extend to imprisonment for life, as well as fine. 
ii. non-male offenders of female children: punishment under Section 4 POCSO . 
Imprisonment of either description for a minimum term of seven years to life and fine. 
iii. all types of offenders of male children: punishment under Section 4 POCSO . 
Imprisonment of either description for a minimum term of seven years to life and fine. 
 
(b) Aggravated penetrative sexual assault: Sections 5 and 6 POCSO defining and 
punishing aggravated penetrative sexual assault of children, and section 376(2) IPC defining 
and punishing the offences of aggravated forms of rape of women are similar in form and 
substance. The only anomaly that exists with regard to section 376(2) IPC is that it ought not 
to have been associated with the punishment for section 375 IPC which finds place in sub-
236 
 
236 
 
section (1) of section 376 IPC. Instead, it ought to have existed as a distinct offence along 
with its punishment. While sections 5 and 6 IPC are clear, consistent and congruent with rule 
of law principles, section 376(2) IPC is congruent in all respects except its lack of clarity 
regarding its existence as a separate offence. 
 
(c) Sexual assault: The law prohibits non-penetrative sexual assault of women by any 
person under section 354 IPC. This applies to non-penetrative sexual assault of women by 
men and women by other women. Minor women are given relief by virtue of section 354 IPC 
from non-penetrative sexual assault by men of any age and by other women of any age. But 
there is no relief under this provision or any provision in the general criminal law for non-
penetrative sexual assault of minor men from other men of any age or from women of any 
age. This approach is incongruent with the principle of equality. However, as per section 
42A, the POCSO prevails over section 354 IPC; hence, sections 7 and 8 POCSO – which 
include both male and female minors within its ambit of protection – renders the law correct 
in its congruence with the principle of equality. 
 
(d) Aggravated sexual assault: Unlike the IPC which does not define or prescribe 
punishment for aggravated forms of non-penetrative sexual assault, sections 9 and 10 POCSO 
define and punish such acts respectively. This approach is congruent with sound legislative 
principles of statutory interpretation that exist in a rule of law society. 
 
(e) Sexual harassment: With regard to offences pertaining to sexual harassment, the IPC 
has not consistently adhered to gender-specificity of the perpetrator (as in section 509 IPC 
where the perpetrator is gender-neutral) and victim as in clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) section 354A 
(1) IPC where the gender of the victim is not specified. However, section 11 POCSO has 
been framed in a gender-neutral manner that is both coherent and consistent with the 
principle of equality. 
 
The first part of section 11 POCSO – regarding utterance of any word or making any sound 
or making any gesture or exhibiting any object or part of body with the intention that such 
word or sound shall be heard or such gesture or object or part of body shall be seen by the 
child – is similar to the offence in section 509 IPC with no difference in punishment. Hence 
there is no inconsistency between the provisions. However, Section 509 IPC excludes male 
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children from its scope and may be considered incorrect in that it is incongruent with the 
equality principle. 
Regarding the second part of section 11 POCSO  which punishes the making of a child 
exhibit his/her body parts, the offence of causing a girl child to disrobe and exhibit her body 
part attracts a punishment of imprisonment of either description, which may range from three 
years to seven years and fine under section 354B IPC. However, if a male child is made to 
exhibit his body parts, then a punishment of imprisonment of either description for a term 
which may extend upto three years and fine accrues under section 12 POCSO. As per Section 
42A POCSO, section 354B IPC would prevail over section 12 POCSO, as it provides for 
greater punishment for offences against girl children. This renders the law incorrect, as it is 
incongruent with the equality principle. 
Regarding the third part of section 11 POCSO, which creates the offence of showing 
pornography to a child, as per section 42 POCSO, when a male person shows pornography to 
a female child, section 354A (1)(ii) IPC applies, as the punishment of rigorous imprisonment 
upto three years, and/or with fine under section 354A(2) IPC is a more severe than that laid 
down in section 12 POCSO . However, when males show pornography to male children, or 
females show pornography to male children, or females show pornography to female 
children, then section 12 POCSO  would prevail; that is, punishment of imprisonment of 
either description for a term which may extend upto three years and fine. Such differential 
treatment to the same classes of persons shows incongruence to the principle of equality. 
Regarding the fourth part of section 11 POCSO – concerning constantly following or 
watching or contacting a child through various means including digital means – the 
corresponding IPC offences of voyeurism under section 354C IPC and stalking under section 
354D IPC are attracted in the case of a male watching or stalking a female child by virtue of 
section 42 POCSO, as they provide for greater quantum of punishment. However, if a male 
watches or stalks a male child, or a female watches or stalks a male child, or if a female 
watches or stalks a female child, then section 12 POCSO applies. Such differential treatment 
to the same classes of persons shows incongruence to the principle of equality. 
 
(f) Child pornography: Sections 13 and 14 POCSO are consistent with one another, 
coherent and congruent with general principles of statutory interpretation and fundamental 
legislative principles characteristic of a rule of law society. However, section 15 POCSO 
238 
 
238 
 
provides inadequate protection to children used in commercial child pornography as a class 
of persons. An offender gets a lighter punishment when compared to a person who stores 
child pornography for non-commercial purposes. Also, imprisonment is optional, and the 
offender can escape by payment of fine alone, as it is not compulsory that payment of fine 
need accompany imprisonment. The crime for commercial child pornography must be given 
greater punishment than those involved in disseminating child pornography for other reasons. 
Section 15 POCSO does not seem correct in being congruent with government policy 
principles as set out in parliamentary reports. 
4.1.2. Does a comparison of the sexual offences laid down in the Goa Children’s Act 2003 
with POCSO offences and their corresponding IPC offences show positive development in 
the law against child sexual abuse? 
 
Section 2 y) of the Goa Children’s Act 2003 lays down three sexual offences against children, 
and section 8(2) prescribes the punishments for the same.285 These have been discussed in 
Chapter 2. Table 2 in Section 2.C.2of Chapter 2 charts the various sexual wrongs affecting 
children, and compares the positions on these offences as laid down in the IPC, the POCSO, 
the Goa Children’s Act 2003 as well as the law with regard to these offences in Kerala. 
These provisions in the Goa Children’s Act 2003 set the baseline for drawing up legislation 
to protect children from sexual abuse. Post-publication of the Child Abuse Report 2007, 
various stakeholders in Kerala started drafting legislation criminalising sexual offences 
against children based on the Goa Children’s Act model. These efforts were set aside post the 
POCSO Bill 2012. It is evident that the corresponding offences in the POCSO have 
maintained a gender-neutral approach, as has the Goa Children’s Act. However, the IPC 
                                                        
285Section 2(y) states that ‘Sexual offences’ for the purposes of awarding appropriate punitive action means and 
includes “grave sexual assault” which covers different types of intercourse: vaginal, oral, anal, use of objects, 
forcing minors to have sex with each other, deliberately causing injury to the sexual organs, making children 
pose for pornographic photos or films; “sexual assault” which covers sexual touching with the use of any body 
part or object, voyeurism, exhibitionism, showing pornographic pictures or films to minors, making children 
watch others engaged in sexual activity, issuing of threats to sexually abuse a minor, verbally abusing a minor 
using vulgar and obscene language; “incest” which is the commission of a sexual offence by an adult on a child 
who is a relative or is related by ties of adoption. Section 8(2) of the Goa Children’s Act 2003 lays down the 
punishment for child sexual abuse: Whosoever commits any child abuse or sexual assault as defined under this 
Act, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term that may extend to three years and 
shall also be liable to fine of Rs. 1,00,000/-. Whoever commits any Grave Sexual Assault shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either description for a term that shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to life 
imprisonment and shall also be liable to a fine of Rs. 2,00,000. Whoever commits incest shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either description for a term that shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to life 
imprisonment and also a fine which may extend to Rs.2,00,000/- Statement of the child victim shall be treated 
on par with the statement of a child rape victim under section 375 IPC, as laid down by the Supreme Court of 
India. 
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continues its gender-specific approach even with regard to children, despite its lofty 
predecessors. 
4.1.3. Has legislation criminalising sexual abuse of children made a positive impact on 
the situation in Goa and is this reflected in the case law? 
 
The POCSO has not specifically repealed sections 2(y) and 8(2) of the Goa Children’s Act. 
However, the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 inserted section 42A POCSO, which 
states that the provisions of POCSO shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the 
provisions of any other law for the time being in force and, in case of any inconsistency, the 
provisions of POCSO shall have overriding effect on the provisions of any such law to the 
extent of the inconsistency. Hence, it is clear that the POCSO prevails in case of sexual 
offences in Goa. This fulfils the index of clarity and coherence, and makes it easier to be 
applied consistently. 
 
The law in Goa regarding the three offences of grave sexual assault, sexual assault and incest 
fulfil the index of correctness as being congruent with the principle of equality. The reason is 
that no discrimination is made between male and female children in the Act. This has resulted 
in cases against boy offenders being filed in Goa, with appropriate convictions. Statements by 
mother and relatives of boy victims were held as corroborative evidence for conviction of the 
accused. 
 
One difficulty with regard to the provisions regarding sexual offences in the Goa Children’s 
Act 2003 is that the definition of sexual offences and its classification into three types of 
offences lies within the definition clause of the enactment in section 2(y), while punishment 
for these three offences lies in the main body of the enactment in section 8(2). Such wide 
spacing between definition and punishment of the offence shows lack of clarity and is not 
congruent with the general principles of drafting of statutes. 
 
Another difficulty is that the three sexual offences defined and punished in the Goa 
Children’s Act 2003 –grave sexual assault (which includes contact offences like penetrative 
acts, injurious acts and using children in pornography), sexual assault (which comprises of 
sexual touching, and non-contact offences of voyeurism, exhibitionism, as well as showing 
pornography or sexual acts to children etc) and incest (which is sexual abuse by a relative by 
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blood or adoption) – lack clarity and comprehensiveness in comparison to the detailed 
definitions and punishments enumerated in the six POCSO  offences. 
Section 8(2) of the Goa Children’s Act 2003 prescribes minimum imprisonment for grave 
sexual assault and incest at ten years and a maximum of life imprisonment. The offence of 
sexual assault does not carry a minimum punishment, only a maximum punishment of upto 
three years imprisonment. With regard to fine, an interesting feature of this legislation is that 
a blanket statutory fine of Rs. 1,00000 and Rs. 2,00000 has been prescribed for sexual assault 
and grave sexual assault respectively. However, in the case of the offence of incest, the fine 
has been prescribed as that which may extend to Rs. 2,00000. It can be observed from case 
laws listed in Chapter 3 that clear specification of minimum punishment and amount of fine 
was conducive to elimination of judicial discretion and subjectivity.286 Non-specification of 
statutory minimum sentence allows for judicial subjectivity.287 Section 8(2) of Goa 
Children’s Act 2003which clearly lays down the amount of fine, as well as minimum and 
maximum punishments, fulfils to a certain extent the index of correctness for being congruent 
with the principle of restriction upon judicial subjectivity. 
 
A synthesis of case laws in Goa in Chapter 3 shows that a majority of decisions reflect a 
protective stance towards children. When the statutory provision specifically provides a fixed 
amount to be fine, once an offence is established, no discretion is left to the court to fix a fine 
less than the statutory quantum. The reduction of mandatory fine is not possible, nor is it 
possible to increase the statutory fine and correspondingly decrease the statutory minimum 
imprisonment. 
 
However, Chapter 2 discusses a lamentable decision in 2014, which reduces the amount of 
statutory fine under section 8(2) of the Goa Children’s Act 2003 from Rs 100,000 to Rs 
10,000. Such case law reflects the illegality of a judicial order, when the statute clearly 
curtails judicial discretion in the matter of sentencing.288 Another decision reduced the term 
                                                        
286Refer to Maloji Patil v State of Goa (MANU/MH/1435/2008), where the Court headed by Justice R.M.S. 
Khandeparkar held that when the statutory provision specifically provides a fixed amount to be fine, once an 
offence is established, no discretion is left to the Court to fix a fine less than the statutory quantum. 
287Refer to Mansoor K. K. Mohammed v State (MANU/MH/0688/2014), where the question was whether the 
accused could be punished under section 354 IPC read with section 8(2) of the Goa Children’s Act 2003 and be 
awarded punishment of rigorous imprisonment for one month and fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default, to undergo 
imprisonment for 10 days, in the absence of medical evidence of the child and corroboration from the child’s 
mother. The Court headed by Justice T.V. Nalawade reduced the punishment to rigorous imprisonment for one 
month and fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default, to undergo imprisonment for 10 days. 
288Mansoor K. K. Mohammed v State MANU/MH/0688/2014. 
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of imprisonment awarded by the trial court, from life imprisonment to imprisonment for 
12years in the case of rape of a mentally-impaired girl child of 7 years of age. The grounds of 
reduction were that the accused was young – 19 years of age – at the time of offence; the 
accused has no criminal antecedents; there was only slight penetration and the hymen was 
intact; and the minimum prescribed punishment as per the Goa Children’s Act 2003 is 10 
years.289 The reason why the trial court had awarded life imprisonment to the accused, and 
why the High Court felt that the said punishment is excessive so as to warrant reduction in 
imprisonment, is not reflected in the wordings of this judgment. 
 
The applicability of the POCSO to Goa brings clarity to the law on sexual abuse in Goa, as 
the provisions of the Goa Children’s Act 2003 on sexual offences against children lack 
comprehensiveness in comparison with the POCSO provisions. 
 
Generally, reported case law in Goa reflects consistency and correctness in being uniform and 
congruent with general principles of statutory interpretation, and congruent with the principle 
of equality characteristic of a rule of law society. Case law in Goa is correct because 
excessive judicial interpretation in violation of the letter and spirit of the law is, to a large 
extent, absent. Therefore, the principle of the rule of law has been generally upheld by the 
upper judiciary in Goa. 
4.1.4. Has the POCSO made a positive impact upon the situation in Kerala as evident 
from legislation and case law? 
 
The POCSO has defined the offences relating to sexual abuse of children and has prescribed 
punishments for the same. An analysis of the case law in Chapter 2 shows that prior to the 
advent of the POCSO, it was only those cases which went to the High Court that stood a 
chance of getting justice meted out to the victim. Even then, absence of statutory minimum 
punishment allowed justice to get subverted unobtrusively under the guise of victim 
protection.290 However, since the POCSO places clear restrictions on the scope for judicial 
discretion, courts are presently forced to comply with the rule of law. 
                                                        
289Dhannaram v State MANU/MH/0030/2012. 
290Refer to Sunil v State of Kerala (MANU/KE/0399/2001) in Chapter 3 where the lower court awarded 
sentences of 2 years, 6 months and 1 year imprisonment to run concurrently for convictions under sections 354, 
448 and 506 IPC. A revision petition was filed before the High Court, alleging delay in filing the FIR by the 
victim, that the victim’s testimony was without corroboration and hence has no evidentiary value. The High 
Court ruled that delay in lodging FIR in sexual offences is not a reason for acquitting the accused, and it is the 
duty of judiciary to consider the testimony of victim of sexual offences with full evidentiary value. The revision 
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The High Court of Kerala, in its various decisions prior to the passing of the POCSO , 
rendered judgments analysing and laying down the meaning of the word “penetration” used 
in the IPC.291 The passing of the POCSO, and the present definition of the offence of rape in 
section 375 of the IPC, settled the controversy in this area and gave clarity to the type of acts 
which constitute penetrative sexual assault or rape. 
 
Post-POCSO, positive judicial decisions were taken affirming the reliability of child 
witnesses of very young age,292 the admissibility of extra judicial confession made by the 
appellant to the doctor while during the custody of police,293 and the non-compoundability of 
a sexual offence on the basis of an agreement between the accused father and complainant 
mother.294 
The decisions of the High Court of Kerala portray a progressive and protective attitude 
towards ensuring the rights of children against sexual abuse. A High Court decision clearly 
states the fear of dishonour as a reason for delay in filing complaints in sexual offences.295 
The pressure of social ostracism is evident in the instance of a mother who is willing to give 
an affidavit before the High Court of Kerala, stating that her husband did not sexually molest 
their 13-year-old daughter.296 These decisions corroborate scientific studies on the reasons for 
non-disclosure, despite the absence of detailed statistical studies on Kerala. Chapter 2 refers 
to the need for charting a system of overcoming such structural barriers against disclosure, 
                                                                                                                                                                            
petition was dismissed, however the sentences given by trial courts under sections 354, 448and 506  IPC were 
reduced to six months and  a compensation of Rs 15000 was awarded to the victim.   
291Refer to Chenthamara v State of Kerala ILR2008(4)Kerala363; 2008(3)KLJ375; 2008(4)KLT290;Santhosh 
Madhavan @ Amrutha Chaithanya v C.I. of Police & Another MANU/KE/0162/2008 and Kunjumon v State of 
Kerala 2011 (4) KHC 72 in Chapter 3. 
292In Sreekuttan v State of Kerala (2011(3)KLJ225) the accused filed a revision petition to avoid conviction for 
rape of a girl of two and half years stating unreliability of the testimony of a child witness. The High Court held 
that as no special requirement regarding a child witness is specified under section 118 of the Evidence Act, the 
sole criterion for determination of reliability was whether the child is able to understand the facts, answer the 
questions clearly and convince the court that his/her testimony is not a tutored one.  
293In Salim v State of Kerala (2012 CriLJ 3198; 2012(2)KLJ764) a twelve year old child was raped and 
murdered. Separate sentences for imprisonment of life was awarded to the accused under sections 376(2)(f) and 
302 of the IPC. The main question raised by the accused during appeal to the High Court was whether the extra 
judicial confession made to the doctor by him was valid. It was ruled that the extra judicial confession made by 
the appellant to the doctor while during the custody of police is admissible since no police officer was present 
during the time when he made the confessional statement. 
294See Noushad K. v State of Kerala (MANU/KE/2025/2014) in Chapter 3.   
295State of Kerala v M. Ayoob 2005(2)KLJ16; 2005(2)KLT 441. 
296Supra n. 293. 
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such as psychological services made available at the cost of the government or the offender, 
as recommended by Justice Hema of the High Court of Kerala.297 
Chapter3 points out that the High Court of Kerala has referred to the need for broader legal 
definitions in the context of the types of penetration possible within the section 375 offence 
of rape. It was observed by Justice Hema that victims of sexual offences are denied justice 
because sexual offences were not defined in the IPC.298 
Reported case law in Kerala reflects consistency with one another, correctness in being 
uniform and congruent with general principles of statutory interpretation, and congruent with 
the principle of equality. Case law in Kerala is correct because of the absence of excessive 
judicial interpretation in violation of the letter and spirit of the law. Therefore, the principle 
of the rule of law, to a large extent, has been upheld by the upper judiciary in Kerala. 
Chapter 3 stated that the narrowness of definitions of sexual offences in the IPC, broadened 
by the Goa Children’s Act and subsequently by the POCSO shows the necessity of 
developing broader definitions to solve the problems posed by the absence of an age of 
consent for non-abusive sexual activity, in exclusion of abusive practices like child marriage. 
The passing of the POCSO has made a positive impact upon the rule of law in Kerala with 
regard to sexual offences against children. 
4.2. Has the nature and scope of the amended offence of rape in the IPC resulted in 
positive advances in responding to child sexual abuse? 
The law on rape is laid down in sections 375 and 376 IPC. Prior to the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act 2013, this provision was interpreted by courts to mean penile-vaginal 
penetration by a man of a woman. It was not possible to extend this provision to include other 
types of penetration. Various recommendations were made by various bodies to make 
amendments making the offence gender-neutral, to change the term “rape” to “sexual 
assault”, and to extend the definition of rape to include various types of penetration other than 
penile- vaginal. The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 did not make the definition of rape 
gender-neutral. It retained the term “rape”. However, it extended the definition of rape to 
include various other kinds of penetration. In this section, the main question is the conceptual 
limit of the offence of rape as the offence applies to the gender-based limit of “man upon 
woman”. The shift from gender-neutrality in governmental policy to gender-specificity in the 
                                                        
297Kunjumon v State of Kerala 2011 (4) KHC 72. 
298Santhosh Madhavan @ AmruthaChaithanya v C.I. of Police & Another MANU/KE/0162/2008. 
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amended definition of rape is outlined. An analysis of the law on rape shows that the law has 
not advanced in response to child sexual abuse. 
 
In this issue, the indices used are 
1. The legislative provision does not provide adequate protection to a person or class of 
persons. 
2. The legislative provision is not in accordance with governmental policy. 
4.2.1. Rationale behind the continuance of the term “rape” instead of “sexual assault” 
 
From the time it was drafted in 1860, section 375 IPC has always been limited to an offence 
by a man against a woman. In a major reform push, the 172nd Law Commission Report of 
2000 recommended that the law relating to rape is to be made “gender neutral, wider and 
more comprehensive, in order to bring it in tune with current thinking”. As part of this 
exercise, the Law Commission recommended the substitution of the offence of rape with 
“sexual assault.”299The proposed definition sought to include all acts of penetrative sexual 
violence against both male and female persons. Also, gender neutrality was sought to be 
maintained in all circumstances mentioned in the first to the sixth descriptions. 
 
But these recommendations were not incorporated into the law. The offences of sexual 
assault in different forms were included within the Protection of Children Against Sexual 
Offences Bill and in its subsequent Act passed in 2012. Thereby, the perpetrator of the 
offences under this statute is any “person”, which includes human beings of any gender and 
any age, and the victim is a child of any gender below the age of 18. Thus, the POCSO 
maintains gender neutrality with regard to offenders and victims as well as age neutrality with 
regard to offenders. 
 
                                                        
299 This term meant (a) penetration of the vagina, anus or urethra of any person (ie, of the victim) by any part of 
the body of any person or by any object manipulated by such person except where such penetration is carried 
out for proper hygienic or medical purposes, (b) causing penetration of the vagina, anus or urethra of the 
offender by the body part of another person((ie, of the victim), (c) introduction of the penis of one person into 
the mouth of another person, (d) engaging in cunnilingus or fellatio, (e) containing sexual assault in any of the 
above circumstances as defined in sub sections (a) to (d). In this context, it is appropriate to point out that while 
sub sections (a) and (b) are clear, it can be seen that sub section (d) is inclusive of the act specified in sub 
section (c), and sub section (e) seems to be irrelevant.. Refer to Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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In the subsequent Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill 2012, it was proposed that the offence of 
rape in section 375 was to be substituted with the offence of sexual assault in gender-neutral 
terms for both offender and victim.300 
 
Incidentally, the J.S. Verma Committee Report submitted on 23 January 2013, dissented 
regarding the changing of the offence of rape to sexual assault in order to denote penetrative 
sexual violence.301 It resorted to partial gender neutrality by favouring the retention of the 
word “man” to denote the offenders of the offence of rape as belonging to the male gender 
alone, but refers to the victim in a gender-neutral manner as “a person”.302 The first to sixth 
descriptions in Section 375 use the gender-neutral term “person” to denote the victim. 
The Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance 2013 passed on 3 February 2013 was based on 
the Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill 2012, and substituted the offence of rape with “sexual 
assault’”, using gender-neutral terms for both offender and victim. 
In a volte-face, the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 retained the previous completely 
gender-specific version of the term rape in the IPC.303 However, no reasons have been 
mentioned as to why the gender-specificity in the term “rape” was retained. 
                                                        
300 Accordingly, the offence of ‘sexual assault’ under Section 375 of the IPC would hold lie if a person (ie, the 
offender) does the following acts: (a) penetration, for sexual purposes, of the vagina or anus or urethra or mouth 
of another person with any body part including the penis or by any object manipulated by such person, except 
where such penetration is carried out for proper hygienic or medical purposes );(b) manipulation of any part of 
the body of another person (ie, the victim) so as to cause penetration of the vagina or anus or urethra or mouth of 
such person (ie, the offender) by any part of the other person’s (ie, the victim’s) body; (c) engaging in 
“cunnilingus” or “fellatio”. All the circumstances mentioned later on (First till sixth) were couched in gender-
neutral terms. Refer to Chapter 3. 
301The Justice Verma Committee Report (2013) referred to the definitions of ‘sexual assault’ as used in the UN 
Handbook and Section 271 of the Criminal Code in Canada. The Committee preferred the use of the word ’rape’ 
over the term ‘sexual assault’ in  because the epithet ‘rape’ carries a high degree of moral and social 
opprobrium, which is not conveyed by the generic crime of ‘sexual assault’. Removal of the term ‘rape’ creates 
the risk of diluting the extent of moral condemnation, and may signal a dilution of the political and social 
commitment to respecting, protecting and promoting women’s right to integrity, agency and autonomy. The 
Committee recommended the introduction of the offence of sexual assault to include all forms of non-
consensual non-penetrative touching of a sexual nature. Verma, J.S., Justice, Seth, L., Justice, & Subramaniam, 
G. (2013). Report of the Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law. New Delhi: Government of India at 
Chapter III, Para 65 (iv), p. 107 and Para 67, p. 111. 
302 If a man (a) penetrates the vagina or anus or urethra of a person (ie, the victim) with any part of his body 
including his penis or any object manipulated by him, except where such penetration is carried out for proper 
hygienic or medical purposes; or (b) manipulates any part of the body of a person so as to cause penetration of 
the vagina or anus or urethra of another person; or, (c) engages in “cunnilingus” or “fellatio”, he commits the 
offence of ‘rape under section 375 IPC. Refer to Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
303(a) penetration of the penis of the  man (here, the offender), to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or 
anus of a woman (here, the victim), or making her do so with him or any other person; or (b) insertion, to any 
extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis of the  man, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of a 
woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (c) manipulation of any part of the body of a 
woman so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of such woman or makes her 
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Vipra (2013) states that a statement raised by women’s groups was the reason why the 
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 changed the offence back to the gender-specific 
“rape”.304It is important for male and female victims to identify the crime as rape, not just as 
an assault that happens to be sexual.305 
4.2.2. Whether gender-specificity renders the law discriminatory: Was the legislature 
correct in rejecting the Law Commission and Verma Committee recommendations 
regarding adoption of full or partial gender-neutrality in the offence under section 375 
IPC? 
Responding to an allegation by Agnes (2002) that it is only “Western feminists” who 
advocate gender-neutral laws, Vipra (2013) studied 96 countries and found that 63 have rape 
or sexual assault laws written in gender-neutral language, 27 had rape laws that were 
completely gender-specific (the perpetrator was defined as male and the victim as female), 
and 6 had partly gender-neutral laws (the perpetrator was defined as male and the victims 
could be male or female).306 
Gender-neutral rape laws are extremely unlikely to be used against women just to harass 
them. The costs of social stigma and ridicule are much higher than the benefits of humiliating 
a woman.307 Female-on-male rape and female-on-female rape occurs, but is not formally 
reported to the police in contrast to the formal reporting of gang rape of a male by other 
males.308 The two reasons for not publicizing a case of a woman raping a man in are: firstly, 
the stigma attached to being raped as a man discourages men from reporting a rape; and 
secondly, the absence of laws that deal with such a situation.309 While there is a lack of male 
rape statistics in India, a survey of 222 men found that a majority of men believe a man can 
be sexually victimised by a woman (Vipra, 2013).310 
                                                                                                                                                                            
to do so with him or any other person; or (d) application of the mouth of the  man to the vagina, anus, urethra of 
a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person. Refer to Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
304Vipra,J.(2013). A case for gender-neutral case laws in India. CCS Working Paper # 286. pp. 5–6. 
<https://ccsinternship.files.wordpress.com/2013/05/286_case-for-gender-neutral-rape-laws-in-india_jaai-
vipra.pdf>.  
305Id at p.27. 
306Id at  p.7. 
307Id at p.28. 
308Vipra J. (2013) cites a few qualitative interviews with doctors and police: Id at pp.13-14. 
309Id at p.17. 
310Id at p.12. 
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Vipra concludes that rape is a function of interpersonal relationships and sexual factors as 
well as social structures, and social inequality must not be cited as an excuse for excluding a 
certain set of victims from the law.311 
It is clear that just because women are considered to be socially unequal to men, this cannot 
be a criterion for excluding men victims as a class from the law. The failure of the legislature 
to adopt gender-neutrality in the offence under section 375, whether defined as “rape” or 
“sexual assault” or “penetrative sexual assault”, points to incorrectness due to incongruence 
with the principle of equality which is fundamental to a rule of law society. 
The recommendation of the 172nd Law Commission Report of 2000 to substitute the gender-
specific term of rape with the gender-neutral term of sexual assault was incorporated in the 
subsequent POCSO, as well as in the Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance 2013. The J.S. 
Verma Committee Report (published prior to the passing of the Criminal Law (Amendment) 
Ordinance 2013) recommended the retention of the term “rape” instead of sexual assault in 
section 375 of the IPC, and advocated a gender-neutral term of “person” as the victim. Both 
the Law Commission of India as well as the J.S. Verma Committee were bodies appointed by 
the Executive to study the issues in a scientific manner and make recommendations to be 
adopted by the legislature. Instead of adhering to these recommendations, the Parliament 
seems to have succumbed to the frenzies of certain pressure groups (Vipra,2013). It was not 
correct of the legislature to have continued with the term rape in gender- specific terms, as 
this points to incongruence with law reform recommendations of executive bodies. 
4.2.3. Was it consistent of the legislature to have enacted the offence of rape in gender-
specific terms for both perpetrator and victim in the IPC, while excluding the same 
from the POCSO? 
 
The POCSO does not contain any offence of rape. This offence in the IPC is preferred over 
the term “sexual assault”. According to the J.S. Verma Committee, the epithet “rape” carries 
a high degree of moral and social opprobrium, which is not conveyed by the generic crime of 
sexual assault. Removal of the term “rape” creates the risk of diluting the extent of moral 
condemnation, and may signal a dilution of the political and social commitment to respecting, 
protecting and promoting women’s rights to integrity, agency and autonomy. With the 
enactment of section 375 IPC in gender-specific terms for offender and victim, as well as 
framing other sexual offences in gender-specific terms, the current governmental policy 
                                                        
311Id at p.20. 
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favours the adoption of gender-specificity regarding sexual offences. If this principle were to 
be applied uniformly across all legislation, then a similar offence of rape in gender-specific 
terms ought to be have been enacted within the POCSO in order to convey a similar “high 
degree of moral opprobrium”. This inconsistency of the legislature in failing to amend the 
POCSO to include the offence of “rape” attracts the index of incongruence due to lack of 
uniformity in the law. 
4.3 Does the current interpretation of the offence of carnal intercourse in the IPC offers 
sufficient protection against child sexual abuse? 
 
“Unnatural offences” is defined in section 377 of the IPC as voluntary carnal intercourse 
against the order of nature with a man, woman or animal. The Explanation to Section 377 
states that penetration is sufficient to constitute the carnal intercourse necessary to the 
offence. This is an offence criminalising voluntary acts of non-penile-vaginal intercourse of a 
homosexual and heterosexual nature, as well as bestiality, in which penetration is present. 
However, the definition of the term “penetration” is not given in the statute. In Sakshi’s case 
in 2004, the Supreme Court of India explained that this provision can be used to criminalise 
the various sexual violations upon children which do not come within the ambit of the penile-
vaginal type of rape of a girl child by a male. However, after the Criminal Law (Amendment) 
Act 2013, the definition of rape was extended to other types of penetration by a man of a girl 
child. After the amendment to section 375 IPC in 2013, the listing of types of sexual 
violations in Sakshi’s case has become obsolete to a certain extent. Suresh Kumar Kaushal’s 
case (2014)312 failed to give any inputs on this matter. Hence, the main question here is the 
correctness of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of section 377 IPC for accommodating 
these “non-rape” type of sexual violations of children as enumerated in Sakshi’s case (2004). 
An analysis of the law on unnatural offences shows that the law has not advanced in response 
to child sexual abuse. 
 
To examine this issue, the indices used are: 
1. The legislative provision and case law is not coherent. 
2. The legislative provision is not uniform and/or congruent with general principles of 
statutory interpretation. 
                                                        
312Refer to Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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3. The legislative provision does not provide adequate protection to a person or class of 
persons. 
4. The legislative provision is not in accordance with governmental policy. 
5. The legislative provisions post -2013 Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 are not 
consistent with one another. 
 
4.3.1. Does the offence of carnal intercourse under section 377 IPC offer adequate 
protection to children as a class? 
 
Section 377 IPC punishes anyone who “voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of 
nature with any man, woman or animal”.The ambit of section 377 IPC extends to any sexual 
union involving penile insertion, which can be understood to include homosexual acts, 
bestiality, as well as consensual heterosexual acts such as oral and anal penetration. 
 
The Law Commission’s 172nd Report in 2000 recommended the criminalisation of non-
consensual homosexual and heterosexual acts within the definition of “sexual assault” in 
section 376 IPC, as well as addition of a new provision – section 376E – to penalize 
“unlawful sexual contact”.313 The 172nd Report recommended deleting section 377 IPC 
except with regard to retention of the criminalisation of “carnal intercourse with animals”. 
However, these reforms did not happen. 
Later on, in Sakshi v Union of India,314 a Division Bench of the Supreme Court interpreted 
section 377 IPC to state that penetration other than penile-vaginal penetration are unnatural 
sexual offences. The Supreme Court listed various unnatural offences to include penile-anus 
penetration, penile-oral penetration, finger-anal penetration, finger-vaginal penetration or 
object-vaginal penetration. 
In Naz Foundation v Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi,315both petitioner 
and the respondent Government agreed that section 377 IPC has been used in filling the 
lacuna in rape laws by punishing types of child sexual abuse which are excluded from section 
                                                        
313The new provision sought to criminalise non-consensual, direct or indirect, intentional unlawful sexual 
contact with part of the body or with an object upon any part of body of another person. The new section 376E 
would also criminalise a person committing unlawful sexual contact with a young person (below the age of 16 
years) with enhanced punishment if the young person is in a relationship of dependency with the offender. Refer 
to Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
314 MANU/SC/0523/2004. 
315(2010)CriLJ 94. 
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376 IPC. In Suresh Kumar Koushal & Another. v Naz Foundation &Others,316the Bench 
ruled that section 377IPC would apply irrespective of age and consent in light of the plain 
meaning and legislative history of the section. It held that amending or repealing section 377 
IPC is a matter that should be a matter left to Parliament. 
 
Reading the new definitions of rape under sections 375 and 376 IPC post-2013, along with 
Sakshi’s case (2004), Naz (2009) and Suresh Kumar Kaushal (2014),it seems that section 377 
IPC would technically apply only to: (1) consensual penile-anus, penile-oral, finger-anal, 
finger-vaginal or object-vaginal penetration of a man by any person; (2) penile-anus, penile-
oral, finger-anal, finger-vaginal or object/vaginal penetration of minor children irrespective of 
consent, by any person; and (3) bestiality. 
In Canada, along with the crime of bestiality, section 160 of the Canadian Criminal Code 
specifies three other offences: 
1. the offence of compelling the commission of bestiality 
2. the offence of committing bestiality in the presence of a child 
3. the offence of inciting a child commit bestiality.317 
There is case law318 as well as some reports regarding the prevalence of bestiality in India.319 
However, there has been no reported case before the courts regarding bestiality by or in the 
presence of children. Section 377 IPC can be used to cover penetrative sexual offences 
regarding animals and children. The definition of unnatural offence, which includes carnal 
intercourse with an animal, is not clearly defined, especially with regard to such offences 
                                                        
316(2014) 1 SCC 1. 
317The Canadian Criminal Code: Bestiality s. 160(1) Every person who commits bestiality is guilty of an 
indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years or is guilty of an offence 
punishable on summary conviction. 
Compelling the commission of bestiality (2): Every person who compels another to commit bestiality is guilty 
of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years or is guilty of an offence 
punishable on summary conviction. 
Bestiality in presence of or by child (3): Despite subsection (1), every person who commits bestiality in the 
presence of a person under the age of 16 years, or who incites a person under the age of 16 years to commit 
bestiality:(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years 
and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year; or (b) is guilty of an offence punishable 
on summary conviction and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years less a day and to a 
minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of six months. 
318 The 1934 Lahore High Court case of Khandu v. Emperor where the accused was convicted for the carnal 
intercourse by placing his penis into the nostril of a bullock. Refer to Chapter 3. 
319 Shukla, R. (2014). Sexual Abuse of Stray Dogs in India. Report by Voice of Stray Dogs. 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BzAMn08dit28QVJ5M1IzLTA2NjA/view. 
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committed in the presence of a child or inciting a child to commit such unnatural offence with 
an animal.320 
4.3.2. Are sections 375, 376 and 377 IPC consistent with each other as well as congruent 
with the general principle of equality? 
 
The 172nd Law Commission’s recommendation for deletion of section 377 IPC has been 
rejected by Parliament and the judiciary. Post-2013, section 377 IPC would apply only to: (1) 
consensual penile-anus, penile-oral, finger-anal, finger-vaginal or object-vaginal penetration 
of any man by any person; (2) penile-anus, penile-oral, finger-anal, finger-vaginal or object-
vaginal penetration of minor males irrespective of consent, by any person; and (3) bestiality. 
After the amendment of the IPC in 2013, no clarification, either judicial321 or legislative, has 
been given regarding deletion of the various types of penetration in Sakshi’s case as inclusive 
within unnatural offences in section 377. The present interpretation of section 377 IPC is 
inconsistent with the approach of the post-2013 definitions of sections 375 and 376 IPC. This 
points to incoherence, vagueness and ambiguity and it is difficult to apply such provisions 
consistently. The inaction of the judiciary in Suresh Kumar Kaushal (2013) to clarify the 
interpretation of “unnatural offences” explained in Sakshi (2004) – which has been rendered 
partially obsolete by legislative amendment – reeks of judicial inadvertence. This is a clear 
instance of non-application of the imperative judicial discretion to interpret the law. 
4.4. Is the current criminalisation of abusive and non-abusive sexual activity of children 
below the age of 18 a positive advance in responding to child sexual abuse? 
There is no specific law regarding the age of consent for sexual activity of female and male 
children. Before the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, the IPC stated the age of consent 
for women was 16 years. It was silent regarding that of men. In 2012, the POCSO 
criminalised all sexual activity with children under the age of 18, irrespective of the age of 
the offender. After the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, the IPC raised the age of 
consent for women to 18 years. This resulted in discriminatory situations where two children 
                                                        
320It is interesting to note a recent Canadian judgment in R. v D.L.W., where it was specified by the Canadian 
Supreme Court that penetration is not necessary for the offence of bestiality under section 160 of the Canadian 
Criminal Code, and that section 160(3) is meant to protect children from sexual exploitation with animals. 
Therefore it was decided that section 160(3) applied to acts of compulsion by a step-father who forced his 15-
year-old step daughter to perform sexual acts with the family dog, even though no penetration was involved.  
However, in India, since the Explanation in Section 377 IPC clearly states that penetration is ‘sufficient’ to 
constitute the offence of carnal intercourse, it is not clear from case law whether penile penetration itself is 
necessary, or whether other kinds of penetration would also come within the ambit of section 377 IPC, as in the 
amended section 376 IPC. 
321See Suresh Kumar Kaushal (2013). 
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who are in non-abusive sexual relationships become criminals before the law. An analysis of 
the law on sexual activity of children shows that the law has not yet advanced to understand 
the parameters of child sexual abuse and how to exclude non-criminal sexual activities of 
children in response. The synthesis of case law from the various High Courts in India in 
Chapter 3 shows that judges favour non-criminalisation of sexual activity when the child is 
mature and responsible enough to understand the implications of his/her sexual act. 
For this issue, the indices used for analysis are: 
The legislative provisions are not consistent with one another 
1. The legislative provisions do not provide adequate protection to a person or class of 
persons. 
4.4.1. Current law regarding the age of consent of boys and girls: Inconsistency in the 
IPC 
The POCSO criminalised all sexual activity of children below the age of 18 years into the 
offences of penetrative sexual assault, aggravated penetrative sexual assault, sexual assault, 
aggravated sexual assault, sexual harassment, using a child for pornographic purposes, and so 
on. The age of consent for sexual activity of both boys and girls under the age of 18 was 
stated for the first time in the case of boy children as 18, and increased from 16 to 18 in the 
case of girl children. 
 
The 172nd Law Commission Report 2000, which recommended criminalisation of the offence 
of sexual assault under section 375 IPC, specified that consent of the gender-neutral “other 
person” (here, the victim) who is below 16 years of age is irrelevant. The Criminal Law 
Amendment Bill 2012 – which also couched in gender-neutral terms the offence of sexual 
assault under section 375 – specified that the offence under section 375 would accrue if the 
victim (both male and female) was below the age of 18, irrespective of consent. Attempts 
were made – first by the 172nd Law Commission Report to specify the age of sexual consent 
of boys as 16 years, followed by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill 2012 to define the age 
of sexual consent of boys as 18 and raise the age of sexual consent of girls to 18. 
The POCSO criminalised all sexual activity, both penetrative and non-penetrative, of male 
and female children below the age of 18.The J.S. Verma Committee, which recommended the 
partly gender-neutral offence of rape in section 375 IPC, made no mention of the issue of the 
consent or non-consent of underage persons. It completely removed the offence of rape 
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committed by a male against an underage victim of any gender by recommending the creation 
of the separate offence of rape of an underage person by introducing a new section 375B 
IPC.322It recommended lowering of the age of consent from 18 to 16 by carrying out 
amendments to the POCSO.323 
The Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance 2013, promulgated on 3 February 2013, largely 
borrowed from the Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill 2012. It specified that such sexual acts as 
laid down in section 375 of the IPC with a person of any gender below the age of 18 by an 
offender of any gender would constitute the offence of sexual assault. 
In spite of these progressive recommendations, the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 did 
not include males as victims of the offence of rape under section 375 IPC. The IPC penalises 
consensual and non-consensual penetrative sexual activity of a woman below the age of 18, 
and not men below the age of 18. As per section 42A POCSO, the POCSO  prevails in case 
of conflict between the POCSO  and any other legislation. The law regarding the age of 
sexual consent of men is clear: it is 18, along with that of women. 
These provisions are consistent with one another, coherent and correct in being congruent 
with government policy principles as set out in parliamentary debates, and congruent with 
                                                        
322To the question whether there exists a need to remove children from the ambit of the definition of “man” and 
“woman” which includes boy child and girl child respectively, specifically for the case of section 375 IPC, it 
can be seen that section 10 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 defines “man” and “woman” as a male human being 
of any age, and a female human being of any age, respectively. The 172nd Law Commission Report submitted to 
the Supreme Court in 2000, as part of the Sakshi case, to recommend retention of the sixth clause in section 375 
IPC which criminalises penile-vaginal penetration of a man with a woman under the age of 16 irrespective of 
her consent. However, it favoured the enactment of a new offence of ‘unlawful sexual contact’ under section 
376E, which would criminalise direct or indirect, intentional sexual contact with part of the body or with an 
object upon any part of the other’s body, one of the persons involved being a young person (below the age of 
16), and with enhanced punishment if the young person is in a relationship of dependency with the offender. 
The Justice Verma Committee Report (2013), in its recommendations, omitted the Sixth Clause to Section 375 
of the IPC and recommended the addition of a new Section 376B regarding the offence of ‘rape of an underage 
person’. Section 375B(1) states that if a man has sexual intercourse with a person below the age of 16 years of 
age with or without that person’s consent, he shall be deemed to have committed rape of an underage person, 
and shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years, but which 
may extend to imprisonment for life. The Proviso states that the existence of a marital relationship between the 
accused and the underage person shall not be a valid defence. The Explanation to this section goes on to say that 
sexual intercourse for the purposes of this section shall mean any of the acts specified in Section 375(a) to(c). 
Section 375B(2) punishes the causing of death or a persistent vegetative state in the course of committing rape 
of an underage person with rigorous imprisonment for a minimum term of twenty years, which up to the 
remainder of that person’s natural life. 
323The Committee agreed with the earlier demands of the women’s rights groups for reducing of the age of 
consent of children for sexual activity to 16 as putting the age at 18 would result in the criminalisation of 
consensual sex between persons who are below 18 years of age. See Footnote 1, Verma, J.S., Justice, Seth, L., 
Justice, & Subramaniam, G. (2013). Report of the Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law. New Delhi: 
Government of India, pp. 443-444. 
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general principles of statutory interpretation and fundamental legislative principles 
characteristic of a rule of law society. 
4.4.2. Child marriage and the age of consent for sexual activity 
With regards to children between the age of 16 and 18, it is important to establish the age of 
consent for sexual activity. The Prohibition of Child Marriage Act 2006, specifies 18 as the 
legal age of marriage for a woman, and 21 as the legal age for marriage of a man. This 
enactment recognises the validity of child marriage in the event the contracting minor party 
wishes to continue in the marriage within two years of attaining majority (section 3). 
However, all sexual activity with children below 18 is criminalised by the POCSO, as 
consent of a child is considered as no consent at all, even if he/she provided consent. Section 
5(m) of the POCSO states that one of the grounds for the offence of aggravated penetrative 
sexual assault is penetrative sexual assault of a child by a person who is a relative of a child 
through marriage. Exception 2 of Section 375 IPC states that sexual intercourse or sexual acts 
by a man with his own wife who is above fifteen years of age is not rape. Section 42 POCSO 
makes it clear where there is conflict between the provisions of the POCSO  and the IPC, the 
provision that stipulates greater punishment will prevail. Since section 5(m) POCSO 
prescribes punishment, while Exception 2 of Section 375 IPC exempts punishment for 
husbands of child wives within the ages of 15–18 years, the POCSO ought to prevail. 
However, the legal position regarding this is still unclear. Section 42A POCSO clarifies that 
in cases of conflict between the POCSO and any other law, it is the POCSO that will prevail. 
The provisions of POCSO are inconsistent with the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act 2006. 
However, it is interesting to note the case of Yunusbhai Usmanbhai Shaikh (2015), where   a 
girl of 16 years got married to a man 12 years older to her, against the wishes of her parents. 
The Delhi High Court could not find proof of kidnapping or rape of the child. 
The synthesis of case law shows that judges favour non-criminalisation of sexual activity 
when the child is mature and responsible enough to understand the implications of his/her 
sexual act. 
4.4.3. The need for a general law on the age of consent for sexual activity 
During discussions on the draft POCSO bill, objections were voiced by various women and 
child rights’ activists regarding the issue of suppression of sexual freedom of children, stating 
that increasing the age of consent from 16 to 18 would be wrongly used by parents to harass 
mature children and add to the plethora of cases before courts of law. As predicted by the 
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women’s rights groups, the lower judiciary currently faces a large number of cases wherein 
the victim is a girl between the ages of 16 and 18, who has made a choice to enter into a 
relationship with a man. Such men are taken to court under the POCSO because the law does 
not recognize sexual autonomy in any form. The criminal justice system is compelled to 
respond by prosecuting the adult male in such circumstances, and the judiciary and police 
stand as mute witnesses to this abuse of the right of mature children to exercise their sexual 
freedom and choice of sexual partner. 
This shows the lack of a clear law regarding the age of consent to sexual activity causes 
problems for the criminal justice system. Not only should the law specify the age of consent 
to sexual activity, but should define the age of consent for a person to have sexual relations 
with partners older and younger than himself/herself. There is a need for a general law on the 
specific matter of the age of consent for sex. Such a law must not be appended to a provision 
on rape in the IPC or the POCSO, as these laws deal with crimes against children. Instead, 
this law should specify the civil rights of a person regarding two things: firstly, it should 
define the age of consent for a person to have sex with partners older than himself/herself. 
Secondly, it should lay down the age at which a person can consent to have sex with someone 
who is within a certain age category if the sexual partners involved are under the age of 18. 
Many jurisdictions have specific laws with regard to this. As rightly pointed out by the J.S. 
Verma Committee, the aim of the UNCRC upon which the POCSO is based is to protect 
children from sexual assault and abuse and not to criminalise consensual sex between two 
persons even if they are below 18 years of age. The absence of a general law which allows 
for sexual autonomy of a person below the age of 18 in certain circumstances makes the law 
incorrect in providing adequate protection to the class of persons between the ages of 16 and 
18 who choose to engage in consensual sexual activities which do not amount to assault or 
abuse or compulsion due to customary practices. 
It is interesting to note from the synthesis of case law that various judicial decisions of many 
of the High Courts in India during 2015 to 2017 show a trend against criminalisation of 
sexual activity between mature individuals, even though the female party may be a minor. 
4.5. Does the present law on sexual assault in the IPC make positive advances in 
responding to child sexual abuse? 
The law on sexual assault is laid down in section 354 IPC. It criminalises the use of force 
upon a woman by any person with intention to outrage the modesty of that woman. This 
256 
 
256 
 
section examines whether “all forms of non-consensual non-penetrative touching of a sexual 
nature” against children have been penalised in the IPC post the 2013 amendment, and 
therefore explores whether the IPC contains sufficient criminal offences in relation to child 
sexual assault. An analysis of this issue shows that the law on sexual assault in the IPC has 
not made positive advances in response to child sexual abuse. Four indices have been used 
for analysis.. 
These are: 
1. The legislative provisions are not consistent with one another. 
2. The legislative provisions are not coherent. 
3. The legislative provisions are not uniform and/or congruent with general principles of 
statutory interpretation. 
4. The legislative provisions do not provide adequate protection to a person or class of 
persons. 
4.5.1. The J.S. Verma Committee Report recommendations to section 354, IPC 
The 172nd Law Commission Report 2000 recommended that the term “sexual assault” be 
used in section 375 IPC instead of the term “rape”. The Criminal Law Amendment Bill 2012, 
specified the section 375offence as “sexual assault”, denoting penetrative sexual abuse. The 
POCSO in 2012 differentiated the offences of “penetrative sexual assault” and “sexual 
assault”; the latter denoting the offence of non-penetrative sexual abuse of children. The J.S. 
Verma Committee Report recommended the replacement of the section 354 IPC offence of 
“assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty” with the term 
“sexual Assault and Punishment for sexual assault” to include all forms of non-consensual 
non-penetrative touching of a sexual nature.324 
The J.S. Verma Committee recommended that non-consensual intentional touching ought to 
carry a punishment of rigorous imprisonment upto five years, or with fine, or both. Words, 
acts and gestures, which (i) create an unwelcome threat of sexual nature, or (ii) result in an 
unwelcome advance, ought to be punished with imprisonment of either description upto one 
year, or with fine, or both. These two types of non-penetrative acts would comprise of the 
offence of sexual assault. 
 
                                                        
324Para 69, Verma, J.S., Justice, Seth, L., Justice, & Subramaniam, G. (2013). Report of the Committee on 
Amendments to Criminal Law.  New Delhi: Government of India, p.436.  
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The J.S. Verma Committee recommended that non-consensual intentional touching ought to 
carry a punishment of rigorous imprisonment upto five years, or with fine, or both. Words, 
acts and gestures, which (i) create an unwelcome threat of sexual nature, or (ii) result in an 
unwelcome advance, ought to be punished with imprisonment of either description upto one 
year, or with fine, or both. These two types of non-penetrative acts would comprise of the 
offence of sexual assault. 
 
Ultimately, the offence of sexual assault was not incorporated into the IPC I by the Criminal 
Law (Amendment) Act 2013. Instead, the existing offence in section 354 IPC, punishing 
assault or use of criminal force to outrage the modesty of a woman, was amended to increase 
the punishment from “imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two 
year, or with fine, or with both” to imprisonment for a minimum of one year and a maximum 
of five years, along with fine. 
As pointed out earlier in this chapter, while the POCSO  offence of sexual assault carries a 
minimum punishment of three years imprisonment of either description and a maximum of 
five years imprisonment of either description and fine, the section 354 IPC offence carries 
punishment for a minimum of one year and a maximum of five years with fine. The 
maximum limits of both are the same, while the minimum limits are different.325 
A comparison of section 354326 and section 509327 of the IPC shows two differences: one, 
with regard to intention or knowledge. As per section 354, the intention or knowledge is to 
outrage the modesty of a woman, while according to section 509, the intention (not 
knowledge) is to insult the modesty of a woman. Two, with regard to the act. In the case of 
section 354, the act is assault or use of criminal force, while in section 509, the offender does 
not assault or use criminal force, but utters words, or makes sounds or gestures so that the 
woman hears the word or sound, or sees the gesture or object, or the offender intrudes upon 
the privacy of that woman.328 
                                                        
325 Refer to 4.1.1 of this chapter. 
326 Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty. 
327 Punishment of utterance of word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman. 
328Narender Kumar, Universal’s Guide for Higher Judicial Services Examination. New Delhi: 2010, Universal, 
p.73 
https://books.google.co.in/books?id=924QqBkezV8C&pg=PA73&lpg=PA73&dq=modesty+of+woman+section
+354&source=bl&ots=udJUTJvo3u&sig=mWPJgoWcb7cLwe02_3LU1Fe9LN0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKE
wjLttvt2K_JAhWSGI4KHe5pCC44FBDoAQgrMAM#v=onepage&q=modesty%20of%20woman%20section%
20354&f=false   
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4.5.2. Interpretation of the term “outraging the modesty of a woman” 
Even after the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, it is not clear as to what acts would 
constitute offences which “outrage the modesty of a woman” under Section 354 of the IPC 
which do not come under the ambit of section 509 of the IPC. As the term “outraging the 
modesty of a woman” has not been defined in the IPC, it is necessary to examine the case law 
regarding this term. 
In State of Punjab v Major Singh,329, Justice Mudholkar discussed the meaning of the word 
"modesty" given in the Oxford English Dictionary: "womanly propriety of behaviour, 
scrupulous chastity of thought, speech and conduct (in men or women) reserve or sense of 
shame proceeding from instinctive aversion to impure or coarse suggestions". It is in this 
sense that modesty appears to have been used in section 354 IPC. When any act done to or  in 
the  presence of a woman is clearly suggestive of sex according to the common notions of 
mankind, that act must fall within the mischief of the section and would constitute an offence 
under the section. In this case, Justice Bachawat made the oft-quoted statement that “the 
essence of a woman's modesty is her sex”. He explained that under this section it is the 
culpable intention of the accused that is the crux of the matter, and not the reaction of the 
woman concerned. Though reaction of the woman is very relevant, its absence is not always 
decisive. 
In Kanwar Pal Singh Gill v State (Admn., U.T. Chandigarh) Through Secretary and Another 
and Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj, I.A.S. v Kanwar Pal Singh Gill330 it was held by Justices K.G. 
Balakrishnan and B.N. Srikrishna that the accused had used criminal force with intent to 
outrage the modesty of the complainant and possessed complete knowledge that gently 
slapping on the posterior of the prosecutrix in the presence of other guests would embarrass 
her. Hence, the accused was fully aware that touching the body of the prosecutrix at that 
place and time would amount to outraging her modesty. Had it been without any culpable 
intention on the part of the accused, nobody would have taken notice of the incident. The 
reaction of the prosecutrix is relevant in that she raised hue and cry immediately after the 
incident. The Court reached the conclusion that a police officer of the highest rank ought to 
have exercised exceeding care in this regard. By touching the body of the complainant with 
                                                        
329AIR 1967 SC 63. 
330 MANU/SC/0433/2005. 
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culpable intention the accused had committed offences punishable under sections 354 and 
509 IPC. 
In Ramkripal S/o Shyamlal Charmakar v State of Madhya Pradesh331 decided by Justices 
Dr.ArijitPasayat and S.H. Kapadia, Pasayat J stated that modesty is a virtue which attaches to 
a female owing to her sex. The act of pulling a woman, removing her saree, coupled with a 
request for sexual intercourse, is such as would be an outrage to the modesty of a woman, and 
knowledge that modesty is likely to be outraged is sufficient to constitute the offence. The 
learned judge observed that modesty is the reserve or sense of shame proceeding from 
instinctive aversion to impure or coarse suggestions. On the basis of the earlier Supreme 
Court decisions on Rupan Deol Bajaj (Mrs.) and Anr. V Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and 
Another332 and  Raju Pandurang Mahale v State of Maharashtra and Another,333 this Court 
reiterated that the ultimate test for ascertaining whether modesty has been outraged is 
whether the action of the offender is such as could be perceived as one which is capable of 
shocking the sense of decency of a woman. 
4.5.3. The appropriateness of the term “modesty” in the IPC 
Despite various judgments preserving the modesty of a woman in tune with protective 
jurisprudence enshrined in Article 15 of the Indian Constitution,334 the Court has never 
objected to the use of the term “modesty”. This “modesty” is criticised as encouraging a 
culture of honour and of femicide – whether as foeticide, infanticide or otherwise – and a 
sense of disregard for the bodily integrity of a woman, as well as forcing women them out of 
education and access to development because of the belief that they are not safe.335 
                                                        
331 MANU/SC/7225/2007. 
332MANU/SC/0080/1996. 
333MANU/SC/0116/2004. 
334 Section 15. Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth: 
(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of 
birth or any of them 
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any 
disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to 
(a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and palaces of public entertainment; or 
(b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of 
State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public 
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children 
(4) Nothing in this article or in clause ( 2 ) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special 
provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the 
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. 
335Jayakumar, K. (2015). Why Are We So Concerned About Protecting The Modesty Of A Woman And Not The 
Woman Herself? September 1, 2015 http://www.womensweb.in/2015/09/concerned-protecting-modesty-
woman-not-woman/. 
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The word “modesty” ought not have been used with regard to a woman within sections 354 
and 509 of the IPC when such a word is never used anywhere with regard to a man who 
possesses the same amount of modesty that a woman is supposed to possess. The POCSO 
does not resort to the use of the term “modesty” here. The term “modesty”, instead of 
upholding the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution, promotes 
discrimination of women by signifying a weakness which should be protected, instead of 
recognising the fact that sexual abuse can occur to any person, irrespective of gender. 
The use of the term modesty within sections 354 and 509 of the IPC render these provisions 
incongruent with the principle of equality, whereas the recognition of sexual abuse in the 
POCSO as a concept entirely free from the straitjacket of the term modesty renders the 
POCSO congruent with general principles of statutory interpretation and fundamental 
legislative principles characteristic of a rule of law society. 
4.5.4. The use of the term “whoever” in sections 354 and 509 IPC is inconsistent with 
other sexual offences in the IPC which specify the offender as male 
Irrespective of the use of the word modesty with regard to a woman, the 2013 amendments to 
the IPC make the perpetrator of the section 354 and 509 offences gender-neutral by retaining 
the term “whoever” instead of “a man”. However, the victim is always a woman. So if we 
were to check how effectively these sections would protect children from non-penetrative 
sexual abuse, only man/boy on woman/girl and woman/girl on woman/girl types of sexual 
abuse can be read within the ambit of this section. Any non-consensual non-penetrative 
sexual offences by both genders against boy children would have to be redressed by section 7 
POCSO alone, as the general criminal law fails to provide relief in this regard. 
4.5.5. The deficiency of section 354 IPC in punishing cases of aggravated sexual assault 
Section 7 of the POCSO criminalises the following acts as sexual assault: 
a. Touching  the vagina, penis, anus or breast of the child 
b. Making the child touch the vagina, penis, anus or breast of such person or any other 
person 
c. Doing any other act with sexual intent which involves physical contact without 
penetration. 
Section 354 IPC ought to cover all the above acts performed against women alone under the 
broad term of “outraging the modesty of a woman”. 
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Section 8 POCSO criminalises aggravated sexual assault when committed by a person in 
various positions of trust or responsibility over the child. The minimum punishment for an 
offence of aggravated sexual assault under the POCSO is five years imprisonment of either 
description, and the maximum is seven years imprisonment. But Section 354 IPC, unlike 
Section 376(2), does not punish aggravated instances of outraging the modesty of women, in 
the same way as when a woman is sexually assaulted by a person who is a public officer or 
when the assaulter holds some position of trust and responsibility, as stated in Section 376(2) 
IPC or section 8 POCSO.336 The non-inclusion of punishment for aggravated cases of sexual 
assault under section 354 IPC and for cases of using sexual words, gestures or acts by 
persons who hold positions of trust or responsibility under section 509 IPC, in comparison 
with section 376(2) IPC reeks of inconsistency of. The separation of aggravated instances of 
sexual assault in the POCSO ought to have made consistent changes to the IPC through its 
2013 amendment. 
4.5.6. Changes required to the offence of sexual assault in the IPC 
The law does not provide adequate protection in relation to a class of offences: namely, non-
penetrative acts of sexual abuse against male minors (section 354 IPC protects female minors 
alone against non-penetrative sexual assault by any person). A class of victims of male 
minors have been excluded. Also, a class of offenders – namely, persons who hold positions 
of trust and responsibility – have not been brought within the ambit of the IPC by imposing 
stricter punishments. 
In order to make section 354 IPC more appropriate for the prosecution of children, the 
following changes ought to be made: 
1. The victim must be gender-neutral 
2. The term “outraging the modesty” must be removed 
3. The acts comprising of non-penetrative non-consensual sexual assault must be 
specified 
4. Provision should be made for punishment of aggravated cases of sexual assault. 
                                                        
336 The Mathura case (1979) of girl-child rape by police authorities (referred to in Chapter 3) as well as the 
sensational case of a senior female officer of the Indian Administrative Service, Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj, being 
publicly assaulted by a senior male police officer of the Indian Police Service and Padma Shri award-winner, 
Major K.P.S. Gill (2005) (referred to in this chapter) are glaring examples of violation of the law by public 
authorities. 
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4.6. Does the statutory exclusion of child-wife rape from the scope of the amended 
offence of rape in the IPC construe a positive advance in responding to child sexual 
abuse? 
 
The Exception to Section 375 IPC lays down the law on marital rape. According to this 
Exception, marital rape of a child-wife below the age of 15 is punishable with enhanced 
punishment.337 But once the age of 15 years is passed, her consent or non-consent to sexual 
relationships is at par with an adult wife, because marital rape is not an offence. However, 
under the POCSO, sexual relations with any child under the age of 18 is a penal offence. 
 
This section examines the appropriateness of retaining Exception 2 of Section 375 IPC on 
marital rape of child-wives above the age of 15 in light of the POCSO, IPC and Prohibition 
of Child Marriages Act 2006. An analysis of this issue shows that the law with regard to 
marital rape has not advanced in response to child sexual abuse. 
The indices used for analysis here are: 
1. The legislative provisions are not consistent with one another 
2. The legislative provisions are not coherent 
3. The legislative provisions are not uniform and/or congruent with general principles of 
statutory interpretation 
4. The legislative provisions do not provide adequate protection to a person or class of 
persons. 
4.6.1. Marital rape in the IPC: 
Marital rape is not an offence in India. Section 375 IPC defining rape does not criminalise 
non-consensual sexual intercourse of a man with his own wife unless the wife is below 15 
years of age. As enumerated in Chapter 3, an Exception to section 375 IPC states: 
Sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years, is not rape. 
4.6.2. Three scenarios created by section 375 and 376 IPC pre-2013 amendment 
 
If a wife within the ages of 12and 15 was raped, then the husband would be punished with 
imprisonment of either description for a term which would extend up to two years or with 
fine or with both. 
                                                        
337 As per Section 376 (2) IPC, this shall incur punishment of rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not 
be less than 10 years but which may be for life – which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that 
person’s natural life – and shall also be liable to fine. 
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Pre-2013 Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, section 376 (1) stated: 
Section 376: (1) Whoever, except in the cases provided for by sub-section (2), commits rape shall be 
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years but 
which may be for life or for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine unless 
the woman raped is his own wife and is not under twelve years of age, in which cases, he shall be 
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or 
with fine or with both: 
Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a 
sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than seven years. (Emphasis added) 
In child marriages, where the wife was below the age of 12, sexual intercourse would have 
been considered as statutory rape and punished with graver punishment as under sub-section 
(2) of section 376 IPC. Pre-2013 Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, enhanced punishment 
was prescribed for rape of a woman below 12 years of age under section 376(2)(f)-rigorous 
imprisonment for a minimum term of 10years upto life imprisonment and fine. However, this 
punishment could have been reduced by the judiciary as per the proviso to section 376(2), 
which stated that the court may also, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the 
judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment of either description for a term of less than ten 
years. 
A joint reading of sections 375 and 376, pre-2013 amendment, provided for three scenarios: 
1. If the child-wife was below 12 years of age, sexual intercourse with her would have 
amounted to rape under section 376(2) with rigorous punishment from 10 years to life and 
fine. This could have been reduced by the judiciary for adequate and special reasons to be 
mentioned in the judgment, as provided in the proviso to section 376(2). Section 376(2) of 
the IPC allowed for judicial discretion by providing scope for subjectivity, and negated the 
principle of the rule of law. 
2. If the child-wife was between the ages of 12 and 15, sexual intercourse with her 
would amount to rape; however, instead of incurring the punishment of a minimum of seven 
years imprisonment to a maximum of life imprisonment and fine, section 376(1) provided for 
a lesser term of punishment – imprisonment of either description for a term which may 
extend to two years or with fine or with both. A child wife was put in a different class of 
persons. A man could avoid normal punishment for rape due to the fact that he had married 
her. 
3. Above the age of 15 years, a child wife was put in the same class as adult wives and 
deprived of her right to consent to sexual relations with respect to her husband. Unmarried 
girls from age 16 onwards had the right to consent to sexual relations to men they were not 
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married to. The fact that marital rape is not recognized as rape within the definition of section 
375 of the IPC does not help the issue of a child-wife forced to enter into sexual intercourse 
with her husband without consent. When the age of consent was put at 16, the law-makers 
sought to put child wives over the age of 15 in a different category without explaining the 
rationale behind such differentiation. Such categorization makes the law inconsistent and 
incorrect, as well as incoherent in that it isvague or ambiguous and difficult to apply 
consistently. 
These legislative provisions placed a child wife within these three scenarios outside the 
protective sphere of criminal law because of the fact that she was married. The provisions 
were incongruent with general principles of statutory interpretation and fundamental 
legislative principles characteristic of a rule of law society because the objective differences 
cannot justify differentiation. 
The J.S. Verma Committee Report 2013 recommended criminalization of non-consensual 
penetrative sex upon a woman by a man, including the same within the relationship of 
marriage, as rape.338 But this was not incorporated within the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 
2013. 
 
Post-Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, sexual intercourse with a woman under the age of 
18 years, with or without her consent, has been criminalized under section 375 IPC. The 
Exception to Section 375, which exempts punishment for marital rape except in the case of 
rape of a child-wife under 15 years of age, has been retained. But, unlike its pre-2013 version, 
section 376(1) IPC completely omits reference to punishment for rape of a child-wife 
between the ages of 12 and 15 by her husband. It does not provide any lower punishment for 
a man who rapes his wife who is under 15 years of age. 
Section 376(2) IPC provides an enhanced punishment of rigorous imprisonment for a 
minimum of 10 years and a maximum of life imprisonment, along with fine, upon whoever 
commits rape on a woman under 16 years of age (clause (i) of sub-section (2)).339Reading the 
Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC, along with section 376(2)(i) IPC, it can be inferred that if a 
husband has sexual intercourse with his wife who is below the age of 15, then he will be 
                                                        
338Para 79, Verma, J.S., Justice, Seth, L., Justice, & Subramaniam, G. (2013). Report of the Committee on 
Amendments to Criminal Law. New Delhi: Government of India, p.117. 
339Pre-2013, this was 12 years of age. 
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punished with rigorous imprisonment for a minimum of ten years and a maximum of life 
imprisonment, along with fine. 
Thus, post-2013 Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, the detrimental effect of sections 375 
and 376 IPC to the rule of law, as mentioned in the first two scenarios above, have been 
negated. These sections have been made more congruent with general principles of statutory 
interpretation and fundamental legislative principles characteristic of a rule of law society. 
However, the retention of the age of 15 for a child wife to be deprived of her right to refuse 
sexual intercourse with her husband, while increasing the age of a woman to 16 from the 
earlier twelve regarding punishment for aggravated acts of rape under Section 376 (2), again 
makes the law inconsistent and incorrect, as well as incoherent in that it seems vague or 
ambiguous and therefore difficult to apply consistently. The gap of one year to reach the age 
of 16 is deemed irrelevant in the case of a married 15-year-old child. She does not gain any 
relief from non-consensual sexual intercourse with her husband, unlike her unmarried 16-
year-old counterpart. Again, the rationale for such differential classification is not laid down, 
which is contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution of India 1950. 
Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC, post-2013 amendment, places a child-wife outside the 
protective sphere of criminal law because of her marital status, as sexual relations with 
unmarried girls below the age of 18 years is treated as statutory rape under the IPC. This 
makes Exception 2 section 375 IPC incongruent with general principles of statutory 
interpretation and fundamental legislative principles characteristic of a rule of law society, 
because the objective differences are not justified. Such incongruence can be removed only 
when Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC is deleted.340 
4.6.3. Marital rape and the Protection of Women against Domestic Violence Act 2005 
 
Indian criminal law does not recognise marital rape as rape. However, the new civil law on 
domestic violence – the Protection of Women against Domestic Violence 2005– includes 
marital rape within the meaning of domestic violence against which women can seek 
protection and remedy. This legislation is the culmination of a century-old struggle that began 
                                                        
340 From a women’s rights perspective, it is preferable not to exclude marital rape, irrespective of age, from the 
definition of rape in the Indian Penal Code 1860. 
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around the time that Phulmoni died (Kannabiran K, 2009).341 An examination of this statute 
shows that the term “marital rape” has not been specifically used. Yet, section 3 of the 
Protection of Women Against Domestic Violence Act 2005 includes “sexual abuse” within the 
term “domestic violence”, and defines “sexual abuse” to include any conduct of a sexual 
nature that abuses, humiliates, degrades or otherwise violates the dignity of woman 
(Explanation 1(ii) of Section 3). The magistrate can grant protection orders, residence orders, 
monetary relief, custody orders, compensation orders, and interim and ex parte orders in 
order to redress the victim and prevent the respondent from committing an act of domestic 
violence. Though the existence of this civil remedy is important, criminalising marital rape 
would act as a powerful deterrent and go a long way towards protecting women in their own 
homes. 
4.6.4. Marital rape and the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act 2006 
The Prohibition of Child Marriage Act 2006 provides for the prohibition of solemnisation of 
child marriages. “Child” is defined as a person who, if a male, has not reached 21 years of 
age, and if a female, has not reached 18 years of age.342 This enactment suffers the 
impediment that it is merely limited to a declaration of the validity or nullity of child 
marriages. 
In child marriages, where any party or both parties involve boys below the age of 21, in the 
case of boys or/and girls below the age of 18, the marriage is valid so long as the contracting 
party who was a child at the time of marriage does not exercise his/her option to annul the 
marriage. Hence, with regard to the issue of marital rape within a relationship of child 
marriage, the provisions of the IPC apply regarding exemption for rape of a child-wife who is 
above the age of 15. If she is below 15, then the punishment of rigorous imprisonment for a 
minimum of ten years and a maximum of life imprisonment, along with fine applies to 
                                                        
341Queen-Empress v Hurree Mohun Mythee (1891) ILR 18 Cal 49, as stated in Kannabiran, K. (2009). Sexual 
assault and the Law, pp. 78-118. Kannabiran, K. and  Singh, R. (eds.), Challenging the Rule(s) of Law: 
Colonialism, Criminology and Human Rights in India.  New Delhi, SAGE, p.31. 
342Section 2(a), Prohibition of Child Marriages Act 2006. 
This enactment makes child marriages voidable at the option of the contracting party (Section 3). It criminalizes 
the promoting or permitting solemnization of child marriages by punishing any person having charge of the 
child, both lawful and unlawful, with rigorous imprisonment upto to two years and fine which may extend upto 
one lakh rupees (Section 11). The Act declares marriage of a minor child to be void when the child is taken out 
of the keeping of the lawful guardian, or by force or deceit, compelled or induced to go from any place or is sold 
for the purpose of marriage and made to go through a form of marriage or if the minor is marriage after which 
the minor is sold or trafficked or used for immoral purposes (Section 12). A First Class Judicial 
Magistrate/Metropolitan Magistrate can issue an injunction order prohibiting child marriages (Section 13), and 
those child marriages which are solemnized in violation of such injunction order are declared by the Act as void 
ab initio (Section 14). 
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whomever commits rape on a woman when she is less than 16 years of age, as per Section 
376(2)(i) IPC. 
The IPC does not punish marital rape of a woman above the age of 15 by her husband, even 
though the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act 2006 clearly states that the age of marriage of a 
woman is 18 and that of a man is 21. 
Further complicating matters is the fact that even though the Prohibition of Child Marriages 
Act 2006 prohibits child marriages, such marriages have been permitted under the Hindu 
Marriage Act as well as Muslim personal law. No specific prohibition has been issued by the 
Indian Parliament against such provisions in personal law. Hence, the problem of child 
marriages continues. 
4.6.5. Marital rape and POCSO 
As demonstrated, the POCSO criminalizes sexual offences upon children below the age of 18 
years, irrespective of the age of the perpetrator of such an activity, or consent of the child 
involved, or relationship with the child. In the paper on child marriage and the POCSO, Raha 
and Giliyal (2013) state that, irrespective of marital status, all sexual activity with regard to 
child wives above the age of 15and below the age of 18 is criminalized by the POCSO. The 
POCSO states that one of the grounds of aggravated penetrative sexual assault is through a 
relative of the child through marriage (section 5(n), punishable with a minimum period of ten 
years imprisonment which may extend up to life imprisonment (section 6).343 
According to section 42A344, the provisions of the POCSO shall be in addition to and not in 
derogation to any other law and, in case of any inconsistency, the provisions of the POCSO 
shall have overriding effect on the provisions of any such law to the extent of the 
inconsistency. 
According to Raha and Giliyal (2013), from a reading of section 42A POCSO  it can be 
clearly inferred that such exemption under Exception 2 of Section 375 IPC is to be 
overridden by the provisions of the POCSO  which criminalises various sexual offences 
against children below the age of 18. 
                                                        
343Raha, S. & Giliyal, A. (2013). Child Marriage and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 
2012. Bangalore: CCL-NLSIU. https://www.nls.ac.in/ccl/justicetochildren/poscoact.pdf  
344This was added by virtue of Chapter V of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013. It did not exist 
previously in the POCSO. 
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Definitely, section 42A POCSO , which was inserted as an amendment to the POCSO  by the 
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, puts the entire issue of exempting marital rape of 
women above the age of 15 by their husbands in a different light. However, the question 
remains whether section 5(n) of the POCSO , which implicates a person who is a relative of a 
child through marriage and who commits penetrative sexual assault upon a child, was 
intended by the Parliament to include a spouse of the child, or a husband of a female child, 
the former being gender-neutral and the latter gender-specific. Again, if the interpretation 
argued by Raha and Giliyal (2013) is correct, then the law would be deemed coherent and in 
tune with the rule of law principle. It is understood that the issue of Exception 2 in Section 
375 IPC is a matter sub-judice.345 
4.6.6. Age of a married woman for sexual activity vis-a-vis age of an unmarried woman 
for sexual activity 
In a decision by the Delhi High Court before the POCSO came into force, Court on its own 
motion (Lajja Devi)v State346, on the pre-2013 section 375 of the IPC regarding the offence of 
rape, the Delhi High Court observed that it is “distressing” that the IPC “acquiesces child 
marriage” by stating that sexual intercourse by a man with his wife above the age of 15 and 
below the age of 16 years is not rape. The Court lamented the distressing fact that various 
legislations like the Indian Majority Act 1875, Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956 
and the Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 recognize child marriages and thereby destroy the very 
purpose and object of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act (called the PCM Act by the 
Court) which was enacted to restrain and prevent the solemnization of child marriages. The 
Court then distinguished the position of girls below and above 16 years of age. With respect 
to girls above the age of 16 years, it held: 
“If the girl is more than 16 years, and the girl makes a statement that she went with her consent and the 
statement and consent is without any force, coercion or undue influence, the statement could be 
accepted and Court will be within its power to quash the proceedings under Section 363 or 376 IPC. 
Here again no straight jacket formula can be applied. The Court has to be cautious, for the girl has right 
to get the marriage nullified under Section 3 of the PCM Act. Attending circumstances including the 
maturity and understanding of the girl, social background of girl, age of the girl and boy etc. have to be 
taken into consideration.” 
 
                                                        
345Mandhani, A. (2015). SC impleads NCW as party to Writ challenging validity of Exception-2 of S.375 IPC -
Sexual intercourse with married girl child between 15-18 years [Read the 
Submissions]http://www.livelaw.in/sc-impleads-ncw-as-party-to-writ-challenging-validity-of-exception-2-of-s-
375-IPC/ ; A Public Interest Litigation filled by Independent Thought, an organization working on child rights 
law, is being heard in the Supreme Court of India for declaring the exception allowing marital rape within 
prohibited child marriages as unconstitutional- Independent Thought v. Union of India [W.P(civil) 382 of 2013] 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Child_marriage_in_India#cite_ref-5. 
3462012 VIAD (Delhi) 465. 
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In cases of marriage of a girl below the age of 16 years, her consent would be immaterial. 
However, the court stated: 
“…there can be special or exceptional circumstances which may require consideration, in cases where 
the girl even after attaining majority affirms and reiterates her consent.” 
 
Most importantly, the court held that consummation with a wife below the age of 15 years is 
an offence and it is irrelevant whether she is married or applicable personal law provides 
otherwise.347 
This problem is exacerbated now that the age of consent for sexual activity of girl-children 
has been raised to 18, as per the POCSO and post-2013 IPC. However, for married women 
below the age of 18, sexual intercourse can take place irrespective of her consent once she 
reaches the age of 15. This kind of classification of women – a higher age to indulge in 
sexual activity if she is unmarried because she is considered by law to be incapable of making 
decisions regarding her sexual freedom, and a lower age to indulge in the same kind of 
activity once she is married – is arbitrary and discriminatory, and makes mockery of women 
as a class. The child-wife above the age of 15 is in a sad predicament: since she is married, 
she does not get the protection against rape that an unmarried girl below the age of 18, merely 
because the rapist happens to be her husband, as Indian law does not recognize marital rape. 
However, as per section 42A POCSO, the girl child above the age of 15 and below the age of 
18 is legally entitled to protection against penetrative sexual assault by a person who is a 
relative through marriage. Whether the relative through marriage would include a husband is 
not specified. 
Incongruence to the rule of law can be removed if Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC is 
amended to exclude sexual intercourse with a wife below the age of 18 years. 
4.II. Conclusion 
 
Analysis of the first issue in this chapter showed that the nature and scope of sexual offences 
in the POCSO show positive advancement in child sexual abuse law. Analysis of the second 
issue regarding the amended offence of rape n the IPC show that, to a certain extent, positive 
advances have been made in responding to child sexual abuse. However, provisions 
punishing penetrative sexual abusers of male children must be added. Having gender-neutral 
                                                        
347Supra n.342 at p.3.  
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definitions of sexual offences for victim and offender in the general criminal law can simplify 
prosecution. Analysis of the third issue regarding the offence of carnal intercourse in the IPC 
shows that sufficient legal protection against child sexual abuse is absent because a reading of 
this section pinpoints the purpose to punish “voluntary” intercourse of a “carnal” nature 
alone. The Supreme Court judgment in Suresh Kumar Kaushal (2013) declares that both 
voluntary homosexual acts as well as heterosexual acts of a non-penile-vaginal penetrative 
nature alone are punishable under this section. Again, instances of sexual abuse of boy 
children by women is excluded from offences under the IPC. Analysis of the fourth issue 
shows that the present law on sexual assault in the IPC requires certain fundamental changes 
to make it more appropriate for prosecution of children: 
a. The victim must be gender-neutral 
b. Provisions punishing sexual assault of male children must be added 
c. The term “outraging the modesty” must be removed 
d. The types of acts which comprise of non-penetrative non-consensual sexual assault 
must be specified in the provisions 
e. Provision should be made for punishment of aggravated cases of sexual assault. 
 
The continuing refusal to recognise forced sexual intercourse within the institution of 
marriage is a stark reminder of social realities which continue to prevent changes in the law. 
Deletion of Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC would be one step towards removal of 
inequalities against women and foster congruence to the rule of law. This recommendation is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, but can be confined to a statement that incongruence to the 
rule of law, from a child rights’ perspective, can be removed if Exception 2 to Section 375 of 
the IPC is amended to exclude sexual intercourse with a wife below the age of 18 years. 
 
The current criminalisation of abusive and non-abusive sexual activity of children below the 
age of 18 in the POCSO does not seem to be a positive advance in responding to child sexual 
abuse. There is a need for a general law which allows for sexual autonomy of a person below 
the age of 18 in certain circumstances, at the same time protecting children from sexual 
assault and abuse. This would provide adequate protection to the class of persons between the 
ages of 16 and 18 who engage in consensual sexual activities which do not amount to assault 
or abuse or compulsion due to customary practices. 
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This chapter has provided an analysis of legislation and case law on the basis of six indices of 
departure from consistency, coherence and clarity; correctness in allowing for uniformity and 
in tune with principles of statutory interpretation; correctness with the equality principle; 
correctness with regard to government policy; and correctness in restricting the scope of 
judicial discretion, as identified from the rule of law sub-rules principles enunciated by 
Bingham (2007). 
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CHAPTER 5: THEORETICAL 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
5. I. Introduction 
 
The law on child sexual abuse in India was vague, obscure and undefined until the passing of 
the POCSO, which is read along with the IPC. Important amendments were made to the IPC 
in 2013 by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, resulting in ambiguity in the 
interpretation of certain provisions of the POCSO. Chapter 3 of this thesis synthesises 
relevant provisions and case law, along with certain provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. From this, six key legal issues were identified, which 
were further analysed in Chapter 4. These issues pertained to the nature and scope of the 
sexual offences in the POCSO, the offence of rape in the IPC, the offence of carnal 
intercourse in the IPC, criminalisation of all sexual activity of children, offences on sexual 
assault in the IPC, statutory exclusion of marital rape of a child-wife in the IPC. 
This chapter discusses the character of the law on child sexual abuse in India and its 
outcomes when viewed from a rights perspective of the UNCRC. Here, key legal issues are 
examined using social science evidence findings laid down in Chapter 1 with regard to the 
difficulties in definitions pertaining to consensual sexual relationships between minors, 
evidence of gender distinctions, and the difficulty for children to disclose, much less 
participate, in the legal process. 
The key issues for analysis are: 
1. The nature and scope of the provisions on sexual offences in the POCSO from a child 
rights’ perspective 
2.The gap in the IPC regarding sexual offences against children, created by the nature and 
scope of the amended offence of rape in sections 375 and 376 IPC and the present 
interpretation of the offence of carnal intercourse in section 377 IPC 
3. The current criminalisation of all sexual activity (both abusive and non-abusive) of 
children below the age of 18 
273 
 
273 
 
4. The statutory exclusion of child-wife rape from the scope of the amended offence of rape 
in the IPC. 
5.1. Classification of sexual activity 
Before proceeding, it must be clarified that sexual activity can be grouped into consensual 
and non-consensual, and abusive or non-abusive. The consent of children below the age of 18 
is now technically immaterial, as they are deemed by law to be incapable of consent. 
However, social science evidence shows that it is a common part of sexual development for 
young people to explore and experiment in sexual interactions with their peers (Araji, 2004). 
Appropriate sexual exploration is when there is mutual agreement between same or similar-
aged peers, it is non-coercive, and all participants have control to participate, continue or stop 
the behavior (Barbaree & Marshall, 2006). 
Based on Araji (2004), the following table classifying “normal” non-abusive sexual behavior 
of adolescents and coercive or forceful or abusive sexual behavior was presented by Boyd & 
Bromfield (2006):348 
Normal adolescent sexual behaviours Concerning/Abusive behaviours 
Masturbation in private Masturbation causing physical harm or distress to self and 
others  
Public masturbation 
Mutual kissing Unwanted kissing 
Sexual arousal   
Sexual attraction to others 
Voyeurism  
Stalking  
Sadism (gaining sexual pleasure from the suffering of others) 
Consensual touching of others’ genitals  
Consensual sexual intercourse  
Consensual oral sex 
Non-consensual groping or touching of others' genitals  
Coercive sexual intercourse/sexual assault  
Coercive oral sex 
Behaviour that contributes to positive relationships Behaviour that isolates the young person and is destructive of 
their relationships with peers and family 
                                                        
348See Table 1 at p.2 of Boyd, C. & Bromfield, L. (2006). Young people who sexually abuse: Key issues. NCPC 
Practice Brief No. 1 — December 2006. <https://aifs.gov.au/cfca/publications/young-people-who-sexually-
abuse-key-issues>. 
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5.2. ISSUES FOR ANALYSIS 
The four issues for theoretical analysis are framed based on the categorising of sexual activity 
as consensual and non-abusive, and non-consensual and abusive. 
5.2.1. The nature and scope of the provisions on sexual offences in the POCSO from a 
child rights’ perspective 
The promulgation of the POCSO shows that Indian law has made positive advances in 
responding to child sexual abuse. This legislations provides clear substantive provisions 
defining the offences and laying down punishments. The six offences of sexual abuse –
penetrative sexual assault, aggravated penetrative sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated 
sexual assault, sexual harassment and using a child for pornographic purposes – cover the 
entire gamut of penetrative, contact and non-contact offences of sexual abuse of children. 
Chapter 4 shows that the POCSO has been drafted consistently, coherently, and correctly in 
accordance with the rule of law. The reasons cited in Chapter 4 are based on the following 
three findings: 
1. The provisions of POCSO are consistently gender-neutral. 
2. A comparison of the sexual offences laid down in the Goa Children’s Act 2003 with 
POCSO offences and their corresponding IPC offences show positive development in the law 
against child sexual abuse in India. The three sexual offences defined and punished in the 
Goa Children’s Act 2003349 lack clarity and comprehensiveness when compared to the six 
POCSO offences. Unlike the POCSO provisions which apply equally to protect boy and girl 
children, the IPC provisions do not offer adequate protection against sexual abuse of children 
of both genders. The recent amendment of the IPC in 2013 specifically punishes acts of male 
voyeurism, exhibitionism, sexual harassment, stalking and rape of females. However, male 
children continue to be excluded from protection against sexual acts in the IPC. The 
provision punishing voluntary unnatural acts under the IPC has been stretched by the 
judiciary to include unnatural sexual acts upon children, which adds to the ambiguity of the 
general criminal law. 
3. The passing of the POCSO has made a positive impact upon the rule of law in Goa and 
Kerala with regard to sexual offences against children. 
                                                        
349 Grave sexual assault (which includes contact offences like penetrative acts, injurious acts and using children 
in pornography), sexual assault (which comprises of sexual touching, and non-contact offences of voyeurism, 
exhibitionism, as well as showing pornography or sexual acts to children etc) and incest (which is sexual abuse 
by a relative by blood or adoption) 
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Article 34 of the UNCRC defines sexual exploitation and sexual abuse to comprise of: 
(a) The inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity; 
(b) The exploitative use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices; 
(c) The exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and materials. 
Article 34 of the UNCRC states that State parties ought to undertake to protect the child from 
all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse through appropriate national, bilateral and 
multilateral measures. After acceding to this treaty in 1992, India has an international 
obligation to abide by the treaty. 
The provisions of the POCSO regarding the definitions of penetrative and non-penetrative 
sexual offences are in line with the stipulations under Article 34(a) of the UNCRC regarding 
unlawful sexual activity. 
Article 2 of the UNCRC obligates the State to ensure for equality of all children, and 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status, as well as 
protection against discrimination or punishment on the basis of status, activities, expressed 
opinions, or beliefs of the child's parents, legal guardians, or family members. 
The POCSO offers equal protection to both boys and girls. Gender-neutrality in the 
definitions augments better protection for children, as, contrary to popular perception in 
India, boys are also highly at-risk as are girls – a fact indicated by the 2007 MWCD Report. 
Hence, gender-neutral definitions of sexual abuse offences in the POCSO allows for better 
protection of children as a class. This statute fulfils the obligations of the UNCRC. 
5.2.2. The gap in the IPC regarding sexual offences against children: sections 375, 376, 
377 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that the pre-2013 provisions on rape in sections 375 and 376 IPC 
were problematic in three ways: firstly, only penile-vaginal sexual intercourse was recognised 
within the offence of rape; secondly, male children were not granted protection from 
penetrative sexual abuse; and thirdly, women sex offenders were not apprehended by the 
criminal justice system because the law does not recognise non-consensual penetrative sexual 
offences committed by a woman. After the 2013 amendment, other forms of penetrative 
sexual intercourse with a woman by a man also came within the definition of rape. This step 
of recognising unwanted oral, anal and other bodily-part intercourse within the offence of 
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rape under sections 375 and 376 IPC eradicated the restricted interpretation given to the term 
“rape”. Yet these provisions continue to be problematic, as they exclude male children who 
are penetrated by males and females, and female children who are penetrated by women, 
from within the scope. Chapter 4 demonstrated the lack of adequate provisions for the 
protection of male children from sexual abuse, as well as the lack of law criminalising 
women who sexually violate others the bodies of others. 
The current interpretation of the offence of carnal intercourse in section 377 IPC, obtained 
from a combined reading of the new definitions of rape under sections 375 and 376 post-2013 
along with case laws in Sakshi’s case (2004), Naz (2009) and Suresh Kumar Kaushal (2014), 
is problematic. Though section 377 punishes only voluntary acts, the court has interpreted 
this to include types of child sexual abuse which are excluded from section 376.350Section 
377 would now technically apply to: (1) consensual penile-anus, penile-oral, finger-anal, 
finger-vaginal penetration, or object-vaginal penetration of a man by any person; (2) penile-
anus, penile-oral, finger-anal, finger-vaginal or object-vaginal penetration of minor children 
irrespective of consent, by any person; and (3) bestiality. 
Section 377 IPC was designed to criminalise voluntary carnal acts, not non-consensual and 
abusive carnal acts. The law does not protect men who seek legal recourse for being forced 
into non-consensual and abusive intercourse with other persons; non-consensual and abusive 
acts by women upon other women are also not addressed. Discussions on these reforms are 
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it is necessary to argue for a separate provision in 
general criminal law regarding punishment of sexual penetration of minor children by any 
person, as in the POCSO, as the absence of provisions prosecuting penetrative sexual abuse 
of children of all genders by both men and women renders the law confusing, inconsistent 
and discriminatory. 
This is problematic from a theoretical perspective when evaluating the law using the 
standards of the UNCRC, and the social science evidence about the prevalence of child sexual 
abuse. 
Despite the 2007 MWCD Report showing higher statistics of boy-child sexual abuse contrary 
to popular conception, the substantive law in India – the IPC – continues to ignore the 
propensity of sexual abuse of boy-children. From a child rights’ perspective, the IPC needs to 
                                                        
350Naz Foundation v Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (2010) CriLJ 94. 
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be amended further in order to accommodate provisions punishing sexual offenders of boy-
children. 
In Chapter 2, evidence shows that girls are at higher risk of abuse than boys. Older boys are 
underrepresented in psychiatric samples, perhaps because of their unwillingness to disclose 
(Putnam, 2003). Factors that perpetuate non-disclosure by males are the socialisation of 
males within a culture where independence, sexual prowess and self-reliance are valued, 
whilst vulnerability, fear, dependency and homosexuality are considered as weaknesses and 
likely to lead to rejection and denigration (Spataro et al., 2001). This is particularly important 
when the IPC does not offer protection to boy-children from abuse. 
Social myths allow women predators of male children to escape punishment. A combined 
reading of sections 375, 376 and 377 IPC show that the law allows adult women sex 
offenders to escape from its purview. In 2015, the Mumbai police reported a case where a 
boy of 16 years of age was repeatedly subjected to penetrative sexual assault by his friend’s 
mother along with blackmail, putting an end to the arguments of pro-gender-specific women 
activist lawyers in India who have been quoted that there is not a single case reported of 
women having raped men.351Despite this case, it is highly unlikely that the law would be 
amended to include women sex offenders of male children. The main reason for such 
hesitancy was highlighted in the Delhi Rape case of 2012 where a minor male aged 17 years 
brutally raped an adult woman aged 21 years, and the fear that such a provision would be 
misused by males in order to escape liability for committing sexual offences upon adult 
women. 
Article 34 of the UNCRC asks States to take steps to protect children from unwanted sexual 
activity. As per this Article, State Parties undertake to protect the child from all forms of 
sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. For these purposes, State parties shall in particular take 
all appropriate national measures to prevent (a) the inducement or coercion of a child to 
engage in any unlawful sexual activity; (b) the exploitative use of children in prostitution or 
other unlawful sexual practices; and (c) the exploitative use of children in pornographic 
performances and materials. 
                                                        
351Dutta, N. N. (2015)16-year-old boy raped by woman in Mumbai – can a man be sexually assaulted? 
http://www.india.com/news/india/16-year-old-boy-raped-by-woman-in-mumbai-can-a-man-be-sexually-
assaulted-337583/  
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Article 2 of the UNCRC obligates the State to ensure for equality of all children, and 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status, as well as 
protection against discrimination or punishment on the basis of status, activities, expressed 
opinions, or beliefs of the child's parents, legal guardians, or family members. 
The law on rape in the IPC specifically excludes male children from within its ambit. Rape is 
confined to penetrative sexual abuse of a woman by a man. It excludes women offenders of 
male children. The general law does not protect male children from penetrative sexual abuse 
by men and women. It does not protect female children from penetrative sexual abuse by 
women. Hence the IPC does not fulfil the equality obligations laid down in Article 2, nor 
does it fulfil the obligation laid in Article 34 (a) of the UNCRC to prevent the inducement or 
coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity. 
5.2.3. The current criminalisation of all sexual activity (both abusive and non-abusive) 
of children below the age of 18 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that prior to the enactment of the POCSO, the age for sexual 
relations was 16, as seen in section 375 IPC which punishes statutory rape of a girl below the 
age of 16irrespective of consent. But the age of sexual consent of male children was not 
stipulated by law. After the POCSO and the 2013 amendment to the IPC, the age of consent 
for sexual activity was18 for both sexes. These provisions in the IPC and POCSO  which 
criminalize all sexual activity (both abusive and non-abusive) of children below the age of 18 
present legal and practical issues, as shown in Chapter 4. The anomaly regarding 
inconsistency in the IPC between the genders regarding the age of consent (the age of 
consent of women is specified through section 375) and the conflict with the POCSO  
regarding which law prevails has been removed by section 42A POCSO , which makes the 
law regarding the age of consent of men and women at 18. The absence of a general law 
which allows for sexual autonomy of a person below the age of 18 in certain circumstances, 
at the same time protecting children from sexual assault and abuse, renders the law incorrect 
in providing adequate protection to the class of “mature” children between the ages of 16 and 
18 who wish to engage in consensual sexual activities which do not amount to assault or 
abuse or compulsion due to customary practices. 
As stated in Chapter 4, no general law exists which specifies the age of consent for sexual 
activity, other than prohibition of child marriage when one of the contracting parties is a male 
279 
 
279 
 
child who has not reached 21 years of age or a female child who has not reached 18 years of 
age under the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act 2006, and the Exception to Section 375 
which exempts married men from statutory rape if the wife is above the age of 15.352Under 
the current law, women can enter into sexual relationships within marriage from the age of 
15, and enter into sexual relationships without marriage after the age of 18 (pre-2013 
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, women’s age of consent was 16 as per section 375), 
while males can enter into sexual relationships within marriage before the age of 21, and 
without marriage from the age of 18. 
The law regarding the age of consent is highly confusing and inconsistent with rule of law 
principles. 
This lack of clarity is also problematic from a theoretical perspective when evaluating the law 
against the UNCRC, and using the social science evidence about the prevalence of child 
sexual abuse generally. 
In addition to Article 34, Article 19 of the UNCRC stipulates that State parties ought to take 
all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child 
from all forms of sexual abuse while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other 
person who has the care of the child. 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has reinforced these Convention rights and made 
declarations which provide more substantive insights into the nature of the abstract rights. In 
2011 in its General Comment No. 13 on Article 19 regarding the right of the child to freedom 
from all forms of violence, the Committee elaborated on the meaning of “sexual abuse” for 
the purpose of interpreting and applying Article 19, defining sexual abuse and exploitation in 
Article 19 to include: 
(a) The inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful or psychologically 
harmful sexual activity; 
(b) The use of children in commercial sexual exploitation; and 
(c) The use of children in audio or visual images of child sexual abuse; 
(d) Child prostitution, sexual slavery, sexual exploitation in travel and tourism, trafficking 
(within and between countries) and sale of children for sexual purposes and forced marriage. 
                                                        
352However, child marriages are not void ab initio, only voidable at the option of the contracting party, provided 
that such marriage, whether consummated or not, was repudiated within two years of either of them attaining the 
marriage age (section 13 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act 2006). 
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Many children experience sexual victimization which is not accompanied by physical force 
or restraint but which is nonetheless psychologically intrusive, exploitative, and traumatic.353 
The Committee stated that sexual abuse comprises any sexual activities imposed by an adult 
on a child, against which the child is entitled to protection by criminal law. Sexual activities 
are also considered abuse when committed against a child by another child, if the child 
offender is significantly older than the child victim or uses power, threat or other means of 
pressure. Sexual activities between children are not considered sexual abuse if the children 
are older than the age limit defined by the State party for consensual sexual activities. 354 
The J.S. Verma Committee stated that the UNCRC aimed to protect children from sexual 
assault and abuse and not criminalize consensual sex between two individuals if they are 
below 18 years of age. Hence the J.S. Verma Committee was in favor of reducing of the age 
of consent for sexual activity to 16, as the age of 18 would result in the criminalization of 
consensual sex between persons who are below 18 years of age.355 It is common knowledge 
that after the POCSO came into force, many cases were registered against young men in 
relationships with girls under the age of 18. However, if these relationships are against 
parental wishes, or the girl-child feels that her lover has cheated her, then cases against the 
man/boy involved would be booked under the POCSO. In many cases, the POCSO is used 
against innocent parties to settle scores. 
Recently, a study by CCL-NLSIU (2016) examined 667 judgments passed by 20 judges from 
the Delhi District Courts from 1 January 2013 to 30 September 2015. In a large number of 
cases involving romantic relationships, a complaint was filed by the family after which the 
prosecutrix and the accused were found to have married each other. In most cases, the 
ceremonies of marriage were not performed, but this aspect was not scrutinized by the court. 
In a few cases, the complaint was filed by the prosecutrix, because of a breach of the promise 
to marry. In none of the cases in which the prosecutrix admitted to a romantic relationship 
was the voluntary nature of the relationship or the age gap between them scrutinized by the 
court.356 
                                                        
353 Para 25, General comment No. 13 (2011). The right of the child to freedom from all forms of violence. 
CRC/C/GC/13 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/docs/CRC.C.GC.13_en.pdf at p.10. 
354See Footnote, Ibid. 
355Footnote 1, Verma, J.S., Justice, Seth, L., Justice, & Subramaniam, G. (2013). Report of the Committee on 
Amendments to Criminal Law.  New Delhi: Government of India, pp.443-444.   
356 CCL-NLSIU (2016). Report of Study on the working of Special Courts under the POCSO Act, 2012 in Delhi 
( p.19). https://www.nls.ac.in/ccl/jjdocuments/specialcourtPOSCOAct2012.pdf. 
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Under Article 12 of the UNCRC, the State is obligated to make provisions that a child is free 
to express his own views in accordance with his age and maturity. The child shall be given an 
opportunity to be heard before any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the 
child. This is particularly relevant in judicial proceedings involving romantic relationships, 
when the age of consent has been fixed at 18 under the POCSO. It is clear that a problem 
exists in establishing whether a child is of sufficient maturity to decide matters of sexual 
consent. 
One solution to this problem would be to bring introduce “close-in-age” exceptions. In many 
countries, these exceptions are made for consensual acts between adolescents close in age. A 
liberal similar-age consent defence ensures that cases, in which a prosecution appears to be 
unjust, are kept to a minimum (Warner, 2012). Regarding the issue of age limits, Warner 
(2012) comments that to some extent all age limits are arbitrary, including the age below 
which no defence of consent is available.357 
For example, in Australia, where the age of consent is at 16 years except for Tasmania and 
Southern Australia at 17 years, some state jurisdictions provide a legal defence when the 
sexual interaction is between two young people close in age (Western Australia, Tasmania, 
Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory). In South Australia, the defence of consent is 
only available to a person who is under the age of 17 and only when the person with whom 
they had sexual intercourse (the complainant) was at least 16 years of age.358 In Victoria, as 
long as the complainant is at least 12 years old and the accused is not more than two years 
older, consent is a defence.359 The ACT has a similar-age consent defence if the complainant 
is 10 years of age or older and the accused is not more than two years older.360 In many other 
countries, like Austria, Bolivia, Croatia, and Sweden, “close-in age” exceptions are stipulated 
for sexual acts if the age difference is less than three years.361 Hungary has an age of consent 
of 14 years, with a close-in-age exception for sexual acts from age 12 if the older party is 
under 18. In the Netherlands, close-in-age exceptions within "social-ethical norms" are at the 
discretion of the prosecution.362 In the Netherlands, the age of consent for both males and 
females 16 years. However, in 1990, the Morality Laws were revised to the effect that all 
                                                        
357Warner, K. (2012). Setting The Boundaries Of Child Sexual Assault: Consent And Mistake As To Age 
Defences. [Online]. Melbourne University Law Review; 36 (3), pp.1009-1036 at p.1020. 
358Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 49(4). 
359Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 45(4). 
360Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 55(3). 
361Legal Ages of Consent By Country https://www.ageofconsent.net/world. 
362Age of Consent in Netherlands https://www.ageofconsent.net/world/netherlands. 
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“non-violent” sexual intercourse with a child between 12 and 16 years will only be 
prosecuted upon complaint by the child, although the age of consent remains 16 years for 
both males and females.363 In Canada, there exist two close-in-age exceptions, depending on 
the age of the younger partner. A youth of 12 or 13can consent to sexual activity with an 
individual less than two years older. A 14- or 15-year-old can consent to sexual activity with 
a partner who is less than five years older.364 
In the USA, where the age of consent varies from state to state from 16 to 18, the close-in-age 
exceptions varies.Federal legislation called the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act 
was signed into law in July 2006. Title I of the Act, known as the Sex Offender Registration 
and Notification Act (SORNA), establishes minimum registry standards states have to meet, 
which include registering juveniles found guilty of certain crimes. Various states have 
enacted laws commonly referred to as “Romeo and Juliet” laws which are intended to protect 
young people who are relatively close in age who engage in consensual sex from registering 
as sexual offenders. Some states, like Florida, have done this using a motion or petition 
process for registration relief, some states have provided age-gap provisions, while other 
states have gone so far as to legalize certain sexual conduct between minors and/or those 
close in age to avoid the registration requirement and the criminal charge associated with the 
sexual conduct.365 Florida’s age of sexual consent is 18 years. Its law provides a mechanism 
for the offender to petition or make a motion to the court to remove the requirement to 
register as a sexual offender if certain criteria are met: the victim must be at least 14 years-
old, the offender no more than four years older than the victim at the time of the offence, and 
the victim must have consented to the sexual conduct.366In Delaware, the age of consent is 
18. But close-in-age exceptions exist which allow minors aged below 18 years to consent to 
sexual intercourse if their partner is under the age of 30 or if they were married at the time of 
the incident.367 Minors above age 12 may consent to a partner no more than 18 years of age, 
while children below age 12 may not consent under any circumstances.368 In Hawaii, the age 
                                                        
363See Footnote 23, Simpson R. and Figgis H. (1997). The Age Of Consent, p. 9. 
https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/researchpapers/Documents/the-age-of-consent/bf21-1997.pdf . 
364Criminal Code (Canada) ss150.1(2)–(2.1) 
365Committee on Criminal Justice (2011). Examine Florida’s “Romeo And Juliet” Law. The Florida Senate 
Issue Brief 2012-2014.http://www.flsenate.gov/PublishedContent/Session/2012/InterimReports/2012-214cj.pdf 
366Section 943.04354, F.S. 
367 S. 770 (2), 11 De. Code Ann. http://www.delcode.delaware.gov/title11/c005/sc02/index.shtml  
368See sections 768-773, Ibid. 
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of consent is 16. However, a child aged 14 or 15 can consent to sexual relations with a person 
not more than five years older than the child.369 
Indian law could specifically provide for provisions in order to enable non-criminalisation of 
non-abusive sexual activity. Adequate leniency must be granted in the case of age-
appropriate sexual behaviour. Article 40 of the UNCRC exhorts State parties to recognize the 
right of every child alleged as, accused of, or recognized as having infringed the law to be 
treated in a manner consistent with the promotion of the child's sense of dignity and worth, 
which reinforces the child's respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of others 
and which takes into account the child's age and the desirability of promoting the child's 
reintegration and the child's assuming a constructive role in society. The addition of 
appropriate defence provisions would help to prevent misuse of the POCSO by various 
interest groups. 
The Netherlands model, where close-in-age exceptions within "social-ethical norms" are at 
the discretion of the prosecution, could suggest a way forward by giving discretion to judges 
to set aside convictions if the accused and the victim are within a reasonable age gap, both 
testify on the non-abusive nature of the sexual activity, and the judge is convinced that the 
sexual offence alleged is a manipulation of the legal system for personal vendetta. 
Despite being a traditionally closed society like India, where religion dominates culture, 
discussions on sexuality are taboo, and pre-marital relationships by women are actively 
discouraged, where it may seem highly unlikely that a discussion on age-appropriate sexual 
behaviour can be initiated, much less legislation providing defence mechanisms for non-
abusive sexual activity, it is welcoming to see judicial decisions by the High Courts of 
various states in India that have dismissed cases filed by the minor girl’s relatives against 
close in age adult males who have been found genuinely in love with the girl, by taking steps 
to get married after the girl child reaches majority. It is interesting to see how the Kerala High 
Court has invoked its inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC in order to quash criminal 
proceedings under POCSO and the IPC pending against the accused husband. This shows that 
there is a judicial trend among the High Courts in India not to criminalise sexual activity 
when the child is mature and responsible enough to understand the implications of his/her 
sexual act. 
 
                                                        
369Haw. Rev. Stat. ss.707-730, 707-732. 
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5.4.4. The statutory exclusion of child-wife rape above the age of 15 years from the 
scope of the amended offence of rape in the IPC 
 
Chapter 4 demonstrated that the retention of Exception 2 of Section 375 of the IPC regarding 
sexual intercourse with child-wives above the age of 15, in the light of the POCSO and the 
Prohibition of Child Marriages Act 2006, is problematic, as all sexual intercourse, both 
consensual and non-abusive or non-consensual and abusive, with children under the age of 18 
is prohibited. 
Exception 2 of Section 375 of the IPC states that sexual intercourse by a man with his own 
wife, the wife not being under 15 years, is not rape. This conflicts with POCSO provisions 
prohibiting sexual activity with children below the age of 18, as well as the Prohibition of 
Child Marriages Act 2006, which establishes the age of a person for marriage as 18 for 
women, and 21 for men.370 But the Prohibition of Child Marriages Act 2006 ensures that 
child marriages are not void ab initio, and only rendered voidable at the option of the 
contracting party, provided that such marriage, whether consummated or not, was repudiated 
within two years of either of them attaining the marriage age.371 These problems present legal 
and practical issues of incongruence. 
These issues are problematic from a theoretical perspective when evaluating the law against 
the UNCRC, and using the social science evidence about the prevalence of child sexual abuse 
generally. 
Article 34 of the UNCRC states that State parties ought to undertake to protect the child from 
all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, through appropriate national, bilateral and 
multilateral measures. It defines sexual exploitation and sexual abuse to comprise of: 
(a) The inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity; 
(b) The exploitative use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices; 
(c) The exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and materials. 
Article 19 of the UNCRC stipulates that State parties ought to take all appropriate legislative, 
administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of sexual 
                                                        
370Section 2(a) Prohibition of Child Marriages Act 2006. 
371Section 3 Prohibition of Child Marriages Act 2006. 
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abuse while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of 
the child. 
 
Child marriage is not unlawful in India. It cannot be considered as “unlawful sexual activity” 
which comes within the ambit of Clause (1) of Article 34. But the continued approach of 
permitting child marriages to remain legal in the name of customary practices in India  ought 
not to prevail in the light of Article 19, which stipulates protection of a child from all forms 
of sexual abuse when in the care of any other person who has the care of the child. Here, the 
husband is entrusted with the care of his child-wife. Hence, India is obligated to fulfil its 
international obligations by making child marriage unlawful. 
 
The concept of marriage ought to involve consensual and non-abusive sexual intercourse 
between two contracting parties. As sexual intercourse can be abusive, it is unacceptable to 
give blanket permission for any kind of sexual intercourse because the two contracting parties 
are in a marriage relationship; more so when at least one partner is a person who is 
incompetent to consent to the contract. By creating a safe zone under the guise of marriage, 
the law allows a male to sexually abuse a girl child above the age of 15years. 
 
There are two options to address this issue: 
1. The law must make marital rape a punishable offence, which allows all married women to 
prosecute their husbands if there is non-consensual abusive sexual intercourse. This would 
allow married girl children above the age of 15 to prosecute their husbands for rape; or 
2. The law must remove the statutory exception for married girl children above the age of 
15to be subjected to intercourse by their husbands. Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC should be 
amended so as to exclude sexual intercourse with a wife below the age of 18 years. This 
would clarify that Indian law penalises child marriage, in accordance with Article 19 of the 
UNCRC. 
Ideally, making marital rape a punishable offence is the way forward in guaranteeing 
women’s rights and children’s rights. However, it is a practical reality that in India it is easier 
for the legislature to exercise the second option. Petitions for making marital rape a 
punishable offence have been rejected umpteen times even by the judiciary; however, an in-
depth discussion on this issue here is outside the scope of this thesis. 
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5.II. Conclusion 
The following analyses have been made in this chapter: 
1. Gender-neutral definitions of sexual abuse offences in the POCSO allow for better 
protection of children as a class, fulfilling the obligations of the UNCRC with regard to equal 
treatment in Article 2 and protection from inducement or coercion to engage in any unlawful 
sexual activity in Article 34. 
2. The general law does not protect male children from penetrative sexual abuse by men and 
women. It does not protect female children from penetrative sexual abuse by women. The 
IPC does not fulfil the equality obligations in Article 2, nor does it fulfil the obligation in 
Article 34(a) of the UNCRC to prevent the inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any 
unlawful sexual activity. 
3. Allowing children within a particular age group to have freedom to decide matters of 
sexual consent with persons within a particular age group may assist in the fulfilment of 
obligations under Article 12 of the UNCRC to facilitate the giving of due weight of views of 
a child in accordance with his age and maturity. Such freedom extends to non-abusive, 
consensual sexual activity, and the legal system ought to prevent abusive and non-consensual 
sexual activity in an age-appropriate manner in accordance with Article 19 of the UNCRC, 
which exhorts the State to take protective measures against all forms of sexual abuse, 
including sexual activities when the child offender is significantly older than the child victim 
or uses power, threat or other means of pressure. Adequate leniency must be granted in the 
case of age-appropriate sexual behaviour, which means recognition of the right of every child 
alleged as, accused of, or recognized as having infringed the law to be treated in a manner 
consistent with the promotion of the child's sense of dignity and worth as per Article 40. 
4. Provisions which condone child marriage, and provide exemptions for rape of child-wives 
above the age of 15, ought to be abolished, in order to fulfil obligations under Articles 34 and 
19 of the UNCRC; the latter provision specifically stipulating that States must ensure 
protection from sexual abuse, while the child is in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or 
any other person who has the care of the child. Since the husband has care over his child-
wife, it is necessary that Exception 2 of Section 375 IPC be amended to exclude sexual 
intercourse with a wife below the age of 18 years. 
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The Constitution guarantees certain rights to children. However, the Indian patriarchal system 
ensures that children, in practice, have few rights. Carson (2014) states that in spite of the 
inclusion of children’s rights within the Constitution, these constitutional rights are mainly 
need-based.372 The analysis in this thesis identifies lacunae in the law from a child rights’ 
perspective against the UNCRC as well as social science evidence. It is time that laws that 
prohibit child maltreatment be enforced and perpetrators held responsible through 
prosecution.373 This can be achieved by reforming Indian law through the treaty obligations 
of the UNCRC, and by the social science and health evidence outlined in this thesis. 
  
                                                        
372Carson, D. Foster, J. and Chowdhury, A.(2014). Sexual Abuse of Children and Youth in India An 
Anthropological Perspective. The Oriental Anthropologist.14: 2: 343-364 at 354. 
373Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
6.1. Introduction 
At the time of this research in 2011,the general criminal law in the IPC contained provisions 
which were insufficient to deal with cases of child sexual abuse. A conspiracy of silence 
shrouded cases of child sexual abuse, due to various socio-cultural reasons, which were 
reflected in the non-receptiveness of the criminal justice system. The few cases that reached 
the courts were usually dismissed for lack of evidence. Since the 1990s, Goa had a high 
foreign tourist influx, which led to the mushrooming of institutions catering to child 
prostitution. The Goa Children’s Act 2003 was promulgated to curb this menace. From 2003, 
this was the only legislation which had specific provisions punishing certain types of sexual 
abuse against children. Goa also had a fully functional Children’s Court, with powers of 
district and sessions, to deal with adult offenders of children. After the official study in 2007 
showcased data regarding high prevalence of abuse, efforts were made to bring about a law 
protecting children along the lines of the Goa Children’s Act 2003. In Kerala, statistics 
showing high prevalence of abuse fuelled endeavours to draft a state law for children. Before 
a state law in Kerala came to fruition, the national special statute of the Protection of 
Children from Sexual Offences Act 2012 came into force. This changed the law on child 
sexual abuse across the nation, including Goa. This law is extremely important in the history 
of child rights because various sexual offences against children, which did not exist in Indian 
criminal law, were defined and criminalised for the first time. Later, the passing of the 
Criminal (Amendment) Act 2013 led to a range of developments against child sexual offences 
in the IPC and POCSO, some of which have created sophisticated methods of dealing with 
certain sexual offences. 
6.2. Research Questions 
This chapter integrates the findings from Chapters 1 to 5 of this thesis and makes a significant 
contribution to knowledge by considering whether the literature and the qualitative analysis 
explore the nature and adequacy of Indian laws on child sexual abuse. This thesis examined 
the following research questions: 
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1. What is the social science evidence about the nature, prevalence and sequelae of child 
sexual abuse generally and in the Indian context? 
2.What are the legislative models for prosecuting child sexual abuse offences in India 
nationally and in the states of Kerala and Goa? 
3. What does a legal analysis of these frameworks reveal about advances and remaining 
problems in these models? 
4. What does a theoretical critique informed by the social science evidence and the UNCRC 
reveal about the adequacy of the law? 
 
6.3. Summary of findings 
 
Social science evidence from international literature demonstrates the need for clear socio-
legal studies on the impact of the criminal justice system on child victims of sexual abuse, 
and fuels the discourse on effective ways to combat non-disclosure due to socio-cultural 
reasons. The existence of various statutes defining substantive offences of child sexual abuse 
leads to confusion in interpretation of which law will prevail when two or more laws apply 
regarding various offences. This thesis shows which law ought to prevail in such 
circumstances. This thesis also discusses the impact of the UNCRC upon four problematic 
issues in the law. 
 
6.3.1. Findings in Chapter 1 
Chapter 1 introduces the topic, stating its context and scope, along with a literature review of 
relevant material from social science and legal disciplines. The gaps in scientific knowledge 
were highlighted, especially with regard to the absence of substantive analysis of the law 
before and after the recent major changes brought about by the POCSO  in 2012 and the 
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013in 2013. The original contributions that this thesis 
makes to knowledge is specified in this chapter. The contributions are: the synthesis of social 
science evidence about the nature, prevalence and sequelae of child sexual abuse generally 
and in the Indian context; synthesis of the legislative models comprising of statutory 
provisions and case law, both pre- and post- the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 
regarding prosecuting child sexual abuse offences in nationally and in the states of Kerala and 
Goa;a legal analysis of legal frameworks, both pre- and post- the Criminal Law (Amendment) 
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Act 2013, in order to reveal advances and remaining problems in these models; a theoretical 
critique informed by the social science evidence and the UNCRC about the adequacy of the 
law. 
6.3.2. Findings in Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 examined the social science evidence about child sexual abuse, its nature, and 
effects upon the health of victims. It makes an original contribution to knowledge by 
examining important Indian and international studies on the prevalence and effects of child 
sexual abuse. This thesis cited Indian case law referring to the socio-psychological contexts 
that make disclosure of sexual offences by women difficult. These references showed the 
importance of access to mental health support for both the child and non-offending family 
members in order to make disclosure, evaluation and examination by the criminal justice 
system easier. Such access to mental health support systems would positively impact the 
long-term emotional outcomes of the child and family. 
6.3.3. Findings in Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 synthesised statutes on child sexual abuse, as well as relevant case laws, and 
identified problematic areas. The IPC, the POCSO, the Goa Children’s Act 2003, and the 
Prohibition of Child Marriages Act 2006 were synthesised and analysed for this purpose. 
Relevant case law of the Supreme Court and High Courts of various states were examined to 
draw up comparisons between the national model and regional models in Goa and Kerala. 
Relevant case law was obtained by utilising the search engine of manupatra.com. 
A significant contribution to knowledge made by Chapter 3 is a comparison of the various 
legislations on child sexual abuse after the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, and how 
these laws impact the law on child sexual abuse in the Kerala and Goa; the former 
representing all other states in the Indian Union, and the latter being unique in having a pre-
existing special legislation. Pertinent articles from the UNCRC which are of relevance were 
examined in detail in order to lay the groundwork for theoretical analysis. 
This thesis identified six issues which are problematic under the present law. Conventional 
legal analysis methods were used to analyse these issues. This analysis is an original 
contribution to knowledge on child sexual abuse law. These six issues were: 
1 Has the nature and scope of the sexual offences in the POCSO made positive advances in 
responding to child sexual abuse? 
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2. Has the nature and scope of the amended offence of rape in the IPC made positive 
advances in responding to child sexual abuse? 
3. Does the current interpretation of the offence of carnal intercourse in the IPC offer 
sufficient protection against child sexual abuse? 
4. Is the current criminalisation of abusive and non-abusive sexual activity of children below 
the age of 18 a positive advance in responding to child sexual abuse? 
5. Does the present law on sexual assault in the IPC make positive advances in responding to 
child sexual abuse? 
6. Does the statutory exclusion of child-wife rape from the scope of the amended offence of 
rape in the IPC construe a positive advance in responding to child sexual abuse? 
6.3.4. Findings in Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 analysed the legislation and case law in Chapter 3 on the basis of six indices 
identified from Bingham (2007) to find establish whether the law departs from consistency, 
coherence and clarity, correctness in allowing for uniformity and principles of statutory 
interpretation, correctness with the equality principle, correctness with regard to government 
policy, and correctness in restricting the scope of judicial discretion. 
It is clear that the nature and scope of sexual offences in the POCSO show positive 
advancement in child sexual abuse law. The amended offence of rape in the IPC has also 
made positive advances. However, provisions punishing penetrative sexual abuse of male 
children must be added into the IPC. Gender neutrality of victim and offender is 
recommended in definitions of sexual offences. The offence of carnal intercourse in the IPC 
does not offer sufficient legal protection. Provisions punishing sexual assault of male children 
in the IPC must be added, with punishment of cases of aggravated sexual assault. The archaic 
term “outraging the modesty” must be removed, and those acts which comprise of non-
penetrative non-consensual sexual assault must be specified. The provision legalising marital 
rape ought to be amended to exclude sexual intercourse with a wife below the age of 18 
years. There is the need for a law which provides adequate protection to the class of persons 
between the ages of 16 and 18 who engage in consensual sexual activities that do not amount 
to assault or abuse or compulsion due to customary practices. Various High Courts in India 
during 2015-2017 have acquitted men charged of sexual crimes against consenting minor 
women, despite the offences of statutory rape and penetrative sexual assault in the IPC and 
POCSO. This shows that legislation needs to be brought in tune with the ground reality. 
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6.3.5. Findings in Chapter 5 
Four issues were identified for further theoretical analysis in Chapter 5, informed by the 
social science evidence and the relevant articles of the UNCRC. Such theoretical analysis is a 
novel contribution to knowledge in this area. These four issues were: 
1. The nature and scope of the provisions on sexual offences in the POCSO from a child 
rights’ perspective 
2.The gap in the IPC regarding sexual offences against children, created by the nature and 
scope of the amended offence of rape in sections 375 and 376 of the IPC and the present 
interpretation of the offence of carnal intercourse in section 377 of the IPC 
3. The current criminalisation of all sexual activity (both abusive and non-abusive) of 
children below the age of 18 
4. The statutory exclusion of child-wife rape from the scope of the amended offence of rape 
in the IPC. 
Chapter 5 found that gender-neutral definitions of sexual abuse offences in the POCSO  
allows for better protection of children as a class, fulfilling the obligations of the UNCRC 
with regard to equal treatment in Article 2, and protection from inducement or coercion to 
engage in any unlawful sexual activity in Article 34. The IPC does not fulfil the equality 
obligations laid down in Article 2, nor does it fulfil the obligation laid in Article 34(a) to 
prevent the inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity. 
Article 12 of the UNCRC stipulates freedom to facilitate giving of “due weight” of the views 
of a child in accordance with his age and maturity, which ought to extend to non-abusive, 
consensual sexual activity alone in an age-appropriate manner in accordance with Article 19 
of the UNCRC. Adequate leniency must be granted in the case of age-appropriate sexual 
behaviour. This involves recognition of the right of every child alleged of or recognized as 
having infringed the law to be treated in a manner consistent with the promotion of the child's 
sense of dignity and worth as per Article 40. Judicial decisions of the High Courts of various 
states in India reflect such trend of leniency in age-appropriate sexual conduct, even though 
the IPC and the POCSO do not uphold these stipulations. Provisions in the law which 
condone child marriage, and provide exemptions for rape of child wives above the age of 15, 
ought to be abolished, in order to fulfil obligations under Articles 34 and 19 of the UNCRC; 
the latter provision specifically stipulating that States must ensure protection from sexual 
abuse, while the child is in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person who 
has the care of the child. 
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6.4. Researcher’s closing statement: Practical implications 
 
The findings from the legal and theoretical analysis in this thesis show how substantive 
provisions of the Indian criminal law on child sexual abuse ought to be interpreted and where 
the law needs to be changed. It is necessary that Parliament designs laws that implement the 
prevention of child marriage irrespective of traditional community practices and also remove 
the exception for marital rape of a child wife above the age of fifteen. On the other hand, the 
legislature needs to form legislation to ensure non-prosecution of age-appropriate sexual 
activity to guarantee the protection of the rights of a child under the UNCRC.  It is also 
important to enact laws that prevent the criminal justice system from re-traumatising a child, 
and courts to interpret the law in such a manner that promotes beneficial outcomes for the 
child. This will help to uphold the principle of the rule of law as enshrined in the Constitution 
of India 1950, and protect the rights of Indian children against sexual abuse. 
The findings in this thesis can be used to encourage further legal research into the nature and 
effects of child sexual abuse as seen in Indian judicial decisions, as well as studies of 
sentencing trends in child sexual abuse cases in India. 
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